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This study examines the possibility of managing the tension between formalism 
and flexibility in Uganda’s commercial adjudication. Using content analysis of the 
country’s commercial ‘hard cases’, the study reveals the tension as a reality in 
Uganda; its foundations, and how to manage it. The central argument is that the 
tension should and can be managed by creating coexistence between formalism 
and flexibility; such coexistence being not only theoretically justifiable, but 
practically viable.  
The tension is revealed as a reality in Uganda, defined by judging based on two 
seemingly polarised views. One is the formalistic view of law as logic, a value free 
science, predictable, certain, clear, neutral, conceptually ordered, and determinate; 
with court’s role limited to literal interpretation and mechanical application of law 
and contract. The other is the flexibility antithesis to formalism, following which, 
courts have authority to interfere with contracts, and make or change law to meet 
ends.  
This study contributes to challenging the dominant view, that the two are 
irreconcilable. I make a case for coexistence, arguing that: there are more areas of 
theoretical convergence than admitted; justifications advanced for either approach 
can be served by the other; no single theory of adjudication or contract fully 
accounts for all judging; and in Uganda, coexistence is the ideal judging paradigm.  
I review conceptual and normative prescriptive adjudicatory theories and find that 
none offers a convincing solution to the tension, the nearest being Eisenberg’s 
conventionism and interests jurisprudence. However, the latter offers a more 
methodical mechanism to coexistenceone whose steps demonstrate its affinity 
with content analysis methodology. Using content analysis methodology, following 
which, the values underlying legal phenomena can be understood from an analysis 
of words, phrases and themes used in judicial opinions, as well as inferences, 
guided by hypotheses or presuppositions from relevant legal theory, I 
operationalise some of interests jurisprudence’s views. These are that, underlying 
the tension is a competition of interests (values) to be discovered from judicial 
 4
opinions, guided by the context’s jural postulates. The discovered values should 
then be weighed, and a balance of the dominant ones used to arrive at ultimate 
judging guidelines.  
Accordingly, Uganda’s competing values are identified, guided by presumptive 
values (value postulates) proposed by other scholars in contract theorybut 
challenging monist theories that advance single values as the ultimate goal of 
adjudication and contract law, as well as those restricting the search to doctrinal 
analysis. Instead, in line with coexistence theory; multiple values, internal and 
external to the judiciary, legal as well as extra-legal, are found to underlie the 
tension in Uganda’s commercial adjudication. These values are elaborated, against 
the backdrop existing literature, and the relevant legal and other institutional 
contexts have surrounded judging.  
The values found dominant are then used to draw the country’s commercial 
adjudicatory scheme of values. As a way towards management of the tension, it is 
proposed that coexistence between formalism and flexibility can be achieved 
through constructing judging guidelines with clear coexistence oriented goals, and 
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This study examines the possibility of attaining legal certainty through a 
coexistence of formalism and flexibility, which are currently at tension in Uganda’s 
commercial adjudication. It proposes that coexistence can be achieved by 
balancing competing values that underlie formalism and flexibility in contract 
adjudication, the law of contract being at the heart of commercial law.1Formalism is 
a judging approach that treats the law as a clear, complete, and certain; formal-
logic and conceptually ordered; discoverable fact from the contract rulebook; a 
science that is value-free i.e. neutral and autonomous, with no room for creativity, 
extra-legal considerations or conceptual flexibilities; predictable and determinate, 
emitting a single right answer in all similar cases. The role of judges is perceived 
as the law’s miners, mechanics and policing contract terms. It is motivated by 
many values that are uncovered and elaborated later, such as adherence to values 
like freedom and sanctity of contract.  
On the other hand, in a growing number of cases, judges in jurisdictions like 
Uganda – a former British colony with a fundamentally common-law legal system – 
flexibly go beyond contract doctrine or terms to find what they deem fair in 
particular cases or to serve other values. They practice flexibility judging, the 
perception that law is not: a science; embedded absolute truths; determinate, 
conceptually ordered, certain (formalist certainty being an illusion), formal, 
predictable, or neutral. Instead, the law is action oriented with a social bend-
                                            
 
1 R Goode, Commercial Law in the New Millennium, the Hamlyn Lectures (Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 
9, 31. 
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experimental; general propositions to be tested in real cases; a jumble of in 
influences to be rationalised; and a means to an end; that end being good society, 
or social welfare, contextually defined by public policy.  
Under flexibility, the role of judges is to guarantee and keep the gates of justice; 
find solutions in and settle disputes; and make real living law. Therefore, they 
always have discretion, and life being too complex, are not bound by 
rulesbeginning with answers to adjudication and relating back to justify them. 
The sources of normativity include both the legal order, and non-law normative 
orders like experience and practice.  
The constant conflict between these differing approaches is the tension between 
formalism and flexibility respectively. From this point on, I shall refer to it simply as 
‘the tension’. The tension not only exists within all common-law legal systems, but 
is also a tension that is seen by some scholars as being core to,2 inherent in,3 
constant to,4 fundamental to5 and lying at the heart of the law; 6 and in that sense, 
a tension that some scholars say cannot be managed, the interests it represents 
irreconcilable, 7 therefore will always be there.  
                                            
 
2 JW Evans and AL Gabel, 'Legal Competitive Advantage and Legal Entrepreneurship: A 
Preliminary International Framework', (2014) 39 (2) North Carolina Journal of International Law 333, 
349-50. 
3 ibid 349. 
4 A Phang, 'A Passion for Justice: The Natural Law Foundations of Lord Denning’s Thoughts and 
Work' (2006) (2) Global Journal of Classical Theology. 
5 WC Whitford, 'Faculty Perspectives: The Rule of Law', (2000) Special Issue, Wisconsin Law 
Review 723, 726. 
6 Goode (n 1)16. 
7 M Zuckert, 'Hobbes, Locke, and The Problem of The Rule of Law', in Shapira I (ed) The Rule of 
Law (New York University Press 1994) 1; Evans and Gabel (n 2); HMS Botoshi, ‘Striking the 
Balance Between the Considerations of Certainty and Fairness in the Law Governing Letters of 





Using an investigation into judging during Uganda’s commercial hard cases, the 
type in which the tension easily manifests, this study joins studies that have 
rejected such irreconcilable views. Instead, it supports propositions for a possibility 
and practical viability of coexistence between formalism and flexibility, as well as 
the tension’s management. The main theses of the study are that formalism and 
flexibility can, and should coexist as a means of managing the tension and 
achieving legal certainty. I pursue the two theses by advancing two key 
propositions. 
Firstly, is that theoretically, coexistence between formalism and flexibility is a 
possibility. The descriptive theory of formalism, flexibility and the tension is 
reviewed, demonstrating that there is more room for convergence than is 
traditionally acknowledged, as well as highlighting direct support for coexistence. 
The case for coexistence is further made by revisiting values proposed by other 
scholars as underlying both formalism and flexibility. It is demonstrated that no 
monist (single-value) theory of values underlying formalism, flexibility or the tension 
between them, doctrinal or otherwise, accounts for the wide variety of judging 
motivators.  
Instead, the study contributes to advancing a coexistence oriented multivalued-
based theory, that views the foundation to the tension as judges seeking to serve a 
cocktail of several formalism and flexibility engendering values that need to be 
balanced to achieve coexistence, thus legal certainty. Further, the study 
                                                                                                                                     
 
Comparative Analysis of Bank Charges in Europe: OFT v. Abbey National Plc through the looking 
glass’, in J Devenney and M Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt, and Investment in Europe 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 212-213; 222 (These scholars pause a question as to whether 
the two are reconcillable, or should just be distinguished, the latter implying the possibility of the two 
being irreconcillable).  
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demonstrates that hardly any of the values propounded by monist theories as 
prime motivators of either formalism or flexibility, cannot be served by the other 
judging approach. Furthermore, key proponents of both single-value and 
multivalued approaches demonstrate room for coexistence between formalism and 
flexibility as a possible way towards managing the tension.  
In expanding the multivalued view, the study approaches the search for, 
elaboration and understanding of foundations to the tension not from the doctrinal, 
contract behavioural, or legal vis-à-vis extra-legal lens, but institutional ones; lens 
of what judges value as part of internal culture, their practice, tradition and 
personal choices and intuitions, on one hand; and the external legal and extra-legal 
judging environment, on the other. Therefore, it is not searching for what principles 
or doctrine judges relied on, or whether they were right in doing so; nor is it limited 
to finding the validity of theories proposed as underlying contract doctrine-theories 
like consent, promise, efficiency, fairness, predictability and certainty.  
Secondly, the study makes a case for the practical viability of coexistence between 
formalism and flexibility, as a way towards managing the tension. In the first place, 
using the findings on judging trends and patterns revealed by the content analysis 
of actual judicial opinions, a concurrent practice of formalism and flexibility in the 
same periods and courts is illustrated as characterising the judging paradigm in 
Uganda.  
 Therefore, knowledge is expanded, by the tension being demonstrated as a 
practical problem as well, in Uganda’s unique context, which requires studies like 
this one, on finding ways for coexistence. For instance, the study reveals that in 
Uganda’s case, it is not true that the tension has always been there, but rather 
came as part of the transplant of the English legal system, was hardly an issue in 
colonial appellate courts; and manifests in different ways within different courts, as 
well as legal, and socio-political epochs/contexts. Further, the country has not 
swings between formalism and flexibility. Rather, the tension has been defined by 
the continuous concurrent practice of the two, in the same courts and periods. 
Notably, is also a growing trend of a third, mixed-approach, where in the same 
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opinion, a judge employs both approaches-demonstrating a net-to-net competition 
of values serving either philosophy.    
Further, the existing prescriptive adjudicatory theory on management of the tension 
is reviewed, against the presumption that a viable theory of adjudication should be 
normative in nature, helping to provide judging guidelines, especially in hard 
cases.8This implies having clarity on the sources, nature, and means of 
constructing guidelines; on when and how to choose between the three 
ingredients: formalism; flexibility; and a mixture of the two. Against this yardstick, 
many adjudicatory theories are found inadequate, mostly because they are merely 
conceptual, or continue the prevailing trust in judges as the determinants of judging 
guidelines. At the same time, most of the normative theories have either not 
covered all three ingredients or done so in ways not convincing or appropriate for 
jurisdictions like Uganda; or indeed, not based their proposals on findings from real 
judicial decisions.  
Accordingly, the jurisprudence of interests is chosen as the most logical guide for 
finding ways to manage the tension. However, its weaknesses are acknowledged 
and ways to cure them devised as a modification, and further contribution to 
knowledge. For instance, the theory’s restrictive notion of interests is expanded to 
values; and the failure to articulate how to the interpret and elaborate values cured 
with aid of the institutional theory of law. Its lack of methodology on discovery, 
weighing values is also cured using content analysis methodology, demonstrating 
the affinity between their techniques. The failure to show how balancing of values 
can be done is also cured by the proposed balancing of values during construction 
of judging guidelines.  
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Specifically, the study extends, supports and operationalises the view from 
jurisprudence of interests that the tension is caused by the competition of 
underlying values during adjudication. Guided by the relevant hypotheses (jural 
postulates), these values need to be discovered from actual court decisions, and 
weighed against each other; then, judging guidelines need to be derived from 
balancing the dominant values.9  
In pursuit of this, the presumptive values proposed by other scholars as underlying 
the tension, which from now I will simply refer to as ‘the presumptive values’ or 
‘value postulates’, are identified. The indicative or lower values making up or 
otherwise known to manifest these presumptive values will act as guides during the 
content analysis, in line with the research design, thereby helping to reveal the real 
competing values in Uganda’s version of the tension.  
Accordingly, the study expands the viability of content analysis of judicial opinions 
as a legal research methodology for mapping the judging landscape, as well as 
what underlies judicial decisions, besides doctrine. I however modify the 
methodology’s notion of exclusive relevance of analytical units and variables, to 
suit the multiple implications from words and phrases used in a legal context.   
 A content analysis of Uganda’s commercial hard cases is done, covering the 
period since colonial times up till today, uncovering the competing values that have 
motivated judges in both formalism and flexibility. The values directly observed, as 
                                            
 
9 HD Laube, ‘Jurisprudence of Interests’, (1949) 34 (1) Cornell Quarterly Law Review 291, 296; 
similar to, although goes beyond the marxist view, that the formalism-instrumentalism dichotomy 
should be transcended by realisation that, embedded in the legal imperatives, are interests of the 
dominant class, and the judicial approaches reflect the struggle between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie (see P Beirne and Beirneand SR Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law 
(Academic Press Inc. (London) Ltd 1980) 4. 
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well as higher ones from my wider inferences, guided by the presumptive values, 
the literature review and Uganda’s general context, are presented, elaborated and 
used to arrive at the scheme of values for balancing. 
 Internally, on the formalism side the key values found include rule of law values, 
values of the judicial role, and responsiveness. Externally, they include legal values 
like conceptual formalism, the legal power value, and market-individualism; and 
extra-legal values like discreteness in contract.  On the flexibility side, the key 
values include internal values from the flexibility perception of law and the judicial 
role, as well as responsiveness. Externally, they include legal values like 
conceptual flexibility, consumer welfarism, and commercialism. Also revealed are 
extra-legal values judicial absolutism and social support.  
In line with interests’ jurisprudence, the scheme of values represent the values to 
be balanced during the construction of judging guidelines, intended to balance the 
two sides as a way towards coexistence. Therefore, knowledge is augmented by 
identification of Uganda’s scheme of values underpinning the tension. Further, 
guided by the need to balance those values, the study proposes the standards and 
goals for; as well as, the nature, source, way to formulate, and constituent 
principles of Uganda’s commercial judging guidelines. 
 Sample principles are proposed, such as: responsiveness; a hierarchical ordering, 
not defined by existing singular monist or pluralist values, but sets of dominant 
values; and a contextual definition of indeterminate standards like reasonableness, 
fairness and substantive justice. Revisiting selected judicial opinions; I argue that if 
judging guidelines made up of such principles had been in force, the uncertainty 
produced by the tension could have been avoided.  
Therefore, the study contributes to in filling the admitted gap of lack of clarity as to 
whether the two judging phenomena can coexist; the interests/values they serve 
reconciled or otherwise the tension managed; and if so, how that can be done. To 
elaborate the above theses, I begin with defining the key concepts that have 
informed the study.  
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Understanding the Key Concepts 
To appreciate the tension, one needs firstly to understand the meanings of the five 
central concepts, namely ‘legal certainty,’ ‘formalism’, ‘flexibility’, ‘hard cases’, and 
‘values and interests’.  This section provides the ways in which each of these is to 
be understood and used in this study.  
1.1.1  Legal Certainty 
There is no universally accepted meaning of legal certainty. For example, Zagler 
and Zanzottera10 and Anthony D’Amato,11 have all suggested differing 
understandings of this phenomenon, which are not going to be elaborated. For 
purposes of this study, Max Weber's definition, as expounded by Arthur L. 
Stinchcombe,12 is instead found more accurate and adopted. The two scholars 
defined legal certainty as follows. 
A sufficient lawful control of the use of government (and other) coercion so 
that property and the value of money were secure, and…when necessary to 
enforce civil law…interpretation, and enforcement of contracts… that could 
be understood in advance of court decisions…legal certainty 
involves…predictable laws and it requires an apparatus to interpret private 
economic matters…so that the discourse that controlled state coercion and 
                                            
 
10 M Zagler and C Zanzottera, ‘Corporate Income Taxation Uncertainty and Foreign Direct 
Investment’ Wien University Taxation Research Paper Series, No. 2012-07, 3. The authors defined 
legal certainty as being made up of six ingredients, namely: (1) dynamic and efficient substantive 
laws clearly stating the rights, obligations and liabilities of all business parties. (2) Business 
transactions being rule-based. (3) Procedural law providing for prompt and inexpensive means to 
courts. ((4) Institutional framework that supports business development and sustainability. (5) Strict 
adherence to the principles of ‘rule of law’ and ‘supremacy of the law’. (6) Efficient and independent 
judiciary. 
11 A D’Amato, 'Legal Uncertainty' (1983) 71 California Law Review 1, 1 
12 A Stinchcombe, ‘Certainty of Law: Reason, Situation-Types, Analogy, and Equilibrium’ (1999) 
7(3) The Journal of Political Philosophy 209. 
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its use in private life could be understood and manipulated by firms and 
households.13 
The essence of the Weberian definition is that a party to a contract should be able 
to predict how both the law and the legal system will treat his or her actions. It 
implies certainty not only in the sense of law being clear, determinate and 
predictable, but also that certainty can be satisfied by the existence of clear and 
coherent judging guidelines.  
The notion of legal certainty has been the subject of two divergent perceptions, 
coextensive with the underlying tension between formalism and flexibility. On the 
one hand are proponents of absolute legal certainty as the criterion for a proper 
legal order, such as Wolff14 and Truscott.15 On the other hand are scholars such as 
the radical realist Jerome Frank,16 who proposed that the law should be left 
uncertain, with flexibility as the sole judicial approach. To them, ‘certainty is an 
illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man and judges must regularly weigh 
competing social interests’.17 
Less often propounded than these two seemingly polar positions is the coexistence 
view that the ideal should be legal certainty whose zone is narrowed,18contextual 
                                            
 
13 ibid. 
14 Wolff LC, 'Law and Flexibility –Rule of Law Limits of Rhetorical Silver Bullet' (2011) 11 The 
Journal of Jurisprudence 549. 
15 K Turcotte, 'Why Legal Flexibility is not a Threat to Either the Common Law System of England 
and Australia or The Civil Law System of France in The Twenty-first Century', (2005) 1 (2) Hanse 
Law Review, I.S. 190-197 
16 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Stevens, 1949). 
17 ibid 65 
18Tamanaha BZ, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2006) 64-65 
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and a question of degree.19 Drake, 20 as well as Holmes and Tamanaha,21 
propounded the view that the efforts of the law should be to narrow the zone of 
uncertainty as far as possible, through the use of objective tests which would make 
the law more predictable. Llewellyn also reasoned that we need a manageable 
degree of certainty that is enough to get on with.22 Drake offers more direct support 
to coexistence, arguing that the value of certainty can be secured, through the 
judges who try difficult cases realising that law is a means to an end; serving the 
purposes of a good society, satisfying our growing social needs, and allowing the 
ought of the law to be part of the law as well as the is. 23 
This study supports that coexistence conception of legal certainty, under the 
presumption that this moderate approach is more realistic and viable in contexts 
like Uganda’s.  Accordingly, this study is predicated on the belief that a realistic 
and contextual conception of legal certainty is indeed possible and should be the 
goal of any viable tension-management regime.     
1.1.2  Formalism  
Formalism refers to judging following the plain and ordinary meaning of the law or 
contract terms ; or the clearly ascertainable intentions of the drafters of the laws or 
the parties to the contracts; or as has over generations been defined by doctrines 
                                            
 
19 L Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 1927-1960 (University of North Carolina Press 1986) 8. 
 
20 Joseph H Drake ‘Editorial Preface to This Volume’, in Jhering V R, (ed), Law as a Means to an 
End (Boston Book Co. 1913), xxii-xxiv 
21 Tamanaha (n 18) 70; 22 In achives reported by Kalman (n 19) 8 
22 In achives reported by Kalman (n 19) 8 
23 Drake (n 20). 
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and precedents.24 More aptly however, Atiyah defines formalism as an attitude of 
the mind of a judge who believes that: all law is based on legal doctrine and 
principles, which can be deduced from precedents; that there is only one correct 
way of deciding a case; that it is not the function of the judge to invoke policy 
considerations or the relative justice of the parties’ claims; that the reasons behind 
principles and rules are irrelevant; that the role of the judge is purely passive and 
interpretative; and that law is a science of principles.25  
Atiyah’s definition is adopted for the purposes of this study, because it combines all 
the key theories that attempt to justify the nature of law as being logical, and the 
role of judges as simple discovery of the law and its mechanical application. 
Further,  formalism is treated as including literalism, being the refusal to read 
anything into a contract, and an insistence that implications can only be made 
when absolutely necessary to make the contract workable.26 In this sense, the 
terms of a contract take the form of rules because their enforcement is a potential 
source of norms.27  
Formalism is of two types. The first one is ‘conceptual formalism’, which is a 
systematic view of the law’s nature and content – namely that rules, concepts, and 
principles have predetermined content, implications, and logical interactions, 
forming a complex whole that must be discovered and worked out by the judges.28 
                                            
 
24 F Schauer, 'Formalism: Legal, Constitutional, Judicial', in Whittington K, R. Daniel Keleman and 
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428. 
25 PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press 2008) 388. 
26 HJ Spaeth, ‘Reflections about Judicial Politics’, in Whittington K and others (eds), The Oxford 
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The second is ‘rule formalism’, which refers to judging by logical reasoning and 
mechanically applying the conceptual law, in order to arrive at the right answer in 
every case.29 The judge should not consider the purpose, goal or possible 
ramifications of the law. It is this judging phenomenon, at tension with flexibility that 
this study investigates.  
1.1.3  Flexibility 
Flexibility is not an established legal concept and there is no commonly 
acknowledged definition, or manner in which it is used in legal theory.30 However in 
practice, flexibility has been used to mean four things: an intrinsic feature of every 
legal rule; an attribute of the application of law; a distinguishing feature of the 
common law that enables the system to deliver justice in the face of changing 
circumstances; and the form some of the legal rules take, rules that create 
discretion, without guiding standards such as those that employ vague standards 
like reasonableness.31 
Evans and Gabel have further clarified that legal flexibilities can be categorised as 
substantive flexibilities, enforcement flexibilities and systematic flexibilities.32 
Substantive flexibilities mean inherent and inevitable ambiguities and gaps in the 
substance of the law created by reason of the nature of the language of the law.33 
They are the reason every legal system has judges to interpret law and rules of 
procedure.34 
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31 ibid 1. 
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Enforcement flexibilities occur in situations when a judge or other authority could 
lawfully take a given course of action but instead legitimately takes an alternative 
one or none at all. It represents lack of uniformity between the law in theory and 
the law in practice.35 Systematic flexibilities, on the other hand, are flexibilities that 
result from the rule of law’s internal defining attributes and the dynamic inter-
relationship between the legal system and extra-legal forces (both constituting part 
of the rule of law), excluding substantive and enforcement flexibilities. They include 
uncertainties caused by both the judging environment and the legal system.36  
In this study, ‘flexibility’ has two basic meanings and perspectives. Firstly, flexibility 
in law refers to conceptual flexibility as an intrinsic feature of the form of rules that 
creates discretion with or without standards to guide its use. Secondly, flexibility 
refers to flexibility judging as an attribute of the application of law by the judges 
during adjudication. Judges do not restrict their role to enforcing contractual terms 
or logically deducing and mechanically applying black letter commercial law as 
stated in precedents and legislation. Rather, they stretch or modify the rules in the 
law, or their applicability, and intervene in contracts to find justice and fairness in 
particular cases or otherwise meet certain stated or unstated goals. 
In some cases, the court becomes creative by sidetracking application of the rule’s 
interpretation based on the language of its formulation. It reaches answers by 
invoking extraneous factors, such as the court’s subjective views, or considerations 
of the rule’s underlying purpose and consequences or moral, social, economic and 
policy frameworks and values. In other cases, the court makes law by sidestepping 
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the rule completely and making decisions that create new rules and doctrine 
without purporting to overrule or replace the existing rule. 
1.1.4  Hard Cases 
Unlike scholars who have viewed ‘hard cases’ as a term too vague to be capable 
of a precise meaning,37 Dworkin aptly defined it as cases in which the result is not 
clearly dictated by statute or precedent.38 They arise when any judge’s threshold 
test does not discriminate between two or more interpretations of some statute or 
like cases, and he has to choose between them by asking which of them fits the 
community’s structure of institutions, decisions and public standards as a whole.39 
Twining and Miers disagree with Dworkin’s assertion that even in the hardest of 
cases there is one right answer, but widen his definition to include cases in which a 
judge has sufficient reservations about applying what he sees as the clear 
interpretation of a statute.40 
For the purposes of this study, both understandings are adopted to determine the 
type of judicial decisions to be analysed. Therefore, hard cases include those in 
which no rule of law is applicable, or where multiple rules with varying answers are 
applicable; or where the rule applicable provides a clear answer, but the judge 
chose to stretch or sidestep it, and rely on other considerations to decide the case.   
In a hard case, the conventional reference to the law, to answer issues before 
court, produces more than one answer as no rule is clearly applicable to resolve 
the dispute. In some cases, owing to the facts, the judge deems unfair or otherwise 
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improper the plausible answer dictated by an application of the literal meaning of a 
rule or concept/principle of law. In either situation, the judge has a choice to make, 
between formalistically applying the law ‘as is’, and flexibly opting for sidestepping 
or sidetracking the rule or principle of law. In the latter case the decision will be 
based on extraneous matters like experience, practice, or the judge’s personal 
intuitions and prejudices.  
Relatedly, there are cases where a court has to enforce a contract in honour of the 
notions of freedom and sanctity of contract but deems as unjust the outcome 
based on literalism. The judge again has to choose between formalistic adherence 
to literalism and flexible interventionism through a re-writing of or writing into the 
contract. It may be necessary to invoke flexible and open-ended values like 
commercial sense or unconscionability, to attain fairness and justice in the 
particular case.  
1.1.5  Values and Interests 
Heck declared that interests jurisprudence is not a theory of substantive values, 
and while he admitted that judges could be aided by making them realise and 
evaluate competing interests, he sought to avoid a search for values.41 Likewise, 
Isay was sceptical on the viability of a theory of values, claiming that it was beyond 
human achievement.42 However, by way of critique to Isay’s views and helping 
Heck complete his puzzle, Laube showed the umbilical link between values (or 
ideals) and interests, and showed how interest values can be ascertained.43 He 
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declared that value is a function of a coherent organisation of the experiences of 
men, the content of our ideals and object of all our interests.  
Therefore, the value of ideals will differ from context to context and determine the 
interests that will compete for recognition in adjudication.44 By way of 
understanding the context, reference should be made to the concrete reality, 
informed by history as the supplier of facts and phases of the evolution of law, and 
its cultural antecedents and their consequences, from which law emerges.45 This 
way, jurists would ultimately formulate decision-making rules to guide each type of 
dispute resolution. 
However, Laube fails to realise that the linkage he clarified implies that ideals are a 
subset of interests, and values are both a subset of ideals and the object of 
interests, meaning that the search for values underlying adjudication encompasses 
competing interests in adjudication. Although Laube rightly argues that not all 
interests are valuable enough to be recognised, he fails to add that all values taken 
into account by a judge in making a decision will be interests that he or she will 
have found compelling. Further, no interest can move a judge to be flexible or 
formalistic unless he considers it valuable to do so.  
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the term ‘values’ is used in the sense 
proposed by Greenstein, to include interests, policies, principles, ideals and all that 
in Uganda as a collectivity, the judges have cared about, whether economic, moral, 
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political, aesthetic, religious or otherwise.46 These are all taken into account when 
coding for possible values underlying formalism and flexibility in tension. 
The Tension as the Problem 
Throughout Uganda’s judging history, commercial adjudication has been defined 
by a concurrent practice of both formalism and flexibility, without clear, certain and 
coherent guidelines as to what should determine such judicial choices, or the use 
of judicial authority each choice entails.  As a result, the legal menu from which 
consumers of the country’s commercial adjudication are served – such as litigants, 
prospective foreign and local investors, legal practitioners, legal academics, and 
even judges themselves – is very uncertain.  
Cases where judges blatantly decide flexibly in ways that deviate from agreed 
contractual terms, express rules or established principles, and which have the 
effect of changing applicable law, are becoming the norm.47 Such decisions are 
made against the backdrop of the 1995 constitution, which vested judges with 
authority to administer justice not only in accordance with a formalistic deduction of 
law, but also in adherence to substantive justice;48 the norms, values and 
aspirations of the people.49 Such authority has been perceived by some judges as 
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power to make law itself.50 This is exacerbated by the conceptual flexibility 
characterising Uganda’s other primary sources of legal norms, such as the 
Judicature Act, and legislation regulating contracts, such as the Sale of Goods Act 
1932, recently replaced by the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act, 2017.  
On the other hand, formalism still plays a pivotal role in commercial justice; for 
instance, many disputes are disposed of on the basis of procedural or other 
formalities, and on technical grounds. Likewise, judges still treasure and practise 
the logical deduction of law as well as its mechanical application.51 The resultant 
tension and legal uncertainty are realities that define Uganda’s commercial justice 
system.  
In judging flexibly, judges contribute to legal uncertainty; they not only leave the 
legal system without a certain legal rule applicable in similar cases, but also make 
law, as their decision will now constitute a new rule that never existed before.52 The 
law loses the predictability that would be generated by formalism. As a result, 
investors and other players in the business community, as well as their lawyers, 
lack clear guidance on how to arrange their affairs or phrase terms of the contracts 
in order to avoid adverse court decisions. Law teachers, legal advisors and even 
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judges themselves cannot define with certainty the content and practical premises 
of Uganda’s commercial doctrine.  
The significance of legal certainty to underdeveloped African countries like Uganda 
cannot be over-emphasised. Firstly, it is at the heart of the rule of law,53 and 
therefore a prerequisite for any properly functioning legal system, and the objective 
of drafters of statutes.54 Secondly, it is an important requirement commercial 
practitioners will look at, in deciding to trade or invest;55 and as such, it determines 
a country’s competitiveness as an investment climate.56 In this regard, legal 
certainty is a determinant of foreign direct investment, which all countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa require, to foster economic growth.57 Currently, Uganda’s 
competitiveness as an investment destination, on account of lack of legal certainty, 
ranks in the bottom zone of the ladder.58 Thirdly, as indicated by Goode,59 
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Schauer,60 and Atiyah,61 in countries like Uganda with contexts like 
underdevelopment, judicial corruption and insufficient judicial systems, judges 
should not be readily entrusted with power to modify and make laws through 
flexibility.  
On the other hand, through flexibility the court wants to fulfil its duty to dispense 
justice in every case, by having regard to the uniqueness of each case, as well as 
taking into account the changing social, economic and political circumstances of 
the time. As acknowledged by Odoki, in the case of countries like Uganda, where 
the common law is a transplant, the court also pays regard to local customs, 
values, needs and the habits of the people.62  
However, although both formalism and flexibility are needed and have been 
concurrently been practised in Uganda, the legal system lacks a defined rational 
and coherent set of guidelines on why, when and how a judge should decide 
formalistically or flexibly during hard or other commercial cases. This study 
contributes to knowledge on how this problem can be managed, against the 
background of the general theoretical discourse on the subject, as well as 
Uganda’s legal and extra-legal contexts.  
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Theoretical Background  
Although the tension between formalism and flexibility is said to be ages-old, from 
the time of Aristotle, the legal theory on the subject has been dominated by 
descriptive discourse, acknowledging the tension as a problem facing common-law 
justice systems, 63 rather than by prescriptive theory aimed at searching for a way 
to manage it. The tension has stimulated legal discourse on the meaning, nature, 
and function of law, as well as adjudication. It has for instance been perceived as  
a  tension between: instrumentalism and non-instrumentalism;64 formalism and 
legal realism;65 legal determinacy and legal indeterminacy;66 consistency and 
integrity (determined by constructive interpretation) and reason and imagination;67 
rules and moral norms; experience and social policies;68 form and substance; life 
and form; rigidity and flow; rules and experience;69 strictness of contractual 
obligations (freedom and sanctity of contract) and the principles of equity, justice, 
conceptual purity and commercial reality;70 procedural justice and substantive 
justice;71 certainty and fairness; rules and principles;72 form and function; legal 
concepts and legal policy; and law and economic efficiency. 
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The descriptive discourse has been dominated by scholars elaborating attributes 
for, and supporting, either formalism or flexibility. Formalists seek to protect law’s 
autonomy by minimising instability from cultural diversity and changes in the 
marketplace. Accordingly, to them, the law is determinate, objective, consistent, 
neutral, formal, clear, and certain; a value-free autonomous science that is 
discoverable from printed texts like statutes and precedents.73 The role of judges is 
to logically deduce the law and mechanically apply it, or enforce contractual terms 
without intervention whatsoever, such that in every dispute, be it a hard case or 
otherwise, there is one correct answer.74  
Flexibility is on the other hand, an antithesis to formalism,75 as its proponents value 
and seek to protect law’s autonomy by permitting it to adapt and change in 
accordance with societal circumstances. Flexibility theory includes anti-formalist 
schools of thought, such as: pragmatism; law and economics theory; critical legal 
theory, institutional theory; and legal realism.76 It is traceable back to the 
declaration by Holmes77 that the life of the law is not logic but experience, the 
moral and political theories, as well as the felt necessities of the time, public policy, 
avowed or unconscious, and judges’ personal prejudices. The law is indeterminate, 
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incomprehensive, not objective, and not certain or clear, not neutral, not consistent, 
and cannot produce determinate results during adjudication.78  
Therefore, the law is dead letters, until acted upon in processes like adjudication, 
to satisfy particular goals; it is experimental, empirical, action-oriented, with a social 
aspect; and it is a means to an end.79 Its sources include experience, and a 
broader social inquiry that speaks to extra-legal norms and values that justify 
decisions.80 The role of judges includes law making81 and weighing competing 
interests in each case, to find what best serves social policy, justice, fairness and 
reality.82  
The above divergent positions make the two appear to be at two polar ends, and 
their balance a real challenge,83contributing to the view that the two judging 
phenomena cannot coexist, nor the values represented by them be reconciled.84 
Formalism has for instance been viewed by scholars like Wolff as a pillar of legal 
certainty; and flexibility as not compatible with the rule of law.85 Other scholars 
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such as Burton86 and Thomas87 have advocated for the abandonment of formalism 
altogether as a requirement of the rule of law. They have argued that flexibility is 
sufficient to guide judicial behaviour and law generally.88 Minda also argues that, 
the history of modern jurisprudence has been one of failed attempts to reconcile 
and synthesize formalism and flexibility.89 He attributes the alleged failure to the 
two theoretical sides developing different and contradictory views about law and 
culture.  
However, some scholars have advanced the proposition that the two phenomena 
can be balanced and coexist. These scholars include Olfer,90 Burton,91 Evans and 
Gabel,92 Hart (to an extent, with regard to what he termed the ‘penumbra’ part of a 
rule),93 Dworkin,94 Zagler and Zanzottera95 and Eisenberg.96 Those compatibility 
scholars largely fall short of exhaustively investigating and constructing a coherent 
and universally applicable theory of adjudication detailing how the tension can be 
managed to achieve legal certainty. Tamanaha,97 Evans and Gabel,98 Zagler and 
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Zanzottera99 and Eisenberg100 concede to this lack of clarity as a gap in the 
literature. 
In response to this gap, prescriptive studies like this one are more recent and 
follow Dworkin’s challenge to legal positivism on account of its failure to appreciate 
the process of adjudication.101 However, many have left unresolved the subject of 
whether (and if so, how) judges should be constrained to address the legal 
uncertainty arising out of the tension.102 Nevertheless, some attempts have been 
made to address the problem. These scholarly efforts are of two types. Firstly there 
are the attempts of the conceptual prescriptive theorists, who sought to find a way, 
to manage the tension, in the conceptual framework available to judges during the 
exercise of discretion. They include the orthodox theorists like positivists and 
realists, progressive realists, and law and economics theorists. Secondly there are 
the attempts of the normative prescriptive theorists, within which category the 
current study is located; they, propose the construction of norms independent of 
judicial discretion to guide judging. These include legal process theorists like 
Burton103 and Cardozo,104 critical legal scholars like Dworkin105 and Hart,106 as well 
as conventionists like Eisenberg107 and the interests jurisprudence, which is 
adopted to guide this study. In these attempts however, the problem of managing 
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the tension has not been tackled exhaustively; in particular, the problem has been 
approached without regard to the peculiar circumstances pertaining to 
underdeveloped former British colonies like Uganda, leaving a gap in knowledge 
that this study helps to fill.  
The legal realists like Posner were of the view that the tension is not a real 
problem, since the judges have discretion, which they can exercise on the basis of 
underlying social policies.108 On the other hand, the legal process theorists such as 
Hart propose that legal indeterminacy can be resolved on the basis of underlying 
principles and purposes.109 Another proposal is from law and economic theory – 
that economic efficiency and wealth maximisation are the guiding factors a judge 
should use,110whereas Dworkin also propounded a theory based on the existence 
of two classifications of judicial discretion – strong and weak.111 Using the 
metaphor of a hole in a doughnut, he argued that discretion does not exist except 
as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restrictions. Discretion exists only to 
the extent permitted by legal rules, and because of that, judges enjoy weak but not 
strong discretion. Therefore, judges should use the principles of justice, fairness 
and due process as guides to the best constructive interpretation of legal practice, 
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with the end goal and blueprint for judges being law ‘integrity’ (speaking with one 
voice).112  
Other proposals include the legal Institutionalists’ notion of general clauses as the 
utmost guiding tools for judicial decision making;113 and Eisenberg’s view114 that 
the tension can be managed by a judges’ convention driven by four fundamental 
principles – objectivity, social support, replicability and responsiveness. All of these 
four are rooted in the social functions of courts and the considerations of fairness, 
structure and function. 
The inadequacies of such existing attempts to find ways of managing the tension 
have been acknowledged by a number of scholars in the field, such as 
Tamanaha,115 Evans and Gabel,116 Zagler and Zanzottera117 and Eisenberg.118 In 
this regard, Evans and Gabel argue that even though balancing formalism and 
flexibility is difficult and has been a problem since Aristotle’s time, the two 
approaches need to coexist, as they are both needed at the same time.119  In this 
respect, these scholars raise the red flag without offering a solution.  Likewise, 
Roscoe Pound,120 one of the most celebrated legal realists, regretted pure realism 
and recognised the need for a balance and framework to control the excesses of 
instrumentalism.  
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Tamanaha121 has also acknowledged the need to find ways of managing the 
tension.122 However, he emphatically admits  to the gap in the knowledge of how 
this can be done123 when he says that the result of the tension is to leave a system 
of judging suspended in uncertain and shifting space; with no clear rule for judges 
to follow; and that it is not clear that such a rule can be formulated.  Tamanaha 
then goes further and attributes the existence of this gap to the lack of enough 
information about judicial reasoning and its consequences; 124 which gap this study 
contributes to filling. 
In chapter five, the study revisits the existing literature on how to manage the 
tension, highlighting the limitations of the various approaches and the necessity for 
further studies like this one. For instance, many of the scholars make the mistake 
of entrusting the very judges causing the problem with finding ways to manage the 
tension. Further, scholars like Eisenberg who propose judging guidelines, 125  fall 
short of clearly articulating how these guidelines can be arrived at; their proposals 
are theoretical, and not the result of an investigation into what motivates judges in 
reality, as is done in this study.  
This study contributes to filling this gap by departing from the irreconcilable view. It 
demonstrates that coexistence between formalism and flexibility is manageable, 
using judging guidelines, consciously derived from the desire to balance the 
competing values underlying the two.126Accordingly, the study validates and 
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operationalises the jurisprudence of interests propounded by scholars like 
Pound,127 Powers,128 Laube,129 and others;130 especially the view that underlying 
the tension are competing interests (in this case widened to values), whose 
balancing should inform judging guidelines. The values are observed from a 
content analysis of judicial decisions; weighed against each other; and the 
dominant ones should used to create a scheme of interests for balancing.  
The content analysis is guided by presumptive values advanced by other scholars 
as underlying the tension, which are revisited and elaborated in chapters six (for 
formalism values) and eight (for flexibility values). In these chapters, their 
relevance to the coexistence debate is analysed; they are coded; and then used 
during the content analysis to guide the search for actual competing values 
underlying the tension in Uganda.  
The weaknesses of the jurisprudence of interests are however acknowledged, and 
to that extent departure is made from the theory. These weaknesses include 
placing too much trust in the person and office of the judge, and the failure by 
Heck, Isay and others properly to articulate a theory that both evidentially and 
contextually ascertains the competing interests; and articulating a theory of values 
underlying adjudication, beyond the judges’ own evaluation and balance of 
competing interests.131 
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Accordingly, the jurisprudence of interests is employed in combination with the 
institutional theory of law, thus allowing further analysis of observed values 
underlying adjudication, using Uganda’s particular contextual concrete order. This 
presents a chance to understand the tension, its foundations, and possible ways to 
manage it, based on realities and pre-law cultural and social realities (institutions), 
such as a country’s history and the body politic.132 The institutional theory is 
therefore employed to help elaborate and understand the values observed from 
content analysis of the words, phrases and themes in the judicial opinions. The 
results of values observed during the content analysis, and their wider theoretical 
and contextual inferences, are discussed in chapters seven (for formalism) and 
nine (for flexibility). The contextual inferences are made against Uganda’s unique 
legal, as well as historical, social, political and economic background. This way, the 
study contributes to knowledge by differing from existing scholarly works that are 
mainly based on judicial practice in the developed and Western world. This is 
especially vital because hardly any studies have been done on adjudicatory theory, 
and specifically the tension in commercial adjudication, within underdeveloped and 
heterogeneous African common-law-based countries like Uganda. 
Uganda: The Research Context 
By way of background to this study, it is important to highlight the key elements of 
Uganda’s general legal and extra-legal context. This forms the basis for a better 
understanding of the values that are revealed, by the content analysis, to underlie 
the tension, and how that tension can realistically be managed.    
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1.4.1  Uganda’s Non-Legal Context 
The country has undergone a long period of political and constitutional instability; 
this has included dictatorship, abrogation of the constitution, and moves towards 
socialism, civil wars, military coups, and recently, populism. Militaristic 
authoritarianism has been the dominant political culture, and its influence has 
extended to interference with the justice system.133 This has been the case 
especially during the 1971-79 Idi Amin military dictatorship;134 and the current NRM 
era, leading to the abuse of due process;135 and to unprincipled flexibility in 
courts.136 
Judges presiding over cases, as well as litigating counsel, have faced intimidation 
and coercion, as the state intervened to influence against adherence to the 
formalistic rule of law.137 The armed struggle that brought the current government 
to power in 1986 formally introduced flexibility as the leading political and judicial 
philosophy, with a new constitution that obliged judges to adhere to substantive 
justice – the values, aspirations and norms of the people – and generally to 
administer justice in the name of the people, which connotes public interest as a 
leading judging motivator. Informal and populist courts, initially called ‘Resistance 
Courts’, and now ‘Local Council Courts’ were also introduced at village and parish 
levels, presided over by ordinary people’s representatives.  The local courts have 
since exercised concurrent jurisdiction with regular courts in contract disputes, but 
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are not bound to follow black letter law.138 The practice in these courts has spread 
to encompass judicial practice in the regular common-law-based court system,  
resembling the American realist revolution of the 1920s and 30s that succeeded in 
the rejection of pure formalism and the popularisation of flexibility.139 However,  
formalism remains a judicial approach available under Uganda’s legal system that 
remains fundamentally based on common law.  
In economic terms, Uganda remains one of the poorest countries globally, ranking 
as number 25 out of the 30 poorest,140 and one of the most corrupt in the world, 
currently ranked as number 151 out of 176 countries;141 yet it has immense natural 
resources that include oil, minerals, and arable land and tourist attractions.142 The 
country also survives under a mixed-market economy that government has publicly 
declared as a free market economy. The state occasionally interferes to remove 
predictability/transparency and to attract and promote the interests of selected 
foreign investors;143 otherwise, parties freely enter contracts and carry on business 
under the free market economy model.  
Socially, as indicated in the preamble to the country’s constitution, the population is 
a highly heterogeneous community, divided into several tribes that speak different 
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languages and pay habitual obedience to different customary norms.144 This, 
coupled with other developments and factors, explains the unique social, political 
and economic adjudicatory environment. Knowing all this helps in understanding 
the values underlying the prevalence of both formalism and flexibility, their being at 
tension, and how this tension can be managed.   
1.4.2  Uganda’s Legal Ordering 
Uganda has undergone four historical phases: pre-colonial; colonial (1894-1962); 
early post-colonial (1962-1986); and late post-colonial (1986 to date). These 
periods have seen significant changes in the country’s legal ordering and are used 
during the content analysis to analyse the manifestations as well as foundations of 
the tension. The results of this content analysis are discussed in chapters four, 
seven and nine. However from the onset, it is clear that, contrary to claims that the 
tension is as old as the law – in Uganda, adjudication in the pre-colonial era was 
solely flexible and neither formalism nor the tension existed. The factors behind 
this are discussed in chapter four, but only as a point of reference for later 
discussions on why flexibility has prevailed since. Because the tension came with 
colonialism, for the purpose of understanding the general legal ordering of the 
country as a research context, the following section divides the country’s legal 
history and state into two: firstly, the colonial era; and secondly the contemporary 
post-colonial era, during which the judicial opinions analysed were made.  
1.4.3  The Tension in the Transplanted Oak  
By 1902 – when Uganda received English contract law – commercial justice in 
England was already faced with the tension, as a result of developments during the 
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classical era (1770-1870). However, it did not translate into a crisis of normativity, 
as formalism had grown to dominate judicial practice.145 Following Allott’s 
metaphor of the transplanted law being an oak, the English context reveals that the 
soils in which the transplanted oak was successfully grown were made of nutrients 
feeding both formalism and flexibility, although formalism dominated.146 Atiyah 
relates that,147 mainly owing to the demands of the marketplace, there was: a shift 
in emphasis from property rights to contract; a shift from particular relationships or 
types of contract to general principles; and a shift from executed to executory 
contracts. Certainty of the law was viewed as superior to equity, normativity 
recognition being dependent on fixed and certain principles.148  
Certain predictable, abstract, and general principles, such as contractual liability 
being dependent on the parties’ intentions, applied to all people, subject matter and 
types of contract.149 This was as opposed to more flexible but unpredictable 
discretionary justice, substantive justice or fairness.150 The court’s business was 
restricted to that of an umpire; procedural fair play would be ensured, but the court 
took no interest in how fair the bargain was, and could not flexibly impose 
obligations on parties from a substantive perspective or using its own sense of 
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justice.151 The judges saw the law as a set of inexorable deductions drawn from 
abstract neutral principles.152 
Likewise,  by 1902, Uganda’s reception date, the English Judicature Acts of 1873-5 
had merged common law and equity, taking away equity’s independence as a 
source of legal standards in England.153 Accordingly, by the 1890s when Uganda 
was colonised, equity was subject to freedom of contract,154 as was held in Barrow 
v. Isaac & Sons.155  Under contract doctrine, non-interventionism – defined by 
freedom of contract – ruled, with considerations of fairness and reasonableness 
only relevant if agreed upon.156 
With regard to statutory interpretation, courts generally had no power to fill gaps in 
legislation,157 as such statutes were drafted in the fullest detail possible.158 Further, 
courts were against giving effect to the equity of statutes and instead abided by 
their plain words, the literal rule of statutory interpretation.159 The English court 
system also had written rules of procedure, codes of ethics and conduct of judges, 
constitutional provisions on separation of powers and impartiality of courts, the 
rules of natural justice and the duty to promote and adhere to the rule of law which 
engendered formalism.160  
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A number of values and interests underpinned the predominantly formalistic 
judging paradigm, including market conformism,161 expediency162 and 
equalitarianism.163 Some saw the rule of law value as a necessary reaction to the 
high levels of disorder and indiscipline amongst the new commercial and industrial 
classes, as today exists in most of Africa,164 and  predictability and certainty as ‘an 
important requirement of the rational, calculating world of commercial men’.165 
Accordingly, Parke J (later Baron Parke) in Mirehouse v. Rennell,166 declared that 
‘for the sake of attaining uniformity, consistency and certainty, rules derived from 
precedents must, unless plainly unreasonable and inconvenient, be applied to all 
cases that arise’. These values, together with others advanced by scholars as 
underlying formalism, are elaborated in chapter six, and their relevance to Uganda 
tested by the content analysis of commercial judicial opinions.   
On the other hand, flexibility survived the classical era, and indeed grew after 
1870, implying that by 1902, although formalism still defined the oak, the effects of 
neo-classical flexibility were already part of the brew that defined the jurisprudence. 
For instance, such flexibility included interventionism, by invoking equity, 
substantive justice and fairness where judges felt that the facts of a case so 
demanded.167 Besides market conformism, defined as the desire to align the law 
with changes in the marketplace, the other values behind such flexibility included 
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the decline of principle as a social value,168 as well as that of  sanctity of promise, 
and also the growth of consumer and social welfarism.169  
Therefore, at the heart of the common law was its ability to be flexibly moulded and 
extended to cater for the changing economic circumstances and to serve the 
interests of justice and fairness in individual cases. As such, by means of the 1902 
Uganda Order in Council making English law the superior legal order,170 not only 
was formalism introduced, but also judicial flexibility; and so was the tension 
between the two, underpinned by England’s context-specific values. Uganda got 
independence from Britain in 1962, but this did not end the tension. The post-
independence legal ordering in which the tension has prevailed is summarised in 
the following sub-section; it contributes to fully understanding the tension’s 
contemporary (post-colonial) manifestations and motivations, as well as possible 
ways to manage it.    
1.4.4  Uganda’s Contemporary Legal Ordering 
In Uganda, the constitution not only recognises non-state normative systems, but 
elevates them to the same status as law; thus obliging courts to adhere to them, 
without calling them law itself or otherwise incorporating them into the content of 
the law.171 Uganda is therefore an illustration of legal pluralism theory; the thesis of 
which is that law cannot be imprisoned in a code, or in law books There is ‘law 
beyond law’, otherwise called ‘living law’ which is should guide judges, for their 
decisions to be effective; and judges should observe these themselves from the 
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citizens social interactions and activities, not codes or legal documents.172 
Therefore, there are normative rules outside the traditional boundaries of ‘law’ as it 
is conventionally understood, and particularly not as it is found in statutes and 
cases.173  In this respect there can be contradictory and inconsistent rules arising 
out of contradictory legal mechanisms that apply to the same factual situations.174 
Further, the constitution obliges judges to uphold the values, norms and aspirations 
of the people,175 which tallies with legal pluralism’s requirement of taking into 
account the role of society in generating and shaping judicial decisions, as the 
latter seek to influence social life.176 
Therefore, scholars seeking to understand Uganda’s judging phenomena, of which 
the tension is one, should be concerned not only with what is logically necessary to 
the concept of law but also what prevails in concrete cases.177  Adjudication in 
such a legally pluralist society cannot be purely formalistic or flexible, as neither 
approach fully accounts for the reality. Both approaches have therefore been 
concurrently practised in Uganda, by judges during commercial contracts 
adjudication; albeit not as part of a coherent system, and thereby contributing to 
the tension and its attendant legal uncertainty.  
                                            
 
172 E Ehrlich, 'Living Law and Plural Legalities', (2008) 9 Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 447; E Ehrlich 
Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (Arno Press, 1975) 498. 
173 NW Barber, 'Legal Pluralism and the European Union', (2006) 12 (3) European Law Journal, 
306. 
174 ibid 308. 
175 Article 126 (1) of the 1995 Constitution. 
176 Ehrlich (n 172) 447. 
177 Croce (n 113) 54. 
 54
The growth of flexibility in general has culminated in substantive flexibility as a 
constitutional directive, making adherence to it mandatory to all courts.178 The 
country is a constitutional democracy meant to be governed by the rule of law.179 
The rule of law requires judges to use only their powers when applying the law,180 
and upholding the law is within this context the first principle of adjudication.181 
However, a judge who upholds the rule of law can only decide formalistically where 
the nature of law is capable of being so applied; that is to say, where it is 
determinate, consistent, neutral and clear.  
The nature of Uganda’s commercial contracts law, and the legal framework on 
adjudication, instead provide fertile ground for both approaches to be practised by 
judges, with no restraint or guidance as to the choice. This fertile ground contains 
substantive flexibilities, such as primary rules found in a number of legislations, 
common law and local case law, together with secondary rules found in procedural 
laws or laws of interpretation. The principal legislations include the Contract Act,182 
the Sale of Goods Act,183 The Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act, 2017, 
and the Hire Purchase Act.184 The rules in such laws are in many cases intrinsically 
flexible. This substantive flexibility is born out of primary rules commanding the use 
of vague standards like reasonableness, substantiality of justice, fairness and the 
interests of commerce.  
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Similarly, the Ugandan legal system is awash with systematic flexibilities, such as 
legal pluralism, as constitutional rules of recognition require courts to adhere to 
open-textured and indeterminate norm sources like morals, social values and 
people’s aspirations.185 Unless there are rational, clear and consistent rules, 
principles and concepts to guide judicial choices in applying this pluralism; the 
inevitable result is the breeding of substantive and enforcement flexibility. 
With regard to the legal framework on adjudication, the country’s constitution is 
based on the doctrine of separation of powers, with the judiciary as an independent 
arm that should adjudicate cases, while upholding the law.186 In playing this role, 
commercial judging in Uganda is mainly governed by adjudicatory rules contained 
in the constitution,187 the Uganda Code of Judicial Conduct 2003,188 the Judicature 
Act189 and the Local Council Courts Act 2006.190 The constitutional provisions on 
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judging include the National Objectives and Directives of State Policy. These 
directives provide, among other things,  that when applying or interpreting the 
constitution or any other law, the courts shall apply the law instrumentally and 
therefore flexibly,191 by recognising Uganda’s pluralistic society, legal pluralism (the 
legal validity and force of non-legal norms and values), aspirations for an 
independent jurisprudence, distributive justice, the country’s experiences, social, 
political and economic contexts, plus the aspirations of libertarianism (democracy, 
freedom and justice).  
These national objectives are an attempt at creating the grundnorm that Hans 
Kelsen claimed could guide judges as the criterion for the validity of the constitution 
and all other laws subordinate to the constitution.192 To Kelsen, law will always 
eliminate apparent inconsistencies through the ranking of rules and norms, and if 
this elimination failed, the maxim lex posterior derogate priori (a later law repeals 
an earlier law) would ensure that valid legal norms could not be set in 
inconsistency.193 
However, Uganda’s intended grundnorm directs courts to apply open-ended, 
indefinable and largely indeterminate norms that would not ordinarily have 
normative value. Social and political diversity and justice; customary values and 
practices; culture; equality; and independence from foreign decisions, are all 
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values without any set and determinate rule content or universal understanding. 
Such indeterminacy is of a nature that cannot be resolved without further laws 
being formulated to guide judges; thus there is a need to find ways towards a 
framework to guide them, which this study contributes to.  
As indicated earlier, the Ugandan constitution also commands flexibility 
adjudication,194 such as conforming to the values and wishes of the people. What 
reflects the values, norms and aspirations of the people is not written anywhere 
and has never been clearly defined by parliament, the courts or any other 
governmental organ. Further, such norms are not even capable of clear 
determination, because their content is bound to change from time to time, from 
place to place and from one community to the next.  
The drafters of the Uganda constitution seem to have shied away from using the 
word ‘morals’, but in reality, they fused the law and morals in constituting what 
should determine judicial decisions.  This study is therefore based on the premise 
that what in many jurisdictions are regarded as extra-legal factors, matters outside 
the law, policy considerations and morality, are actually part of the law in Uganda, 
having been commanded by the supreme law,195 the national constitution. The 
legalisation of policy considerations, and the pursuit of morality in judicial decision-
making, calls for a critical re-examination of studies and theories that have looked 
at flexible judges who adhere to policy considerations as engendering legal 
uncertainty and the rule of men, as opposed to the rule of law.196 
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In reality, flexibility is being practised by Ugandan judges, in place of the formalist 
conception that the role of the court is interpretation and application of the law or of 
a term of a contract ‘as it is’ (as opposed to ‘as it ought to be’). When called upon 
to adjudicate commercial contract disputes, courts have replaced the law with what 
particular judges consider to be just, fair or commercially reasonable decisions in 
individual cases. The substantive and systematic flexibilities have contributed to 
the inability of commercial contracts law to dictate particular results in all cases; 
and this inability runs contrary to the formalistic understanding of the law 
propounded by Langdalle and his followers,197 and clarified by Dworkin.198 Instead, 
in Uganda these flexible rules have created legal indeterminacy and uncertainty,199 
validating Holmes’s200 declaration that ‘the prophecies of what the courts do in fact 
and nothing more pretentious are what I mean by law’. 
A case in point is SDV Transami (U) Limited v Agrimag Limited & Jubilee 
Insurance Co. of Uganda.201 In this case, a contract of carriage between the parties 
provided that goods were carried at owner’s risk and no liability was to arise save 
in cases of gross negligence. The arbitrator’s decision was that no negligence had 
been proved but he invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and inferred gross 
negligence. On an application to set aside the award, the judge upheld it, 
reasoning that in such cases, the ‘apt’ question is whether the award ‘conformed to 
the considerations of justice and fairness’. Without judging guidelines that would 
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help in defining what justice and fairness mean, such decisions have made the 
commercial law uncertain to its users.  
Ugandan courts have also shown flexibility by practicing interventionism in 
contracts, to serve state policy and other extra-legal considerations. This was the 
case in Traces SA v. Attorney General,202 where a foreign investor was contracted 
by the government to collect TV Licence fees as required by law, but during 
contract performance the President, at a political rally, abolished the fees. The 
judge found for the foreign investor but declined to grant the remedies in the 
contract or declare specific performance, citing the President’s pronouncement as 
having changed government ‘policy’, and therefore having rendered the fees no 
longer collectable as per the law.  
Faced with such flexibility decisions on the one hand, and formalistic ones on the 
other, commercial law users cannot define and predict with certainty the law 
relating to the full range of possibilities from commercial transactions. Most 
importantly, it is not clear when and how a judge will strictly abide by the rules or 
terms of a contract, or interfere to serve flexible values like substantive justice and 
fairness, leaving the tension as a problem this study contributes to managing.  
Research Question 
Debates addressing the tension between formalism and flexibility have largely 
limited themselves to investigating the theoretical foundations and other 
justifications for both judging approaches.203 An investigation into such foundations 
is relevant to this study, but only in order to answer to the question of why, if at all, 
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there is need for the two phenomena to coexist. Against the background of making 
a case for coexistence as the appropriate judging paradigm for Uganda, a further 
contribution to knowledge is made by attempting to construct Uganda’s context-
specific solution to the tension.  
Therefore, the main question answered by the study is ‘How can the tension 
between formalism and flexibility in Uganda’s commercial adjudication be 
managed?’ Answering this question requires answers to the following three sub-
questions:  
(a) What is the nature of Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm? 
(b) Why has the tension between formalism and flexibility prevailed in Uganda’s 
commercial adjudication? 
(c) How can the competing values underlying formalism and flexibility coexist? 
Research Objectives and Motivations 
This study is motivated by the desire to achieve a number of objectives. They 
include verifying the tension as a problem in Uganda, making a case for the 
coexistence of formalism and flexibility, searching for the foundations of the 
tension, and searching for ways to manage it with regard to Uganda. The following 
part of the thesis elaborates the objectives and offers a glimpse into what the study 
has done to achieve each one.  
1.6.1  Understanding the Judging Landscape: Uncovering the tension 
As the first step, the study aims at finding out the manifestations of formalism, 
flexibility, and the tension between them, in Uganda’s commercial judging 
paradigm. The judging practices indicative of both phenomena are identified, 
together with their frequencies, trends and patterns. This is intended to 
demonstrate the tension as a reality and as a problem in Uganda’s commercial 
adjudication; and one that this study contributes to solving. In pursuance of this 
objective, chapter four demonstrates that the tension has dominated the country’s 
commercial judging paradigm since colonial times.  
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Using the results of content analysis of judicial opinions, the chapter explains the 
tension’s manifestations from all three dimensions revealed by the data. These 
dimensions are: Uganda’s legal history; Uganda’s political history; and the 
frequencies, patterns and trends of both formalism and flexibility within the different 
courts in Uganda. Also explained and evaluated are the minimal efforts by 
individual judges, and the ineffective international treaties, intended to manage the 
tension. Both of these mechanisms are found inadequate, incoherent, and 
inconsistent; which creates uncertainty as to the likely results, and therefore the 
real law, in Uganda’s commercial hard cases.  
1.6.2  Making a Case for a Coexistence Judging Paradigm 
The study aims, from a theoretical standpoint, to make a case for a coexistence-
judging paradigm, as the appropriate path to legal certainty in contexts like 
Uganda’s; a task pursued throughout the thesis, but with particular attention in 
chapters three, five, six and eight. The study seeks a departure from the 
‘irreconcilable’ view discussed above,204 and searches for a way to reconcile the 
competing values behind each judicial approach, as a way to manage coexistence 
between the two. Claims like Minda’s,205 that efforts at finding reconciliation result 
in enduring failure, amount at best to conceding defeat before the boxer enters the 
ring. These claims fail to recognise the substantial number of concessions scholars 
on either side of the divide have made towards the middle line. Chapter three 
illustrates that there is greater room than might be immediately apparent for a 
reconciliation of formalism and flexibility. This indicates the possibility of a meeting 
point, in the form of a coexistence paradigm, especially in contexts like Uganda’s, 
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as long as the interests and other values the tension represents are identified and 
understood. 
1.6.3  Searching for Foundations of the Tension 
The dimensions the Ugandan context brings to the table are distinct from those 
arrived at by studies else where, such as about American judicial history, which is 
said to have systematically alternated between formalist and flexibility 
instrumentalist periods;206 or English judicial history, which has not experienced a 
realist (and therefore flexibility) revolution.207 Spiller and Gely208 have confirmed 
the lack of studies of the factors underlying judging in other jurisdictions, especially 
the poorest ones; 209 which gap this study contributes to filling. This is done by the 
content analysis of judicial opinions in actual hard cases, from colonial times to 
date, to uncover the competing values motivating both formalism and flexibility, and 
therefore underlying the tension in Uganda.  
Besides mere identification, the study aims to bring understanding to such values, 
including the way they have manifested in Uganda; and the higher values or wider 
implications they represent. In turn, this is expected to inform the construction of 
judging guidelines intended to balance formalism and flexibility, as a proposed 
approach to manage the tension. The cornerstone of interests jurisprudence is 
judges acting as social engineers, whereby they should ensure the balancing and 
satisfaction of such competing values, defined by the desires and claims before 
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them.210 The solution to this problem of balancing should therefore be informed by 
the foundations to the problem.  Therefore, the ultimate objective of this study is to 
contribute to the search for ways to manage the tension, informed by its 
foundations.    
1.6.4  Management of the Tension 
This study is in line with the work of scholars who reject the view propounded by 
orthodox jurisprudence; namely, that the problem of resolving the tension should 
be left to the judges, either by allowing unfettered discretion, or by allowing judges 
to be the finders, formulators and emitters of their own guidelines. At the same 
time, the source, nature and process of the formulation of the ultimate judicial 
guidelines that are proposed by other scholars, such as legal process theorists, are 
found either inadequate or inappropriate for contexts like Uganda’s.  
The way to manage the tension is therefore sought through a study of its causes, 
as defined by Uganda’s reality at the different historical times during which both 
formalism and flexibility have been practised in the courts. To this end, the study 
aims to support and validate Holmes’s claims, which should be understood as 
calling for coexistence and not unprincipled realism; especially the claim that ‘the 
law represents the stories of a nation’s development, its life’s experience and the 
environment of judging as opposed to logic’.211 Related to this is Holmes’s 
explanation that: 
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No one will ever have a truly philosophical mastery over the law, who does 
not habitually consider the forces outside of, which have made it what it is … 
the law finds its philosophy not in itself consistently, but … in history and the 
nature of human needs…212 
Institutionalists MacCormick and Weinberger have rightly conceded to the 
truthfulness of the above claims by Holmes, and proposed that such experience 
does not defeat logic or rationality, but instead gives us the rational grounds of 
choice beyond the limits of what is prescribed by formalism.213 This implies that, 
the rules that should guide judges, who wish to apply formalism or flexibility in 
reaching their decisions, should be informed by the experiences and history, 
Uganda and its legal system have gone through. 
By analysing the identified tension engendering values using their relationships to 
the body politic in Uganda, its history and judicial approach, this study uses the 
institutional theory mentioned above in order to contribute to the construction of an 
appropriate theory of adjudication for the country. Croce further elaborates that 
constructing any such appropriate theory of law requires scholars to understand 
the sources of the social arrangements of a particular collectivity (in this case 
Uganda), and the social and symbolic struggles at hand.214  
Further, an examination is made of existing scholarly propositions on what should 
guide judges in the choice between formalism and flexibility.  The study analyses 
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the adequacy and appropriateness of each of the existing theories, propositions 
and efforts towards the management of the tension, using the lens of the Ugandan 
legal system and the general Ugandan context. The thesis advanced is that none 
of the propositions so far advanced for restraining judges is fully appropriate to act 
as a single source of guidance for Uganda’s commercial contracts adjudication. 
Therefore, the study aims to come up with recommendations for legal reforms that 
can achieve management of the tension, and legal certainty that is realistic within 
the country’s context.  
Structure of Chapters 
The study is presented in ten chapters. Chapter one creates a sense in which the 
rest of the thesis should be understood, by providing the background information 
and explaining the problem under investigation, the research question, the 
objectives the study intends to achieve, and the gap in knowledge it contributes to 
filling. It also lays out the theoretical and contextual background of the study.  
Chapter two explains the methodology employed. It discusses and justifies content 
analysis as the methodology used in conducting the study, propounding the view 
that neither doctrinal analysis nor the orthodox purely qualitative/quantitative 
approaches are appropriate for investigating the subject at hand. Accordingly, the 
research steps proposed by interests jurisprudence are operationalised using a 
content analysis methodology to guide the study.  
Chapter three provides the theoretical elements that have guided the content 
analysis of legal opinions, to arrive at the landscape of Uganda’s judging paradigm, 
and to make inferences that have revealed the values that underlie both formalism 
and flexibility and that are in competition in Uganda. Further, the chapter offers a 
general review of the literature on the foundations of the tension, demonstrating 
that none of the literature fully accounts for the general prevalence of the tension, 
let alone its particular prevalence in Uganda.  Finally, the chapter reviews existing 
theory in order to make a case for coexistence between formalism and flexibility.  
Chapter four presents and discusses the research findings of the content analysis 
on the nature of Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm, demonstrating the 
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tension as a practical problem, that calls for studies like this one. The chapter helps 
to understand the way the tension has manifested in Uganda and is thereby 
important in analysing its foundations and possible solutions. To enable the 
research on such foundations, chapter six revisits the views of other scholars on 
the values motivating judges to decide formalistically. The chapter demonstrates 
the viability of coexistence, and especially the need for a multivalued approach that 
balances competing values. In line with interests jurisprudence, the study treats the 
values elaborated in the chapter as the jural postulates, in this case termed value 
postulates, that guide the coding and content analysis for the values underlying 
formalism in Uganda.  
Accordingly, chapter five reviews the literature on existing attempts at finding ways 
to achieve the coexistence of formalism and flexibility, and on the management of 
the tension. The major prescriptive theories and proposals are synthesised and 
analysed in the light of the Ugandan context and adjudicatory reality, making a 
case for the jurisprudence of interests as the guiding theory of the study, subject to 
its limitations being addressed using guidance from the institutional theory of law. 
This theory is employed, in combination with the theoretical review in chapter 
three, in order to make wider inferences from the findings of the content analysis.  
In chapter seven, the findings of the content analysis with regard to the values 
underlying formalism in Uganda’s commercial adjudication are presented and 
discussed. The observed indicative values or sub-values are weighed, and 
inferences made from them to reveal higher values underlying formalism, which 
are then elaborated in order to understand their wider theoretical and practical 
implications. The chapter demonstrates that the formalism in the tension has been 
motivated by Uganda’s judging culture, made up of values that constitute the 
internal judging criteria, as well as legal and extra-legal values that constitute the 
external criteria. The dominant values are identified as possible candidates for the 
value balancing that should inform the principles, standards or rules that can guide 
judges, as a means to promote coexistence and therefore management of the 
tension.    
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On the other hand, chapter eight revisits the views of other scholars on the values 
motivating judges to decide flexibly. It also demonstrates the viability of 
coexistence and the need for a multivalued approach that balances competing 
values. Again, the key values proposed by other scholars are earmarked to act as 
value postulates (jural postulates) and guide the content analysis of the values 
behind flexibility in Uganda. In chapter nine, the findings are weighed, presented 
and discussed. Likewise, indicative values or sub-values are weighed, and 
inferences made from them to reveal higher values that are then elaborated, using 
the theoretical background in chapter three and eight, as well as Uganda’s reality.    
The values revealed and discussed include those that are internal to the judicial 
institution as well as external oneslegal and extra-legal external ones. Amongst 
all these values, the dominant ones are also identified for balancing with formalistic 
ones, to arrive at coexistence and management of the tension.  
Chapter ten recaps and concludes the entire study. It specifically helps to answer 
the question of how to manage the tension, by making recommendations for a 
legal framework that can achieve a coexistence of formalism and flexibility within 
the Ugandan context, based on the findings in chapters seven and nine. The 
proposals do not include rules, principles or standards that can be used to arrive at 
a coexistence of the two, as this task could not be achieved in the time and space 
available to the study. They are proposals on the type of guidelines that can be 
formulated, together with their normative premises, and not the exact content or 
exhaustive list of judging guidelines, as that is beyond the scope of the stud.
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 Research Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter explains and justifies the strategy, technique and methods used in 
answering the research question, within the study’s theoretical and general 
context. Content analysis of judicial opinions as a legal research methodology and 
design is explained and evaluated, covering the key issues of reliability, replicability 
and validity. The methodology’s strength, limitations, and the solutions to the 
limitations are also revealed, to the extent that they relate to the research context.  
Content Analysis is the systematic and objective analysis of manifest and latent 
content of texts like judicial opinions, and make inferences therefrom; to identify 
their key characteristics, such as symbols, discourses and themes; in order to 
uncover consistencies, differences, and deeper meanings, relative to the context.  
The ‘context’ is the conceptual and theoretical environment in which the judicial 
opinions are analysed, and the whole world in which they can be related to the 
research question.1 In any content analysis, the context is relevant because it 
defines the analyst’s hypothesis of what the text means; and in the course of the 
analysis, embraces the knowledge the analyst applies to the text, such as theories, 
propositions or intuitions.2Therefore, before explaining and evaluating the 
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methodology, it is vital to have an overview of the theoretical context in which this 
study is located, which is later elaborated in chapters three and five. 
The Theoretical Context  
This study departs from the scholars who view the coexistence between formalism 
and flexibility, or the balancing of their interests, as impossible,3 by proceeding on 
the presumption that an adjudicatory theory that achieves such goals is necessary 
and possible. From this perspective, the research is exploratory, as well as 
prescriptive. The study first uncovers and explains the values that motivate judges 
to both formalism and flexibility. In the final chapter, balancing the competing 
values is then used to inform the identification or construction of possible ultimate 
judging guidelines, as a way towards coexistence and therefore management of 
the tension.  
The study contributes to extending the knowledge of the validity of the 
jurisprudence of interests as an approach to answering the research question, by 
illustrating its applicability and viability in the Ugandan context. As will be 
elaborated in chapter five, the theory has some limitations that potentially affect its 
reliability. However, to the extent that the theory proposes that judging guidelines 
should arise out of and reflect a balance of the competing values in the tension 
between flexibility and formalism,4 operationalising it is a viable approach to finding 
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a way to manage the tension. Accordingly, the study adopts it, while making 
exceptions with regard to the theory’s key weaknesses. For example, interests 
jurisprudence leaves to the judges the tasks of identifying and balancing competing 
values; the study departs from this. The institutional theory of law is also used, to 
guide in understanding the values identified through the lens of Uganda’s reality 
during the time of the judicial opinions. This helps to overcome another weakness 
in the jurisprudence of interests, namely that it does not provide a detailed guide on 
how the values recognised as competing should be elaborated and their practical 
implications fully articulated.   
The main motivation behind the adoption of the jurisprudence of interests is that 
constructing a management mechanism from the values underlying the tension 
would be a rational and source-based way of searching for a solution to the 
problem. The competing values will be identified by a content analysis of judicial 
opinions in Uganda’s commercial hard cases as the source of primary data. The 
findings are further analysed to understand the wider and more abstract values that 
individual lower values or categories of values imply, in order to further understand 
the competing interests and values that need to be balanced.  Through this, the 
study proposes to provide a responsive mechanism, made up of objective and 
balanced judging guidelines, to guide judicial choice in the use of flexibility or 
formalism, as a way to manage the tension and thereby contribute to realistic legal 
certainty. 
Accordingly, the jurisprudence of interests is guiding the answer to the questions of 
why the tension has prevailed, and how it can be managed, using data from a 
content analysis of judicial opinions, reported or unreported, made by Uganda’s 
High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, across the country’s different 
historical periods. The question that arises then is why content analysis, which is 
neither qualitative nor quantitative, but having attributes of both, is the study’s 
methodology of choice. 
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Justification for Content Analysis 
Content Analysis, being a methodology that by definition seeks direct observation 
of elements from texts, as well as concealed ones that may require discovery using 
inferences and interpretations, as well as enabling quantification of variables to get 
trends and patterns; 5 is suitable for this research, and therefore employed for a 
number of reasons.  
In the first instance, an approach that is neither purely qualitative nor quantitative is 
suitable for conducting an investigation into the consciousness and foundations for 
judicial reasoning and perception.6 For example, the existence and frequency of 
flexibility, formalism and the tension between them, as realities in Uganda, are 
ascertainable, using quantitative methodology, from the language of judges. Yet, 
as declared by Holmes, behind the logical language and form used by judges there 
often lay unarticulated and unconscious competing values, which are at the very 
root and nerve of the opinion, but which are incapable of quantification.7 This study 
requires the uncovering of such competing values, while at the same time noting 
the frequency with which they have appeared, so as to qualify for balancing in line 
with interests jurisprudence.8 In these circumstances, a suitable research 
technique should go beyond the limits of the conventional quantitative/qualitative 
methodological divide; and, content analysis does this.  
No consensus exists amongst scholars as to whether content analysis can be 
defined as a qualitative or strictly quantitative technique. It was born as a 
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quantitative technique, as it was used mainly for counting frequencies during the 
1930s and 40s.9 Neuendorf10 argues that it can only be quantitative since it 
involves scientific methods and design priori and aims at an exact and precise 
numerically based summary of a chosen message without detailed descriptions.11 
On the other hand, substantial support exists for qualitative content analysis, 
otherwise called interpretive approaches;12 a fact also acknowledged by its 
sceptics.13 Unlike other interpretive analysis however, in content analysis, the 
standards of scientific methods are met; for example in terms of, objectivity, inter-
subjectivity, reliability, validity, generalisability, replicability and hypothesis 
testing.14 The difference between quantitative and qualitative content analysis is 
said to be that in the latter, there is no separation between the data collection and 
data analysis phases, but rather the two move in parallel and simultaneously in 
interaction with the text.15 
The extreme view for qualitative content analysis is represented by Krippendorff’s 
declaration that there is no distinction between qualitative and quantitative content 
analysis and all reading of text is qualitative.16 This remains the case even when 
the analysis involves certain characteristics of a text that are later converted to 
numbers, as is the case in this study.17  
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A similar view is held by Duncan & Hutchinson, who indicate that content analysis 
can be used to quantify the use of words before examining the meaning, to identify 
patterns. However, they also talk of a qualitative content analysis frequently used 
by lawyers, and clarifying by distinguishing it from doctrinal analysis; for, content 
analysis is used by critical legal scholars to deconstruct text, rather than reading 
and synthesising it, as is done in doctrinal analysis.18 For instance, critical legal 
scholars use the technique to identify meaning behind words, not only in legislative 
but also in judicial text,19 just as in the subject of this study. 
The position taken by this study is the view articulated by Franzosi, that whenever 
possible one should try to mix qualitative with quantitative content analysis.20 This 
is because firstly, as is the case with survey research, the numbers in content 
analysis were once words, themes and concepts in judicial opinions that are 
capable of a qualitative investigation, only turned into numbers representing 
frequencies by counting the number of times they appear.21 Further, the mixed 
approach view to content analysis has been used and recommended as suitable 
for studies like this one, which is looking for both the existence of phenomena in 
judicial opinions – answerable using quantitative descriptions – and why they exist, 
to which qualitative content analysis is more suited.22 
Secondly, content analysis is a suitable approach because its roots are in legal 
realism, which rejected legal formalism’s search for independent doctrines of law 
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that constrain legal actors.23 Content analysis is appropriate for theoretically 
influenced studies in major branches of jurisprudence.24 The technique is however 
applicable and usable in all theoretical contexts.25 Such contexts include the one in 
this study, that looks at judges and the law as predictably responsive to various 
social, political and market conditions; these are, empirical claims that researchers 
can test,26 although legal certainty can and should exist alongside such flexibility. 
Thirdly, content analysis is also typically used in descriptive and exploratory 
studies, especially those examining a body of case law, legal doctrines or aspects 
of opinion writing that help to explain the background of legal doctrines, case 
subject matter or case outcomes.27 The answer to why flexibility and formalism 
have prevailed in Uganda is in this case sought from a better understanding of the 
background to case outcomes as explicitly or implicitly revealed by judicial 
opinions, making content analysis a useful technique. 
Fourthly, the suitability of content analysis is validated by other scholars tackling 
similar or related research questions having successfully used it. Hall and Wright 
brought it to the fore of legal research, proposing that although it was originally a 
social science methodology, it could form the basis for a uniquely legal empirical 
methodology.28 This is because it naturally resembles the traditional legal scholarly 
exercise of reading cases, while at the same time bringing the rigour of social 
sciences to our understanding of case law, creating a distinctive form of legal 
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empiricism.29 However, long before this, although most of them did so crudely, a 
number of famous scholars employed content analysis, including Karl Llewellyn 
and Richard Posner, with Llewellyn using it to study judicial rhetoric and decision-
making,30 answering similar questions to the ones in this study.31 For instance, it 
was found suitable for looking at the motivations and social concepts used in 
judicial opinions,32 and in research on how judges explain their decisions; as well 
as the connection between law (and judges’ decisions) and social, political and 
economic conditions,33 such as the influence of social policy in the formalistic 
doctrinal reasoning of judges.34 
In contract adjudication and theory, most notable was the work by Hillman35 and 
Johnson,36 who studied the relationship between contract law and business norms. 
Hillman studied how successful promissory estoppel was in courts of law, finding 
that decisions show that scholars’ theoretical assumptions of its importance were 
false.37 On his part, Johnson examined how reported contract disputes could help 
tell what business practices the Commercial Code commanded judges to be 
guided by during adjudication.38 Such studies act as evidence that the 
methodology can be a useful approach to investigating the existence of the tension 
in Uganda, and the values that underlie it, as in this study.  
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Fifthly, the use of content analysis brings the benefit of creating order and logic in 
what appears, by use of mere conventional legal analysis, to be a chaotic or 
haphazard body of case law.39 In Uganda, an attempt at conventional legal 
analysis of judicial practice and behaviour would lead to a body of cases that is 
largely unreported, inconsistent in judicial approach, and having no guidance on a 
judge’s choice to be flexible or formalistic. By using content analysis, this study 
contributes to bringing order and logic, when it identifies the themes, trends and 
patterns that flow through Uganda’s body of commercial hard cases. From these 
themes, trends and patterns, using direct explication and inference, the study 
uncovers the values underlying both flexible and formalistic adjudication, whose 
balance should held construct rules, principles and standards to act as Uganda’s 
ultimate commercial judging guidelines. 
Sixthly, content analysis is known to guarantee against contamination by the text’s 
sources, by focusing on the textual features of which the sources are unconscious, 
through the use of coding categories the sources are not able to control.40 In this 
case the judges, as sources of the judicial opinion as text, used the words and 
language from which themes can be extrapolated, without knowledge that they 
would form the units of analysis in this study. Therefore, the units of analysis are 
pure and free of judges’ manipulation. If this were not the case, then it would affect 
the reliability of the themes identified as denoting flexibility or formalism; or indeed 
the validity of the conclusions in the form of observed and inferred values. 
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Limitations of Content Analysis 
Content analysis has been criticised for failing to go deep enough to reveal 
complex issues of legal interpretation, like procedural patterns and legal 
techniques, and further that the landscape of case law cannot be restricted to 
judicial opinions;41 all of which criticisms are relevant to the search for values 
underlying the tension. Moreover, in the range of values in judicial practice, ‘the 
judge’s art when greatly practised is said to be far too subtle to be measured by 
any existing behavioural technique’.42  Therefore, without a contextual articulation 
of the values revealed by the judicial opinions, any wider interpretations beyond 
their observance, trends, patterns and documentation will leave validity as an 
issue. The question would then be, whether there is independent validation of the 
values identified as being responsible for the judges’ formalistic or flexible 
decisions; or whether they simply formed cover-ups for other reasons unarticulated 
in the given opinions.  
Accordingly, a full understanding of the foundations for flexibility, formalism and the 
tension between them requires further articulation of the values identified from 
analysis of the wording in judicial opinions, by testing them against the relevant 
body politic and discourses. Otherwise, considered as its most significant 
limitation,43 the exclusive dependence of content analysis on the contents of 
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judicial opinions would be a mere mapping exercise,44 and generate a potentially 
incomplete and misleading picture.45 
The reasons given by Oldfather, Bockhorst & Dimmer for the lack of consistency in 
the degree to which statements of judicial opinion correspond with the actual 
reasons for deciding the case are: cognitive limitations, where a judge may be 
unaware of or unable fully to articulate all components of his decisional process; 
insincerity or deceit, where the judge knows that the reasons he/she has given in 
the opinion are not the true factors motivating or explaining the decision; and the 
natural tendency to want to provide a strong reason for a decision reached, so that 
the opinion will highlight only the reasons that support the decision.46 
These three reasons are human weaknesses to which any decision makers in any 
jurisdiction, judges in Uganda not being an exception can be party.47 In addition, 
the Ugandan context presents more reasons that could potentially create doubt as 
to whether the values reflected by the judicial opinions correspond to the true 
reasons for the flexible or formalistic decision-making. For instance, judicial 
reasoning is often influenced by corruption, with almost 50% of Ugandans 
perceiving the judiciary as corrupt, and nearly 50% of those who had come into 
contact with courts between 2014 and 2015 admitting to have given a bribe.48 The 
Chief Justice Katureebe has also admitted to the infection being widespread, to the 
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extent that at times litigants choose their preferred judicial officer,49 and at least 
one high court judge (Justice Joseph Murangira) is currently facing charges of 
taking a bribe.50 
The defence by its proponents has been that content analysis does enough to 
create the best basis for understanding legal opinions, which are at the core of 
every legal system and its functioning.51 Therefore it is adequate to use in a study 
like this one, where no attempts appear to have been made to investigate why the 
tension has prevailed. Any deeper research into the causation and institutional 
background for the competing values identified would call for a social-legal 
investigation into the linkage between the values revealed in the judicial opinions 
as underlying the tension, and Uganda’s historical, social, political and economic 
context. However, this can only be reliably done following the results of studies like 
this one, in the first place identifying and analysing some of the competing values 
to provoke further research.   
Therefore, in this study, as part of the content analysis methodology, the 
researcher makes ‘abductive inferences’,52 supported by secondary information 
from reviewed literature sources, such as textbooks, journals and newspapers 
about the research context, and particularly Uganda. Unlike deductive or inductive 
inferences, abductive inferences involve inferring contextual phenomena like 
formalism, flexibility, market conformism, consumer welfarism, commercialism, and 
other phenomena that theoretically have a bearing on the tension. This points to 
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unobserved phenomena of interest, takes the analysis outside the data and 
bridges the gap between descriptive accounts of texts and what they mean, refer 
to, entail, provoke or cause.53 The evidence required to back the inferences is in 
the form of analytical constructs and everything known about the context, such as 
would be derived from secondary data the institutional theory helps to uncover.54 
The analytical constructs include the key attributes of formalism and flexibility 
analysed in chapter three, as well as their corresponding value postulates reviewed 
and elaborated in chapters six and eight respectively. 
Secondary Data and the Institutional Theory of Law 
In seeking a validation and better understanding of the values revealed, therefore, 
the institutional theory of law guides the use of secondary information relating to 
the judging environment, contained in textbooks, journals, newspapers, policy 
documents, and similar publications, which – just like the literature reviewed – has 
been studied using the library research technique.  The institutional theory of law 
as propounded by Schmitt55 is chosen because it reverberates with Holmes’s 
declaration that, the law embodies stories of a nation’s development, and its life is 
experience informed by the necessities of the time, the moral and political theories, 
intuitions about public policy and the prejudices judges share with their fellow 
men.56 It provides that that every legal norm and phenomenon is anchored in 
reality and the product of attempts to preserve and promote some widespread 
social practice.57 
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A contextual analysis and elaboration of the values ascertained as underlying 
commercial hard cases adjudication satisfies both MacCormick’s58 and Durkheim & 
Schmitt’s definitions of institutions.59 The proposition from institutional theory,60that 
norms arise from previous social practices which the concrete order must preserve 
and promote, leads one to make inferences and arrive at understanding the higher 
values indicated by the identified lower values or manifestations, by relating them 
to the judging environment and practices of the times when the relevant decisions 
were made. This contextual analysis then produces a better understanding of what 
actually motivated the judges to be either flexible or formalistic, especially if, as 
proponents of the theory claim, both phenomena are needed at the same time.61 
But first and foremost, the study has analysed content of the judges’ opinions to 
generate primary data on indicative values or manifestations of higher values, 
before such inferences can be drawn. This analysis has systematically and 
objectively followed a network of steps and procedures that are replicable, 
collectively called the ‘Content Analysis Research Design’.62 
Content Analysis Design 
The study employs a content analysis design that is meant to generate findings for 
all the research sub-questions. In seeking findings answering the sub-question of 
what Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm is vis-à-vis the tension, the design is 
exploratory, seeking to generate data for mapping the judging landscape. Beyond 
this, generating findings for values that form the tension’s foundations requires a 
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more elaborate content analysis than the mere exploration, mapping and 
quantification of trends and patterns necessary to answer the first sub-question. 
The third sub-question of how formalism and flexibility can coexist is a theoretical 
one, answerable by way of making proposals, based on analysing existing 
mechanisms and the findings in answer to sub-questions (a) and (b).  
The approach to answering the research question has to rest on the bedrock of the 
study’s theoretical framework. Accordingly, with regard to sub-question one, the 
coding for search units to observe during the reading of cases is informed by the 
formalism and flexibility attributes identified in chapter three.63 The data from this 
analysis are then used to map the prevalence of both judging phenomena and the 
tension between them. In the case of sub-questions two and three, the content 
analysis is guided not only by the coding of indicative values proposed by other 
scholars,64 but also operationalises the proposed mechanism of the jurisprudence 
of interests to find both such competing values underlying the tension, and a way 
to manage it. This mechanism needs elaboration before one can appreciate the 
research design adapted to its operationalisation. 
2.6.1  Interests Jurisprudence’s Mechanics for Coexistence  
Pound65 proposed a four-step mechanism, which Powers66 christened ‘the 
mechanics of interests jurisprudence’, that judges (in this case widened to the legal 
system) can use to balance competing interests, to achieve coexistence and the 
task of law. The first step is for judges to observe and record the totality of 
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competing de facto values.  These are ascertainable from the claims, demands, 
assertions and interests that human beings are pushing for recognition, and 
satisfaction by the law.67 Despite the obvious unease about this task being left to 
the judges, this preliminary step is adopted in this study, as underlying values are 
observed from the interests, demands and claims that appear to have competed in 
Uganda’s commercial adjudication. Because the study is not a live evaluation of 
interests in active disputes, such values are identified by analysing the contents of 
judicial opinions as texts, especially looking at what motivated judicial choice; the 
results are shown in Appendices 1-8.   
The second step is to derive, from the competing values, a list of fundamental 
principles of human conduct. These are the presuppositions of the legal order of a 
particular society, that appear from an abstraction, translation, and synthesis of the 
greatest mass of the identified values/interests, otherwise called the jural 
postulates of that society.68 These jural postulates have been otherwise explained, 
by Powers,69 to be working hypotheses of what people in a particular society want 
the law to accomplish. In this case, there is hardly any focused study to earmark 
Uganda’s jural postulates, and the task could not be accomplished in the space 
and time allowed for this study. In place of such a study, Uganda being part of the 
global commercial village, and therefore the community of users of its commercial 
law coming from multiple jurisdictions, this study adapts what it considers to be 
universal jural postulates. These are ascertainable by reviewing, and synthesising 
existing international literature on values underlying formalism and flexibility; 
presenting the competing values the community of commercial law users in 
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different jurisdictions desire adjudication to serve−especially common law 
countries. These presumptive value postulates advanced by other scholars will be 
discussed in chapters six and eight. Viewed in relation to Uganda’s body politic and 
other contextual pre-law institutions, they are representative of what should be 
expected from Uganda’s commercial adjudication, the legal system in Uganda 
being common law based. As such, in reference to them as hypotheses of what the 
Ugandan commercial law community expect, I adopt the phrase value postulates 
or presumptive values, both of which I use interchangeably, as the occasion 
demands.  
This step has been used to guide the coding for, analysis, and synthesis, of lower 
values, which are the manifestations to the value postulates. Further, the value 
postulates have guided the use of inferences and interpretations in the derivation 
of principles, concepts and themes that speak to the different dominant categories 
of higher values, and therefore the identification of such higher values as 
underlying both formalism and flexibility, and their competition resulting in the 
tension. The results are reflected in Appendices 1 to 8.  
The search for such values is guided by the jural postulates of the society at a 
particular time, in this case the presumptive values articulated in chapters six and 
eight.  As indicated above, the presumptive values or their manifestations are 
coded, and the codes used as the campus informing the search for Uganda’s 
context-specific values underlying formalism and flexibility, as well as their 
underpinning lower values or manifestations, the results for which are presented in 
Appendices 1-5. From such lower values, higher values or value categories are 
identified and reported in Appendices 7 and 8. The latter results are the results of 
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my inferences, guided by the literature review, the theoretical framework and my 
background legal and adjudication knowledge and experience. 
The third step is the formulation of a scheme of interests or values, being an 
inventory and catalogue or arrangement of values underlying adjudication. Pound 
proposed that the value catalogue should be made up of individual, public and 
social interests;70which categorisation this study finds inadequate to account for all 
the value types identified during the content analysis. Nonetheless, the findings 
from this stage are presented in tables appearing as Appendices 7 and 8. These 
findings are then used to make an evaluation and appraisal of competing values 
within different categories. Values are only compared and evaluated with others in 
the same category using their rate of prevalence, as all categories are deemed of 
equal value. This third step is what is used to identify the key underlying values 
and themes they represent, as explained in chapters seven and nine, and the final 
scheme of values indicated in chapter ten. 
That Pound’s ‘scheme of values’ technique is not found entirely applicable in 
Uganda, and thus its modifications justifiable. Firstly, the manifestations of these 
values are not strictly exclusive, as a single judicial practice, tradition or sub-value 
may indicate more than one higher value. For instance, the rejection of extra-legal 
considerations, like purposes and effect of the contract or rule, speaks to judicial 
objectivity and rationality; as well as ‘justice as legality’. Likewise, deriving contract 
law from a few fundamental, general and abstract principles indicates rationality 
and objectivity, as well as legal certainty.   
                                            
 
70 R. Pound, Outline of Lectures on Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press, 1943) 97-112; Pound 
‘A Survey of social Interests’ (n 65) 1. 
 86
Secondly, in actual judging practice, Pound’s three categories of interests have 
been fused, and also invoked interchangeably, by judges. For instance in National 
Social Security Fund & Sentoogo v. Alcon International Ltd,71 a contract deemed 
by judges to be unconscionable, ordinarily a matter of injury to private interests of 
equity; as well as prejudicial to the rights of the workers that saved money in the 
Appellant fund; unconstitutional; and contrary to the national interest; was 
interfered with for being contrary to public policy.  
Therefore, the scheme of values adopted by this study follows the practical 
provinces of judging, being the internal to the judiciary vs. external criteria, as well 
as legal vs. extra-legal within the external judging criteria. This systematic – as 
opposed to substantive – categorisation helps to move the focus beyond the claims 
and assertions of the parties, to suits and society generally; to how certainty in 
judging can be achieved using a balance of such values.        
The fourth and final step relates to how the tension can be managed. It involves 
deciding which of the competing interests prevails over others, to act as a judging 
criterion in similar cases. Interests jurisprudence proposes that it should be the 
one, which permits the satisfaction of the widest range of claims, with minimum 
friction and waste to the entire scheme of interests as a whole.72 However, as 
Powers explains,73 the jurisprudence of interests is based on a relativity of value or 
interests, as their values depend on acceptability and recognition by a particular 
society, reflected by its current civilisation.  
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As such, only those that are strong enough by appearing more acceptable, without 
regard to their intrinsic worth, can make it to the table for balancing as part of the 
formulation of guidelines to coexistence. However, if the social conditions change 
in a way that reflects changes in the jural postulates, the minor interests may later 
get recognition and be given value to guide judging, just as the dominant one can 
become minor and be removed from judging guidelines.  
Accordingly, in this study the frequency of a value at a particular time of Uganda’s 
history is used to determine its merit, with those appearing in fewer than 10% of 
the cases analysed treated as minor and therefore not worth immediate 
consideration in the formulation of judging guidelines. As per interests 
jurisprudence, such minor values are meant to be eliminated from further 
consideration, in the process of formulating the jural postulates, for at this time it is 
principles and themes supported by the greatest number of values/interests that 
are considered fundamental and worth balancing.74 In this study, this is when 
determining which of the values identified in step two should be analysed in the 
third and fourth steps.   
The mechanics of interests jurisprudence and the generally recommended steps of 
content analysis during legal research blend well, and therefore combine to guide 
in answering the research question. Each of them calls for a rational and objective 
step-by-step analysis of adjudication texts, like judicial opinions, to ascertain 
competing values and thereafter make deeper and further analysis of findings to 
arrive at wider themes, concepts and discourses to use in answering the research 
question. Accordingly, the content analysis design employed comprises the 
following key steps.     




2.6.2  Key steps of the Content Analysis: 
Selection and Collection of Cases for Analysis 
With the process of reduction that content analysis uses to unitise text, the general 
body of commercial case law was looked at, to isolate commercial contract hard 
cases as the focus of this study. This was done by perusing hard and soft copies of 
indices of reported cases in the High Court from 1902 to 2018; in the Court of 
Appeal, including the defunct East African Court of Appeal, from 1902 to 2018; in 
the Privy Council, from 1902 to 1964; and in the Supreme Court, from 1974 to 
2018. These periods represent the lives of the corresponding courts that have 
exercised powers of judicature in Uganda. 
Reported cases in the indices are arranged in alphabetical order, which helped in 
identifying relevant cases, using such key words and phrases as ‘commercial law’ 
and ‘contract’ – which represented the general areas of law under which the 
majority of cases fell. To ensure exhaustiveness of the study however, the search 
a) Unitising of text, which involves 
(i) selecting cases to be analysed and 
(ii) defining and coding analytical constructs and themes; 
b) Reading the judicial opinions; 
c) Deducing the essentials of judicial opinions and summarising them; 
d) Extrapolating, from the judicial opinions, themes representing flexibility and 
formalism; 
e) Recording the descriptive and exploratory search results by tabulation; 
f) Extrapolating and inductively inferring explicit values underlying flexibility 
and formalism from the observed themes; 
g) Abductively inferring implicit values underlying flexibility and formalism; 
h) Recording the inference outcomes by tabulation, alongside the descriptive 
and exploratory results; 
i) Deriving patterns, trends and other frequencies of flexibility and formalism 
from the tabulated data; 
j) Writing out the final analysis, including an articulation of the identified values 
within the wider theoretical and general context. 
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was continuously repeated using key words and phrases reflecting the specific 
commercial contract subject headings used in the law reports’ subject matter 
indices. There are mainly: Banking; Sale of Goods; Insurance; Negotiable 
Instruments; Employment; Hire Purchase and Securitisation; and Debentures and 
Instruments by Way of Security (Bills of Sales). 
Commercial contract cases were then accessed in the respective law reports and 
read. However, the law reports available at the time of the study did not contain all 
of the cases decided by the courts. Law reporting had long died, with the 
breakdown of the state in Uganda over the decade beginning in 1971, when the 
renowned Idi Amin took power in a military coup and abrogated the constitution, 
triggering years of military authoritarianism. At the time of the study, the Uganda 
Law Reports had last been published in 1973; the East Africa Law Reports in 1975; 
with a 1990s revival focusing on reporting mainly Kenyan cases; and the High 
Court Bulletin and Commercial Law Reports being published irregularly.75 
Accordingly, the researcher has accessed judicial opinions of the past, from the 
scanty publications available, as these represent the only reliable sources of such 
data. This is not to say that fewer than necessary opinions were available. To the 
contrary, having scanned judicial practice over the course of the entire life of the 
country (since the transplant of English law) has provided over 300 judicial 
opinions, with each historical epoch represented, as indicated in Appendices 1 to 
5. This number of cases is presumed to represent, fairly, the population of 
Uganda’s commercial hard cases across judging history. In any case, the size of 
sample is immaterial, because as Krippendorff notes, with regard to content 
analysis of texts to uncover data like values that form the foundations to the 
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tension, it is not about statistically drawing samples, but presenting quotes and 
examples in support of a general point, as representative of similar if not absent 
cases.76  
The physical law reports on which the research was based were found in the High 
Court Library at the Main High Court Building, at City Square, in Kampala, Uganda; 
the Court of Appeal Library within the Court of Appeal Complex at Twid Plaza, in 
Kampala, Uganda; the Supreme Court Library at Upper Kololo Terrace, Kololo, in 
Kampala, Uganda; and the researcher’s law firm, Fides Legal Advocates Library, at 
Plot 1-3 Coral Crescent, Kololo, , in Kampala, Uganda. 
Online reporting is a very recent phenomenon, the only reliable resource being the 
Uganda Legal Information Institute (ulii) website, https://www.ulii.org At ulii, the 
Law Reporting Department of the Uganda Judiciary reports decisions of the 
Commercial Court (part of the High Court), the Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court; which decisions are the focus of this study. However, https://www.ulii.org 
was only fully constructed recently, intended among other things to revive, 
modernise, make regular and streamline law reporting, the past state of law 
reporting having been dubbed disastrous.77 The website covers cases from 1999; 
however, cases decided during later years, after 2010, are more reported, with 
1999 for instance having only one case, 2000 seven cases, and 2001 five cases, 
as compared to 2011 where the monthly average was over 10 cases reported. 
To overcome the shortfall in law reporting, the researcher read through each one of 
the tables of contents of law reports published in Uganda so far, and used his 
position as an advocate in Uganda’s courts of Judicature to gain access to the 
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court files, in the registries of the different courts, of a number of unreported cases. 
A search was made of the courts’ computerised lists of filed cases. The courts’ 
computerised lists, however, mainly cover cases filed from 2001 when 
computerisation of the courts’ registries began.78 In each court registry’s general 
computer can now be found titles to cases that by 2001 were pending completion, 
together with cases filed post-2001. Alongside each case title is also indicated the 
branch of law and a brief description of the cause of action or remedies sought. 
There are also judicial opinions accessed from full decisions that were uploaded 
online by the judges themselves, but not yet captured by www.ulii.org. A number of 
decisions were also accessed from the law firm files of Fides Legal Advocates, 
especially decisions in cases I had argued in court. All those cases accessed 
otherwise than from publications were photocopied and are available for 
verification together with all others analysed. 
Accordingly, contract cases from both the pre- and post-computerisation periods 
have been analysed, together with unreported decisions on the court files post the 
2001 computerisation of court registries. Decisions found to be hard cases, within 
the context of this study, were then chosen for further reading, documentation and 
analysis. 
As earlier elaborated,79 what is meant by ‘hard cases’ here, is those in which the 
result is not clearly dictated by statute or precedent80 or those in which a judge has 
sufficient reservations about applying what he sees as the clear interpretation of a 
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statute,81or contract terms.  The judge then has to choose between more than one 
possible answer, by asking which of the possible answers fits the community’s 
structure of institutions, decisions and public standards as a whole,82or otherwise 
serve the values at hand. 
To identify a hard case was however not possible from the beginning of that case’s 
documentation, since some of the elements that would qualify a case as such 
appeared in the middle or even at the end of the judicial opinion. The researcher 
therefore had first to do a quick and general reading of the commercial contract 
cases, to determine which ones fit the definition of a hard case. Following this, 
substantially the entire universe of hard commercial cases was then photocopied 
and collected to form units of text for further reading and content analysis. 
Another criterion for choice of cases to analyse was the presence or absence of a 
record for the judge’s reasoning. Specifically, cases where a judge appeared to 
reason in justification of his flexible or formalistic approach were chosen as the 
core texts for analysis. Besides selection of the cases to be analysed, as an 
integral part of the content analysis methodology,83 a coding scheme was 
developed to guide the reading and analysis of their corresponding judicial 
opinions. 
Coding Scheme 
Coding involves constructing a pre-defined set of concepts/categories under which 
the specific segments of the content of a text relevant to the research question, in 
                                            
 
81 W. Twinning & D. Miers, How to do Things with Rules, (3rd Edn. Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1991; and 
5TH Cambridge University Press 2010) 98 & 367. 
82 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana 1986) 255-256. 
83 M Hall, ‘Coding Case Law for Public Health Law Evaluation: A Methods Monograph’, (2011) 
Public Health Law Research, 18; Hall and Wright (n 23) 80-81. 
 93
this case themes and values, are characterised by placing them in a given 
category.84 The term ‘category’ is used here to mean a group of words with similar 
meanings or connotations.85 The categories are derived from the manifestations 
and sub-values that define higher values, proposed to be at play by existing 
literature, on values underlying both formalism and flexibility during adjudication. 
The codes then guided the researcher in reading and analysing the text as he 
looked for information that was a good fit for the predefined codes, to create data 
from which inferences could be drawn. Before describing the codes used and how 
they were applied, one needs to appreciate why and how coding was done. 
2.8.1  The Value of Coding to the Study 
According to Hall and Wright, the value of a coding scheme in analysing judicial 
opinions is to ensure an objective and consistent reading of the selected cases, 
with greater focus on the research question.86 It helps to avoid bias, in the sense of 
the researcher merely looking for confirmation of a predetermined position. 
Therefore, all decisions on variables (in this case the value postulates), their 
measurements and the coding rules must be made a priori, before the reading and 
observations from the texts begin, to ensure that bias is avoided (objectivity or 
intersubjectivity).87 Intersubjectivity is what scholars who view objectivity as an 
illusion and all human inquiries as subjective, take as a state of being consistent 
during an inquiry (not asking “if it is true” but rather if we agree it is true.”).88Further, 
coding helps to create reproducibility,89 such that other researchers are able to 
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apply the scheme to their own research, in line with the methodology used in this 
study.90 
2.8.2  Presumption of Equality amongst Opinions 
Coding and the resultant counting of cases assumes that the judicial opinions are 
equal in value, such that the information from one is as relevant as that from 
others. As such, there is in the methodology a presumption of equality of all cases, 
courts and judges.91 In this study, the judicial opinions analysed cut across courts 
of different weights in terms of precedence, with the Court of Appeal superior to 
and its decisions binding on the High Court, and the Supreme Court superior and 
its decisions binding on both the Court of Appeal and High Court. 
Although on the face of it this creates an imbalance between the opinions 
analysed, revisiting the research problem and question dispels the possibility of 
such inequality. The issue at hand is not the doctrinal outcomes of the opinions, 
but the landscape, and whatever else motivated judges to arrive at such outcomes. 
In the search for the values underlying the opinions, the level of the court in the 
hierarchy is immaterial. What matters is the set of reasons a judge assigned to his 
decision, that explain the flexibility or formalism he or she employed. This 
presumption of equality has helped to reveal that the values uncovered cut across 
the different levels of courts, with High Court judges sometimes appearing bolder in 
their expression. 
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2.8.3  The Coding Process 
As is the case with content analysis, the theoretical framework of the study guided 
formulation of the coding units.92 The coding units used are referential in nature, 
indicating the way each unit is represented in legal theory and practice.93 For 
instance, the judicial reasoning that seeks to strictly construe the terms of contract 
by their literal meaning, without regard to considerations like fairness, is a coding 
unit named Pacta Sunt Servanda, coded as ‘PACTA’. From observations of 
PACTA tendencies, is inferred the value of freedom of contract, unitised as 
‘Freedom of Contract’ and coded ‘FOC’. Such referential unitising has been 
preferred because it will be easy for other researchers, knowledgeable in the 
theory and practice of commercial law, to replicate. It is also the recommended 
type of coding units for studies like this one, that are interested in making 
inferences about attitudes, values and preferences.94 
Accordingly, both manifest and latent variables, as attributes of the phenomena, 
have been coded and used. The manifest content in this case refers to clearly 
visible judicial practices that fit the description of formalism or flexibility. It also 
includes statements made by judges giving reasons for their decisions, which are 
descriptive of value judgements and pronouncements.  On the other hand, as 
defined by Neuendorf, latent content consists of the unobservable concepts that 
cannot be measured directly but can be represented or measured by one or more 
attributes.95 It speaks to the deeper meaning behind the words and phrases used 
by judges, that can be arrived at using variables extracted from a variety of 
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theoretical works, like the attributes and value postulates given in chapters three, 
six and eight. 
Two types of coding units have therefore been developed. The first category is in 
the form of the flexibility and formalism attributes in appendices 1 to 5, containing 
the derived data.  They are correlations assumed to explain how available texts (in 
this case judicial opinions) are connected to the possible answers to the research 
question. The coding units are therefore extracted from and seek to operationalise 
the research context in analysing the texts, acting as rules of inference that guide 
the analyst from the texts to answering the research question. These analytical 
constructs have added to the reliability of the coding scheme, since they act as 
testable mini-theories of the context, making the knowledge of context like this 
study’s theoretical framework portable, codable and reproducible by other 
researchers.96 They also ensure that the content analysis models the context of 
use. In this case, the context is the proposition that in Uganda courts have 
practised both formalism and flexibility at the same time; and that the coexistence 
of the two can be achieved through the pursuit of ultimate guidelines; and that 
formulation of the guidelines should be informed by the jurisprudence of interests, 
in combination with the institutional theory of law. Three aspects of the theoretical 
framework have informed the coding units to guide answers to the research 
question. 
Firstly, there is the imperative to ascertain whether and why both flexibility and 
formalism have prevailed in Uganda at the same time. This led to a baseline 
testable proposition, that as opposed to the ‘either/or’ non-reconcilable claim by 
proponents of the absolute formalism or absolute flexibility judging paradigms, both 
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flexibility and formalism have been practised by the same courts and judges at the 
same time. To achieve this descriptive aspect of the study, the theoretical 
attributes of both flexibility and formalism (or a combination of them) expounded by 
scholars, such as Chen-Wishart,97 were translated into coding categories to guide 
the reading and analysis of the judicial opinions in ascertaining the prevalence of 
the two judging approaches. 
Secondly, the guided coding emerging from the jurisprudence of interests aimed at 
answering why both formalism and flexibility were actually practised by commercial 
judges at different epochs of Uganda’s history. This would uncover competing 
interests and other values underlying flexibility and formalism, to inform the 
creation of ultimate judging guidelines that would in turn produce a coexistence 
between flexibility and formalism, and thus manage the tension.98 These values are 
supposed to be ascertained from the judicial opinions themselves, guided by the 
coding of sub-values of value postulates, and in turn using these to analyse the 
reasoning of the judges to find their equal or substitutes in Uganda. This stands for 
what would be taken as best in promoting the ultimate goal of social welfare in 
interests jurisprudence. 
Thirdly, because the jurisprudence of interests does not have an exhaustive theory 
on what social welfare actually means, and how it is linked to law and commercial 
adjudication in particular, the study also employs aspects of the institutional theory 
of law to explain observed values. This has also helped in formulating the second 
category of coding units, used to unmask judicial reasoning, and reveal what 
Holmes termed the inarticulate and unconscious competing value judgements, 
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legislative grounds that are the very root and nerve of the whole 
proceeding.99Therefore, to achieve more reliability and validity of findings, social 
welfare has not been presumed or used as the ultimate goal of law or adjudication 
in Uganda. 
2.8.4  Coding Units, Codes and Instructions 
Content analysis usually involves preparing Coding Forms and Coding Books that 
together include particulars of the codes used and detailed explanations of their 
application. For this study however, the essence of the two documents has been 
captured in Appendix 9, titled The Coding Table. The codes were developed in the 
light of the need to be guided in reading the judicial opinions, for the purposes of: 
validating the presumption of prevalence of flexibility, formalism and the tension 
between them in Uganda’s commercial hard cases adjudication; finding, by 
observation and inference, the values that form the foundations to the phenomena 
under study; and thereby creating data for wider and exhaustive articulation of 
such values as a way towards finding a source for reliable and responsive ultimate 
commercial judging guidelines. 
The coding has therefore been used to tabulate the data derived from the content 
analysis, with the source and value of each component clearly indicated. For each 
epoch of Uganda’s commercial judging life, the same coding scheme has been 
used. However, the results are tabulated and reported separately using 
Appendices 1-8.  The separation is for ease of particularised analysis, and in order 
to help answer the research question with attention to Uganda’s historical context 
and general body politic as the institutions forming the judging environment. 
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2.8.5  Testing Coding Reliability 
Because the intention of coding in content analysis is to ensure reproducibility, and 
the nature of the variables coded can be subjectively construed, it was vital for me 
to test coding reliability.100 Adopting Neuendorf’s definition, reliability means the 
extent to which the procedure for ascertaining the practices of formalism and 
flexibility, and their underlying values, would yield the same results in repeated 
trials.101 This can be established either by subjecting the coding to another scholar, 
to get comparisons and work on the differences of opinion; or by using the 
researcher’s own knowledge and expertise.102  
In this case, my knowledge of the guiding theories of the study and my over 20 
years experience in litigation was used to improve the reliability of the coding 
throughout the course of analysis. Further, the above detailed description of the 
methodology and coding scheme in this study achieves the standard regarded by 
Hall and Wright as constituting adequate reliability, i.e. being sufficient for others to 
replicate.103 The initial set of categories was after all not treated as cast in stone, 
as more categories revealed by the reading of judicial opinions were added, to 
allow a more exhaustive coding scheme that could capture all relevant data from 
the judicial opinions. Finally, as part of ensuring reliability, the initial list was refined 
by generalising the reach of some categories, thereby avoiding repetition and 
overlaps. Categories that could be combined and defined under a single concept or 
terminology were joined and redefined as such, and more particular categories 
were dropped for more inclusive ones. 
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Presentation, Analysis and Validity of Results 
For the findings to be analysed, the first step is the development of analytical 
constructs.104 According to Krippendorff, analytical constructs are ‘if then’, acting as 
rules of inference, that have guided the researcher to connect the observed explicit 
values, manifestations of flexibility and formalism, trends and patterns, to 
answering the research question.105They arise from revisiting the theoretical 
framework of the study, deriving guiding mini-theories therefrom, and using them to 
interpret and analyse the data. Accordingly, the theoretical justifications and 
explanations for both flexible and formalistic commercial judging are tested against 
the manifest and latent values behind Uganda’s commercial adjudication. 
2.9.1  Validity of Findings 
With a revisit to the theoretical underpinnings of the study, therefore, inferences 
are drawn and their probability and validity strengthened by the researcher’s 
knowledge of the context of study.106 As defined by Weber, validity is the extent to 
which the variable derived (in this case the stated underlying values) corresponds 
to the construct the researcher intends it to measure.107 A variable is therefore 
valid if it matches the abstract concept it represents, the strongest form of validity 
being validity due to external criteria, such as being consistent with the theoretical 
arguments relating to the topic or field of study. 
Therefore, correlation between the theoretical framework and research findings, 
and using the framework as a guide in drawing inferences, proves validity of the 
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values derived as foundations to flexibility and formalism; and as valid sources of 
Uganda’s ultimate judging guidelines. It also creates the study’s internal 
consistency. To Weber, this consistency is another source of validity, because the 
textual evidence being consistent with the interpretations is what validates the 
findings.108 In this study, the context includes the relevant legal theory, doctrine, 
practice, and the institutional background to Uganda’s commercial judging, which 
have all been taken into account in understanding the values observed and 
inferred from the analysed case law. 
2.9.2  Drawing Inferences and Reporting Findings 
The criteria used to arrive at the inferences include: the ordinary – and, where 
applicable, technical – meanings of the words and phrases judges used when 
justifying or laying ground for the practice of either formalism or flexibility; the wider 
conceptual connotations of the meaning of such statements or words used; and the 
significance of such concepts in the wider Ugandan context, i.e. the nature of the 
country’s legal and commercial justice system, history, and general body politic. 
Accordingly, the final data and analysis include direct reporting of observations, 
and extrapolations of trends, patterns, and latent values underlying both formalism 
and flexibility in Uganda’s commercial judging. Extrapolations are inferences of 
unobserved instances within or beyond the observed data.109 
For reporting purposes, the cases are summarised to elucidate the relevant parts 
of the opinions, and tabulation made of the research results. Tabulation was done 
because it is the most recommended and most commonly used technique of 
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making large amounts of data, resulting from content analysis, comprehensible.110 
The findings are presented in Appendices 1-5. The tables have columns for: the 
court that decided the case; the judge; the official citation; the summary of the 
case; the attributes of either flexibility or formalism; the judicial approach; and the 
derived/inferred values underlying each judicial approach. 
The judicial opinions are summarised, as opposed to laying them out in entirety, as 
part of the content analysis methodology. Rearticulating and summarising of large 
volumes of data are done to reduce the diversity of text down to what matters.111 
The summaries therefore targeted the actual parts of each opinion where the judge 
can be seen to have decided flexibly or formalistically, or where he or she 
expressed or alluded to the underlying values to such a judicial approach. 
The codes used to navigate and interpret the judicial opinions and arrive at both 
the attributes and underlying values are also indicated in the table, making it easy 
to construct clear graphs and make other extrapolations from the tables. These 
tables are therefore the springboards for the analysis of findings done in chapters 
five, seven and nine. 
2.9.3  Mode of the Final Analysis 
The final analysis does not follow statistical models, for as indicated by Hall, the 
final analysis of results derived from content analysis need not involve any 
statistics.112 It is proper to make such analysis in a rigorous, purely qualitative way, 
focusing on themes and patterns that are better understood through conceptual 
descriptions and narrative illustrations than numbers. Guided by the categories as 
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determinants of both flexibility and formalism, judgements are read as text. From 
the reading are identified words, phrases or themes, their inferences, and the 
patterns and trends relating to the analytical units, which are then recorded and 
tabulated – a defining feature of quantitative content analysis. 113 
Coding has enabled the search for, and the quantification and eventual 
presentation of, attributes – and therefore occurrences of flexibility and formalism, 
and their underlying values – during the different judging periods across history. 
This quantitative aspect of the analysis is used to answer the question of what 
Uganda’s judging paradigm is. The results are presented and discussed in chapter 
four, and demonstrate the tension as a real problem in Uganda’s commercial 
adjudication. Further, to an extent the frequencies play a role in selecting values to 
analyse, while answering questions of why the tension has prevailed, and how it 
can be managed. This follows the view of interests jurisprudence, that every 
society should have a system and hierarchy of values to guide courts and 
legislators on its basic interests, and that the law should give effect to this system 
at a particular time. 114 The system should include the means of ranking interests 
and identifying those to be adjusted and balanced by courts in cases of a tension.  
In this regard, the study adopts the quantitatively-oriented proposition by Pound115 
and Powers,116 that the strong values are the ones to be balanced,  not because of 
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their intrinsic worth or validity, the level of influence they appear to have in 
society;117subject to having minimum adverse effects on the general scheme of 
interests. 118In this study, the criterion is the frequency with which they have 
appeared in judicial opinions.  
Meanwhile, consideration of the weak ones – those that have appeared with low 
frequencies – is suspended, when making the list to be analysed further, for not 
being fundamental enough in society to be protected by the law, until and unless 
circumstances change to require otherwise.119 Powers120 notes that this relativity of 
values and interests, that depends on the frequency with which a value has been 
claimed, is an integral component of the jurisprudence of interests. Under this 
relativity, values that hitherto had dominance are dropped to the suspension zone 
upon losing favour in society, while those that were previously minor will make it to 
the balancing table, for having attained dominance, and therefore gained favour.  
The Pound-Powers proposition above informs this study’s discussion on values in 
chapters seven and nine. The competing values are identified from output one of 
the content analysis, the results of which are presented in Appendices 1 to 5. 
Further analysis is made, and by use of inferences the higher values – those that 
values in output one imply – are presented in Appendices 7 and 8. The frequencies 
of values in output two are then determined, and the results presented in Appendix 
6 and Figures 1 to 12. As indicated above, two final levels of analysis are then 
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made, to determine research outputs three and four; which define the discussion of 
values and their categorisation in chapters seven and nine. The results are 
suggested to be the focus of balancing to arrive at judging guidelines that could 
achieve coexistence of formalism and flexibility.  
Besides the exploration of the tension as a reality in Uganda and determining a 
system and ordering of values to be balanced, the actual content and implications 
of values that explain the foundations to the tension are derived by direct 
extrapolation from the content of the judicial opinions. Themes and concepts that 
point to the values underlying both formalism and flexibility are observed or inferred 
from the words used by judges, expressly or by implication. Where values are not 
directly evident from the language used by the judge, inferences and 
interpretations have been made from the observed analytical units. This is guided 
by the list of indicative values advanced by both formalism and flexibility theory, as 
underlying either phenomenon in contract adjudication, as discussed in chapters 
six and eight. That list is however a basic checklist and not the ultimate one, as 
allowance exists for identifying and articulating values the judicial opinions may 
reveal, besides those identified in chapters six and eight.     
To help illustrate the patterns and trends, however, counting was done, and 
frequencies of given features reported, as this could help answer the research 
question, thereby challenging the conventional wisdom or provoking further 
research.121 The trends and patterns are represented in graphs, with each image 
representing a different aspect of the analysis. This is done for each different 
epoch, with the observations and inferred values regarded as providing a summary 
of the foundations to flexibility, formalism and the tension between them in 
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Uganda’s commercial judging. As such, the final analysis depends less on what 
happened in particular cases, and more on the content analysis approach of 
arriving at generalised conclusions.122  
A systematic and objective discovery of viable and theoretically plausible ways 
towards the coexistence of flexibility and formalism is achieved, by constructing 
possible ultimate concepts and standards to inform the formulation of commercial 
judging guidelines applicable to all manner of commercial contract disputes. It is 
therefore important, as is done in chapters three and five, to review the theoretical 
discourse surrounding the tension and assess the logicality and viability of 
coexistence between formalism and flexibility, and therefore the management of 
the tension. Therefore, the study first brings understanding to the tension as the 
problem and makes a theoretical case for coexistence; identifies the units of 
analysis for coding and research; and sets the theoretical context within which the 







                                            
 
122 Neuendorf (n 11) 15. 
 107
 Theoretical Foundations to the Tension  
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on the formalism-flexibility divide, for the 
purpose of bringing understanding to the theoretical foundations to the tension, as 
a first step to finding ways to manage it. The chapter revisits key propositions on 
both sides, indicating the norms and judicial practices through which formalism and 
flexibility manifest, and the jurisprudential perceptions underlying them. It does not 
review literature on specific values proposed by scholars as competing on either 
side of the tension, but rather their theoretical foundations. Literature on such 
specific values is revisited in chapters six and eight, with regard to formalism and 
flexibility respectively.  
Common-law-based commercial law practised in countries like Uganda mainly 
grew out of judicial reasoning, with hardly any significant legislative intervention.1 
Therefore, as suggested by Macneil,2 as well as Adams and Brownsword,3 there is 
a linkage between the formalism and flexibility judging ideologies on the one hand, 
and specific contract ideologies, plus the values that inform them, on the other. 
Macneil4 maintains that values like rationality, arising out of the view of contract as 
promise, promote formalism.5 However, Adams and Brownsword fail to articulate 
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the causal relationships amongst judging approaches, contractual ideologies and 
underlying values. This study proceeds on the assumptions that doctrinal values 
like market individualism are amongst those that motivate judges to decide 
formalistically; and that doctrinal values like consumer welfarism are amongst 
those that motivate judges to decide flexibly. Adams and Brownsword’s claim, that 
there is a natural affinity between the judicial and contractual ideologies, is 
opposed.6  
This chapter therefore first reveals the key attributes of formalism and flexibility, 
which will act as a lens through which to observe these two approaches during the 
content analysis. A general evaluation of the literature is also made, on specific 
competing values underlying the two judicial approaches. The chapter further 
revisits the formalism-flexibility discourse, to make a theoretical case for the 
viability of a coexistence-judging paradigm; where instead of searching for a 
winning side, a balance in the service of both formalism and flexibility values can 
be attained.  
Key Attributes of Formalism in Adjudication 
By building a scientific legal system, Pound notes that the formalism legal theory 
has influenced a culture of scientific and artificial societal attitudes, and a 
corresponding approach to law.7 There is, an even more relevant, subtle, and far-
reaching influence on judging practice. The same would be true with flexibility legal 
theory; but, Pound wrote when formalism ruled, and his efforts were part of the 
revolt that promoted flexibility as a saviour from the injustice of legality and the 
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ghosts of past judicial intellect.8 His focus was therefore, understandably, on what 
the formalism legal theory had brought, and on what was wrong with that 
contribution. Similar analysis about flexibility would be mainly speculative, and not 
anchored in court disputes; which in this case are the reality he so valued. 
The extent to which the two judging ideologies have had influence in Uganda, and 
what values have motivated their prevalence, are revealed in chapters six to nine. 
However, to do that, one needs to understand the theoretical attributes that define 
both formalism and flexibility in adjudication. The attributes are perceptions of 
judges as will be tested in real cases, and not necessarily those of the general 
public, about the key topics jurisprudence in the field has addressed. On the side of 
formalism legal theory, from the point of view of its most influential scholar, 
Langdalle, and his followers, key attributes of formalism in adjudication are 
ascertainable.9 They are categorisable as relating to the nature of law, the sources 
of normativity and the role of the judge in a dispute.  
3.2.1  The Nature of Contract Law 
The first attribute relating to the nature of the law is what Burton10 referred to as 
‘determinate formalism’; the perception of the nature of the law as a clear, 
complete, certain, predictable and determinate body of dogmatic rules that 
commanded a single right result in all possible cases.11 This explains Adams and 
Brownsword’s observation that in contract adjudication, the formalistic view’s 
fundamental judicial practice is that the contract rulebook governs all reasoning 
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and decisions.12    
Secondly, law is a formal and conceptually ordered system that satisfies the legal 
norms of objectivity and consistency.13 This points to the rules being coherently 
derived from a small number of abstract principles and concepts that contribute to 
a holistic framework and system within which persons transact with each other; 
thus the view that law is logic.14 This is as opposed to being derived from legal 
policy or standards.15 The concepts and principles are fundamental because, by 
logical deduction, judges identify a few concepts which they see as self-evident 
and used as the premises for all reasoning, reaching conclusions without involving 
or invoking any values, morality or social policy. They are also general because 
they are applicable to all types of contracts.  
Atiyah gives examples of such operative principles and concepts that defined the 
classical formalistic contract theory: no man was his brother’s keeper; it was up to 
the parties to bargain and agree over the price and terms; offers are made and can 
be rejected, accepted or met with counter-offers; neither party owes the other any 
duty before the deal is struck and each party relies on his own judgment and 
information, the only exception being that there must be no misrepresentation or 
fraud, which were construed narrowly; and the deal is finally struck when parties 
agree, and mistakes are irrelevant unless they affect the free will and voluntary 
consent to make an agreement, for, parties should agree freely and with no 
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abnormal pressures.16 
Further, such general abstract concepts are operative concepts, but law as 
conceptually ordered also includes the legal system relying on classificatory 
categories.17 For instance, certain aspects of behaviour being regulated by the law 
of negligence and other torts, distinct from the subject of contract law. Formalism 
theory takes such strictness as extending to all sources, from which judges are 
authorised to look for normativity.  
3.2.2  The Sources of Normativity 
Formalism legal theory views the law as a value-free science,18 whose materials 
are all contained in printed books, and therefore should be applied free of morality 
and other extra-legal norms. Therefore, law is formal and autonomous, as well as 
neutral, because it is separate from the contingent empirical context and can be 
invoked by persons with different opportunities in the enjoyment of rights or 
performance of duties.19 In contract terms, the law is neutral because rules from 
general concepts and principles apply to all persons and subject matter alike, 
following the contract rulebook – the rules in statutes and settled case law.20  
Further, contract law is autonomous and formal because the contract rulebook has 
its own logic, in the sense that there is a logical construction and consistency from 
offer and acceptance to determination of contracts. Such logic is closed, and the 
contract concepts are characterised by purity, integrity and doctrinal conservatism, 
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where grounds for decisions ought to be well established and not products of 
creativity and innovation.21 As such, the individual or institutional values of judges, 
as well as the social, political or economic values that at times motivate judges in 
hard cases, are irrelevant during commercial adjudication unless otherwise 
declared by law.22 Therefore, there is no room for extra-legal considerations like: 
policy; fairness; worthlessness; subjective judging, such as the use of personal 
intuitions; and preferences, or other forms of judicial flexibility.  
There is also no room for conceptual flexibilities like the notions of reasonableness 
or unconscionability. Where they seem to appear, the judges have to structure the 
discretion in such notions in terms of general rules of thumb for applicability and 
legal validity.23 In support of this view, Joseph Raz24 argues that there is a 
distinction between a judge’s decision and the existence of reasons that inform the 
judge’s decision; an observation Freeman cites as justification for a new line of 
research focusing on adjudication.25 Therefore, as explained below, the role and 
authority of judges in contract disputes is also viewed as very restricted. 
3.2.3  The Role of Judges in Contract Disputes 
The role of judges is to recognise that the law is defined by the attributes, 
explained above, of the law’s nature and sources of normativity. Judges should 
limit themselves to a logical deduction or discovery of the law from fixed principles, 
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concepts and rules. Thereafter, they have to objectively and mechanically apply 
the law to cases before them, to arrive at answers dictated by the law and only the 
law.26 Accordingly, in contract disputes, the judge’s function is limited to ensuring 
procedural and not substantive fairness.27 Procedural justice, defined by a party’s 
compliance with the legal procedures and formalities of contract formation and 
performance, defines the court’s province during adjudication. In the same vein, 
concepts like freedom and sanctity of contract are invoked notwithstanding their 
purposes, or the context surrounding the contract or dispute. Relatedly, law 
making, or the revisiting of the decisions of lower courts on the grounds of the 
propriety of the results, are beyond the province of the courts. Appellate courts are 
only concerned with ensuring that such lower courts mechanically applied well-
established rules.28 Therefore, formalistic judges will not reopen the contract on 
grounds of substantive fairness, worthlessness, or policy considerations. Any pleas 
based on the purposes or results of the contract and dispute will be rejected, and 
decisions will be based on the extent to which the operative concepts, principles 
and rules were adhered to.          
The above formalistic propositions are in reality reflective of values both of a 
judging culture and legal nature – those produced by the legal system, such as the 
laws on judging. Their relevance as being part of the values responsible for the 
formalism in the tension is tested in this study. Further, the formalism legal theory 
has had a direct influence in contract adjudicatory theory, which on the other hand 
has had scholars attempt to understand values that have motivated formalism, 
flexibility and the tension between them. Such perceived formalism values are 
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reviewed in chapter six, as they inform the coding for units of analysis during the 
content analysis to identify and analyse the values that underlie formalism in 
Uganda, thereby contributing to the tension.  
Key Attributes of Flexibility in Adjudication  
The foundations of the flexibility theory of adjudication can be traced to the views of 
its founder,29 Holmes, who declared that30 the life of the law had not been logic but 
experience; the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political 
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, and even the 
prejudices judges share with their fellow–men. Further, law is not neutral and 
value-free but reflects the stories of a nation’s development through many 
centuries and cannot be dealt with as if it were a book of mathematics. 
These ideas formed the basis of the flexibility schools of jurisprudence, that view 
the attributes of law, the sources of normativity, and the role of judges in ways that 
oppose the claims of formalism theory. Examples of these schools of flexibility are: 
pragmatism; law and economics theory; critical legal theory; institutional theory; 
and legal realism.31 Their common thread is scepticism, and their views being the 
antithesis to formalism,32 especially to the view that law is logic, abstract and a 
matter of truths to be discovered by deduction.33 This study reviews the flexibility 
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schools’ main propositions, to reveal the key attributes that manifest flexibility in 
adjudication, which then guide the study in uncovering and understanding it as part 
of the tension, as well as its motivations.  
3.3.1  The Nature of Contract Law 
Regarding the law’s nature, a number of propositions have been advanced by 
flexibility legal theory. Firstly, is the view that law is not a science, and as such 
cannot be understood using logical deductions the way science is. Minda34 notes a 
reconciliatory view with formalists amongst pragmatists, and states that the law is a 
science; however, this conclusion is negated by Pound’s35 explicit disclaimer that 
law is not a science. Rather, he only called it so because it was so perceived by 
others, but the idea of science as a system of deductions had become obsolete. In 
the same  way, James36 argues that although truth exists, in no way can there be 
absolute truths, as scientists would have it. Instead, for anything to be true or 
determinate, including laws or any morality underpinning them, one must be 
capable of testing it in reality, and verifying its workings and application using 
social experiences.37 Accordingly, truths should be created in the course of goal-
oriented activities, and only considered provable as reliable and successful when 
tested in real life, and acted upon.38  
Secondly, law is indeterminate, not objective; is not neutral and cannot produce 
determinate results during adjudication – a position termed by Burton as the 
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‘determinate critique’.39 Under this conception of law, it is experimental, empirical 
and action-oriented, with a social aspect.40 For instance, enduring morality, settled 
concepts, principles and rules are not sources of law. Instead, they should be 
stated as general propositions, whose meaning, implications and value will depend 
on the results they produce in a given context, following a judge weighing them as 
part of the competing values.41 Because of this, legal principles and doctrine 
should be adjusted to the human conditions they govern, not the other way around. 
Accordingly, principles attain life only by producing workable and just results during 
adjudication.42  
Further, law is indeterminate because it is not so clear, certain or complete as to 
constrain judges to a single result in all similar cases; judges always have 
discretion.43 This type of determinate critique looks at situations such as rules that 
are vague, or open-textured, such that one cannot with certainty point to a 
particular way a judge will decide when applying them in similar cases. 
In contract theory, such indeterminacy is defined by what Adams and Brownsword 
call the realism rulebook, being replete with discretionary normative standards 
such as reasonableness, fairness, conscionability and good faith.44 These 
standards have grown in the common law of contract since 1870s England saw the 
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arrival of neo-classicism, to replace a number of rigid principles and concepts like 
laissez-faire or freedom of contract that defined formalistic classical contract law.45  
Thirdly, although it is a whole unit, the law is not conceptually ordered, as it is not 
logically consistent,46 comprehensive47 or objective.48 Many of its doctrines are not 
coherent, and should be seen as a jumble of many influences that are yet to be 
entirely rationalised.49 Therefore, contract laws are not rules derived from a 
coherent system, or a small number of general, fundamental, and abstract 
principles and concepts. Adams and Brownsword therefore indicate, as one of the 
attributes of realist judging ideology, the lack of recognition of logic in the contract 
rulebook, as judges will override orderly concepts like offer and acceptance to find 
remedies.50 Further, there should be transcendence of the orthodox categorisation 
and classification of law, such as ‘tort’ v. ‘contract’, which according to Grey, are 
symbols of the formalistic conceptual ordering of law.51 Negligence can for instance 
be invoked in allocation of rights and obligations within contract. As such, there is 
no conceptual purity, as judges can fill gaps in law whenever practical justice so 
demands.   
Fourthly, the law is not certain in the way the formalists understand it, although 
legal certainty is vital as the state of a rational and civilised body of laws. The 
formalistic view of law as predictable and certain is viewed as an unrealistic ‘state 
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of formal and static perfection’; 52 an illusion and state of repose humans long for; 
and a form of flattery and a fantasy of judges’ minds, informed by their longing for 
security; yet such cannot be the destiny of man.53 In its place, pragmatists propose 
that certainty has been achieved when every rule can be articulated definitely to an 
end it serves and the grounds for the end have been or can be clearly stated.54 
Accordingly, as noted by Adams and Brownsword, flexible judges are free to 
indulge in doctrinal and conceptual innovations; this has resulted in doctrines like 
promissory estoppel, unconscionability and economic duress.55 This way, contract 
is not only indeterminate in the sense that judges keep making new law; but also, 
businesspersons cannot predict with certainty whether there is any law worthy of 
the label ‘contract law’, in the sense that they can be certain the premises of that 
law are applicable to their transactions.  
Fifthly, the law is a means to an end, judged by its practical utility and the results it 
achieves (the jurisprudence of results), and therefore should not be based upon 
deduction from assumed concepts (the jurisprudence of conception).56 The end 
goal of the law is a good society, a standard represented by public policy and 
established adaptation to human needs. Public policy would in this case be 
informed by the history, culture and experience of the people in the community.57 
The realists also supported such claims by pragmatists that we need to understand 
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law contextually, as an instrument, and a means to an end, so that purpose will 
determine interpretation, even of the plain meaning of words.58 
Therefore, in contract adjudication, judges are expected to decide purposely, not 
only with regard to the purposes of the rulebook, but generally, to bring the law in 
line with changing social and economic contexts.59 Their function is to achieve a 
just solution in the circumstances of each case,60 as opposed to upholding fixed 
principles of contract law.   
3.3.2  Sources of Normativity 
Holmes’s use of the words ‘experience’, ‘the stories of a nation’s development’ and 
‘the prejudices judges share with their fellow–men’ point to the nature of the 
sources of law under flexibility theory in adjudication. The law and its meaning are 
to be created by judges through a medium of culture and defined by experiences 
and facts, with the judge using induction as opposed to deduction.61 Logic is 
therefore subordinate to experience, which is a broader cultural inquiry of history, 
economics, politics, and general reality, as defined by the felt necessities of the 
time.62 
In practical terms, while adjudicating commercial contracts disputes, community- 
and individual-driven non-law normative orders – like ordinary course of dealings, 
usage of trade and custom – become superior to written law and precedents in 
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guiding courts to the right answer, since the former will reflect experience more 
than positive law. The law must be understood theoretically and not 
mathematically,63 as normativity will be recognised by judges not only from the 
rulebook, but more compellingly, from the law’s foundations and those of judicial 
decisions. Goode explains these to imply the social, economic, political and 
historical forces outside the corpus of rules that surround their genesis and 
functioning, as well as the judging environment.64 
Therefore, normativity is always contextual in nature, rooted in custom and the 
shared expectations of a particular community,65 derivable from human 
experiences and practices. Decisions from hard cases are therefore good law, as 
judges should always consider the merits of each case, and bring to bear on the 
facts the competing values at hand, such as fairness and convenience (politics), as 
well as judicial sympathy.66 Judges are taken to be the custodians of practical 
justice and convenience, not mere gatekeepers of the code.67 This perception has 
been confirmed as ruling in Uganda’s Court of Appeal, by Byamugisha, J.A in 
Belex Tours & Travel v. Crane Bank Ltd & Another,68 making judicial sympathy, 
expressed by the judicial hunch – judges’ subjective personal intuitions and 
preferences – a vital source of normativity.  
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3.3.3  Judges’ Role in Contract Disputes  
Because the law is a means to an end, commercial adjudication has to be 
fundamental, legislative, purposeful and result-oriented.69 Such ends were seen as 
achievable by changing the crystallised and inelastic theory and practice of law,70 
otherwise becoming flexible and stretching the meaning and understanding of law 
in adjudication. This possibility is viewed by a group of realists as the norm and not 
a mere exception, creating what has been termed the nightmare view of scholars 
like Frank.71 This is the view that judges never decide cases according to the law; 
as opposed to the noble dreamers like Lon Fuller,72 whose view is that judges 
always decide, although flexibly, according to the law even if the applicable rules 
are not clear. According to Frank, the problem of the law is what he termed the 
basic myth, which is the belief that the law is clear, exact and certain.73 This belief 
is false and the failure to know its falsehood leads to judges making the wrong 
decisions, thus creating the actual problem of the law. 
Two grounds that are later tested in the study have been advanced to support the 
radical realists’ scepticism about rule-based judging. Firstly – that life is too 
complex to be governed by rules, and that therefore there is relevance in including 
non-technical and extra-legal considerations in judicial decision-making.74 
Secondly – that conceptual formalism had a political agenda; for instance, judicial 
decisions upholding the freedom of contract ignored realities like social and 
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economic inequality, and instead served political agendas represented by the 
ideological beliefs of the judges.75 
Therefore, legal relation-back is an attribute of flexibility theory in adjudication, in 
that rules, concepts and principles are not predetermined before disputes are 
decided, but rather they are  built from the social choices judges make in a dispute. 
Pound indicated that rules should fit cases rather than cases fitting rules – a judge 
should not start with the law to apply in a case, but from the result he works 
backwards and determines the concepts or rules to support the end.76 Further, that 
principles of law exist, but they are not fixed.77 They are only derivable by grouping 
together a number of cases to obtain a generalisation that is usable, subject to 
changes when new cases appear with varying facts.78 The main role of judges is to 
weigh competing interests in search of what best serves social policy and reality. 
According to Holmes, this should be done openly and not subconsciously, as the 
latter would leave the actual grounds and foundations of the judgement 
inarticulate.79 The judge will have to look for normativity, even from non-legal 
systems like the values, community norms and aspirations of Ugandans, 
mentioned as ultimate in Article 126 of the country’s constitution. 
One of the issues such flexibility brings is whether judges can make law. Although 
Pound80 was sceptical about it, both strands of realism saw judges as playing the 
central role in the making of the law, maintaining that legal rules and doctrine are 
simply dead letters as long as they are not enforced, or as long as the public does 
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not comply with them.81 Llewellyn82 took this position to the extreme, by claiming 
that what legal officials like judges do about disputes is the law itself. Accordingly, 
as argued by Tamanaha,83 law as a means to an end must be understood not by 
looking at rules, concepts or principles but from the manner in which it functions 
through the conduct of legal officials and the way society reacts to such legal 
actions. The key question that follows then is, what those ends are; the values that 
actually underlie the tension between formalism and flexibility. 
Foundations to the Tension: A General Review 
The following four sub-sections make a general evaluation of key contributions and 
limitations to understanding why the tension prevails, to demonstrate the 
knowledge gap in question. The study is not concerned with why formalism and 
flexibility have not yet been reconciled, but rather investigates the first question, as 
to why the two phenomena have prevailed. Understanding the lack of effective 
reconciliation mechanisms speaks to a policy and social inquiry, which is not viable 
in the time and space available to the study, and in any case, should be based on 
the findings of studies like this one. A review of the existing literature on why 
formalism and flexibility have prevailed in courts reveals trends in thought, notable 
contributions and limitations that partly define the knowledge gap in question.  
3.4.1  The Tension as a Competition of Values 
Scholarly efforts that have attempted to explain the foundations to the tension in 
commercial and indeed other types of adjudication include the view that the tension 
is a result of competing values. This study extends that view, otherwise held by a 
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few scholars, notably McDougal and Scholars of interests jurisprudence. According 
to McDougal,84adjudication can be explained by a contextually determinable set of 
value categories representing culture, and procedures for their clarification. These 
include: power, manifested by coercion that shapes other values; wealth; respect; 
and freedom, implying a free society; all capable of intellectual clarification through 
a social inquiry. Besides this study’s findings not supporting the values of freedom 
and respect, in an attempt to show originality, McDougal harshly and unfairly 
criticises earlier scholars. For instance, he does so against major legal positivism 
theorists like Hart, as well as the realists and sociologists like Pound, for 
concentrating on factual choices in decisions, while ignoring factors such as 
perceptions and rules.85 Further, for failing to articulate a set of value categories, or 
a comprehensive systematic approach to their articulation as a way to guide the 
understanding of adjudication.  
Contrary to those claims by McDougal, several other scholarly work before and 
after his have consciously or otherwise suggested a number of values or value 
categories responsible for formalism and flexibility in adjudication. Some have also 
viewed such values as systematically ordered, or capable of systematic elaboration 
towards formulating judicial guidelines. Pound,86 for instance, viewed competing 
interests in adjudication as falling into three categories – individual, public and 
social interests, with social welfare as the ultimate value that the other values help 
to realise.   
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Further, regarding the systematic elaboration – one may differ with the evaluation 
in Hart’s rules of recognition theory,87 but saying that it is not a systematic way of 
arriving at judicial guidelines, is misconceived. The rules of recognition proposed 
by Hart88 are not only systematic but encompass the rule of change to cater for 
uncertainty and legal adaptability to change,89 and also the rule of adjudication, 
providing a method by which judges can recognise normativity and its 
applicability.90 Further, the theory is contextual, as it provides that rules about rules 
ought to be identified using a pre-law hypothesis, informed by customsocial and 
cultural norms; an argument Kenny and Devenney also advance with regard to all 
judicial choices.91 According to Freeman, such pre-law hypotheses are observable 
from practice and incorporate substantive values.92  
Furthermore, like McDougal,93 the jurisprudence of interests school94 (and later the 
law and economics school)95 views adjudication as underpinned by competing 
values that are hierarchically ordered. The sociologists’ interests jurisprudence that 
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McDougal96 blames for not being elaborate, also propose a contextual step-by-step 
systematic analysis,97 similar to McDougal’s own proposal,98 for identifying, 
elaborating and balancing competing values to guide adjudication.99  
However, there is no consensus on the ranking of values in the hierarchy, as 
scholars differ on what the judges’ ultimate value is,100 to which all other values are 
subordinate, and which adjudication ought to satisfy. This study takes the view, 
that value hierarchy is not only necessary but also logically possible. The hierarchy 
should be arrived at using the influence and frequency of each value or its 
indicative lower values during the content analysis, which should determine 
whether its weight qualifies it for being amongst the dominant ones to be balanced, 
as part of the effort towards coexistence.  
More significantly, this study supports the view that underlying the tension is a 
context-specific systematic ordering of value categories. In this case, the content 
analysis shows an ordering based on four output levels, which have guided the 
search for, presentation and elaboration of the values in Uganda’s context. The 
first output level is the set of sub-values of the higher values, in the form of 
indicative values. These are directly observable motivations of judges’ decisions 
that imply higher values. The second output level is the set of higher values that 
underlie and combine to form more abstract general values. For example, freedom 
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and sanctity of contract as implying a general value of market individualism. The 
third output level is the general categorisation of values, such as values of the 
law’s perceptions, values of the judicial role, doctrinal vis-à-vis pluralist or 
systematic values, and legal vis-à-vis extra-legal values. Fourthly is the 
institutionally based divide of internal v. external judging criteria, relating to values 
that are internal as opposed to external to the judiciary.  
3.4.2  Doctrinal versus Pluralist Value Perceptions 
The search for foundations has taken two theoretical dimensions. Some studies101 
have explained phenomena like formalism in the tension solely by reference to 
contract doctrinal values; while others102 are pluralists in the sense that they have 
viewed the foundations as including externalities to doctrine. Such externalities 
include values of a systematic nature exhibited by a country’s legal system, as well 
as wider societal values. In line with this study’s coexistence thesis, both are 
relevant to the search for foundations to the tension in Uganda. The study 
proceeds on the presumption that in hard cases, neither formalism nor flexibility 
can be explained by doctrinal values alone, although such values are a key 
ingredient in the brew that motivates judicial approach. Even the noble dreamer 
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realists Llewellyn103 and Fuller,104 who put up a big fight for flexibility judging, 
acknowledged this by declaring that concepts are indispensable because they 
bring the categorisation and ordering that forms the basis for judicial reasoning. At 
the same time, other factors like policy, efficiency, fairness and practical justice are 
at play in such cases, as judges are confronted with the practical implications of 
their decisions.  
But even then, although the list of underlying values identified by this study is also 
far from exhaustive, many of the pluralists cover limited scopes that leave major 
categories of underlying values unarticulated. Significant amongst these is 
MacNeil,105 who in a similar manner to this study views such values to be 
categorisable as internal and external, with both sovereign and non-sovereign 
normative sources being part of the external.106 Further, his view is that with 
flexibility-oriented relational contracting such a division cannot be strictly adhered 
to.107  
However, the nature of contract and its doctrine, as opposite to contract 
adjudication, form the focus of MacNeil’s analysis, and his internal-external divide. 
Internal values are considered as those exemplified by the discrete or relational 
nature of contracting, as opposed to their being internal to the institution and the 
culture of judging as is perceived in this study. The result is that although some 
values may seem similar, the way they have manifested and influenced judging will 
differ when tested on the basis of real judicial opinions. An example is what 
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MacNeil calls the power norm, that relates to the sovereign’s use of law to enforce 
contracts and liberty, as well as restraining the adversary from enjoying rights or 
breaching contracts.108 In this study the power value relates to judicial absolutism 
in the case of flexibility and judicial restraint in the formalism sense, where judges 
are authorised or restrained by laws such as the constitution and other laws on 
judging, from being formalistic or flexible.   
Furthermore, studies like McDougal’s109 are rare, as key pluralists Atiyah,110 
Tamanaha,111 Goode112 and Friedman113 have identified the set of values 
underlying formalism or flexibility as an ancillary element in studies on wider 
subjects, and therefore do not devote enough space to fully articulate them. As a 
result, the values articulated are, as is the case with doctrinal theorists, a result of 
conceptualism and general theorisation about wording, in random cases and 
statutes. Both fall short of applying more extensive research using rigorous 
methodology as is done in this study; that would reveal value patterns, trends and 
practical influences during judging. It seems to be the reason Tamanaha gives very 
little attention to doctrinal values, as he extensively articulates those manifested by 
the judging institution and environment from historical materials. Key doctrines like 
freedom of contract make their way into the discussion as proof of instrumentalism; 
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formalistic values like judicial objectivity as proof of the causal, relationship 
between them and the tension.114 
At the same time, even McDougal’s work was, admittedly, restricted to general 
values of human nature,115 which he termed the basic values of human dignity. 
Further, as is the case with this study, McDougal’s value categories and specific 
values were not comprehensive; like the bulk of the literature on the subject, his 
work was not backed by a social inquiry, which he admitted would provide a more 
adequate inquiry and analysis.116 In this case, a further social inquiry into the 
values identified would help validate their influence in adjudication.   
Relatedly, the doctrinal value theorists have generally been more concerned with 
articulating values underlying contract doctrine, as Adams and Brownsword 
admit.117 They have aimed at understanding rules and standards in statutes as well 
as precedents, rather than what motivates the judging phenomena of formalism 
and flexibility. Further, apart from rare and half-hearted attempts like Adams and 
Brownsword’s,118 most of the research has not been towards finding ways for 
reconciliation or any other form of coexistence between the competing values. The 
attempts in question are half-hearted because they do not boldly contribute 
towards the possibility of constructing autonomous, objective and rational judging 
guidelines informed by a reconciliation of competing interests they identify; rather, 
they provide a few principles judges could use to manage the tension. The 
perception that the two phenomena cannot be reconciled persists in these 
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works,119 which could explain why so little effort is made to go beyond 
understanding the implications of such values underlying doctrine to adjudicatory 
theory, and how the tension they cause can be managed. The other general trend 
underpinning the literature on the values underlying formalism, flexibility, and 
therefore the tension is the dominance of monist jurisprudence over multivalued 
theories. 
3.4.3  Dominance of Monist Jurisprudence 
Literature on why the tension has prevailed is dominated by monist value theories, 
which advance a single value as being the prime one, standing at the apex of the 
hierarchy.120 They seek to understand contract law and adjudication as if they were 
intended to satisfy that prime value, making it the one that transcends all other 
values, the latter being articulable only through the prime value.121 Examples of 
these values are parties’ will,122 efficiency,123 consent,124 contract as promise,125 
certainty as prime value,126 market individualism127 and  conceptual formalism.128  
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On the other hand is a rare but growing view, propounded by Posner,129 
Llewellyn,130 Farber,131 Eisenberg,132 MacNeil,133 Trebilcock134 and Trakman,135 as 
well as Schwartz and Scott, that monist theories do not fully account for judicial 
choice.136 Instead, there is a need to develop a multivalued understanding of why 
judges make the choices they make, and find a way to give due regard to, and 
balance, the several values competing during adjudication; in other words, work 
towards the coexistence of the values engendering formalism and flexibility.  
This study contributes to expanding this latter, multivalued, school of thought by 
demonstrating that in the Ugandan context, the tension is underpinned by a 
multiplicity of values motivating both sides of the formalism-flexibility divide. No 
single value can claim superiority or dominance over others, to qualify for being 
treated as the ultimate guide during adjudication. Rather, several values contribute 
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to the tension in different measures, combining to compete on each side of the 
tension; which calls for studies like this one, into ways to manage their balance and 
coexistence.  This is against the backdrop of the existing literature, especially the 
monist theories having focused on jurisdictions other than Uganda.   
3.4.4  Relevance to Uganda 
Finally, none of the studies found and reviewed relate to commercial adjudication 
in Uganda. Most of the studies were performed in the Western world, and therefore 
relate to values of doctrines, and non-doctrinal values, in different contexts. 
Referring to the period before and after President Idi Amin’s regime (1971-1979), 
Macneil137 simply points to Uganda as the best example of understanding how the 
political and economic collapse of a country can affect contractual behaviour, 
thereby affecting contract law and adjudication. Although a starting point for the 
study in the sense that the presumptive values identified are coded to guide the 
content analysis, unless supported by the findings, they cannot be relied on to 
make conclusions about the tension in Uganda. This study for instance pursues the 
possibility of coexistence between formalism and flexibility in Uganda’s commercial 
adjudication. This is because, in Uganda’s context, coexistence is the call of legal 
and practical reality. Further, as the following section demonstrates, there are more 
points of agreement between theorists on both sides of the divide than might 
appear on the surface.  
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The Case for a Coexistence Judging Paradigm in Uganda 
In the face of a number of scholars claiming that formalism and flexibility cannot 
coexist – such as Tamanaha,138 Botoshi,139 Minda140 and Wolff141 – have been led 
to question whether this claim is logical, and therefore revisit the views of other 
scholars on the subject. In addition to legal and contextual foundations for its 
proposed adoption in Uganda, which will be analysed in chapters six to nine, the 
following part reveals legal theoretical support for a coexistence paradigm of 
judging, appearing from as far back as the days of Austinian legal positivism. This 
follows unconvincing arguments advanced by orthodox – and in some cases 
contemporary – legal theorists, for a purely formalistic judging paradigm on the one 
hand; and on the other hand, the limitations of the attempts by other scholars like 
the realists to construct an alternative flexible paradigm. 
3.5.1  Coexistence Support in Formalistic Legal Theory 
The orthodox legal positivists had in their theory the realisation that in some cases, 
courts will meet situations where positive law offers no clear answer and the judge 
will have to look for an answer outside the expressions of black-letter law. This is 
contrary to criticism from scholars like Dworkin142 and Morison, 143 namely that the 
positivists like Austin lacked a theory of adjudication and failed to take into account 
the social context within which the legal decision-making is made. Austin for 
example, claimed that customary laws were rules set by mere opinions of the 
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governed, and only became positive law after being relied on as grounds in judicial 
decisions.144 Further, that after becoming grounds for the judicial opinions, the 
customary rules acquire a dual character of being both positive law and positive 
morality. 
Austin also supported coexistence as the ideal paradigm through his sovereign 
theory on habitual obedience.145 For a sovereign to pass commands that would 
have the force of law, he or she had to enjoy habitual obedience from the 
community. According to Freeman, in doing so, Austin recognised that the law 
cannot itself be based on the law but must be based on something outside the 
law.146 He therefore sought to base it upon fact, as the habitual obedience of the 
mass of the population. This acknowledgement of the relationship between the 
legal norms and their non-legal sources is no different from the claim by Holmes, 
that the law reflects the history of a country and the experiences of the legal 
players.147 A point of convergence between flexibility theory and positivist 
formalism therefore exists with regard to the source of law being outside the law, at 
least in the case of customary norms.   
Further, there is convergence regarding the judges’ role in the making of law. 
Austin’s view that it is the invocation and application of customary norms by judges 
that make them law  is similar to the claim by the flexibility-oriented realists that 
rules remain dead letters until actively applied and acted upon by judges.148 
Furthermore, by claiming that customary law acquires a dual character of positive 
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law and morality, Austin was clearly speaking about the paradigm of coexistence of 
the formalistic positive law and the flexible morality. It is these common grounds 
that point to the necessity for a paradigm that allows for the coexistence of 
formalism and flexibility becoming a matter of consensus in legal theory. 
Following Austin, later positivists Kelsen and Hart provided more direct support for 
the coexistence judicial paradigm. Hart rejected Austin’s strictly formalistic theory 
and sought to put forward an improved version of legal positivism.149 He claimed 
that the legal system was a union of rules, constituting both primary and secondary 
rules that made up one whole. Primary rules are the rules providing substantive 
law that describe legal obligations, while secondary ones relate to matters like 
judicial procedure and the law of evidence.150  
Hart supported the coexistence of formalism and flexibility and further claimed that 
each primary rule has two components, the core and penumbra.151 There is more 
to a legal system than a union of rules, in that moral principles and substantive 
values should be taken into account by a judge in resolving a case, using the 
penumbra of a rule.152 In this case, the rule is always determinate and certain at 
the core, in which case formalism should be used in its application, but can be 
uncertain and require flexibility in adjudication at the penumbra.153 
Therefore, understanding the core of a rule will require strict interpretation, 
discovery and logical deduction. On the other hand, the penumbra of the rule 
should be understood and applied using the purpose, reality and general context of 
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the contract or adjudication, thereby attaining a framework for coexistence, at least 
in the sense of both judicial approaches having clear provinces.  
Hart154 was more emphatic when it came to the nature and source of what he 
called ‘rules of recognition’.155 These are the rules that would guide a judge in 
determining the validity and applicability of the primary rules to apply in particular 
circumstances, as opposed to Austin’s theory of habitual obedience. These rules of 
recognition are not static and determinate but must incorporate substantive values. 
Rules of recognition are meant to arise out of mere practice, not law, and the level 
of flexibility a judge is to use in invoking these rules should be an empirical 
question dependent on the moment.156 Hart’s strand of positivism therefore 
supported a formalistic definition of the core of rules, and flexibility as the default 
approach to adopt in hard cases. In such cases, the judge would be allowed to 
weigh between several answers that can be correct using substantive values, 
thereby supporting a form of guideline that can lead to coexistence. 
Kelsen, who wrote around the same time, is known for his ‘pure theory of law’.157 
Under the pure theory, the legal process is a hierarchy of norms, each norm getting 
its validity from a higher norm, until one reaches the basic norm as the ultimate law 
and guide to adjudication. Kelsen158 specifically supported the coexistence 
paradigm when he claimed that as long as there is discretion or a choice as to 
applicable rules, the norm creating function takes a political character, but the 
function is still a legal one because it is within the framework of norms. By this, 
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Kelsen was admitting the role of non-legal values in determining the legal rules that 
judges are to use in adjudication. Calling it a political function connotes extra-legal 
considerations judges are to take into account when deciding hard cases and is an 
endorsement of flexibility as the default approach to use.  
Accordingly, Freeman has argued that Kelsen, although a positivist, was not a 
formalist because he did not believe that the interpretation and application of 
norms should be mechanical. To the contrary, those higher norms determine the 
creation and content of norms only to an extent. However, a formalistic agenda can 
be equally highlighted in Kelsen’s theory by his clothing of judicial decisions, 
politically reached, with legality. If he did not mean to uphold the value of 
formalism, there would be no reason to confer legality on a role politically played by 
a judge.  The better way of interpreting Kelsen’s ‘political legality view’ is that he 
was supporting a coexistence paradigm. However, what he failed to do was to 
suggest what would guide judges in their political function, in order to retain the 
framework of norms. 
Further, Kelsen claims that at the top of his proposed hierarchy of norms, the basic 
norm is not created by any particular procedure but is a mere presumption.159 The 
factors informing this presumption are not well articulated, but one can only 
conclude that this was another admission of the ultimate source of law not being 
law itself, contrary to the formalists’ claims of the determinacy, autonomy and 
neutrality of positive law. Such space given to extra-legal factors implies a judge’s 
authority to invoke substantive values in hard cases, and thereby create rules to fill 
gaps left by legislation. At the same time, the claim that all legal norms have a legal 
source reasserts the value of formalistically engendered legalism, thereby 
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supporting a case for a mechanism to attain the coexistence of formalism and 
flexibility. 
This support for a coexistence paradigm is further illustrated by Kelsen’s 
reasoning, that a legal or normative order is only valid if it corresponds with reality 
and has efficacy.160 That relationship between validity and efficacy is the tension 
between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, which can be resolved by looking at ‘the 
agreement’ as a yardstick.  Here, he was clearly promoting a coexistence 
paradigm that would be pegged on formalistic laws being balanced with contextual 
reality. Further, as supported by the findings in this study, the notion of contract 
was declared as an arena where such balancing can be done successfully. 
Therefore, revisiting formalistic legal theory reveals that what appears to be the 
irreconcilable division between formalism and flexibility-divide is simply mystical. 
Several major proponents of formalism admit room and offer support for a 
coexistence of formalism and flexibility in adjudication. This compromise proves the 
necessity and viability of coexistence, as pursued by this study.   
3.5.2  Co-existence Support in Flexibility Legal Theory. 
Proponents of the flexibility-judging paradigm have also provided support for 
caution and the need for a middle line defined by coexistence. This support is 
based mainly on the acknowledgment that legal certainty is necessary, at the very 
least as a matter of degree, and the need to restrain judges to avoid misuse of 
process, and excesses. 
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The legal realists, whose main mission was to challenge certainty-oriented 
formalism, did not challenge the proposition that the law should be certain.161 To 
the contrary, Holmes called for objective tests to make the law more predictable, 
and advocated for efforts to narrow the zone of uncertainty as far as possible.162 
Having led the theory that law is indeterminate, and adjudication should be flexibly 
approached, this call from Holmes for legal certainty and objective rules is probably 
the strongest support for a coexistence paradigm. 
Further, the proposition that – even if only to an extent – legal certainty should exist 
was shared by another key proponent of the flexibility adjudicatory theory: 
Llewellyn.163 Goode notes that realists like Llewellyn and Fuller, who advocated for 
judges to decide cases in accordance with policy, concede that concepts are vital 
and should not be changed lightly.164 This goes further to render support to 
coexistence as a judging paradigm. Certainty, even if to a small degree, will bring 
determinate and objectively applied rules, standards and principles, thereby 
balancing the spirit behind formalism with flexibility.  
Fuller takes the blame in the adjudication puzzle away from conceptualism; instead 
he finds the main error to be a misapplication and worship of concepts.165 The 
alternative to worship of concepts would in this case be a selective application of 
concepts, which is in line with a co-existence between formalism – as represented 
by concepts – and flexibility, as represented by policy considerations. 
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For his part, Goode proposed that viewing both legal and extra-legal norms 
hierarchically was the principle that should govern when a concept can be changed 
by a judge;166 in other words, a judicial guideline to coexistence. He argued that 
since concepts are instruments of long-term value, they should only rarely be 
changed, to maintain their underlying purposes. Therefore, the more fundamental 
the concept, the greater the care should be before changing or circumventing it. On 
the other hand, important policy considerations should not be subordinated to 
business expediency. This means that even amongst non-legal considerations, 
there should be ranks of importance in the application of norms.  
Besides the realists, the pragmatists, as a less radical strand of flexibility legal 
theory, provided more direct support for a coexistence-judging paradigm. 
Tamanaha notes that Pound’s last search was for what he termed the ideal 
element in law, which was meant to be a technique that the law can apply to 
control instrumentalism and achieve its balance with formalism.167 The rationale 
was his acknowledgement that the excesses of instrumentalism needed to be 
controlled using a canon of values. 
Another group of flexibility-leaning theorists who support a coexistence paradigm 
are the analytical legal theorists; this grouping, grew out of critiquing orthodox legal 
theory. Amongst these, Dworkin168 reasoned that rules in legislation and case law 
should coexist with moral considerations, not because judges use rules due to their 
morality, but because moral considerations justify the rules. As such, there is a 
need for a theory of adjudication that will determine what guides judges when they 
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‘run out of rules’ and have to resort to such moral principles. The reference to 
judges running out of rules is when the judge is faced with a hard case. Therefore, 
Dworkin was promoting moral values as the source of normativity where the law is 
inadequate; in other words, judges can flexibly fill gaps in the law. 
Such viability of coexistence is also recognised by relational contract theory 
acknowledging the necessity of formalism in contract doctrine. MacNeil, for 
instance, argues that an interaction between the positive law of the sovereign and 
the behavioural dimensions of relational contract theory reveals that positive law 
supports both relational contract and discrete exchange.169 The law commonly 
allows discrete exchange with its corresponding notions of freedom of contract and 
property.170 At the same time, relational contract was aided by, among others, the 
law of principal agency, employment, corporations, and the state intervention in 
contract by regulation.171  
Therefore, although the tension between formalism and flexibility appears to 
involve two conflicting blocks of legal theory at polar ends, revisiting the thoughts of 
particular scholars proves that there is a silent consensus towards a coexistence-
judging paradigm as the ideal.  The key issue therefore becomes the continued 
search for Pound’s ‘ideal element’, being the gap in legal literature that this study 
contributes to filling, as a way towards establishing the appropriate management 
regime to achieve the coexistence between formalism and flexibility. 
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3.5.3  Coexistence as the Ideal Paradigm under Legal Pluralist Uganda 
Besides coexistence having received support and admission from proponents of 
both formalism and flexibility, the paradigm is inevitable in legally pluralist societies 
like Uganda. Pluralism theory helps to understand the nature and source of 
contract law applicable in Uganda and the role of judges in the country’s legal 
system. The claim by pluralists in this case is as put by Griffiths172, that advocates 
of legal centralism (which includes top-down proponents such as Austin and 
Hobbes, as well as bottom-up theorists like Kelsen and Hart) provide, only an ideal 
and illusory account of the law as being an exclusive, systematic and unified 
hierarchical ordering of normative propositions. To the contrary, legal pluralism in 
fact exists, either where the state recognises different bodies of law for different 
groups in the population, as is the case in Uganda, or where pluralism is the 
empirical state of affairs.173 
Legal pluralism has, since colonialism, characterised Uganda’s legal system, with 
the English law of contract and institutions functioning alongside indigenous and 
locally grown normative systems. This has always produced a mixture of different 
normative systems functioning within one legal order. Uganda’s legal pluralism is 
however different from the type commonly observed by legal pluralism scholars, 
where state law stands independent of non-state normative orders within the same 
legal system. In Uganda, the constitution not only recognises such non-state 
normative systems, but gives them legal force by obliging courts to adhere to them, 
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although not calling them law itself or otherwise incorporating them into the content 
of the law.174 
Although sceptical about the possibility of a coexistence paradigm, Minda observes 
that post-modern jurisprudence reflects a course of thinking where a more pluralist, 
contextual and non-essential explanation of law and legal decision-making is 
developed for multicultural societies.175 There is a movement away from the ‘rule of 
law’ thinking based on universal truths, the belief in one rule of law; one fixed 
pattern, set of patterns or generalised theory of jurisprudence. Instead the trend is 
to use interpretation in some cases to arrive at new thinking about the law. 
A number of other theories contain elements of the legal pluralism line of 
reasoning; that there is law beyond law, and a multiplicity of rules of law; while 
exploring the practical implementation of laws in judicial decisions. These are, 
mainly: critical legal theory, relational theory; legal realism; pragmatism; 
instrumentalism; institutionalism; and the economic analysis of law. However, this 
pluralist movement does not reject formalism; nor does it embrace unprincipled or 
uncontrolled flexibility. To the contrary, it stands for recognition of the normativity of 
positive and formalistic law while at the same time removing the shadow 
surrounding non-state normative sources; the shadow that allows judges to invoke 
and ignore them at will.  
In the next chapter, the tension as a reality resulting from the multiple sources of 
legal norms, as well as other foundations, as will be discussed in chapters six to 
nine; is brought to the fore, and what remains is for lawyers to find means of 
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coexistence between the flexibility that such norms bring, and the formalism at the 
centre of positive law and legalism. Accordingly, following the content analysis of 
judicial opinions, guided by a coding of the key attributes of both formalism and 
flexibility as revealed in this chapter. Following this, the next chapter illustrates that 
it is logical to search for coexistence, by presenting and discussing the study’s 
findings regarding the tension as a reality in Uganda; its manifestations, 
competition of values as its foundation, and the inadequacy and incoherency of 
existing attempts to manage it.  
Therefore, the next chapter will bring understanding to the problem under study, 
thereby forming a practical context and basis for the discussion on the possibility 
and viability of its management in subsequent chapters.  In the same way, the 














 The Tension in Uganda’s Commercial Judging 
Paradigm 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the nature of the tension in Uganda’s judging paradigm, 
laying the basis for investigating why the tension has prevailed, and how its 
underlying competing values can be reconciled, as a way towards managing it. The 
judging paradigm is explained against the backdrop of absolute judicial flexibility 
having defined judging in pre-colonial Uganda. This was followed by the concurrent 
practice of formalism and flexibility from the colonial era to date. The two judging 
approaches are shown as having been continuously, concurrently and incoherently 
practised, thus the tension between them; with hardly any rational efforts to create 
coexistence. 
The chapter therefore begins by examining the background to the commercial 
judicial approach in the country, revealing that the tension begun with the 
transplant of English law to Uganda, and was given a new dimension when the 
colonial government allowed the pre-colonial flexibility-dominated judicial system to 
continue alongside the tension-ridden English judicial system. Since then, 
postcolonial- judging has been defined by a continuous decline in formalism, and 
apparent dominance of flexibility over formalism. However, mixed-approach 
judging is becoming the third and fastest-growing trend.  
The chapter ends by identifying and evaluating the existing mechanisms to 
manage the tension, demonstrating that most of the relevant legal instruments are 
paper tigers; they not only get watered down by their own provisions, but also are 
also redundant in the arena of judicial practice. Further, that throughout history, 
individual judges have made reference to being guided by criteria that are 
incomprehensive, incoherent, inconsistent and uncertain in content, source and 
methodology. However, their presence highlights the viability and need for 
commercial judging guidelines as a way towards coexistence.  
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Pre-Colonial Uganda: An Era of Absolute Flexibility 
By way of a historical background to understanding colonial and post-colonial 
judicial approaches, this section supports Holmes in saying that the life of the law is 
made up of the stories of a nation’s development.1 Besides the content analysis of 
judicial opinions, values that have underpinned the tension can be inferred from 
such historical occurrences and institutions that surrounded Uganda’s commercial 
judging.  
The British colonised Uganda in 1894,2 and created the country Uganda as a social 
and political collectivity, followed by the transplant of the English law and system of 
commercial justice already characterised by the tension. Prior to colonialism, 
contrary to scholarly claims that the tension is as old as Aristotle;3 amongst the 
Ugandan native communities it was not part of the justice system. Allot confirms 
that there was a developed concept of law and judicial system that grew 
organically and resolved commercial disputes with flexibility, meaning that 
formalism was completely alien.4 No written law existed, although a concept of law 
and legal system existed as a social reality, with norms, institutions and processes 
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that included adjudication and contract.5 Such processes defined the norms and 
institutions in action,6 not the formalistic other way round. The key issue then is, 
what values and interests underlay such flexibility.  
4.2.1  Foundations to Pre-colonial Flexibility 
A number of values help to explain this judging paradigm and the absence of the 
tension in pre-colonial Uganda. The values identified are all external; they can be 
inferred from the market and the general body politic of the time, as no exhaustive 
records of contract doctrine or judging culture seem to exist. They include 
conformism to the nature of the marketplace and the habits of its players; judicial 
absolutism; social support; the conceptions of the judicial role; and the ‘Ubuntu’ 
conception of justice and fairness.  
Market Conformism 
Commercial contract law is a people natured law, in that it addresses ways in 
which merchants relate with one another and third parties in a marketplace;7 the 
institutions in place to regulate contracts will reflect the commercial persons’ best 
practices.8 In pre-colonial Ugandan communities, the informal and flexible pre-law 
institutions that included the economic practices, attitudes and the social-political 
environments constituted the reality that gave rise to community values and 
interests, mainly of a public and social nature, underlying flexibility judging. For 
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instance, by 1894 in the kingdom states of Nkore, Toro and Bunyoro as well as 
Buganda, classification existed, with some communities agrarian while others were 
aristocrats, and there emerged a feudal system with private property and contract 
defining the marketplace.9 
The rulers, who doubled as judges, monopolised some sectors, such as the 
international trade in slaves and ivory, in exchange for goods like cotton products 
and guns.10 This meant that adjudication had to be flexible, to allow them to 
continue protecting their own interests. Further, there was no concept of money – 
which is the medium through which accuracy in transactions, formalistic doctrine 
and adjudication are realised today11 – as trade was on barter terms.12 The 
indeterminacy of such considerations could not be facilitated with static rules or 
formalistic judging, making flexibility inevitable. As indicated by Allott, conformism 
to a market defined by such informal and flexible transactions led to flexibility 
judging, with unpredictability of dispute settlement and the norms to be used.13  
Judicial Absolutism  
Pre-colonial flexibility judging was also motivated by absolutism, a value of political 
culture which extends to the courts, where the rulers are deemed to have final 
authority on all matters including the law, and are not answerable to anyone, not 
even the subjects.14 As illustrated by French political history, it is responsible for 
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authoritarianism becoming part of a country’s political culture, and in turn part of 
the flexible judicial culture. In medieval France, flexibility thrived, as judges – 
having been appointed by the Kings– saw no obligation to justify themselves when 
making decisions.15 Even to date, the 800 years of absolutism in French political 
culture continue to explain the continuation of flexible adjudication in France’s High 
Court.16 Likewise, in Uganda, absolutism has consistently survived the numerous 
changes in the country. In pre-colonial Uganda, the highest political office came 
with the highest judicial authority, as the two were fused, and lower political offices 
came with judicial authority given by the absolute rulers.17 In many respects, 
absolutism can be illustrated as part of the political-social reality, which underlay 
flexible adjudication.  
Firstly, political culture was defined by the concept of a sovereign with absolute 
authority to rule over all matters, including law and judging.18 Such rulers had the 
final word on the content of law and justice – almost akin to the positivist sovereign 
proposed by Austin19 – whose command was law, backed by sanctions and 
enjoying habitual obedience, but in this case having judicial powers as well.  
Secondly, the highest rulers, such as the Kabaka (King) in the Buganda kingdom, 
were the final courts of appeal, to which disputes decided by subordinate ministers 
and chiefs could be referred.20  
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Therefore, each community had an absolute ruler as the person who adjudicated 
disputes, enjoying unrestrained discretion; which to Allot, led to flexibility in 
determining the understanding of legal norms and their implementation.21 The only 
institution that would have curtailed the rulers’ appetite for flexibility was the public, 
which enjoyed a central role in adjudication as a primary source of law and 
determinant of the acceptability of judicial decisions. However, the public 
mechanisms of social support and public opinion were themselves an additional 
recipe for judicial flexibility.  
Social Support  
Flexibility in Uganda’s pre-colonial adjudication is also attributable to social support 
being the basis of the acceptability and validity of legal norms. Eisenberg explained 
that social support is a value underpinning judicial decisions, as it requires that 
rules established or applied by the courts should be supported by the general 
standards of society or special standards in the legal system.22 Such standards 
include all moral norms, policies and experiences that have public support. In pre-
colonial Uganda, the role of social support in making adjudication flexible can be 
appreciated from the structure and composition of courts, and the concept of law at 
the time. 
In much of pre-colonial Uganda, normativity and judicial decisions were dictated by 
public opinion, as the courts of first instance and in some cases reference or 
appeal, were the elders in a community, with the public represented or directly 
participating. The function of a judge was to collect and express public opinion from 
the people at the hearing, a type of judicial practice similar to the role of judges as 
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defined by institutional theorists.23 In line with this, Hone noted that, during civil 
disputes like contract, the side that adduced most witnesses carried the day, and 
litigants would hire partisans to applaud every point made by their employers, and 
loudly jeer the adversary’s witnesses.24 
Regarding the nature of the sources of law in pre-colonial systems like Uganda’s, 
Hart, relates that ‘every legal system operated on the basis of authoritative sources 
of law’.25 The sources of law derived such authority from social support, making 
them indeterminate, diverse and inherently flexible, with social convenience, and 
not certainty, the measure of social welfare.26 These sources of law were 
indeterminate and flexible in a number of ways.  
Firstly, the law was never codified or otherwise written down in any form,27 but 
always-verified using social facts observed by the population.28 The rule of the 
recognition of law was support from the indeterminate ideals, practices and 
opinions of the public. Secondly, there were no secondary rules or norms, such as 
the civil procedure or judging rules, to resolve doubts; which of course led to 
uncertainty and flexibility in judging.29  
The value of social support can also be traced in the process of law making. There 
was no lawmaker whose word would be looked out for to define the law, making it 
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everybody’s role to observe It.30 Public opinion confirmed and standardised a 
custom or practice as law,31 and the courts merely expressed, developed or 
reinforced the law already made by the people organically through practice.32 The 
growth of law was natural, evolutionary, unplanned, unconscious and spontaneous; 
it changed easily, irrationally and organically following a change in the 
circumstances in which the law had to operate.33 This mode of law making could 
only breed flexibility, as norms were applied to suit the context of the time. 
Accordingly, commercial contract law was flexibly grown from practice, as 
happened in other jurisdictions, contract being ‘an empty vessel into which the 
contracting parties can pour practically any legal mixture they choose’.34 As trade 
grew, contract law and adjudication were bound to follow its course; the course of 
informality, with no fixed rules. In such a system, the perceptions of the judicial role 
had to be flexibility-oriented as well.  
Conceptions of the Judicial Role  
The judicial system did not have a rational system following a particular theory of 
jurisprudence. However, the only concept of justice pursued by courts was 
substantive justice, which connotes flexible judging. The 1926 report of the 
Provincial Commissioners, recommended the continuation of the flexible pre-
colonial judicial system, on the ground that it gave substantive justice to the 
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people.35 The report further detailed the basis for this value, thus: it was quick, 
understandable by the people, in accordance with people’s hereditary customs and 
unfettered by procedure. The customary values the report alluded to as underlying 
flexibility included the declaration of rights and duties, as well as remedies 
available for breach of contract, the rationale for which speaks to the Ubuntu 
concept of justice.  
The Ubuntu Concept of Justice  
During much of pre-colonial Uganda, especially areas inhabited by the abantu 
ethnic group, one of the main motivators of flexibility was Ubuntu, a traditional ideal 
of justice and fairness prevalent in many African cultures,36 including Uganda.37 It 
is a value connoting compassion, reciprocity, dignity, harmony, simple humanity, 
humanity in the sense of being interconnected, and the common good.38 These 
ingredients manifested by the remedies for breach of contract being restitution,39 
bargaining40 and settlement.41 There were no compensatory, punitive or exemplary 
reliefs. Instead, remedies akin to specific performance and restitution were 
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common. For instance, Hone reports that if one’s claim was a goat, the court 
ordered that one be given a goat and nothing more.42 
Further, the compliance to remedial judicial decisions was voluntary, with no 
compulsion except the fear of public opinion;43 otherwise, no court awards 
enforcement machinery existed.44 This is because the key goal of adjudication was 
restorational, not just of a party’s position, but of social welfare, represented by the 
need to keep balanced the state of things within society.45 The competing interests 
were mainly of a public nature, as all wrongs were deemed wrongs against society; 
thus the lack of a distinction between civil and criminal wrongs.46 The 
corresponding judicial flexibility resonates with social welfare having been 
advanced by legal process theorists as the key goal for flexibility in adjudication.47 
The other manifestation of Ubuntu was that the key role of a judge was to be the 
chief bargainer and settler of cases, as opposed to the formalistic judge’s role of 
finding the right answers.48 Such adjudication connotes judicial flexibility, as no 
single answers are expected, but rather what is contextually just or fair; although in 
this case the result was open to manipulation not only by means of bribing the 
public, but also the courts.49 This implies that bribery was not seen as a vice, but 
rather a means to empower the courts to reach a decision flexibly in order to meet 
certain goals. 
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Therefore, flexibility judging in pre-colonial Uganda was underpinned by flexibility-
oriented pre-law institutions, such as cultural values. The adjudicatory landscape 
was to drastically change, as colonialism brought Uganda into the world 
commercial justice arena, with the introduction of English law and the English 
system of adjudication, which was already experiencing the tension. At the same 
time, the pre-colonial flexibility was not thereby replaced, but given new vehicles 
and shapes, setting the stage for the tension in contemporary Uganda, without any 
significant efforts to manage it.  
The Tension in Contemporary Uganda 
Contemporary commercial judging represents adjudicatory patterns and trends, 
from the colonial introduction of the English legal system to present day Uganda. 
This is the judging period when formalism and its tension with flexibility become the 
new reality, in place of the pre-colonial flexibility-judging paradigm. 
4.3.1  The Tension’s Cradle: English Legal System Transplant 
Both formalism and flexibility were permissible under the transplanted English legal 
system, because common law represented both immemorial custom and principle 
and was kept up to date through on-going application and conformity to society. As 
such, it stayed principled, rational and based on reason (formalistic) while at the 
same time capable of being moulded to adapt and conform to changes in society.50 
Alongside this dualistic common law, the pre-colonial flexible indigenous 
commercial justice system was left to run, without clear judicial guidelines for 
managing the resultant tension between the two, let alone the one inherent in the 
common law, especially when it came to hard cases.  This marked the beginning of 
                                            
 
50 BZ Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2006) 32-33. 
 157
the tension in Ugandan courts, as the trend duplicated that in other parts of British 
Africa where the indigenous judicial system had been maintained alongside the 
translocated English system. Commenting on the decision in Dyson Holdings Ltd v 
Fox,51 which interpreted the word family‘’ in a statute with regard to the social 
context, Allott52correctly defined the situation in such courts as an agony that  
springs from the clash between rigid rules or canons of construction on one 
hand, which cannot be abandoned without throwing the certainty of the law 
and the authority of judicial precedents into doubt, and the desire to give 
effect to major changes in social institutions and attitudes on the other.53 
The agony that Allott speaks of in this case is the very tension this study is 
concerned with; in Uganda, both the certainty provided by formalism, and the 
responsiveness of flexibility, are needed at the same time. As illustrated in Figure 1 
below, is the agony that has defined commercial judging throughout post-colonial 
Uganda, manifested by practices that are indicative of both formalism and 
flexibility, and a lack of significant efforts towards attaining coexistence between 
them. 
That the colonial courts faced the agony described by Allott,54 and that they 
responded by judging flexibly, is best illustrated by Abraham C.J in Tota Ram v 
Mistry Waryam Singh.55 In this case, the Chief Justice declared that common 
sense was vital in interpreting the law such that where an enactment stated that 
                                            
 
51 [1976] QB 503 
52 Allott, The Limits of Law (n 5) 108. 
53 Allott, The Future of African Law (n 4) 108 
54 Allott The Future of African Law (n 4), Allott, The Limits of Law (n 5) 108. 
55 (1932-35) UPLR Vol. 5 76, 78 
 158
‘where the principal though disclosed cannot be sued,’ it meant ‘where the principal 
cannot be sued at the time the contract is made’. 
In this case, the court was clearly not guided by the literal meaning of the words in 
the statute, or by canons like the doctrine of precedent, but applied the law with 
regard to what made sense at the moment, as dictated by the political, economic 
and social circumstances.  This charge is supported by the following concluding 
words of the Chief Justice in the decision: ‘After all, as a certain distinguished jurist 
once said, our law is rapidly degenerating into common sense’.56 These words by 
Chief Justice Abraham point to the tension having become the norm in colonial 
commercial justice. 
A content analysis of the legal opinions in commercial hard cases illustrates that 
since this colonial era, the tension has defined Uganda’s commercial justice 
system. The analysis has produced the data in appendices 1-5, from which 
variables have been extrapolated, counted and plotted on charts, to reveal the 
frequencies, patterns and trends of judging approaches that prove the tension as 
defining Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm. The results are presented using 
appendices 1-8, and Figures 1-12, which form the basis for the explanations and 
discussions that follow in this chapter. The major finding in this sense is that 
formalism and flexibility have been concurrently but incoherently and illogically 
practised across Uganda’s post-colonial judging history, and the tension has 
always existed as the by-product of such a judging paradigm. 
Manifestations and prevalence of tension have been found to present in three 
dimensions, which in the following sections are used to guide further discussions 




about findings about the nature of Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm. The 
first dimension is the type of judicial approach adopted in the different judicial 
opinions, i.e. whether formalistic, flexible or mixed-approach, and how frequently 
each approach has been observed during the analysis. The second dimension is 
the concurrent prevalence of formalism and flexibility during the same legal and 
political historical epochs Uganda has experienced.  In this case, the analysis has 
been made following the country’s political epochs, which besides the pre-colonial 
era (already handled above), are the colonial era (1894-1962), the early post-
colonial era (1962-1986), and the late post-colonial era (1986-2018). 
On the other hand the legal historical epochs are constituted by the different 
constitutional regimes the country has had, the constitution being the supreme law 
in Uganda and the source of judicial authority. The regimes used are the colonial 
regime; the independence federal constitution regime (1962-1966); the first 
republican constitution regime (1967-1995), during which military governments 
suspended some of the constitutional provisions; and the second republican 
constitution era (1995-2018). 
The third dimension is the concurrent prevalence of formalism and flexibility within 
the different courts of judicature that made the judicial opinions. Prevalence of the 
different judging approaches has been shown in the High Court, the Court of 
Appeal, the East African Court of Appeal, the Privy Council and the Supreme 
Court. Data relating to the Court of Appeal and the East African Court of Appeal 
are however treated together, as one replaced the other. The findings below are 
therefore presented using the three dimensions.  
4.3.2  The Judging Paradigm under Uganda’s Political History 
Appendices 1-5 indicate that the commercial adjudication tradition in Uganda has 
been made up of three models of judicial opinions; formalistic opinions, flexible 
opinions and mixed-approach opinions. A comparison of the frequency of 
formalistic and flexible opinions reveals that the tension has existed and prevailed 
in Uganda since the colonial transplant of English law, with neither side winning. 
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Klabbers claims that winning should not be the measure of where we are in the 
contest between formalism and flexibility, or in any legal theory.57 However, in a 
study like this one, investigating the possibility of their coexistence, one cannot 
help but start analysing the tension by asking if there has ever been a winner in the 
particular jurisdiction; and if not, what the defining elements of the resultant tension 
are. Winning in this case is not to be understood as winning a baseball match, as 
Klabbers understood it.58 Rather, it should mean one approach gaining a level of 
dominance that would qualify it as the major or default choice of judging, and a 
defining characteristic of judging culture. The answers in Uganda’s commercial 
judging are derivable from the research findings presented in the tables appended 
and the figures below. 
Table 1 in Appendix 6 reflects the number of cases that were observed as falling in 
each category of judicial opinion, out of the 300 cases analysed. The numbers are 
used to come up with the percentages in Table 2 in Appendix 6, and the 
percentages then used to construct the chart in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Judging Approaches during Uganda’s Political History 
The results reveal that the tension has manifested in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
tension can be observed by looking at the frequencies, patterns and trends 
reflected by analysing the judicial approaches employed in the total population of 
legal opinions across the political history of the period under study. There is 
evidence of a concurrent practice of both formalism and flexibility, from the colonial 
period to date, with neither of the two approaches becoming significantly dominant. 
Figure 1 reveals that during the colonial era the prevalence of the two judging 
approaches was almost at par, with cases in which the two were simultaneously 
used constituting less than 10% of the hard cases analysed. After Uganda attained 
independence in 1962, in the early post-independence period leading to 1986 
when the current regime forcefully took power, a slight reduction in flexibility is 
observed, accompanied by a more significant reduction in formalism. This trend of 
formalism losing favour has continued in late post-independence, and appears to 
be on going, but alongside this trend, flexibility has stayed almost at the early post-
independence levels. 
The above would ordinarily point to the dominance of flexibility, implying a move 





























judicial system itself. However, such hopes are quashed by the constantly 
increasing frequency of both formalism and flexibility being practised at the same 
time, and in the same judicial opinion, which this study refers to as the mixed 
approach. Figure 1 indicates that such judicial opinions have been on the increase 
from colonial times to date, and currently far outweigh formalistic opinions.  
The place for formalistic opinions is continuously being occupied by the mixed-
approach cases, confirming Evans and Gabel’s proposition, that although 
balancing formalism and flexibility is difficult, it has to be done as they are both 
needed at the same time.59 However, to arrive at a more comprehensive 
understanding of Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm, the above findings, 
arrived at through the lens of the country’s political history, have been followed by 
analysis of the same data, but seen in terms of Uganda’s legal and judging 
historical epochs. 
4.3.3  The Judging Paradigm under Uganda’s Legal History 
The tension has also been found to manifest in the analysis of frequencies, 
patterns and trends relating to the particular constitutional regimes to which the 
country’s judicial system has been subjected. These regimes are: the colonial rule, 
during which judging was commanded by the colonising agreements and by the 
adopted British unwritten constitution; the 1962-66 era, during which the 
independence federal constitution ruled; the 1967-95 era, during which the 1967 
republic constitution commanded formalism judging but was regularly interfered 
with by military proclamations; and the post-1995 era, during which the current 
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constitution has commanded both formalism and flexibility judging. The results of 
this categorisation are presented in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2: Judging Approaches under Uganda’s Legal (Constitutional) Regimes  
The trends and patterns in Figure 2 reveal that the tension has manifested 
differently during each of the various constitutional regimes. The values underlying 
such trends and patterns are discussed in chapters seven and nine. However from 
the onset, it is clear that the tension has been underpinned by the prevalence of 
formalism, flexibility and mixed judging fluctuating in response to the changing 
contexts of Uganda’s legal history. 
During the colonial era, when judging derived its authority from the colonising 
agreements with native rulers, like the Buganda Agreement of 1900, subject to the 
unwritten British constitution, formalism and flexibility were practised in almost 
equal measure, flexibility having a slight edge. Formalism having been part of the 
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colonially-imposed legal culture and jurisprudence, the 1962 independence 
constitution brought a new legal order which came with a sharp decline in 
formalism. This points to the influence of the value of self-determination. Flexibility, 
which defined pre-colonial adjudication, grew to its highest level of prevalence in 
the country’s entire legal history. Analogeously to the decline of formalism and 
growth of flexibility in the 1920s-30s US judicial system, this trend was the result of 
a new national pride and rejection of everything British, as a symbol of liberation.60 
Although Figure 1 indicates a consistent decline in formalism, from independence 
to date, Figure 2 reveals that  actually this decline was interupted by an increase in 
formalism, against a decline in flexibility, from 1967 to 1995. This period saw the 
legal and judicial order officially derived from the 1967 constitition, but regularly 
interrupted by military dictatorships, suspending parts of its provisions, and being 
the actual source of judical authority and legally acceptable judging approach. 
This presents the Ugandan context as unique, as military dictatorships and other 
authoritarian governments have been associated with judicial absolutism and other 
values that yield flexibility at the expense of formalism.61 The answer could be in 
the significance of other underlying values of the judicial approach during this time; 
as will be discussed in chapters seven and nine. 
In the meantime, one has also to note that as formalism and flexibility competed in 
dominance, cases where judges employed a mixed approach significantly gained 
in frequency just after independence, signalling increased discretion, authority 
and/or boldness by judges. This trend was reversed in the 1967-95 period, during 
the first republican constitutional regime, which could account for the unusual 
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trends in the prevalence of purely formalistic or purely flexible judging approaches 
during authoritarian governments. 
Finally, formalism was again to decline, almost to its lowest levels from the time of 
early independent Uganda, and flexibility, together with mixed-approach 
judging,was to grow to maintain dominance and attain the highest levels, during 
the 1995-2018  second republican constitutional order. In terms of the tension 
between formalism and flexibility, the trend in this period indicates an increased 
dominance of flexibility over formalism amongst single-approach cases, alongside 
unprecedented tension between the two appraoches reflected in the surge of 
mixed-approach cases. 
The post-1995 period is the era of constitutionally-permissible judicial legislation, 
under which although the common-law formalism is still part of the law on judging, 
courts are obliged to decide flexibly, taking into account the country’s historical, 
social, political and economic contexts and the values, norms and aspirations of 
the people.62 The impact of the legal ordering is analysed, alongside other 
motivating values underlying judicial approach, in chapters seven and nine. 
However, in terms of understanding the judging paradigm, one would want to go 
beyond the periodical manifestation of the tension to how particular courts have 
collectively approached hard cases, and what their role is in the tension. 
4.3.4  Manifestation of the Tension across the Different Courts 
Although each judicial opinion was made by a single judge, the opinions have been  
analysed using the lens of the courts to which a collection of judges belonged 
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during a particular time. In this regard, the court, and not the individual judge, is 
seen as the promoter of flexibility or formalism,  which is further proved as 
characterising the tension, when one looks at judicial approach across the entire 
court structure, as opposed to looking at single courts. 
As presented in Figures 3-5, patterns have been observed and trends derived to 
understand the institutional behaviour and judging paradigm, vis-à-vis  the tension, 
of the courts at all three levels of courts of record. These are the High Court, the 
Court of Appeal (East African Court of Appeal for the period up to 1974), and the 
Supreme Court (during colonial times, the Privy Council). 
 
 
Figure 3: Judicial Approaches amongst Colonial Courts 
Figure 3 reveals that during the colonial era the tension was concentrated in the 
High Court, which was the highest court resident within Uganda. The frequency of 
judicial opinions across the colonial political period, reflected in Figure 1, is 
mirrored in how the approaches appeared in the High Court. The exception is that 
flexibility slightly outnumbered formalism, as opposed to the general trend in which 
it is the other way around. As cases went on appeal however, the tension seems to 
have consistently reduced till it disappeared at the apex, the Privy Council. As 
such, in the East African Court of Appeal, flexibility reigned over formalism and the 
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mixed judicial approach, while in the Privy Council formalism was the default 
judicial approach. 
The above results imply that the tension was prevalent, but not in every court; it 
was limited to the High Court, with the appellant courts facing no problem of choice 
between competing values in hard cases. At first appeal, the judging norm seems 
to have been choosing experience over logic, while at final appeal logic was 
chosen over experience; either way, leaving no room for the tension between 
formalism and flexibility. These findings on colonial judging cast further doubt on 
the claims that the tension is inherent and will always be there; giving more 
credence to the thesis of this study, that it can and should be managed. After 
independence, however, the judging paradigm shifted, as is demonstrated in 
Figures 4 and 5 below. 
 
 
Figure 4: Judicial Approaches in Different Courts (1962-1986) 
Figure 4 reveals that in early post-independence, from 1962-1986, flexibility in the 
High Court stayed at the same level of prevalence as there was during colonial 
times, but formalism reduced, while there was a more than twofold increase of 
mixed-approach judging. Beyond the court, the high level of formalism hitherto 
observed in the Privy Council shifted to the East African Court of Appeal; and later, 
with the collapse of the East African Community, the Court of Appeal. No judicial 
opinion based on absolute flexibility was found; while cases based on absolute 
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formalism were the majority. At the same time, a mixed-approach judging remained 
at almost the same level between the High Court and the higher appellate courts.  
Therefore, during this early post-independence era, the tension mainly manifested 
by way of reasonably high levels of mixed-approach judging, and the fact that in 
cases where the judges chose either formalism or flexibility, flexibility reigned in the 
High Court; while formalism did so in appeals from the High Court. Finally, as 
illustrated in Figure 5, in late post-colonial Uganda, with the introduction of the 
Uganda Court of Appeal as the middle appellate court, and making the Supreme 
Court the ultimate one, the configuration of the tension changed again. 
 
Figure 5: Judicial Approaches in Different Courts (1986-2018) 
The key changes in this era are that formalism in the High Court has stayed  at 
almost the early post-independence levels, but flexibility has reduced further and 
mixed-approach judging increased above 30%. These trends  have been 
maintained by the Court of Appeal; judging in the Supreme Court, however, reflects 
formalism staying at almost the same levels as in the lower courts, but with a 
drastic increase of flexibility to almost 70%. Mixed-approach judging in the 
Supreme Court has also surged to over 60%, the highest any court has attained in 
the history of the country. 
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The net effect of the above trends is that the judging paradigm continues to be 
defined by an ongoingconcurrent use of both flexibility and formalism. Rarely 
have courts opted to have one approach dominate the other. Even where such 
normalcy has been observed, it is cancelled out by the character of the judicial 
approach across the general court structure; or, the judicial approach in higher 
courts is at odds with the normalcy, and leans more to the opposite side of the 
flexibility-formalism divide. In view of the ever-increasing  frequency of mixed-
approach judging, alongside the sharp increase in flexibility in recent times, the 
conclusion is that the nature of Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm is one 
defined by both formalism and flexibility, the two being forever in tension.  
Therefore, Uganda’s judging paradigm does not conform to the common 
understanding of a judging paradigm in the western world; the West’s history 
having been a movement from formalism to flexibility, then back to formalism and 
later back to flexibility.63 For instance, Horwitz64 describes the American experience 
as a story in which formalism ruled the 18thcentury, with flexibility taking over in the 
early 19thcentury, and formalism returning in the late 19thcentury (although he 
claims that this was opportunistic formalism), only for it all to swing back to 
flexibility in the early 20thcentury.  The findings in the Ugandan case show that not 
only are the swings in western judicial approach inapplicable to Uganda’s story, but 
also that no swings took place, in the sense of one judging approach having such 
dominance that it could be seen as ruling a particular judging era.   
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Instead, the paradigm in Uganda appears to be in line with Duxbury’s view, that the 
description of jurisprudence’s history as a constant pundulume swing of contrasting 
schools of thought is exaggerated.65 Rather it is the case that each school existed 
at all times, and it was just a question of which one of the two dominated at a given 
time. However, Duxbury’s subsequent claim that the mere dominance of one 
judging approach at a time amounted to coexistence, and  solved the tension,66 is 
simplistic to say the least. The Ugandan experience has shown that this 
dominance is not only temporary, but often neutralised by mixed-approach judging.  
A mere concurrent practice of both formalims and flexibility would probably not 
result in the tension; or if it did, the same could be managed to arrive at legal 
certainty if there were mechanisms to guide judges on which approach to take, or 
the limitations of each approach, in searching for answers to hard cases. The data 
in appendices 1-5 reveal that judges faced with such choices have very rarely 
appeared to gain benefit from this form of guideline, and in those few cases, almost 
each judge construed the source and content of such guidance differently.  To fully 
understand the judging paradigm as being defined by the tension, one needs to 
understand this management phenomenon, whose findings are presented in 
Figures 6 and 7 below. 
Figures 6 and 7 present findings in mixed-approach cases, being the ones in which 
both formalism and flexibility were applied in one opinion. This mixture 
demonstrates the competition between the values underlying each of the two 
approaches, and  fact that there are hardly any reconciliatory mechanisms judges 
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could apply. This has left the judicial decisions a ground for the clash between 
formalism and flexibility, and the judging paradigm being defined by that tension.  
4.3.5  The Tension as a Competition Amongst Values in Adjudication 
The tension is probably most visible when one gets a front view of the sub-values 
that have underpinned higher values behind both formalism and flexibility, and how 
they have competed for dominance, especially in mixed-approach judging. In this 
part, comparing and analysing the frequencies of values found to have motivated 
mixed-approach judging are used to demonstrate such competition. The 
frequencies are presented in Figures 6 and 7, which reveal a neck-and-neck 
competition between the values influencing each of the judging approaches in the 
tension. The findings therefore support the claim of the jurisprudence of interests’ 
claim,  that the tension results from competing interests and values during 
adjudication, that need to be discovered and balanced as a way to certainty.67  
Figure 6 indicates the prevalence of the different judging cultural values as the 
internal judging criteria behind mixed-approach opinions.  
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Figure 6:  Judging Cultural Values in Mixed-Approach Judicial Opinions 
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The findings in Figure 6 indicate that during colonial judging, a number of 
formalistic values tied with flexibility ones, there by demonstrating the competion 
between them, that calls for balancing as a way towards coexistence. Firstly, the 
formalistic logical deduction and mechanical application of law, and therefore its 
implied values of the rule of law and the judge’s role as a mechanic, appeared in 
50% of cases; the same frequency as the flexible value of relational contracting. 
Secondly, is the tie between the formalistic procedural justice holding sway, and 
contextual interpretaion and application of rules and contract terms; each at 37%. 
Thirdly, is  the tie between the formalistic values of accuracy, represented by  
treatment of value as money and market individualism observed through the 
upholding of pacta sunt servanda, against the flexible perception of lawmaking as a 
judge’s role; all at 25%. Fourthly, there is a tie between the formalistic value of 
literalism in contract interpretation, and the flexible sub-values of open recognition 
of the need for flexibility, reliance on indeterminate doctrine and purposive judging; 
each at about 13%.  
In early postcolonial-judging, the judging paradigm still included a competition 
between formalistic and  flexible values, although with less of a tie as observed in 
colonial cases. The competition appeared in two ways. Firstly, although there 
appeared to be fewer formalistic values, this was far from implying an absolute 
flexibility paradigm. The few that appeared were in significantly higher percentages 
than most flexibility values, the net effect of which being that there was still a stiff 
competition of values in adjudication. Out of the opinions analysed, logical 
deduction and mechanical application of law, for instance, appeared in 33%,  
procedural justice holding sway in 24%, upholding pacta sunt servanda in 29% and  
literalism in contract interpretation at 19%. These frequences were in contrast to 
those of flexibility values; although these were greater in number, only contextual 
interpretation and application of rules and contractual terms appeared most often, 
at 38%, the next being the recognition of law’s adaptability and elasticity,  as well 
as categorisation and classfication of law, at 19%, while the rest were below 15%.  
Secondly, as was the case with colonial judging, the early post-colonial tension as 
a competition of values still included a competition between some formalistic and 
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flexibility values. Notably, the flexibility values of utilitarianism and commercialism, 
manifested by recognition of commercial practices and usage and the non-
recognition of equality of contracting parties, tied at 14% with the formalistic value 
of accuracy, manifested by construing actual loss as the only measure of damages 
in contract. Similarly, the flexibility sub-values of exercising judicial absolutism, 
judicial interventionism in contract and reliance on indeterminate doctrines tied with 
the formalistic value of presumption of equalitariansim, at approximatelly 10%.  
Amongst late postcoloinial-opinions,  the tension as a competition of values has 
continued, although again taking a different dimension. There appear not to be 
many ties or significant dominance between formalistic and flexibility values. 
Instead, Figure 6 reveals the emergence of opportunistic formalism as part of the 
internal judging culture, which is evidence of the tension existing as a result of 
judges’ failure to choose between competing values. Further, the figure reveals an 
internal but even competition between formalistic and flexibility values, in the sense 
that there is a lack of dominance; each side has been well represented in the high, 
middle and low prevalence of values.    
The tension as a competition of values defining Uganda’s commercial judging 
paradigm is also demonstrated by an overview of the prevalence of values external 
to the judiciary, but motivating judicial choice. The results from an analysis of 




Figure 7:  External Values behind the Mixed Approach in the Various Periods 
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The findings in Figure 7 indicate that during colonial judging, besides relational 
contracting that was observed in 50% of the cases analysed, the external judging 
criteria is defined by a neck and-neck competition between formalistic and flexible 
values. In approximately 38% of cases analysed, judges percieved the meaning 
and nature of law in formalistic-positivist terms, the same frequency as cases in 
which judges were guided by the flexibility-engendering economic efficiency as a 
normative criterion. Another set of formalistic values – freedom of contract, 
accuracy in adjudication, procedural justice and sanctity of contract –appeared in 
25% of colonial judging, the same frequency as the flexibility values of perceiving 
law as the predictions of judges, and as a means to an end.  Further, appearing at 
appproximately 13%, were the formalistic values of certainty of law, the judges’s 
lack of role in lawmaking,  and conceptual formalism on the one hand; and on the 
other, the flexibility values of judicial absolutism, conception of law as experience, 
efficiency and a means to ends; substantive justice; and other systematic 
flexibilities.  
In early postcolonial-judging, the neck and-neck type of competition continued to 
define the tension as the judging paradigm, with a number of formalistic values 
appearing with the same frequence as flexibility ones. Although some can not be 
said to be the reverse side of those they tied with, the reality of the existence of 
both judging approaches, as a result of underlying values competing for influence 
in judicial choice, is demonstrated.  
The other exception to the sub-value competition as a neck-and-neck contest 
between opposing values was with regard to the perception of law’s nature and 
meaning. In this case, legal positivism appeared dominant, at approximately 48%. 
This dominance is however watered down by the prevalence of flexibility 
preceptions of law; law as a means to an end at 33% and economic efficiency as 
the normative criterion at 24%. These flexibility perceptions, individually, appeared 
less frequently, but when added together accounted for a much bigger value than 
positivism, pointing to a the reality of a competition of values and the resultant 
tension between formalism and flexibility.  
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During late postcolonial-judging, the results with regard to the external criteria 
portray a picture similar to that of the internal criteria, with the tension defined by a 
generally even formalistic-flexible values competition. In this case, formalistic sub-
values appeared with significantly high frequency; conceptual formalism at 20%, 
legal positivism at 22%, freedom of contract at 25%, sanctity at 33% and contracts 
as discrete at 18%. On the other hand, flexibility values were found present in 
comparably high frequencies, especially given that they were greater in number. 
For instance, of the cases analysed, the conception of law as a means to an end 
appeared in 31%, economic efficiency in 24%, opportunism and judicial absolutism 
in 24%, substantive justice in 21%, law as the predictions or of what judges will do 
and conceptual flexibilities  in 18%.  
The above results reveal that throughout judging history, Uganda’s judging 
paradigm has been defined by the tension between formalism and flexibility, which 
has resulted from a competition between underlying values. What these values 
mean and stand for, and the way they have presented in actual court cases, so as 
to be part of the competition and influence the tension, are further discussed in 
chapters seven and nine. What is important at this stage is to note the value 
competition as a reality underlying the tension, that calls for a study like this one, 
that seeks to understand these values and explore the possibility of balancing 
them, as a way to manage the tension. This is not to say that such attempts at 
managing the tension in Uganda do not exist.  
Existing Tension-management Mechanisms 
This section illustrates that in very few of the opinions analysed have judges 
referred to some form of principles as a guidence for judging, either flexibly or 
formalistically. The results reflect the state of the tension-management regime as 
generally inarticulate, inadequate, incoherent and inconsistent. The tension-
management mechanisms found are of two broad categories. The first category 
consists of domestic attempts, such as attempts individual judges have made to 
define principles that should guide decisionmaking in hard cases.  
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The second, are the international instruments such as treaties, under which 
Uganda bound itself to ensure legal certainty during adjudication, although these 
have hardly ever been invoked by judges in real disputes. The way guiding 
principles have been arrived at,  is by way of lone judges venturing into trying to 
find an ultimate norm to use as a guide, rather than through Uganda having a 
conscious, coherent, theoretically-sound and well-researched framework for 
management of the tension.  I proceed to elaborate these efforts. 
4.4.1  Domestic Attempts to Manage the Tension 
The results presented in Figure 8 below, and in appendices 1-5, indicate the 
absence of significant mechanisms for, and patterns of, management of the 
tension. This is in the form of judging having been done with reference to some 
form of guidelines, a phenomenon represented by the red bar in Figure 8. The blue 
one refers to the frequency with which judges acknowledged, or otherwise 
subjected their decision to, what can be defined as a mechanism to manage the 
tension. The two were observed during the content analysis following the codes 
‘JUDGING GUIDE’ and ‘MGT’ respectively. During the colonial era, both were 
observed in less than 3% of the cases analysed, while cases from early post-
independence revealed none. On the other hand, late post-independence has seen 
increased attempts at judges making reference to guidelines and embracing 





Figure 8: Judging with Reference to Judging Guidelines  
Overall, Figure 8 demonstrates that judges were found to have referred to some 
form of guidelines, or other tension-management mechanisms generally, in less 
than 9% of the opinions analysed. This implies that there have been minimal efforts 
to manage the tension, as would create legal certainty. But even then, the few 
norms judges have, although very rarely, recognised as guidelines need to be 
understood. This, added to the absence of studies like this one, on how a 
comprehensive framework to manage the tension in Uganda can be achieved, 
confirm the study’s contribution to the knowledge gap.  
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Judging Criteria in Colonial Uganda 
As demonstrated in Figure 8, before independence judges attempted to pay 
attention to some form of guidelines or other management mechanism in only two 
cases, representing less than 3% of cases analysed. Therefore, management of 
the tension, and the legal uncertainty caused by the nature of the colonial legal 
system, hardly received any attention from judges.  
In Mwenge v Migadde,68 the hierarchy of norms guided the court under colonial 
law, which placed flexible norms below and subject to formalistic ones. If this were 
still the principle to guide judges, it would mean that the validity and acceptability of 
flexibility was determinable by its conformity or consistency with formalism and 
legalism. However, Article 126 (1) and 126 (2) (e) of the constitution bind judges to 
be guided by the values, norms and aspirations of Ugandans, and to hold 
substantive justice superior to technicalities. This changes the colonial hierarchy of 
norms and makes the rule in Migadde’s case unconstitutional and therefore void 
today.69    
Another case where judging guidelines appeared was Bhimjani v Patel, in which 
the judge openly decided flexibly and made new law.70 While justifying the 
presumption that the reasonableness clause was part of the then Uganda’s Rent 
Restriction Ordinance, although it actually was not expressly provided for, the 
judge indicated that the court’s discretion had to be guided by the principles in 
statutes. These included special conditions present, all relevant circumstances at 
the hearing date, the general scheme and purpose of a statute and broad common 
                                            
 
68 (1932-35) UPLR Vol. 5, 98 (Appendix 1: Case 3). 
69 ibid 
70 (1956-57) 8 UPLR 164 (Appendix 1: Case 36) 
 181
sense viewed from the perspective of a man of the world. These principles are 
subsets of, and can be looked at as representing, responsiveness to the context of 
a case, and social acceptability determinable by relevance to general common 
sense.  
The above references to judging guidelines were, however, isolated cases, as the 
general trend was non-existence of any form of guidelines or tension-management 
mechanisms. However, there appears to have been no normativity crisis, a 
phenomena explained by a number of factors.   
Firstly, in line with the English ideals of legal certainty, the colonial government 
placed limits on the growth of customary law by taking away some of the tools that 
gave it flexibility. One of the tools removed in this manner was the ease of 
amendment and modification of law. Organic growth meant ease of amendment, 
which in turn meant ease of adaptability and growth whenever circumstances so 
demanded. 
However in the celebrated case of Kajubi v Kabali,71 Chief Justice Gray in the East 
African Court of Appeal declared the rule that applied to stateless communities 
before colonialism as governing all modification or amendment of customary law in 
Uganda. The court thus held that traditionally, in Buganda, no individual or group of 
individuals could modify the original customs of a native community, not even the 
court, without the assent of the native community.72 This had the effect of 
modifying Buganda’s customary law through judicial flexibility. 
                                            
 
71 (1944) 11 EACA 37. 
72 ibid. 
 182
The removal by Kajubi’s case of the Kabaka’s jurisdiction to amend and modify law 
reduced the flexibility with which custom could be changed. The impracticality of 
obtaining the entire community’s consent to amend or modify a law meant that the 
customary norms already in existence had become fixed, made determinate and 
more certain in line with the English ideals about law.  By this fixation, customary 
law had also been robbed of its inherent mechanism for growth and ensuring that it 
kept relevant to changing circumstances in the way the common law did. 
Secondly, flexibility was limited through the conditions imposed for its applicability 
under both the Colonising Agreements and Article 20 of the Uganda Order in 
Council (the repugnancy clause). Customary and native law could only apply if it 
was not repugnant to justice, morality, any Order in Council or laws made under 
the Order in Council.  The caveat embedded in the repugnant clause could 
however not help in managing the tension. The subjection of African law to the 
colonial English law meant imposing formalistic legislation as the fence over which 
flexibility would not help the law to cross, as demonstrated in Migadde’s case.73  In 
1939, Attorney General Hone74 conceded that the repugnancy clause was a 
limitation to the growth of customary law, although he argued that new customary 
law could be made.75 The flexible and indeterminate standards of justice and 
morality were an imposition of traits of the non-instrumentalism of the natural law 
jurisprudence that again favoured formalism over flexible instrumentalism, as used 
in pre-colonial days. 
Thirdly, the tension was managed by default, through segregative legal pluralism; 
that made the largely flexible traditional legal norms apply in the African courts, and 
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the predominantly formalistic English laws apply in the non-African protectorate 
courts. Although this policy left the tension to prevail in the protectorate courts – 
owing to, among other things, the dualistic nature of the common law – the fact that 
the proportion of the population subject to the jurisdiction of such courts was just 
about 2%,76 meant that the uncertainty arising out of the problem would not be 
experienced by the majority of Ugandans. 
Fourthly, there was at least one certain rule of recognition of valid law, as 
substantively flexible laws were subject to conformity with the 1902 Order in 
Council and other formal laws made by Her Majesty the Queen of England, and to 
English precedents.77 The native laws being made by the native supreme ruling 
council (Lukiiko) were also subject to approval by the British Governor, and this 
safeguarded the capitalist interests that English law formalism stood to protect.78 
These caveats meant that flexibility could only be exercised within discoverable 
legal limits, as was confirmed by the court in Migadde’s case.79 
Fifthly, the lawyers and judges in the country received British training that, 
according to Chief Justice (emeritus) Wako-Wambuzi, involved not only the British 
legal system but also its culture, such as etiquette, plus personal and community 
values.80 Further, selection to the position of a judge also depended on a detailed 
investigation of one’s life history, including the family background. This training and 
background check no doubt ensured that judges were equipped not only to 
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understand the substance and philosophy behind common-law doctrine, but also to 
make judicial choices in a way that upheld the coexistence of formalism and 
flexibility due to the dualism of the common law at the time.81 
The mechanisms to manage the tension could not last beyond the colonial state, 
as none of them suited an independent and sovereign Uganda, governed by 
African Ugandans, with a nationalistic outlook to policy. Further, by the time of 
independence, no deliberate efforts had been made to build a single coherent legal 
system that would apply to the whole of Uganda and all Ugandans; it would not be 
until the country was a few years to self-government that it integrated the traditional 
flexible-oriented legal system with the dominantly formalistic English one. 
The only traces of effort to tackle legal uncertainty were the amendments to 
relevant legislation, which only dealt with curing substantive flexibilities. 
Consolidation Agreements were for example followed by other agreements 
(‘Corrective Agreements’) amending or clarifying terms that were presumed to 
have caused legal uncertainty. Such corrective agreements included the Laws 
Agreements of 1910 and 1937, both of which clarified the subordination of the 
Kabaka to the English sovereign, and that the laws made by the Kabaka applied 
not only to the Baganda in Buganda but also to all natives in Buganda. Corrective 
Agreements occupied the place of constitutional amending statutes. This implies 
that legal uncertainty, arising from the formalistic interpretation of the terms of the 
agreements and the practical realities that had seen the Kabaka being seen as the 
sovereign in the eyes of the natives, had been managed using legislation. 
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However, in areas where legal uncertainty arose as a result of enforcement 
flexibility (such as from judicial activity) or systematic flexibility (especially due to 
the pluralist nature of the legal system) no attempts were made at solving the 
problem.    The colonialists therefore handed over a legal system comprising highly 
indeterminate and uncertain laws, and courts that were legally permitted to, and 
did, make decisions at will, formalistically or flexibly; with no clear doctrinal, 
contextual or statutory guidelines. Therefore, by the time Uganda became 
independent, the tension prevailed in commercial adjudication, with its 
management occurring only as a matter of accident rather than conscious effort. 
During postcolonial-judging, the trend has changed significantly, with more cases 
observed in which judges referred to guidelines or other management 
mechanisms.  
Judging Criteria in Early Postcolonial-Uganda 
Early postcolonial-judging showed an increase in reference to management 
mechanisms, to 6% as shown in Figure 8, but a total absence of judging guidelines 
as part of such mechanisms. The main tool used to manage the tension was 
limiting judicial absolutism and making formalism the default apparoach;  judges 
had no discretion to override the law according to personal preferences, prejudices 
or attributes.  
This was the era of successive militarism and outright dictatorships defining 
political culture; but instead of such authoritatrianism increasing judicial absolutism, 
judges’ wigs were trimmed and their province limited by rules. An example is 
provided by the numerous decrees passed during Amin’s dictatorship (1970-79), to 
regulate commercial rights and obligations; judges had to be strictly guided by 
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these, as was the case in Samuel Hawaga v Christopher Bisutu,82 and Uganda v 
Stephen Kafeero.83  
The other mode of limiting judicial absolutism was by the courts insisting on strictly 
enforcing the terms of a contract as a way of avoiding judges substituting their 
wishes for the intentions of the parties. In Dr Syedna Mohamed Burhannudin 
Saheb & 2 others v Jamil Din & Others,84 the judge recognised the tension and 
decided that the best way was to be guided by such a need to avoid substitution of 
intentions, and thus had to decide formalistically.85 Further, again as can be 
discerned from the Dr Syedna case, the judge required proof of vitiating factors as 
a basis for considering judging flexibly.86 Such requirement for proof would then 
become the control to unguided flexibility, and thereby manage the tension.   
Besides limiting judicial absolutism, in one early postcolonial-case, Edmund 
Schluter & Co. (Uganda) Ltd v Patel, the judge continued to give adherence to 
contextual responsiveness as a guide to choosing flexibility.87 This one case is, 
however, far from what one can call a significant effort to manage the tension using 
a consistent and comprehensive framework. This is especially true given that the 
case is the only one, out of 85 analysed in the period, which does not point to its 
being a general guideline.  
Further, as was the case with colonial Uganda, the methods of determining when, 
to what extent, and in what form to be guided by the context, were all left 
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inarticulate. This study contributes to knowledge by proposing that responsiveness 
be recognised as a value that cuts across formalism and flexibility, and whose 
exhaustive articulation can help in formulating an ultimate judging guideline. This is 
against the backdrop of the presence of judging guidelines being invoked in hard 
cases having increased in late postcolonial-Uganda; but still reflecting incoherence, 
inadequacy and the need for studies like this one, focused on the question of how 
the tension can be managed. 
Judging Criteria in Late Postcolonial-Uganda 
Although the findings for late postcolonial-judging reveal more reference to tension-
management mechanisms, and specifically judging guidelines, rarely was a guiding 
principle referred to by more than one judge, the most frequent appearing in only 
two opinions. This implies that, the tension-management efforts observed have 
been lone efforts by the respective judges, and to the lack of a rational and 
coherent set of guidelines that engender legal certainty. However, these judicial 
efforts need to be understood, as they should form the beginning of any final 
thoughts on the formulation and construction of ultimate commercial judging 
guidelines to manage the tension. 
Firstly, there is the notion of treating competing norms and values in a hierarchical 
manner, the formalism-engendering ones being the default and proof-based 
flexibility ones the exception. This was declared by Byamugisha, J.A while refusing 
to fill gaps in contracts by implying terms in Kibalama v Alfasan Belgie CVB.88 
Therefore, judges will only resort to flexibility if its motivating values are backed by 
support from the business community, evidenced by being adapted as implied 
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terms. So, as a default rule, the formalistic value of pacta sunt servanda held sway, 
and was only flexibly interfered with if such interference-enjoyed public support, the 
public being the business community, which would speak through practices. This 
would call for proof, that the business community subscribed to certain terms as 
being implied in particular types of contracts, as a precondition to flexibility 
adjudication seeking to incorporate them. The judge’s declaration can help to attain 
coexistence, as it serves adherence not only to freedom and sanctity of contract, 
but also to the rule of law, while at the same time providing a source for validity of 
the practices that, according to Murray, might not otherwise be acceptable to 
individual merchants – the business community being the source of any implied 
terms.89 
Justice Byamugisha’s approach is in line with an earlier proposition by America’s 
Justice Scalia,90 that realism is unavoidable, and in the totality of circumstances 
test, and balancing, as modes of judicial analysis, will always be there. However, 
wherever possible the rule of law should be preferred, and if the point of 
impossibility is reached, then in the context judges should act as fact finders not 
expositors of law. This line of judicial reasoning will be revisited as part of the 
recommendations, but for now it suffices to note that it has been wrongly baptised 
as either formalism or flexibility, instead of acknowledging it as a part of the effort 
to build a framework for coexistence.  
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Tamanaha, calls this approach the new formalism in contract law, because it 
partakes of aspects of both rule formalism and pragmatism.91 Murray also argues a 
case for a neo-formalism, different from the classical type by not being as rigid, but 
also insisting on the terms of the contract being the only contract the courts 
recognise and enforce. 92 The trade usage, course of dealings and custom allowed 
by the Uniform Commercial Code of the US are in this case only looked at as 
modifying the terms in the event that the parties so agreed, expressly or by 
implication. Such neo-formalism notions are misconceived. Instead, Justices Scalia 
and Byamugisha’s proposition goes beyond the formalism-flexibility divide and 
presents a possible rule for reconciliation, giving both formalism and flexibility room 
to coherently and predictably prevail.  
Secondly, there has been the notion that formalism should hold sway in procedural 
questions, as opposed to substantive ones where the court needed to be ready to 
decide flexibly. This was declared in Tobacco and Commodity Traders 
International Inc. v Mastermind Tobacco (U) Ltd.93 However, a guideline in the 
opposite direction was used in Gitway Investments Ltd v Tajmal Ltd & Others, 
where the judge declared that when modernising law to rid it of technicalities 
(flexibility), the court should not fundamentally change the nature and scope of the 
cause of action.94This implies that flexibility should be limited to procedural and 
other technical aspects of the law and judges should guard against making 
substantive law in the process. The appearance of tory positions in the same 
judging period confirms that the existing efforts to manage the tension are 
uncoordinated, incoherent, inconsistent and uncertain themselves, and therefore 
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cannot serve the quest for legal certainty by providing the framework to manage 
the tension. 
Thirdly is the reference to the Uganda Judicial Code of Conduct as a yardstick to 
tame judicial absolutism as a value underlying flexibility. This code sets out the 
professional conduct judges should adhere to, and in two cases these guidelines 
have been used as the boundaries for flexibility. In Muwema & Mugerwa 
Advocates v Shell (U) Ltd,95 civility, good manners, professionalism and decorum 
were cited as attributes of judicial professional conduct that the judge should have 
adhered to while refraining from judging in the flexible way she did. Likewise, in 
Highland & Agriculture Export Ltd & Another v Alpha Global 21st Joint Venture & 5 
others,96 prudence was invoked by the judge as his guidance to flexibility. These 
are standards stated by the code of conduct formulated by the judges themselves 
as expected of their office. However, they cannot be relied on as the guidelines to 
judicial approach, for they cannot help in determining choice by judges conducting 
themselves professionally. Beyond professionalism, judicial choice is about how a 
judge should choose between competing answers. Further, even the judicial 
absolutism the code helps to control is the type that will be expressly based on 
misconduct, which was only found in the Muwema case.97 This is not to say that in 
other cases judges were not motivated by unprofessional conduct, but where such 
are not articulated, as should ordinarily be expected, the code becomes redundant. 
Fourthly, there are guidelines highlighted by judges, in the form of standards to 
determine the recognition of normativity and validity in non-legal orders; and 
therefore legal pluralism in hard cases. The first of these standards is the 
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assumption theory proposed in Edmund Schluter & Co. (Uganda) Ltd v Patel that 
judges should always assume that the general principles fitting the circumstances 
of a case are applicable.98 The judge declared that, in a hard case, where no clear 
rules of law are applicable, general principles should be used. Further, that such 
general principles are derivable by way of assumptions from the circumstances 
surrounding a case –otherwise referred to as ‘experiences’ in this study. This case, 
coming long before the 1995 constitution, demonstrates that legal pluralism has 
long been part of the values underlying flexible adjudication, and it should be given 
attention when one is looking for the source of ultimate judging guidelines. The 
assumption theory raised by the judge needs further scrutiny, alongside other 
proposals, on how to arrive at such guidelines. 
The second standard is the notion of legitimacy proposed in Magezi & Another v 
Ruparelia,99 in which the court declared that the surrounding circumstances of a 
contract are the criteria courts will use to determine what is legitimate. By the use 
of the word legitimate‘’, and by using it in the context of judicial criteria, the court 
was clearly mindful of the fact that extra-legal norms as may be produced by 
experience may not tally with what is legal. However, they could be legitimate, 
meaning that the community sees them as acceptable to regulate behaviour. The 
judge therefore indicated his having been motivated by legal pluralism in reaching 
the flexible decision.    
The third standard is the evidential rule requiring courts to take judicial notice of 
notorious facts, which was used in Mbale United Transporters Ltd v Town Clerk, 
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Mbale Municipal Local Government Council & Others.100 While justifying a flexible 
decision, the court declared that a dispute could not be determined by the mere 
fact that illegality, even unconstitutionality, has been raised. The court has also to 
take judicial notice of and give adherence to the non-legal norms that render 
procurement valuable, such as transparency, public accountability, and best 
practices.  
A number of other judging guidelines were observed as having been used in single 
cases. They include looking at the end as justifying the means (utilitarianism). 
Firstly, there was the example of Atom Outdoor Ltd v Arrow Centre (U) Ltd, where 
the effect of the contract was taken as the ultimate guide to judicial choice.101 
Secondly in this list of single-case guidelines was the principle that the law should 
be viewed as unified and consistent. This can be deduced from Karangwa v 
Kulanju,102 where the judge declared that in interpretation of statutes, he had to be 
guided by the need to harmonise conflicting statutes, rather than opting to go with 
one over the other. It is a principle that can guide judges facing a crisis of choice in 
a hard case, the crisis having been brought about by ambiguity, inconsistency or 
other uncertainty caused by the language of a statute.   
Thirdly there was the principle of judicial consensus as the guide to the 
acceptability of a decision, and the rule of recognition of legal validity. In Belex 
Tours & Travel v Crane Bank Ltd & Another, judicial consensus was cited by the 
Court of Appeal as the basis for interfering with contracts whenever fraud or 
illegality had been noticed by the court.103 This implies that consensus, 
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indeterminate as it is, was not only treated as a way of founding ultimate-judging 
guidelines, but also as a guideline in itself. What is not clear is how consensus can 
be observed and confirmed to exist so as to crystallise into a norm. The judge was 
looking at precedents as reflecting consensus in this case, but the word connotes 
that a single or few precedents cannot suffice. It has to be a continuous recognition 
of a rule or principle by judges; but it is not clear how long or how many times a 
position should be repeated for there to be a consensus.    
Finally, international best practices were declared as a guide to judging, by the 
Court of Appeal in Commodity Export International Ltd & Another v MKM Trading 
Co. Ltd.104 Computer-generated evidence was declared admissible, relying on 
common-law positions and practices from England, Canada and the US. Probably 
unsurprisingly, in today’s world, where due to technological advancement and 
increased international trade the world is becoming one big market, the judges of 
the court of appeal allowed room for guidelines from other jurisdictions. Although it 
is an isolated case so far, the fact that it was the court of appeal making the 
declaration gives international best practices a valuable part of the existing tension- 
management regime.  However, such practices were not exhaustively articulated 
with regard to commercial judging generally, as this study contributes to knowledge 
by doing. Instead, a single practice was used to resolve a particular problem.   
Therefore, the tension that defines Uganda’s commercial judging  paradigm has 
not been countered by judges preferring mechanisms for its management, judging 
guidelines or otherwise, in a significant way. No evidence of a coherent mechanism 
on how to manage the tension appears from the judicial opinions analysed. This 
makes relevant the question answered in this study, of how the tension can be 
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managed. However, efforts have been made by Uganda’s international trading 
partners to create safeguards against the legal uncertainty that could arise from the 
country’s judicial flexibility, .The adequacy of these efforts is analysed below.  
4.4.2  International Mechanisms for Management of the Tension 
International treaties, and conventions of trade and commerce, to which Uganda is 
a party, provide another form of management of the tension. These include the 
Bilateral Trade Agreements (BITS); the Trade Related aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement (1994); and the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency (1997). These international instruments are intended to 
manage the tension by safeguarding against uncontrolled judicial flexibility in trade 
and commercial disputes, while ensuring legal certainty.105 
Uganda has so far signed fifteen BITs, of which only eight are in force. The 
provisions of these BITs are substantially the same. Therefore, the study of one is 
adequate for evaluation of the treaties in general as a tool for management of the 
tension. In this case, the Uganda-Netherlands BIT is the example used. The treaty 
guarantees that the contracting state will provide equal, fair and equitable 
treatment of foreign investors.106 Some rights under contract doctrine are also 
guaranteed; such as subrogation rights, which are to be recognised by the 
contracting party.107 Further, removing jurisdiction from Ugandan courts is used to 
                                            
 
105 The Preamble to the TRIPS agreement mentions as one of its objectives, reduction of the 
tension through multilateral procedures of dispute resolution; Ensuring legal predictability is one of 
the goals listed in the Preamble to the 2013 Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997); and Article 2 of the Bilateral Investment 
Treaty between Ugandan and the Netherlands, as well as others mentions as the object of the 
treaty, the protection of investors’ investments within the framework of each country’s laws and 
regulations, which implies legal certainty.  
106 Article 3 (1) & (2).  
107 Article 8. 
 195
control judicial flexibility and the uncertainty of the Ugandan justice system. The 
settlement of disputes between a contracting party and an investor are to be 
referred for arbitration or conciliation, under the settlement of Investment Disputes 
between states and nationals of other states, opened for signature at Washington 
on 18Th March 1965.108 However, the BITs do not go far enough, as they only offer 
direct guidance on judicial choice by way of the recognition of subrogation rights. 
Such rights, automatically arising by virtue of an insurance contract, are only one of 
the very many subjects of allocation of the varying rights and obligations arising 
from the insurance contract; let alone other types of commercial contract. Further, 
the treaties offer no guarantees on legal certainty in disputes between private 
parties of the member states. Besides that, even the private-public disputes they 
cover are limited to those involving investors from signing states. This is not an all-
encompassing tool for tension management.  
With regard to the TRIPs Agreement, the intention is to limit the scope for flexible 
national judicial approaches in World Trade Organisation member states.109 
Further, Articles 41-50 set judging guidelines that could ensure certainty even in a 
flexibility-judging paradigm. They include the requirements that judicial decisions 
are written,110 that they include the reasoning behind them,111that they are based 
on evidence before the courts that parties have been given an opportunity to be 
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heard,112 and that there has been an opportunity for judicial review of decisions on 
points of law.113 
However, TRIPs as a tool for management of the tension is limited and inadequate 
in three ways. Firstly, there is the agreement’s narrow relevance, of intellectual 
property related contracts. The bulk of commercial contract disputes cannot be 
decided with the guidance of the principles agreed upon in TRIPS, unless adopted 
through an independent instrument.  
Secondly, TRIPs allows developing and least-developed countries to use TRIPs-
compatible norms, in a manner that allows them to pursue their own public policies 
to support economic development.114 This opens a window for developing 
countries like Uganda to maintain flexible systems of commercial justice, and justify 
them as necessary for economic development.  
Thirdly, the gates for eroding all manner of formalism and its attendant certainty 
are opened by the respect accorded to differences in the national legal systems of 
member states.115Relatedly to this is the principle that it is up to each member 
state to determine the appropriate methods of implementation of the agreement 
within its existing legal system.116 By allowing such room for maintenance of 
Uganda’s local commercial justice system, the tension is left unmanaged, as it 
forms a defining character of the country’s judging paradigm.  
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, since the English legal system was transplanted to Uganda, the 
tension has been a reality that has defined this commercial judging paradigm; 
manifesting by the concurrent practice of formalism and flexibility during the same 
period, in the same courts, and sometimes in the same cases. One of its 
characteristics has been the competition between the values motivating formalism 
and flexibility, defined by joint and substantially common frequencies. 
 At the same time, the tension-management regime has been incomprehensive, 
incoherent and disjointed, leaving the tension untamed. Constructing a viable 
management mechanism requires weighing, understanding and balancing such 
competing values as are revealed to underlie the tension, by the content analysis 
of Uganda’s judicial opinions. Therefore, the next chapter contributes to making a 
case for the viability of coexistence, by reviewing the literature on how the tension 
can be managed. It analyses the weaknesses and strengths of existing theoretical 
propositions and identifies and justifies the theories guiding the study in the search 
for how the tension can be managed in Uganda.     
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 Towards a Coexistence Theory of Adjudication  
Introduction 
In this chapter, a construct is made of the theoretical framework to guide this study, 
after reviewing the existing literature and theories of adjudication on how to 
manage the tension between formalism and flexibility. The chapter reviews the 
literature on prescriptive theories of adjudication, both conceptual and normative, 
that have proposed ways to achieve legal certainty by managing the coexistence 
between formalism and flexibility in adjudication. The prescriptive discourse is 
concerned with the search for ways to guide judicial choice by empowering, while 
at the same time restraining, the commercial judge, in order to balance the 
interests served by flexibility and formalism. The key elements of debate in this 
prescriptive discourse are the answers to four questions, namely: the nature that 
judicial guidelines should take; who should be their emitter from what sources 
should they be formulated; and how should they be formulated. 
Legal scholars have debated for centuries the subject of meaning and nature of 
law; however, less attention has been given to the theory of adjudication, and more 
particularly its contextual application. Studies and writings on the theory of 
adjudication are recent developments and follow Dworkin’s challenge to legal 
positivism on account of its failure to appreciate the process of adjudication.1 
According to Dworkin, theories of law should contain a theory of adjudication that 
deal with controversy, and particularly the standards judges must use in deciding 
hard cases.2 Dworkin therefore reacted to the inadequacies of positivism by 
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constructing a theory of adjudication, proposing that judges use and must use 
moral considerations in addition to the rules found in statutes and cases.3 After 
Dworkin’s theory of adjudication, which will be analysed in further detail later in this 
chapter, there has been a growing recognition that adjudication is actually central 
to legal theory.4 
This chapter therefore reviews and analyses the literature in this growing field of 
adjudicatory theory, reaching the conclusion that an exhaustive theory to guide the 
search for coexistence and therefore legal certainty is yet to be constructed. Even 
if this gap in theory did not exist in general, it certainly exists for a context like the 
Ugandan one. Accordingly, a combination of aspects from the jurisprudence of 
interests, and institutional theory, is proposed and justified as the most appropriate 
theoretical framework to guide this study. 
Conceptual Prescriptive Theories of Adjudication 
In this study, ‘conceptual theories of adjudication’ means theories that are judge-
centred, whereby concepts empower judges to manage the tension without 
restraint from autonomous rules, principles or standards. These concepts include 
the trust in the power of discretion, as well as the view from progressive realism 
and economic determinism that social science concepts can guide judges. 
5.2.1  Trust in Judicial Discretion and Self Regulation 
Orthodox legal theory, represented by both positivists and radical realists on 
different sides of the formalism-flexibility divide, acknowledges the tension, but puts 
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all its trust in judicial discretion and self regulation, as providing judges with enough 
of an armoury for judicial choice in hard cases. The legal positivist Austin’s view 
was that judges had to use their discretion to fill gaps left by the negligence and 
incapacity of members of the legislature.5 This implies that in hard cases, the 
tension would be managed by giving judges personal freedom to determine why 
they should decide formalistically or flexibly. After Austin, even Hart, who claimed 
to present a softer strand of positivism, was of the view that in every legal system a 
large and important field should be left open for the exercise of discretion by judges 
and other officers, to render vague standards determinate, guided by practice of 
the legal system.6 
Hart’s7 reasoning was that, contrary to Austinian positivism’s claim that law was 
determinate by nature, rules would always become indeterminate at some point, 
for three reasons. Firstly, that language is by nature indeterminate, with words 
containing both a core meaning and a penumbra of doubt, which gives judges a 
choice to make, within the constraints of the law. Secondly, rules are by nature 
open-textured because they use general standards, such as reasonableness, 
equity and equitability. Thirdly, that there is indeterminacy inherent in the common 
law system of precedent. 
At the core of the rule, where the law is determinate, the judges’ role would simply 
be discovering the applicable rule and mechanically applying it. However, at the 
penumbra, the legal uncertainty produced by indeterminacy would have to be 
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resolved by judges filling gaps in law using judicial discretion. In the exercise of 
such discretion, judges had to take into account substantive values and moral 
principles.8 The trust in discretion was maintained by the radical legal realists, who 
otherwise expressed a lot of scepticism about positivism, arguing that many legal 
doctrines are not coherent.9  Further, that judicial decisions on freedom of contract 
were always based on a political agenda.  
As such, the radical realists called for courts always to go outside the law and fish 
for answers from raw social power and economic realities.10 By this means, the 
judge was to use his discretion in determining how such social forces informed the 
right answer in any case. Frank, for instance, encouraged judges to take 
cognisance of rules and concepts, but only as fictions meant to serve as tools for 
particular purposes.11 In that case, legal certainty can only exist in a real or deeper 
sense if judges are more enlightened, so as to have self-control over their own 
prejudices, and know that rules and precedents are not their masters but mere 
tools for use in the interests of doing justice.12 
By way of a solution to the tension, Frank, proposed that substantive and 
procedural laws should be made even more flexible, to allow judges to make 
individualised decisions more honestly and openly, without the fear of 
justification.13 Frank emphasised Holmes’s thesis of law being the prophecies of 
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courts, and the trust in judicial discretion being the best management tool.14 He 
therefore believed that there is no need for regimes to manage the tension; but 
rather that judges should be given the trust to manage it, and lawyers should focus 
on the realities of court practice, and not their wishes about what that practice 
could be. 
The radical realist view continues to influence the choices of modern judges who 
look at law as a means to an end. Thomas makes the case for substantialism, or 
autonomous judicial choice, arguing that although formalism continues to be alive 
and influential, it is the cause of uncertainty.15 This is because beyond the fixed 
meaning of rules, judges are left to grapple with how to achieve justice in individual 
cases. On the other hand, although certainty is elusive, it can be achieved by 
accepting the reality of judicial choice in legal reasoning, which should be informed 
by fairness and relevance, as the ends of law.16 Fairness is the reference external 
to law that should guide judicial choice. What constitutes fairness is a readily 
identifiable bundle of values and being obvious makes fairness predictable in 
particular cases. Relevance, on the other hand, is the ability of the law to take into 
account changing circumstances and the expectations of the community. Thomas 
therefore claims that practice is superior to law, and what constitutes law is 
ultimately the judge’s personal perception of what is relevant, appropriate and 
just.17 
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Thomas’s thesis still fails to provide clear criteria to guide judges in choosing 
between competing values that are bound to inform perceptions of fairness as a 
value of adjudication. To call fairness readily identifiable is to be blind to contexts 
like Uganda, made up of numerous ethnicities and religious beliefs, with wide gaps 
between economic classes. Such diversity makes it difficult to have uniform values 
that one would call self-evident. Further, the identification speaks to a detailed 
analysis of judicial opinions, like this study, to ascertain which bundle of values 
judges in a specific jurisdiction have taken to constitute fairness; making the value 
far from obvious. Thomas also contradicts himself when he says that ultimately, 
legality should depend on the judge’s personal perception; having claimed that the 
judges should be guided by community ideas of fairness.  
In reality, Thomas’s thesis is an attempt to provide normativity to the excessive 
conceptual trust placed in discretion by orthodox legal theory. This attempt is made 
more unfeasible by Thomas’s claim that judges should not be restrained by any 
rules.18 In this regard, Tamanaha rightly argued that placing faith in the judges is 
not a solution, and the question of what limits should be placed on judges remains 
a dilemma.19 Self-regulation would for instance imply that judges are free to 
change and make law from their personal will, for the whole essence of discretion 
is the exercise of individual preference and prejudice, from competing interests and 
values. This would not only amount to usurping the will of the people, expressed 
through the election of members of the legislature, but also contract law would be 
deprived of even the slightest degree of certainty. One would not know under what 
circumstances the law would stay as written or known in precedents, or what the 
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legal meaning of a rule is, for no one can foretell another person’s present or future 
preferences, motivations, views or prejudices. 
Some critical legal theorists also see judicial discretion as adequate to manage the 
tension. This has influenced the way precedents are used as a source of 
normativity, even in hard cases within common-law countries. Freeman notes that 
due to the infinite variability of facts in life, it is impossible to apply past rules in a 
purely mechanical way.20 Instead, judges have to mould the rules to meet changing 
situations, in which case the judges will not be too strict on rules, to allow an 
interplay between them and social forces. In performing this moulding, judges use 
their reason and discretion to ensure that common law remains rational, principled 
and rooted in British custom, while at the same time adaptable and relevant to 
social and economic circumstances.21 Tamanaha notes that through the use of 
judicial moulding, the common law has always managed the change, calling for 
reasoning and flexibility, while retaining the stability formalism and principles call 
for.22 Such a conclusion by Tamanaha is an admission of common law itself having 
embraced the idea that coexistence as the ideal paradigm. 
In the Good Faith thesis, Burton proposed another judge-centred approach to 
managing the tension.23 The theory proposes that both legal determinacy and 
indeterminacy are insignificant. Instead Burton argues that the tension between 
flexibility/indeterminacy and formalism/determinacy can be resolved by a third 
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alternative of judges acting in good faith, while performing their duty to uphold the 
law,24 thereby ruling out abuse of discretion. 
Although Burton presents the good faith thesis as an alternative to all other 
theories on the management of the tension between flexibility and formalism, he 
actually simply puts more trust in judges even than the legal realists when he 
seeks to rely on their rationality, objectivity, credibility and moral righteousness. 
‘Good faith’ is a very subjective phrase that speaks to one’s moral standing and 
humanity. 
The judge-centred theories are limited in a number of ways, especially with regard 
to their applicability in the Ugandan context. Firstly, the theories all assume that 
judges will always act rationally; which is a fallacy in very poor countries like 
Uganda, with high levels of corruption, and differing sources of morality, social 
norms and values. In this regard, Minda’s criticism of the idea of neutral principles 
of adjudication and legal process theory, 25  applies to the theories that put too 
much trust in judges. Minda argues that the theories wrongly assume that judges 
are genuine and conscientious and can control themselves in choosing between 
competing principles and interpretations.26 
Secondly, there is a lack of clear and objective guidance on when and how a judge 
can apply discretion. The common-law principle of stare decisis is meant to 
establish rules to guide decision-making. However, in cases where there is 
uncertainty as to which rule to apply or where there is a gap in the rules, the 
sphere of discretion is unregulated. What common-law judicial systems normally 
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have as the nearest thing to guidelines are practice directions, such as Uganda’s 
Judicial Code of Conduct.27 According to Freeman however, such practice 
directions are mere rules of practice and not rules of law, and as such are not 
binding on the courts.28 
In Uganda’s case, the wording of the directions confirms their lack of normativity. In 
particular, Section 1 of the Judicial Code of Conduct directs judicial officers to 
reach judicial decisions following their ‘conscientious understanding of the law, free 
of any direct or indirect extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or 
interference, from any quarter or for any reason’. This very open-textured language 
leaves the discretion given to judges unregulated, and in effect leaves adjudication 
to be guided by rules of men and not rules of law. 
Thirdly, the trust in discretion presupposes a society in which the judiciary can be 
trusted to make choices objectively, uninfluenced by considerations that should not 
be judiciously relevant, such as personal preferences, religious, social or political 
prejudices, political interference and the like. Uganda’s life has involved 
colonialism, military dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, the militarisation of the 
judiciary, a chief justice killed by the state, judicial appointments being made on 
account of one being a political cadre, widespread corruption amongst judicial 
officers, and other vices in the judicial system. In such a context, it is highly 
debatable whether judicial discretion should be trusted that much. All these vices 
are illustrated, and their significance elaborated, in chapters six to ten of the study. 
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Judge-centred conceptual theories, such as the belief in judicial discretion, and 
Burton’s good faith thesis, are therefore not the solution to managing the tension 
between flexibility and formalism in Uganda. This leads one to a review of other 
propositions, such as some scholars’ conceptual proposition that judges should not 
only take into account social sciences but also look to them for guidance. 
5.2.2  The Use of Social Sciences as Judicial Guidelines 
The social sciences, and social science methods, have been suggested as the 
proper basis for judges seeking guidance during adjudication. The progressive 
realists set the foundation for the place of social sciences in adjudication, and the 
economic theory of law built the superstructure, articulating Llewellyn’s theory of 
efficiency in more detail. 
The Progressive Realists’ View 
Progressive realists, including Holmes, Pound and Llewellyn, proposed that social 
science approaches should be used to develop a new objective policy analysis of 
the law.29 These were approaches such as are found in subjects like economics, 
which would represent the realities of the commercial world and public interest. 
Llewellyn, for instance, proposed that human behaviour had to be studied in order 
to free the law from its past.30 Through such studies a coherent concept of public 
interest, reflecting commercial reality, would be articulated to guide judges. 
In general, the progressive realists’ guiding theory on how judges can benefit from 
social science was the judicial observance of practice as the best evidence of 
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efficiency. Llewellyn therefore proposed that judges have to use their own 
experience, whether derived from having interest in commerce, by trying many 
commercial cases, or through reliance on trade custom or trade association rules.31 
However, Minda rightly criticises the progressive realists for believing that social 
sciences like economics are neutral, universal and fundamental, saying that they 
are no better than the formalists.32 They have only substituted a non-legal and 
apolitical form of conceptualism for the legal conceptualism.  This criticism is valid 
because social sciences are bound to be even more non-neutral than law; they are 
formulated by a limited number of groups of people, that are more likely to be 
moved by subjectivity than would be the case for large houses of legislators 
making law. 
Further, the limitations of trust in discretion apply also to the progressive realist 
antidote. This is especially because judges would have to make interpretations, 
and assess the applicability of social sciences, based on personal experiences; 
which is no different from trusting judicial discretion. One cannot separate personal 
prejudices and emotions from the factors judges would consider in using discretion. 
The interpretation and applicability of such social sciences, unless limited by 
normative guidelines, could easily be influenced by a particular judge’s personal 
background, social or political prejudices, human experiences and beliefs outside 
the law or social sciences. This conceptual antidote therefore would leave 
unprincipled flexibility untamed and would fail to create more legal certainty. 
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Llewellyn’s views and efforts are nonetheless credited for the development of 
America’s Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which was an attempt at creating 
neutral law; a type of management tool that would balance flexibility with 
formalism.33 The UCC embraces flexibility by allowing generous recognition of 
waiver and modification of contracts, and giving legal effect and force of law to the 
course of dealings, course of performance and customary trade usages. 
According to Shahar, such provisions as are in the UCC allow reality of a situation 
dictated by commercial forces to override rigid allocation of rights and duties, which 
means that courts have to look for the substance of the parties’ agreement rather 
than a formal historical manifestation thereof.34At the same time, the UCC 
balances the needs of both flexibility and doctrinal certainty, by giving effect to the 
text and formalism of the contract, as well as providing flexibility in their 
interpretation to give commercial reality effect.35 
The development of a uniform normative code containing management tools for 
the tension, as in the American case, appears to have been an exceptional by-
product of Llewellyn’s views. The UCC is the type of normative prescriptive 
framework that a country like Uganda needs, to guide commercial adjudication. 
The exception is that the rules, principles and standards making up its content 
would be arrived at after investigating the interests and values underlying Uganda’s 
commercial justice system, especially the decisions made by judges. 
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The Economic Analysis View 
The views of the progressive realists are in tandem with the economic analysis 
school of thought, which proposed that economic efficiency should constitute the 
ultimate goal of the law and the guiding principle to adjudication. ‘Economic 
efficiency’ here means allocating resources in the optimal way to achieve 
maximisation of social wealth and minimisation of costs. The pursuit of efficiency 
was proposed as an alternative both to formalism and to the classical utilitarian 
view of flexibility,36 as an attempt to create certainty without adhering to either 
phenomenon in the traditional sense. 
Farber, explained that the principal traditional role of courts is seen as dispute 
resolution, and not making law, with a backward-looking perspective that centred 
on fairness (the post ante perspective).37 However, economic analysis theory 
requires courts to look instead at the future consequences of a decision, called the 
ex-ante perspective. Decisions should not be guided by formalist concepts like 
freedom of contract, or flexibility-driven considerations like unconscionability of 
bargains, or other matters of fairness and morality.  In a typical contract dispute, 
William v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company,38 Farber illustrates that the effect of 
a decision, on the buyers as a group continuing to benefit from credit sales without 
collateral, would outweigh the fairness in a single case where a buyer could 
otherwise win on grounds of unconscionable credit terms.39 
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Therefore, courts should use economic determinism to maintain legal certainty, 
predictability and consistency, as judicial choices will not be unprincipled, in the 
radical realist (fairness) or positivist (certainty) senses, or even subjective. In effect, 
what is proposed is a substitution of the parties’ intentions in a contract, or its 
fairness, with the notion of public good. If judges were to be guided by ex-ante 
economic efficiency considerations, the rights and intentions of parties to contracts 
would always be arbitrarily sacrificed, in the service of the common good.  
Posner tried to deal with this absurdity by proposing that the court should presume 
that at the time of contracting, when the costs of the transaction are at zero, parties 
to contracts consented to having their disputes resolved on the basis of economic 
efficiency.40 However, this hypothetical or imposed consent would not be a logical 
way to serve certainty, for the condition presupposes parties who are literate and 
know the complexity of adjudication in advance of disputes. This does not 
represent the commercial community of Uganda. In fact, hardly any country can 
claim to have such a sophisticated commercial community, let alone a poor and 
largely illiterate country like Uganda. 
Dworkin41 also rightly criticises Posner’s alleged consent, saying that besides 
raising a moral judgement of the parties to the contract, it does not tally with the 
fact that individuals do not always give consent for rules to apply in a legal system. 
This criticism cannot be truer than in the Ugandan context, where even indirect 
consent to law, which is given through elections of legislators, has sometimes been 
absent; but laws are nevertheless made. This happened when English contract law 
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was imposed on the country under the 1902 Uganda Order in Council, and during 
1971-1980, when laws were made by way of the decrees of the Military Head of 
State. 
On the question of how judges can arrive at economic efficiency, Schwartz, 
explains that courts must make independent inquiry into a contract’s normative 
suitability when one party’s consent was not conscionably obtained, using 
Llewellyn’s practice as the best evidence of efficiency.42 Llewellyn, as the pioneer 
of the economic efficiency theory of adjudication, elaborated practice in the sense 
that since they had freedom to contract, parties to contracts pursued self-interests 
and therefore, their consent to a deal would be the best evidence of efficiency.43 
These practices will therefore appear in the form of custom, usage of trade, course 
of dealings and other habits of businessmen. 
Efficiency is also considered measurable by using a cost-benefit analysis standard, 
which the economic analysts call Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. This means a situation 
where a judicial decision leaves some people worse off, but the gains it brings to 
society far outweigh the losses, such that the losers can be fully compensated.44 
This is what Farber termed the cost-benefit analysis that should be used by judges 
to determine how efficient their decisions would be in maximising social wealth.45 
Dworkin46 and Farber,47 have debated the issue of taking wealth as a social value, 
with Dworkin on the ‘no’ and Farber on the ‘yes’ side. Dworkin was clearly looking 
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at Western societies, as Farber rightly points out; but Farber, by looking at 
Bangladesh as the yardstick of values in poor countries, also went off tangent. As 
was demonstrated in chapter four, social values in African countries like Uganda 
are grown in a garden very rich in culture and heritage that has persisted for 
hundreds of years. The legal system, represented by the constitution as epitome, 
has held on to the normativity of cultural values and local custom, the history of 
which predates monetisation of the economy. Further, in chapter nine, economic 
efficiency and wealth maximisation is also demonstrated as underlying flexibility in 
Ugandan courts, and is therefore part of the reality to be considered when 
searching for prescriptions for the tension.  
However, it remains to be investigated whether post-independence Uganda can be 
rightly defined as conforming to Dworkinean or Faberian views on wealth as a 
social value. That cannot be exhaustively done in this study; however, it suffices to 
note that the country’s history indicates the continued influence of wealth 
maximisation in adjudication, although it is doubtful whether it carries the same 
sense, and if economic analysis is the right guide to managing the tension. 
As pointed out by Farber, the other limitation of the applicability to Uganda of the 
economic analysis of law is the lack of institutional competence.48 Judges are not 
competent to use – and do not have the authority to use – a private dispute that 
represent the litigants’ interests as an opportunity to promote desired social 
policies. In Uganda, there will also be a problem of judges having the capacity to 
define what economic consequences (ex-ante perspective) their decisions are 
likely to have. An ordinary Ugandan judge will require expert evidence of such 
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effects, from economists, which will increase the costs of litigation rather than 
reducing them as the theory suggests. 
Farber49 suggests that a hybrid – of the ex-ante perspective from law and 
economics theory, and Rawls’s theory of justice – would solve the shortcomings of 
law and economics theory. Both theories rely on a person having made a 
hypothetical bargain, and having agreed that in the event of a dispute certain 
criteria will be used by judges to do justice. This leads one to look at the school of 
thought Rawls belonged to, which believed in normative prescriptive theories of 
adjudication that propose guidelines beyond the conceptualism. 
Normative Prescriptive Theories of Adjudication 
The normative theories propose judging norms, in the form of ultimate standards, 
concepts, principles and rules to guide judging. The common idea is that such 
judicial guidelines ought to be clear, express, consistent and determinate, while at 
the same time permitting flexibility in a principled way. Further, the normative 
theories propose that judging guidelines should be consciously formulated by a 
deliberate law-making process – as opposed to being a matter of self-control by 
judges. The most prominent normative prescriptive theories are the interpretive 
and procedural morality views of legal process theory, and theories advocating for 
ultimate judging principles, rules and standards. 
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5.3.1  Procedural Values as Criteria for Adjudication 
Amongst the normative prescriptive theories is the school of thought that believes 
in the legal process itself generating normative criteria that can then guide judges 
in resolving disputes. Scholars in this camp included Fuller, Fiss, Dworkin and 
Rawls. Fuller and Rawls believed in the discovery and use of procedural morality, 
while Dworkin and Fiss saw adjudication as a matter of interpretation. 
Procedural Morality in Legal Process 
Rawls’s view was based on an attempt at defining a moral discourse based on the 
social contract, to establish minimum standards or rights that would be essential for 
a just society.50 The first standard was that a legitimate procedure for rendering a 
fair decision had to be based on the community’s values of fairness.  Secondly, 
that the institutional process for decision-making had to be based on free 
individuals. Rawls saw free individuals as those that had no position, or did not 
know their position, in society; otherwise called ‘the veil of ignorance’.51 Under this 
veil of ignorance, all individuals would agree to certain principles of justice, and 
such principles would be neutral, for no ulterior motives would be at play; thus 
Rawls’s reference to it as ‘the original position’. These neutral principles are the 
ones that judges would then be guided by in all cases where they sought to do 
justice, and that would translate into the community’s standards of fairness. 
Other legal process theorists, however, proposed a way of balancing flexibility and 
formalism without morality guiding normativity, but looking at the law and 
procedure for guidance, even to the purposes and values of the law itself. Fuller, 
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for instance, observed that legal certainty is better served by attending more 
carefully to judges’ non-technical considerations during adjudication.52 Judges 
follow precedents through an articulation of shared purposes that reveal what 
earlier judges were up to, making such purposes worth discovering as being part of 
the law itself.53 
In contract theory, for instance, Fuller proposed that courts more often allow 
plaintiffs, who have relied on the defendant’s promise, to succeed; 54 more than the 
formal law seem to allow. Contract doctrine would be improved if such reliance 
were recognised as a legitimate basis for recovery in courts. Fuller also called for 
discovering the values in procedural laws, arguing that there was an internal set of 
normative values to guide purposive judges.55 Such procedural values had to be 
discovered to restrain subjective judges; otherwise judges had to decide in 
accordance with the rules in fulfilment of the social contract, and the notion of 
process. 
The internal criteria stance of legal process theorists fails to show how the judges 
would, on a case-by-case basis, engage in finding the values underlying 
procedures and laws, so as to have guidelines that provide certainty. It helps 
however to acknowledge that a scrutiny of the law and its procedure will reveal 
values that have competed in adjudication to cause both the flexibility and the 
tension.  
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This study contributes to knowledge by discovering such values with regard to 
Uganda’s commercial adjudication, not only underlying flexibility but even widening 
the search to discover those values responsible for the formalism in the tension. 
How these values should be unearthed, and the fact that they are what should be 
reconciled as a way towards constructing ultimate and autonomous judging 
guidelines to manage the tension, are also contributions made by this study. Next, I 
analyse the theory that adjudication is and should be about interpretation.  
Adjudication as a Process of Interpretation 
The interpretive strand of legal process theorists includes Fiss56 and Dworkin.57 
They promote the view that adjudication is a process of interpretation, and that 
through interpretation judges can understand and express the meaning of texts 
and discover the values embedded in them. According to Fiss the community of 
the legal system could formulate disciplinary rules that would guide judges to make 
rational normative choices about sharply contested issues.58 By nature, disciplinary 
rules would comprise established rules, customs and conventions of the legal 
culture, reflected in the language of the constitution, case law and the prevailing 
cultural heritage of society. 
Fiss’s theory sought to define a normative process for enabling judges to engage in 
legal interpretation – not only to discover the meanings of statutes and contracts, 
but also their underlying values – while at the same time restraining them from 
crossing the red line.59 Without looking outside the legal system, rules would be 
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established to regulate adjudication in a manner that balanced flexibility and 
formalism. Fiss however omits vital sources of values and interests that should 
inform any formulation of the ultimate principles or rules for adjudication. For 
instance, his list does not cover plain policy as could be declared by a government 
or generally agreed to by a community. This is neither custom nor heritage but will 
practically influence a judge’s decision in some cases, for example Traces SA v 
Attorney General60, where the Ugandan High Court chose to decline awarding 
remedies agreed in a contract, citing a change in government policy.  
Further, commercial practices and developments in industry, commerce and 
technology are not covered by Fiss’s list, yet these contribute to the context under 
which contracting takes place, and they should therefore be understood. Taking 
these developments into consideration would also help to highlight values 
necessary for a judge to arrive at a workable and realistic decision. 
Finally, by opting for rules, Fiss reverses his gain towards coexistence and falls in 
the formalism ditch. Rules by nature connote an attitude that favours adherence to 
written letters and would certainly be regarded as removing judicial flexibility as 
opposed to managing its use. While the guidelines should be normative in 
character, they ought to be flexible enough to allow the resolution of deadlocks in 
hard cases, while containing rules as well as standards, and principles. 
Dworkin also believed in the suitability of an objective interpretation regime as the 
best way to filter and discover community values that would in the end inform 
adjudication in both clear and hard cases.61 Dworkin’s theory, however, went 
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beyond Fiss in the sense that it covered non-rule standards and principles. He is 
well known for attacking legal positivism on the ground of looking at law as only 
being made up of rules, ignoring other standards made up of principles and 
policies.62 Principles should be the ones to unlock (as he called it) the tie in 
adjudication. 
Regarding the content, nature and source of the ultimate principles, Dworkin 
proposed the theories of law to be integrity, and constructive interpretation of legal 
practice.63 ‘Law as integrity’ means that the law should speak with one voice, 
therefore it should be based on coherent principles of due process, fairness and 
justice. Judges have to enforce these principles in all fresh cases so that decisions 
are based on the same standard. Dworkin recommended law as integrity to be the 
blue print for adjudication by which judges have to be guided.64 
Under the theory of constructive interpretation of legal practice, Dworkin proposed 
that adjudication should follow three steps.65 The first step is called the pre-
interpretation stage; judges have to identify rules and standards that constitute 
practice. The second step, called the interpretive stage, involves judges settling for 
general justifications for the elements in step one. In the third step, the post-
interpretive stage, the judge has to adjust his senses of what the rules identified as 
practice require, so as to serve the justification he identified at step two. 
At the centre of Dworkin’s proposed steps, therefore, is the judge’s ability to 
perceive, elucidate and reason out what practice is and its moral or contextual 
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justification, so as to guide his decision in a case. This does not pass for restrained 
judicial activity; rather, it shows how a judge can exercise personal preference and 
prejudice in an organised and controlled way. The justification judges have to come 
up with is not guided by any criteria, and is left to his or her personal beliefs, 
experiences and views. Dworkin’s views are therefore no better than those of 
scholars like Holmes66 and Thomas, who openly crowned judges as the kings of 
the law; 67 this still leaves a gap in how judges can actually be restrained by the 
principles, besides the content and nature of such principles, which is equally 
critical. Relatedly, I proceed to review the claim that adjudication should be guided 
by what is acceptable. 
Acceptability  
The coexistence school of thought does not look at adjudication as providing a 
decision that should be seen as true or false. This is because that would imply 
deductive judicial reasoning, which does not apply where a judge has to choose 
between alternatives.68 Instead, as Freeman argues, judicial decisions are either 
right or wrong, or good or bad, in the sense that they either are or are not based 
upon cumulative reasons that are acceptable – hence  the notion of acceptability.69 
The notion of acceptability, therefore, refers to the ultimate validity criteria that 
have been agreed upon in a community, for judges to use in decision-making. 
Freeman looks at the ultimate criteria as existing in every legal system, with the 
source of those criteria being not ethics but practical experience, custom and 
tradition. The variety of criteria courts employ therefore, reflects the varying 
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attitudes towards the solution of problems with which they are called upon to 
deal.70 
The acceptance notion therefore demands that a proper search for a regime to 
manage the tension between flexibility and formalism would require an examination 
of the particular context of the country concerned, to uncover the unique judging 
criteria agreeable to its people. Freeman’s view is that the ultimate criteria should 
not be seen as absolutes in the natural law sense, but justifiable as ultimate 
depending on the particular purpose or community.71Beyond specific communities 
however, other scholars have proposed the development of universal ultimate 
principles and standards that would guide judicial reasoning in hard cases. There 
are however variances about their nature, content and sources, as can be 
discerned from the interpretive theory, the conventionists school, the neutral 
principles theory and the jurisprudence of interests. 
The Neutral Principles Theory 
Under the neutral principles theory, judicial discretion is acknowledged but 
considered limited, in the sense that judges should not be allowed to employ 
subjective values in adjudication. Instead, legitimate judging should follow 
procedural values that provide the objective process through which the law can 
achieve its goals. These legal policy considerations judges engage in should be 
principled, rational and objective. This purist view further proposed that in the end 
judges would develop neutral principles. Reasoned elaboration is one such 
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principle by which judges are to be restrained.72 The idea here is that judges 
should be obliged to give elaborate reasons – which would in turn limit their 
leverage to indulge in unprincipled subjectivity – and stick to the law and a clear 
analysis of the policies embedded in the law itself. Consistency is another one, 
which entails treating similar cases alike, and this would restrain judges seeking to 
invoke subjectivity in decision-making. 
The key elements in the neutral principles theory are ability to come up with 
principles that are actually neutral, and the viability of judges having to regulate 
themselves. Minda argues that it is impossible to find neutral theories whenever 
two principles are in conflict.73 Although this attack was based on constitutional 
disputes, it is relevant to contract hard cases as well, for the essence of a dispute 
in such a case is the conflict of inherent interests. 
Further, its reliance on the ability and willingness of judges to self-regulate is 
unrealistic in countries like Uganda, where the credibility of some judicial officers, 
and the independence of the judiciary, are on the low side. The scepticism about 
schools of thought that put all the trust in judicial discretion apply to the neutral 
principles theory, to the extent that judges are expected to define and enforce the 
neutral principles. But could judge made conventions be the solution? Some have 
inquired.  
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Judges’ Conventions as a Source of Ultimate Principles 
One of the strands of the ultimate principles theory proposes that judging in civil 
matters like contract should be done in conformity with principles and standards set 
out in autonomous judicial conventions. This view is preferred to suggestions that 
the path to the formulation of guiding principles and standards should begin and 
end with judges themselves. Scholars like Atiyah74 and Dworkin75 have suggested 
plausible principles and standards that can guide flexible and formalistic judges, 
but without a definite source to which judges should make reference. Judicial 
restraint is in the end left to be defined and limited by the judges themselves. Such 
scholars travel on the right path but disembark before reaching the final destination 
– legal certainty. 
Llewellyn realised this shortcoming and proposed that adjudication should be 
guided by rules in form of commercial codes, but that courts should not be their 
originators.76 Instead, he proposed administrative agencies or specialised law 
reform organisations, like the Uganda Law Reform Commission. Along this line of 
thought, conventionist scholars have proposed judicial conventions similar to 
Uganda’s criminal sentencing guidelines,77 and the ‘guide to interpretation’ clauses 
of the Multilateral Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.78 The Vienna 
Convention regulates international contracts, some of which have commercial 
aspects, and the formalism versus flexibility dichotomy has been at play in the 
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International Court of Justice trying such disputes.79 Therefore, the judicial 
convention is a relevant piece of literature and can be a point of reference in 
searching for a way to manage the tension. 
Similarly to what is proposed in this study, the Convention provided for judging 
guidelines in Article 31-33, mainly formalising and standardising the interpretation 
and application of contracts as a mechanism to manage the tension by balancing 
formalism with flexibility.80 For instance, when determining the content of treaties, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) judges are required to use subsequent 
practice of the parties, and other relevant rules of international law.81 This helps to 
create a balance between maintaining conceptual ordering and consistency in law, 
and adaptability to changing circumstances and experience. Two contract 
interpretation techniques are also provided to judges to manage the tension. 
Firstly, there is the reinterpretation of a treaty on the basis of its evolutive 
character, which will take into account the formalistic will theory, defined by the 
parties’ intentions.82 Secondly, there is reinterpretation based on the current and 
subsequent practice of the parties,83 which caters for economic efficiency and other 
realistic considerations demanded by the contract’s utility.  
Jean d’Aspremont criticises the tension-management mechanism described above; 
regarding it as ineffective on the ground that it simply created formalism, while 
flexibility continues to exist in the ICJ decisions.84 This view however exhibits a 
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misconception of what the process of balancing formalism and flexibility should 
achieve. The legal certainty intended does not mean flexibility-free adjudication, 
but rather both flexibility and formalism being practised coherently and rationally, 
following a certain and predictable course. Further, the fact that the learned scholar 
acknowledges that the ICJ has, since 1969, used this mechanism to reach 
decisions, and the fact that he does not provide evidence of this having resulted in 
a legal crisis, is evidence of the mechanism’s viability; making its adaptability in 
private commercial law adjudication pertinent. Finally, Jean d’Aspremont’s85 
support of the view that elaborating formal standards of interpretation to balance 
formalism and flexibility in the Vienna Convention was not easy, but a miracle, 
betrays his non-conformity claims as based on a defeatist mind-set.86  In that 
regard, it is not different from other claims that formalism and flexibility cannot 
coexist, or that the tension between them cannot be managed; and all such claims, 
are rejected in this study.87 
Therefore, the conventionist school that includes Eisenberg,88 Fiss89 and 
Burton,90provides a more viable way to manage the tension. Eisenberg in particular 
developed a detailed theory and framework for ultimate judging principles.91 
However, his proposals are not based on a deliberate effort to balance values 
observed as competing in real cases, as is done in this study; this makes his 
proposals largely theoretical, and their applicability to Uganda needs testing 
through studies like this one. Relatedly, Eisenberg does not articulate the source of 
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or how constructing content to ultimate guidelines should be arrived at, let alone 
what values should inform the principles embedded in them.  
Nevertheless, Eisenberg’s proposals are a viable attempt at managing the tension 
using judging guidelines. He noted that common-law rules dominate the law of 
contract and tort, but it is far from clear what principles courts use or should use in 
establishing common-law rules. The rules established are a result of interplay 
between rules in precedents and moral norms, experience and policies, but courts 
are not free to employ social norms, policies and experience as they see fit.92 
Accordingly, Eisenberg proposed that the common-law rules that judges develop 
should satisfy four standards:93Firstly, rules should be in conformity with all moral 
norms, policies and experiences that have social support. Secondly, rules should 
be consistent with one another to make one body of law. Thirdly, the rules adopted 
in the past (precedents), should be applied consistently over time. Fourthly, if there 
is a conflict between norms, policies and experiences that have social support, the 
best choices should be made. If these standards are all pointing to one answer, 
then the system of common-law rules is running normally. In the event of a conflict 
between the above standards – in other words, in hard cases – the judge has to 
change the law. Eisenberg therefore proposed that courts be guided by a 
professional convention of judges, employing four foundational principles of 
adjudication rooted in the social function of courts.94 
The first principle is objectivity, which entails impartiality and universality, meaning 
that there will be no influence from anyone, or anything, and rules should not be 
                                            
 




applied uniquely but as would be applied to anyone.95 The second principle is 
support, which requires that rules established or applied by the courts should be 
supported by general standards of society or special standards in the legal 
system.96 The requirement of support comes from the social function of courts plus 
the structure and fairness of the foundational principles.97 
The third principle is replicability, which stands for predictability and legal certainty. 
However, the importance attached to replicability should be context-specific. Its 
importance in any given area should depend on the weight attached to the value of 
planning, as against the value of flexible response to new conditions; and the value 
of channelling the behaviour of private actors, as against that of responding to their 
fair expectations. 
Eisenberg’s fourth principle is responsiveness, which comes from the position of 
courts in the legal system and society as a whole. Courts are not obliged to 
respond to society, but only relate to it through the intermediary of lawyers. On the 
other hand, courts are not obliged to follow the professional discourse of lawyers, 
but only respond to it. Eisenberg proposed that courts should respond to legal 
discourse in the narrow and wide senses. The narrow sense is that of responding 
to the case as presented before court. This means responding to pleadings, briefs 
and other actions of counsel. The wider sense is responding to opinions of the 
legal profession generally, such as publications and deliberations, or reviews at 
conferences. 
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With regard to the source of ultimate principles, standards and rules for 
adjudication, the study rejects the practice of placing excessive trust in judicial 
discretion, economic determinism and the self-regulation perspective. Instead, the 
institutional theory, to the extent that it looks at the source, nature and effects of 
legal phenomena as context-based, is found more persuasive. 
Accordingly, a combination of interests jurisprudence and the institutional theory of 
law is adopted to guide a search for underlying interests and values from which a 
coexistence management regime can be derived to guide commercial contracts 
adjudication in Uganda’s context.  The specific elements of these theories adapted 
to guide this study are highlighted below. 
Guiding Theories of the Study 
In finding the appropriate management regime for realising coexistence, no single 
legal theory is exhaustive. Therefore, with respect to the nature and content of a 
coexistence management regime, and to the extent of the applicability of the 
theories to Uganda’s unique context, the jurisprudence of interests, and 
institutional theory, are guiding the study. In the exacting search for what should 
guide the judges, one needs first to understand the nature and structure of the 
legal system in question.  What is appropriate is bound to differ from one 
jurisdiction to the next. Uganda is viewed as a country with unique characteristics; 
for instance, legal pluralism is not merely a matter of debate between academics, 
as is the case elsewhere, but in fact constitutes part of the legal order created by 
the 1995 Constitution. In this regard, the notion of general clauses advanced by 
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Schmitt’s institutional theory is revisited as a possible tool for identifying a 
framework for a commercial judging guide for Uganda. 
However, to construct the general clauses, institutional theory proposes a 
framework to guide judges, and this framework embodies morals, faith and public 
reason.98 In Uganda, these components are already set out as judicial guidelines 
by the constitution, and these general clauses are part of the problem and not the 
solution; which calls for a re-examination of what character the guidelines suitable 
for the Ugandan context should take. Contribution is therefore made by proposing 
ways to arrive at a rational and comprehensive framework for management of the 
tension, tailored for the Ugandan context, guided by interests jurisprudence. 
Interests Jurisprudence 
Sociological jurisprudence proposes, as the way towards managing the tension, a 
theory of interests – otherwise referred to as the jurisprudence of interests.99 The 
idea is that during adjudication, judges are faced with competing interests; the 
facts, society’s reality and the rules of law, each fighting to prevail at the expense 
of others. Every decision they make is a compound brewed using these different 
ingredients, mixed in varying proportions.100  However, justice is best served by a 
system of adjudication that is not a prisoner of rules. Judges should identify, openly 
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articulate, adjust and balance such competing interests so that the overriding ones 
prevail in particular cases.101 The word ‘interest’ is in this case used in the widest 
range of its connotations, to cover all things that man holds dear and all ideals, 
which guide man’s life, making it interchangeable with the word ‘values’, as is done 
in this study.102 Accordingly, past practices and existing rules of law should only 
have force if and when they represent the continuing values of society; otherwise 
they should be rejected or modified. This theory, it is argued, has worked to deliver 
group and individual justice during constitutional adjudication in the United 
States,103 under the influence of the German jurist Jhering.104 He is credited with 
being the godfather of this theory, in turn influencing the sociological jurisprudential 
thinking of theorists like Cardozo, Pound and Holmes, as a reaction to what was 
perceived as the tyranny of legal concepts.105  
Like this study, their theories have contributed to answering the questions of what 
the foundations to judicial choices are, and therefore why the tension has 
prevailed, and also how it can be managed. Contribution to knowledge is in turn 
made by this study operationalising the theory, subject to the injunctions and 
modifications indicated below. This serves to extend its viability as an adjudicatory 
theory that provides a framework for arriving at the coexistence of formalism and 
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flexibility, and therefore management of the tension. The following sub-sections 
explain the theory’s key propositions, as they relate to this study. 
5.5.1  Foundations to Judicial Choice 
The phenomena that interests jurisprudence came to challenge arose from the 
dominant positivist conception of law as logic, where judges formalistically applied 
capitalist/individualism-oriented abstract concepts like freedom of contract, at the 
expense of reality.106 In place of such conceptual jurisprudence, the theory 
proposes that judges should respect existing doctrine, but adopt a utilitarian 
understanding of the task of the law, to inform their decisions. The task of the law 
is the satisfaction, at all times, of as many as possible human demands, claims, 
desires and interests, with the least possible friction and waste to the entire 
scheme of interests at the time.107   
Therefore, legal concepts should be applied in hard cases with regard to how they 
actually work and affect people in real life. As in this study, Pound dealt with the 
tension between formalism and flexibility in hard cases, because his focus was on 
cases where there was a discrepancy between legal doctrine in books and 
empirical data about law, as well as cases where the court decisions differed from 
the words of statutes.108 The judges, through legal reasoning, are expected to 
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reconstruct legal doctrine to reflect the balancing of competing interests and 
thereby manage the tension.109 
According to Pound, to achieve an interest-based analysis, judges should 
hierarchically classify and arrange competing interests (to be recognised, adjusted, 
enforced and secured by the law) as: individual interests; public interests; and 
social interests.110 Although all these categories are traceable to individual 
interests,111 in case of conflict neither individual nor public interests should be 
treated as absolute, for the value of each depends on the reality and utility in a 
particular case.112 A judge should however view the underlying goal or end of law 
and adjudication as serving social welfare;113 therefore, wherever there is a clash 
with other categories, social interests should prevail. But even then, social interests 
can at times also be outweighed by more important interests, values and other 
considerations of society.114 
In the treating of all values as equal lies one of interests jurisprudence’s limitations, 
as it creates indeterminacy during the balancing, in the sense that a judge is left 
with no objective criteria for choosing which value to sacrifice for another. Judicial 
subjectivity and outright law making, intended to be minimised, are instead left to 
determine judicial choice. Accordingly, one of the major criticisms levelled against 
Jhering and Pound relates to failure to propose an objective-judging criterion. 
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There is controversy as to whether Pound died trying to search for ‘the ideal 
element in law’115 as an objective way of managing the tension, or had abandoned 
the search in favour of the view that criteria must be derived from the situation of 
the members of a society whose law is being considered in a particular case at 
hand.116 Jhering, on the other hand, failed to answer the questions of ultimate ends 
and objective criteria for selection and preferment of interests.117 
I will not divert into evaluating the different accounts of Pound’s final mission with 
regard to finding an objective mechanism for judicial choice that can achieve 
coexistence.  
Instead, this study views the jurisprudence of interests as having provided the 
basic framework for constructing such a mechanism, in a number of ways. Firstly, 
the theory brings to the fore the need to recognise articulate and inarticulate values 
competing in adjudication as the foundations to judicial choices such as formalism 
and flexibility. Secondly, the theory provides for the next step, balancing the 
identified values; and beyond this, some of the theory’s proponents, including 
Pound, have gone ahead to propose techniques on how objective criteria can be 
developed from the balancing of such values.118 These efforts towards achieving 
coexistence, as a way to manage the tension, are explained and evaluated in the 
next sub-section, indicating the extent to which they influence this study.  
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5.5.2  Relevance to the Study  
Although proponents of interests jurisprudence approached the tension from a 
United States or European constitutional law perspective, the theory is adapted to 
guide this study, and this is so for a number of reasons. Firstly, constitutional 
adjudication is relevant to commercial adjudication. The basis of constitutionalism 
in countries with written constitutions, like the United States and Uganda, is 
contracts – the social contracts about how people should be governed.119 Like 
commercial contracts, these contracts have parties; all the citizens; and terms that 
have been reduced into writing, and to which judges give adherence. 
Secondly, in the case of Uganda, the constitution, as the supreme law, is the final 
point of reference for the law on judging and substantive rights, including 
commercial ones.120 In this respect, it is directly linked to all commercial 
adjudication; especially in that it has obliged judges to consider, not only the rules 
of law, but also extra-legal normative sources like society’s peculiar circumstances, 
values and aspirations.121 This is confirmed by the fact that in a number of 
commercial disputes the constitution has been relied on to allocate the rights and 
obligations of parties to the contract.122 
Thirdly, the jurisprudence of interests approaches the answer to the management 
of the tension with a view similar to the main thesis of this study, namely that 
formalism and flexibility can coexist by means of their underlying values being 
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ascertained and balanced.123 This is based on the realisation that certainty – 
engendered by formalism – and the law’s adaptability – to take care of society’s 
changes reflected by new interests – are both necessary.124 Accordingly, although 
it promotes a utilitarian understanding of law, the theory is neither a strand of 
realism, nor does it entirely fault either side of the formalism-flexibility divide.125 
Therefore, the jurisprudence of interests supports the coexistence of formalism and 
flexibility, providing a theoretical framework that is relevant and appropriate to 
guide this study in its efforts towards finding ways to manage the tension. 
5.5.3  Towards Coexistence 
According to the jurisprudence of interests, the duty of judges is viewed as 
recognising competing interests that need protection, weighing and balancing them 
through a systematic and rational ordering, and reconciling or adjusting using an 
authoritative technique.126 The evaluation and adjustment of competing interests is 
meant to identify those that should prevail when there is a clash, the ultimate 
interest being social welfare and the general wellbeing of man.127 In doing this, 
judges are expected to develop a legal policy oriented analysis, or interest 
analysis, as a method of reaching right answers in all similar cases.128 Two of the 
main proponents of the theory, Pound and Cardozo, have each proposed 
techniques that can be used not only to identify competing values but also to 
develop or ascertain judging guidelines to manage the tension, through 
coexistence.   
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Cardozo’s Adjudicatory Methods 
Cardozo viewed judges as reaching decisions using four methods and sources of 
criteria (logic, history, tradition and sociology) that should to achieve coexistence; 
be applied hierarchically in the adjudication of hard cases.129 Firstly is what he 
called the method of philosophy, which is reasoning by analogy. Judges compare 
cases to others, seeking to establish unity and a rational logical order in the law. 
The analogy is ultimately based on human experience and espouses values like 
efficiency and utility.130 Accordingly, Cardozo’s first criterion is what would create 
consistency, unity and rationality in the law, as well as utility, based on the 
experience and personal reasoning of the judge, thereby having formalism coexist 
with flexibility. 
Secondly, Cardozo identified the historical or evolutionary method.131 This refers to 
the tendency by judges to look at principles within the limits of their history; in other 
words, the use of history to understand principles, rules and doctrine, which 
understanding then determines judicial choice in hard cases. For instance, the 
extent and applicability of the doctrine of freedom of contract can be understood in 
reference to its having developed within the conditions of the classical era, which 
speak of capitalist market individualism as the value it represents.132   
Cardozo’s third method refers to tradition, which represents the general standards 
of rights or duties perceived and practised in a community, such as custom, course 
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of dealings in contracts, usage of trade and the like.133 Cardozo connects tradition 
to judicial choices, not in the making of new law, but in the application of existing 
rules.134 It should guide judges where history and reason cannot help them. 
Fourthly, Cardozo identifies social welfare, expressed through the method of 
sociology, as the greatest criterion and underlying purpose that adjudication should 
work to satisfy.135 By ‘social welfare’ he meant all extra-legal considerations of a 
public nature, such as public policy, common good, and standards of right conduct 
like those commanded by religion or the ethics of social justice.136 
Cardozo’s mechanism helps to define the internal judging culture in common-law 
jurisdictions, which is a step towards uncovering the real values underlying 
adjudication. However, besides identifying social welfare, he does not extend the 
search to the values themselves, as is done in this study. But even with regard to 
social welfare as being the ultimate judging criterion, Cardozo needed to go further 
and elaborate how judges would determine it and simultaneously maintain the 
consistency, predictability and neutrality of law. Subjecting final judicial decisions to 
absolute social welfare will create a lot of uncertainty, unless clear principles and 
guidelines exist on how and when a judge can ascertain its content, and invoke it, 
and likewise, how a party to a contract can phrase the terms to achieve 
commercial gain without offending social welfare.  
Further, as with other social values, the process of Uganda becoming more 
developed and embracing global trends means that what serves social welfare is 
bound to change more often than not, but unevenly within different parts and 
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communities in the country. Uganda’s reality in terms of civilisation is that 
communities are characterised by social and economic disparities – rural versus 
urban and even urban versus urban – unlike much of the Western world, where 
you find standardisation in different parts of the country.  In such societies as 
Uganda’s, judges cannot be guided by allowing social needs to prevail on a case-
by-case basis, as their definition will not be obvious, and indeterminate. Whose 
understanding of social welfare should the judge adopt? The rural or urban 
businessman? The urban businessman in the capital city? Or the much less 
developed townships? Clear principles have to be formulated to guide judges as a 
way to avoid uncontrolled subjectivity and achieve certainty, using a more 
methodical mechanism, as is investigated in this study. The question that comes 
next is, how relevant the jurisprudence of interests is in this investigation. 
Pound on Coexistence 
Stone rightly argues that Pound supported coexistence, having proposed that 
judges should follow the gathering and interpretation of law and facts with the 
discovery of the ends intended by the law and how they have been served.137 But 
on the other hand, he viewed judicial lawmaking as relying on the subjectivity of 
judges and their philosophy of values, which fails to take into account all the 
relevant facts; a view shared by Cardozo.138 Therefore subjectivity ought to be 
minimised and in its place there should be a determinate technique of arriving at 
judicial choices informed by facts from the judging context, legal and extra-legal.  
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Further, Pound139 directly supported coexistence by advocating for judges to 
recognise that law in the books is significantly connected and related to the law in 
action – the ends of the law, a relationship that should be investigated to arrive at 
ways to manage the tension. Using the childhood adventures of Finn and Sawyer, 
Pound illustrated this by referring to a situation where certain tools are prescribed 
for the performance of a certain task, but where those that can actually do it are 
different, requiring the mechanic (judge) to discover those other tools and change 
from the prescription to have the ends served and complete the task.140 
The above coexistence proposals by key proponents of the jurisprudence of 
interests demonstrate that the theory aims at resolving the same problem as this 
study seeks to help manage, answering similar questions. It seeks to provide a 
method for finding principles that judges should follow in deciding cases,141 by 
looking at the role of judges as collaborating in the realisation of recognised ideals 
within a given legal order.142 This study agrees with such an identification of 
interests, in this case covered under ‘values’, competing in court cases as 
speaking to the needs of the commercial community that adjudication should 
address.  
Accordingly, this study seeks to extend the applicability and validity of this theory in 
Uganda, as it proceeds on the presumption that the tension in Uganda has been 
underpinned by a competition between formalism-engendering values and 
flexibility-engendering ones. The content of judicial opinions as texts are analysed 
with a view to uncovering such competing values, although the theory has some 
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limitations that have led to exceptions to its adoption, and therefore partial 
departure in this study.  
5.5.4  Limitations of Interests Jurisprudence 
Firstly, the theory’s major proponents, like Pound, leave the identification and 
evaluation of interests, plus the formulation of judging guidelines, to the judges, 
who should perform these functions using practical reasoning.143 They view all 
interests to be equally valuable and only invoked and given weight by judges in 
particular cases,144 with the task being to bring rational reconciliation and harmony 
between legal institutions and the interests of society at the appropriate time and 
place.145 This thinking reveals a number of weaknesses in the theory, and has 
attracted criticism. Pound,146 James,147 Dewey148 and Jhering149 are criticised for 
failure to propose an objective system for the selection and evaluation of interests 
underlying adjudication.  
Further, judges – by virtue of the nature of training, experience and exposure in 
common-law jurisdictions like Uganda – lack the means and competence to weigh 
and adjust societal values, or forecast the utility and impact of proposed 
guidelines.150 Therefore, the finding of judging guidelines is better done as a 
deliberate and autonomous task of legislation, although judges’ input should be 
used by way of studying their decisions, as proposed in this study.  
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Leaving the tasks to judges would also be self-defeating, because the process of 
reasoning cannot create complete and determinate rules or principles. If judges 
were to continue engaging in practical reasoning to create the judging rules and 
principles, such guidelines would often be changing, as reasoning can change 
even in a matter of hours.  
Relatedly, the proposal creates a danger of judges managing litigation in a way 
that would reflect their personal preferences and prejudices, and in turn claim an 
accumulation of similar cases reflecting their subjectivity as representative of 
competing interests in cases. This is especially true under a court procedure like 
Uganda’s, where the judge has a final say on matters like issues to be framed, and 
admissible evidence, and where the judge can generally restrict lawyers on matters 
they should address him or her about in a particular case. 
Secondly, there is the failure by the jurisprudence of interests to construct a theory 
of values that could guide judges, which stems from the little or lack of weight they 
attached to values as motivators of judicial decisions. For instance, Heck declared 
that the theory aids judges to reach decisions by balancing and weighing 
competing interests, not values, because the jurisprudence of interests is not a 
theory of substantive values.151 This study supports Isay’s criticism of Heck, and 
other interests jurisprudence scholars, for refusing to inquire into values, citing the 
lack of standards for judges weighing values.152 Also supported is his call for a 
method to guide judges, having at least some directive as to the viewpoints from 
which judges should make evaluations and the standards by which they should 
weigh the interests thus evaluated. On the other hand, Isay wrongly took the 
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defeatist view when he went on to claim that, although we should search for 
values, constructing a rational theory of values is beyond human attainment.153 
Contrary to such defeatist views, this study seeks to expand Laube’s view on how 
to resolve the problem of the absence of a scale of values, by recommending that 
concrete reality, informed by history and culture, be used to identify the value of 
ideals in each specific context.154 In the case of Uganda, the constitution makes 
substantive justice, values, aspirations and the norms of Ugandans part of the legal 
regime judges are to apply.155 Therefore, any viable theory of adjudication should 
allow the identification and balancing not only of competing interests, but also of 
the values – understood as encompassing the interests and aspirations (in the 
jurisprudence of interests sense, ‘ideals’, and therefore part of values) – the 
constitution seeks to protect and promote. 
Thirdly, most of the theorists in the jurisprudence of interests had no answers to 
the question of how judges would be guided in the evaluation of interests; which is 
understandable, considering their failure to appreciate the role of values, in a wider 
sense that goes beyond mere interests. Heck preferred to call it a matter for legal 
philosophy, a science that to him was pre-legal.156 Cardozo and Pound seem to be 
among the few that tried to go beyond the mere identification of competing 
interests and values, to answering how the tension should be managed. However, 
as analysed above, their efforts do not go far enough.157  Other key interests 
theorists like Heck only envisioned formulation of judging rules, an indication of 
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extreme positivist methodology. Indeed Heck declared that the law viewed as a 
whole consists of commands, although such commands affect social life leading to 
interests competing with one another.158 However, like Dworkin, he rightly attacked 
positivism; a view that looks at ultimate guidelines as rules, leaves out principles 
and other standards that could help to guide judges in decision-making.159 
Principles and standards are crucial as part of ultimate guidelines, because they 
will create space and restraint on flexibility without making the judge feel 
imprisoned by another version of formalistic rules. 
Fourthly, in accepting that the values differ from context to context, and that 
understanding each context requires reference to concrete reality informed by 
history and the reality’s cultures, the jurisprudence of interests is then faced with 
another problem of institutional competence of judges. It is not feasible that any 
single judge will be possessed with such far-reaching knowledge of the law’s 
context as relates to each case before him or her. Certainly, Ugandan judges are 
trained as lawyers in the same way, and in the same institutions, as all of us 
Ugandan lawyers were; and from such training, one would not acquire expertise in 
subjects like history or sociology. It is also not practical that before making each 
hard decision an already overburdened Ugandan judge should therefore have the 
added duty of conducting research on Uganda’s reality to uncover such values. 
What is logical is to have the underlying values that have commonly competed in 
litigation and adjudication independently searched for and synthesised, as this 
study proposes, to reveal the rules, principles and standards that should guide 
judges with certainty. 
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Finally, the categorisation of interests is logical only if one takes social interests to 
represent interests of the special society or community of persons to which the 
adjudication is relevant. For instance,  the commercial community is the society 
whose interests will be identified in a contract dispute. Short of this injunction, there 
is no difference between public and social interest. Awareness of the above 
limitations has helped in defining the premises within which interests jurisprudence 
guides the study. 
5.5.5  Guiding Theoretical Premises 
This study is therefore guided by the jurisprudence of interests, but with the 
following injunctions. Firstly, the importance of ascertaining competing values in 
adjudication is recognised alongside that of competing interests, and interests are 
treated as a subset of values and not as independent or remote criteria to the 
judicial approach. Secondly, judicial guidelines in the form of ultimate rules, 
standards or principles should be formulated as a conscious law reform exercise, 
and not left to be determined by internal criteria; in other words, not left to the 
discretion of judges. Accordingly, the identification of competing values should not 
be a matter of pure process and practical reasoning by judges, but of research like 
this study, guided by appropriate legal theory and methodology. 
Therefore, in this study, the task is not left to judges; but in a more methodical and 
objective way, content analysis is made of judicial opinions in Uganda’s courts of 
judicature to ascertain the values competing in the country’s commercial 
adjudication. The opinions are analysed not for their effect on doctrine, but as texts 
that tell the facts of Uganda’s commercial community civilisation over the years; 
this being the most appropriate basis on which to arrive at results that can be 
interpreted to ascertain values for balancing. Values of an internal nature, that 
make up Uganda’s commercial judging culture, as well as those external to the 
judiciary but influencing formalism and flexibility, are uncovered. Such values are 
revealed by analysis of words used by judges in their legal opinions, together with 
further interpretation and inference from the values recognised, with aid of the 
institutional theory of law. 
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Relevance of Institutional Theory 
Using the Ugandan context, the study partly validates the claims of Holmes, that 
law embodies the stories of a nation’s development and its life is experience 
informed by the necessities of the time; the moral and political theories, intuitions 
about public policy and the prejudices judges share with their fellow men.160   
Likewise, the study validates the claim of scholars like Schauer161 and Vermeule162 
that the question of whether formalism or flexibility is the appropriate judicial 
approach is a purely contextual one, depending on the decision-making 
environment and the personal attributes of the judges. The above views of Holmes, 
Schauer and Vermeule find resonance with the institutional theory of law 
propounded by Schmitt and his followers.163 
Institutional theory holds that norms arise from previous social practices, which the 
concrete order must preserve and promote. These pre-legal social practices at the 
core of a specific cultural order are what Schmitt called institutions.164 As defined 
by Durkheim and Schmitt, institutions are therefore the beliefs and modes of 
conduct instituted by a collectivity and having a reality outside the individual who 
conforms to them.165  
The theory is used to elaborate on the values ascertainable from interests 
jurisprudence, because it also supports coexistence, by holding that both formalism 
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and flexibility are needed at the same time. This is because formal norms do not 
contain all that judges need in order to interpret and enforce them, yet norms 
require a certain degree of formality since they are to be used in gauging different 
situations.166 To arrive at coexistence, Schmitt proposes the use of something 
similar to the jural postulates of interest theorists – the concept of general clauses 
(Generalklausel), such as good faith and reasonableness.167 General clauses 
should be used by legislators to cater for concrete reality,168 and provide a general 
framework of values and principles such as ‘morals’, ‘faith’ and ‘public reason’ to 
guide judges.169 
The list of general clauses and guiding values and principles proposed by Schmitt 
was widened by MacCormick, who claimed that there are general principles of a 
pervasive nature that bear on the decision maker in all circumstances including 
giving guidance to judicial discretion.170 The law, such as the American Uniform 
Commercial Code, and the UK’s Sale and Supply of Goods Act of 1994, obliges 
the decision maker to consider standards or concepts made up of different 
interests and values in particular cases. Such values include fairness, efficiency, 
wisdom/prudence, reasonableness, rationality and other salient values that should 
be followed by an application of common sense.171 
The questions that arise are – What is the source of such general principles or 
clauses? And how can they be recognised by a judge in Uganda’s commercial 
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adjudication? The answer from institutional theory is that all theory and practice by 
humans, including such judicial guidelines, are shaped by the institutions, which in 
turn form the context of a particular stable collectivity.172 The judges’ role is 
therefore to select the normative facts of such a collectivity, and use the results as 
the general standards binding on the collectivity.173 In this sense, institutional 
theory is compatible with the jurisprudence of interests as represented by Laube, 
which claims that values are crucial in adjudication, and context-specific; they arise 
out of the concrete reality as informed by the historical facts, phases of evolution of 
the law and effects of cultural antecedents at play.174 
The difference between the jurisprudence of interests and institutional theory, with 
regard to the source of ultimate judicial guidelines, is that institutionalism extends 
the search and understanding of underlying competing values beyond the purism 
of procedure. As such, a researcher other than a judge presiding over a case can 
use the judging environment to interpret and elaborate on values both articulate 
and inarticulate but discoverable from the words used by judges; as is done in this 
study. This study therefore adopts the compatible institutional theory as the 
solution to the weakness of jurisprudence of interests, not only in terms of judicial 
competence in understanding and interpreting extra-legal institutions and contexts, 
but also in terms of the replicability of the theory’s mechanism in non-judicial 
studies. Therefore, institutional theory helps in guiding this study by looking at a 
specific context’s peculiar history, and other pre-law institutions, as helping to 
understand the values competing during adjudication. 
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This is however not to support institutional theory’s general clauses or principles 
notion as a solution to the tension, or to say that the theory should be adopted 
entirely. To the contrary, institutional theory has a number of weaknesses; it is only 
a logical choice to the extent that it helps to explain the source of interests and 
values for consideration, and not how they should be used in managing the 
tension. 
Firstly, what the Institutionalists call general clauses or principles and standards – 
such as morality, fairness, good faith, wisdom, rationality and reasonableness – 
are all subjective values that will certainly differ from society to society. The 
universalism claimed by MacCormick is at best wishful thinking; even in the same 
community one is bound to find different perceptions of what constitutes fairness, 
reasonableness and the like.175 MacCormick himself admits that adjudication over 
such values should not be about finding the right or wrong answer but whether a 
decision creates a better or worse situation.176 This means that litigation involving a 
definition of such standards is bound to be highly contentious, creating conceptual 
flexibility and legal uncertainty. 
Secondly, giving the subjective values the upper hand in guiding judicial choice 
does not take care of the interests served by formalism. Judges’ application of 
subjective values without guidelines will result in flexibility becoming the ultimate 
judicial approach, yet even institutionalists admit that formalism is to an extent vital 
in a stable legal system.177 Thirdly, in Uganda, the sources of normativity in the 
country’s legal system are pluralist, with both formalistic and flexible sources 
having equal force of law. To put morality and other subjective values like 
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reasonableness at the apex of judicial guidance is to create an unresolvable crisis 
of values; a crisis Schmitt himself admitted would be a weakness in his general 
clauses theory.178 
Fourthly, institutionalists, like interests theorists, are also guilty of placing too much 
trust in the judges, especially in claiming that the underlying values are to be 
constantly sought and weighed by the very persons whose decisions are to be 
guided.179 The reasoning behind this weakness seems to be the fixation that 
separation of powers has always to imply non-interference of one institution in 
another’s job; therefore judges should find guidelines for their own discretion. This 
fixation does not tally with reality, as MacCormick180 again admits; in one-party and 
despotic states, there is no independence of the different institutions of 
government. Uganda has had a history of recurrent despotic regimes and single-
party rules, either de jure or de facto. Therefore, its reality is one where the 
‘separation of powers’ concept is a mere illusion, in the sense that it is the 
exception rather than the norm. 
Notwithstanding the above weaknesses however, institutional theory is helpful 
because understanding of the values underlying the tension cannot be sufficiently 
reached to justify their adjustment and balancing, without going beyond their mere 
observation and recognition.181 It is unlikely that a full elaboration of motivating 
values will appear on court record; some of the detailed implications of words and 
phrases used, like judicial absolutism, if written will be grounds of appeal because 
the law may look at them as not being justiciable. Further, parties to a dispute will 
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inevitably not reveal matters of social policy or commercial reality that could be at 
play, due to the rigid rules on cause of action, pleadings not being argumentative 
or oppressive and relevance or admissibility of evidence. 
Therefore, there is a need for the jurisprudence of interests to be supplemented by 
guidance from a theory that helps in drawing inferences from the judges’ words 
and phrases, informed by other institutions surrounding the judicial opinions. This 
is because as noted by Croce,182 such institutions are the actual source of the 
values that compete during adjudication, yet they are also informed by the realities 
of a particular context as a collectivity. At the centre of this effort towards building 
coexistence is a need to have a mechanism for managing the tension that is viable, 
as being rooted in the real causes of the tension, and at the same time coherent 
and rational.  
Accordingly, as part of the content analysis methodology,183 the coding of values to 
be observed in the judicial opinions is informed by the existing literature and theory 
on the subject. In the same vein, interests jurisprudence counsels that such a 
search is informed by existing jural (in this case value) postulates – the 
presuppositions about the ideals motivating judges.184 Accordingly, as part of 
making a case for the rationality, logicality and viability of coexistence between 
formalism and flexibility, the next chapter revisits the views of other scholars on 
what values motivate formalism. The chapter will show that other scholars who 
have tried to understand the foundations to formalism either support coexistence or 
fail to make a case for absolute formalism. At the same time, in an effort to make a 
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case for the viability of such coexistence, the presumptive values advanced by 
other scholars are treated as the value postulates whose defining manifestations 
and sub-values are then coded to guide the content analysis.  
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 The Value Postulates Underlying Formalism 
Introduction 
This chapter revisits, with three purposes, the values scholars have proposed as 
underlying formalism in the tension. Firstly, it intends to apply coexistence 
adjudicatory theory to the arguments of other scholars for or against proposed 
underlying values, to further make a case for the logicality of coexistence between 
formalism and flexibility.  
Secondly, as a contribution to theory on how to manage the tension, it seeks to 
support Eisenberg,1 as well as Schwartz and Scott,2 in saying that none of the 
single-norm or pluralist theories, formalist or flexibility-oriented, articulating internal 
or external values, fully accounts for and should be the ultimate guide to judicial 
choice. Rather, those different values shown by heterogeneous contractual and 
dispute contexts limit each other’s domain. Therefore, in resolving conflicts, 
adjudication and other law making should balance the different social propositions 
conflicts generate, using a multivalued approach, which applies good judgement to 
weigh and accord roles to each conflicting value. However, these scholars join 
others like Trebilcock3 and Tamanaha4 in admitting to the lack of a mechanism to 
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attain such weighing and balancing of values, and a gap in the knowledge on 
whether and how it can be done.5  
Thirdly, as further such contribution, the values advanced by other scholars, and 
their informative lower values, or manifestations are identified as presumptive 
values. They are presumptive, because they are used to guide the coding, search 
for and analysis of formalism-engendering values, at competition with flexibility-
engendering ones. The chapter therefore provides landmarks for identifying both 
internal and external formalistic values that should inform the weighing and 
balancing of values and interests, when constructing commercial judging 
guidelines to help manage the tension.  
The Internal Criteria 
This section contributes to knowledge by articulation and elaboration of formalism-
engendering values that are internal to judging culture – which, according to 
Ostrom & Hanson6 is ultimately rooted in the beliefs and behaviours shaping the 
way things get done by individual judges; defines what is possible in the work 
environment; relates to the daily tasks of judges; and is grounded in activities 
familiar to all courts in the legal system. Fuller,7 Dworkin,8 Bagchi9 and Chen-
Wishart10 have acknowledged the central role-played by judging practice and 
procedural values in the prevalence of formalism. In pursuit of this view, the 
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interests jurisprudence and neutral principles strands of the legal process theory,11 
as well as Denning,12 Fuller and Perdue,13 propose the discovery and use of the 
values in procedural laws as objective internal normative criteria for hard case 
judging, and a way to overcoming the tension.  
Denning, for instance declared in George Mitchell’s case14 that there is a ‘secret’ 
judging criterion, what he called the ‘notion of true construction’. The word secret 
implies normative values the judiciary internally uses as judging criteria. They are 
not visible from a simple analysis of the legal or extra-legal sources of normativity. 
Rather, they constitute ‘judging culture’,and are discoverable by analysing the 
practices, policies, processes and traditions underlying judicial approach. The 
existing literature reveals a number of such values, which are internal to the 
personality of the judge and the institution of the judiciary. Such internal values in 
this case include rule of law values; values of judicial perceptions about the nature 
of law, its sources, as well as judges’ roles in commercial disputes; and judging 
cultural values – those informed by judges’ practices and traditions.  
6.2.1  Rule of Law Values  
Occupying the central place in influencing formalism are the rule of law values,15 
that denote judges resolving disputes following settled principles or rules, as 
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opposed to personal whims or extra-legal considerations.16 In a wider context, the 
‘rule of law’ means an orderly normative framework that is enforced by the state. 
Such enforcement is built around the judge as its central pillar; the judge should 
however be independent, reaching decisions without influences external to the law, 
be they political, social or personal preferences and intuitions. Judicial decisions 
should however also be reasoned and rationally justified, taking into account the 
general principles applicable and the demands of the peculiar circumstances at 
hand.17 ‘The rule of law’ further connotes a society where the law regulates human 
conduct, as opposed to the ‘rule of men or women’, whether such persons are 
judges or otherwise. It is also is said to ‘...embody the absolute supremacy or 
predominance of regular law’.18  
Therefore, in pursuit of rule of law values, judges desire the fulfilment of the legal 
enterprise, in which courts act as adjudicators of disputes within the boundaries of 
a legal order,19 and rules are vital as the essence of law and order.20 Poor, 
emerging and developing countries need the rule of law and its attributes of legal 
and institutional certainty/predictability, as a necessary precondition in the process 
of becoming market economies.21 Carothers argues that because the rule of law is 
the universally accepted ideal, no leader can publicly challenge the rule of law as 
being bad.22 Therefore in all countries, Uganda not being an exception, the rule of 
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law with its pillar of legal certainty should form part of the legal system’s key goals.  
Carothers also argues that there is no common understanding of ‘the rule of law’, 
even amongst different political parties in the same country.23 Therefore, owing to 
the way the rule of law emerged in the West, it cannot be readily transplanted to 
developing countries.24 
The role of courts, and the institutional competences of organs in the legal system, 
also vary from country to country depending on the needs, interests and powers of 
regime actors.25 As such, there is no consensus on a definite list of higher or lower 
values that comprise rule of law values, but they include: the conception of justice 
as legal justice;26 legal certainty and predictability;27 judicial objectivity;28 
rationality;29 judicial accountability;30 and equality.31 The following brief elaboration 
of each value demonstrates their roles in motivating formalism.  
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Justice as legality 
The key value the law aims to realise is justice,32 the rule of law being the minimum 
moral content said to be acceptable by the whole of mankind as the main basis of 
justice;33 and justice as the end of the rule of law.34 However, different conceptions 
of justice will be at play in judging formalistically or flexibly.  Judging in accordance 
with rules rests on judges conceiving justice as legality,35which motivates 
formalism as opposed to substantive justice. Adjudication according to rules 
involves applying the law with a value-free mind-set, and without regard to legal or 
contractual purposes, or other extra-legal values,36 that would otherwise form the 
basis for flexibility. Disputes will be considered through the lens of pure procedural 
justice, legality and formality, no matter the merits of the case. There is no human 
face to justice (the basis for flexibility conceptions of justice like the African 
Ubuntu37) as seen against the backdrop of commercial law having been 
dehumanised to protect interests in businesses transacted at long distances, 
between strangers,38 and through notions like artificial persons, being able to do 
business and have locus in courts. For instance in the colonial case of Katate v 
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Nyakatukura,39 business associations like companies wholly owned by Africans 
were held not African.40  
In commercial adjudication, at the heart of the decision by a judge whether to 
interfere with contractual terms, and their attendant interpretation or enforcement, 
is their conception of justice.41 Under the formalistic approach to justice as legality, 
all issues before court are deemed legal issues.42 Specifically, court is preoccupied 
with inquiring into whether or not there was conformity with due process of contract 
formation and performance, litigation and adjudication, as defined by the rules of 
law.43 According to Bagchi44 and Rawls,45 this formalistic view is informed by the 
pure theory of contractual justice. Under this pure theory, process and procedure 
justify the enforcement or otherwise of contracts, and shape rules without regard to 
contractual outcomes or purposes; thus the perception of justice in contract as 
procedural, and therefore ‘legal justice’. This being the case, judges are motivated 
by the desire to fulfil the public expectation of legality embodied in principles like 
predictability; that disputes between contracting parties would be resolved on an 
equal footing using existing, value-free and determinate rules.46 This line of 
reasoning prompts a review of the influence of predictability, and its attendant legal 
certainty, in motivating formalism. 
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Predictability and Legal Certainty  
Legal certainty has been proposed as the prime value of common-law legal 
systems like Uganda’s,47 and adherence to this value has become synonymous 
with, and motivated the formalistic rule of law, with flexibility viewed as not rule-of-
law-compatible.48 It is an integral component,49 a fundamental pillar50 and the 
central principle of the rule of law.51 Related is predictability, a sub-value and 
integral component of legal certainty. Goode52 tries to draw a distinction between 
legal certainty and predictability, claiming that predictability is vital for the market 
economy, but commercial life is inherently uncertain and adherence to the former 
is not dependant on the latter. Therefore, judges employ a number of tools to 
adjust doctrine to suit changing circumstances, and thereby thrive on uncertainty.  
Goode’s argument however confuses relevance with the character of the values at 
issue. To the extent that his examples are factually correct, he simply proves that 
both the legal certainty from predictability, and the uncertainty from changes in the 
market, are motivators to judicial choice as they respectively contribute to the 
formalism and flexibility in the tension. In a market economy, the rational 
calculating commercial men require the predictability that comes with judging per 
clear rules,53 and the result is legal certainty as opposed to judging by hunch.54 
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Formalist judges adhere to the rational materialist’s need to know, and plan to 
evade or invoke the legal incentives and penalties in advance, as a way to secure 
the best return.55 Likewise, clients want to know their rights and obligations, as well 
as their chances of success in disputes, to guide business decisions, which 
adjudication should respect.56 Besides, in market economies the structure of 
contract is dominated by the predictability of standard contracts, which imposes a 
demand for predictable outcomes of disputes,57 which formalism seeks to 
guarantee. 
In terms of manifestations, Alexy58 observes that this notion is the ground of 
positivity, since all that is called positive law stems from the requirement for legal 
certainty.59 Therefore, exhibiting a positivist conception of law manifests legal 
certainty as a value. Atiyah also notes that it was the reason general abstract 
principles applicable to all contracts were developed and favoured for the market 
economy during the classical era.60 The subject matter of contract was deemed 
immaterial to legal discourse; more important to judges was the formalistic 
conceptual ordering of law, derived from abstract general principles.61 The other 
manifestation is the rejection of equity, as legal certainty that stands on fixed and 
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certain principles is considered more important than equity that depended on the 
subjectivity and will of judges.62 
On the face of it, this location of legal certainty within legal theory seems to 
suggest that its adherence always motivates formalism. However, with regard to 
the possibility of coexistence, it is also plausible that adherence to the rule of law 
contributes to legal certainty and not the other way around, and that the space 
legal certainty occupies within the sphere of the rule of law is exaggerated. This 
argument is based on the view that legal certainty is a mere perception of how 
predictable the legal position looks, with respect to any given set of facts, such that 
– as Perry observes – legal systems that deviate from the ideal paradigm may 
provide efficiency and predictability in the eyes of some investors.63 This contextual 
basis of perception implies that legal certainty can be attained even by working 
towards a coexistence of formalism and flexibility, in the sense that the resultant 
legal framework is what will be predictable, as the applicable adjudicatory regime.  
Further, the scholars who elevate the position of legal certainty as discussed above 
seem to be under the influence of Radbruch’s school of thought, that justice is a 
notion connoting correctness, at the source of a constant tension with legal 
certainty, the latter embodying no more than positive law.64 They base their views 
on the issue on the foundation of a positivist understanding of the nature of law. 
Evans and Gabel,65 for instance, maintain that there is a difference between laws 
and their supporting institutions (on the one hand) and the norms, customs, values 
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and beliefs that define socially-acceptable behaviour, otherwise known as informal 
institutions, on the other.66  
Such conclusions are not in consonance with both written law, or with judicial 
practice, in Uganda, where there is a fusion between law and what Evans and 
Gabel deem informal institutions. Constitutionally, judges are obliged to make 
decisions in civil disputes in conformity with, not only the law, but also the norms, 
values and aspirations of the people.67 Further, custom is another source of law in 
Uganda; indeed it is called ‘customary law’, which is not written anywhere, but 
provable through evidence of norms dictated by cultural practices and beliefs.68  
What constitutes legality and therefore the subject of legal certainty differs from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, contrary to Wolff’s argument that legal flexibility is 
unconstitutional since the English constitution is based on the rule of law. In the 
same way, Evans and Gabel69 wrongly claim that if any country wants to 
participate in the global economy, it must adhere to some rule of law. This limited 
focus of most scholars on Western legal systems explains the exaggerated value 
attached to the notion of the rule of law, and its attendant legal certainty value.  
The studies are irrelevant to jurisdictions like Uganda, where the constitution is 
clearly not based on the notion of the rule of law, as it puts no duty on judges to 
adhere to it. Instead, under the Ugandan constitution,70 the ultimate source of 
normativity is given as not only the law, but also the ‘power of the people’, whose 
aspirations even the judiciary must conform to; which implies that realistic certainty 
and predictability demand a co-existence between formalism and flexibility. 
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Unfortunately, official and scholarly attention has hardly been drawn towards 
finding how this coexistence can be managed, as is investigated in this study. 
Related to legal certainty is the value of judicial objectivity, also proposed as 
underlying formalism.  
Judicial Objectivity 
Another key rule of law value underlying formalism is judicial objectivity. So 
celebrated is it, that an objective judge was the ideal behind classic phrases used 
to capture the rule of law, such as the rule of law not man, and law is reason, not 
passion.71 The objective judge is a loyal, unquestioning servant of the law, who can 
will nothing but in an impartial way discovers and pronounces it without extra-legal 
influences.72 Therefore, judges will in a formalistic manner logically deduce 
contract law from the ordinary and plain meaning of statutes and precedents; reject 
non-legal considerations, treating them as subordinate to positive law; and derive 
contract law from fundamental, general and abstract principles.   
Relatedly, literalism remains prevalent in commercial adjudication, due to the 
objective theory of contract formation and interpretation, which holds that the 
contractual parties’ intentions are only ascertainable from their words and conduct, 
rather than subjective notions.73 Literalism is part of formalism, and the objective 
theory of contract is part of judicial objectivity; not only because contract is a 
source of normativity in its own right, but also because the two are historically 
conjoined. Although Perillo casts doubt on the date of invention of the theory he 
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advances, Gilmore traces the linkage between the predominance of the objective 
theory and Langdallian formalism, especially the notion of contract law as derivable 
from general principles.74  
Further, like formalism, the objective theory grew during the classical period in 
response to the demands and conditions of the market economy; like the quest for 
predictability,75 laissez faires economics76 and commercial class interests 
protection.77 The objective theory is also at the centre of the parol evidence rule,78 
which outlaws the use of extraneous evidence to prove, vary or alter the plain 
meaning of written terms or those that are required to be written by law; adherence 
to which is one of the manifestations of objectivity.79     
However, extreme sceptics argue that judicial objectivity is an illusion and judges 
are always subjective, with legal values like predictability, certainty, stability and 
equality subject to the judicial hunch. Consciously or otherwise, judges’ personal 
wills, preferences and prior non-legal objectives always colour the correct 
interpretation and ends of rules, the whole idea of rule of law thereby being a 
fraud.80 On the other hand, there are indicators that objectivity can be served 
through a coexistence-judging paradigm as well. For instance Tamanaha81 points 
out that a careful review of flexibility theory suggests that it also subscribes to 
judicial objectivity being a value of the rule of law. This is where decisions are 
                                            
 
74 CR Gilmore G. The Death of Contract, (The Ohio State University Press, 1974, 2ND Edn. 1995) 
12.  
75 Perillo (n 73) 427, 428-9. Although he stays demanding for evidence of the phenomena, Perillo 
admits that the nexus was more than likely there. 
76 Gilmore (n 74) 7.  
77 Perillo (n 73) 427, 428-9. 
78 ibid 432; Macneil, ‘Values in Contract: Internal and External’ (n 29) 373.    
79 Sections 91-94 of the Uganda Evidence Act (Chapter 6 of The Laws of Uganda). 
80 Tamanaha, Law as Means to an End (n 4) 236.  
81 ibid, 236-41.  
 265
based on the law, rather than the hunch theory of judging, that allows untamed 
judicial subjectivity.82 The actual problem being the unfounded scepticism amongst 
judges over whether objectivity is possible to practice.83 Yet, judicial objectivity is 
part of the formalism-engendering judicial values yielded, not by mere perception, 
but also by practice required by the higher rule of law value, alongside others like 
rationality, judicial accountability and equality.   
Rationality      
Rationality is not used in the general sense discussed in chapter five, of being the 
phenomenon of decisions being directed into particular patterns or trends by clear 
and calculated goals or values, as well as universalism. This general sense is 
recognised only as an attribute of a possible coexistence regime, than a value 
underlying either judging approach. In this case, rationality is discussed as a value, 
being the desire by judges, like other humans, for logic, unity, order and 
consistency in all matters, including contract behaviour, principles and rules.84 It is 
one of the values underlying formalism, as it promotes the classical nature of 
contract law. 85  
To maintain the predictability required by the free market economy,  judges 
objectively stick to the rule of law by upholding the formalistic conceptual ordering 
of contract law.86 Specifically, contractual validity and enforcement are a question 
of compliance with the coherence and consistency of doctrine, which is refined and 
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reduced to a set of systematically and logically ordered concepts and principles, 
from formation triggered by an offer, to the end of contract.87  
Normativity in all types of contract disputes will therefore be derivable from a few 
abstract but fixed general principles and concepts, notwithstanding considerations 
of substantive justice or fairness.88 Examples of such principles are listed by 
Atiyah, and explained earlier in this thesis.89  
At the same time, the classification and categorisation of law will be strictly 
adhered to as a way of maintaining some order, which – however inconvenient –
has formed the foundation for legal reasoning.90 For instance, negligence or 
property law remedies are unavailable in contract disputes. Also, exceptional 
principles regulating specialised categories of contract, like sale of goods and 
insurance,91are inapplicable to other types of contract.  
However, rationality is better secured by ultimate judging guidelines, constructed to 
balance formalism and flexibility, rather than by trying to stifle judicial innovation 
and its adjustment in cases where the result would be manifestly unfair or 
irrelevant to the commercial practices and philosophy of the day. Such judicial 
rationality is accompanied by the value of judges being accountable to the source 
of their power and authority. 
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Judicial Accountability 
Judicial accountability is gaining prominence as a hallmark of the rule of law,92 and 
is listed as one of the core values of modern judging,93 and specifically as part of 
Uganda’s internal judging criteria.94 Under the Latimer House principles,95 judges 
are to be accountable to the constitution and the law, and the judiciary is restrained 
from law making, that responsibility being left to parliament.96 The judiciary should 
only interpret and apply laws so made. However, room is left for flexibility, as 
purposive and constructive judging is permitted, as long as such does not amount 
to making or filling gaps in law.97 This implies that judicial accountability is 
perceived in the coexistence sense, but the law being the default normality 
recognition criterion.  
In the same way, under Uganda’s judicial values and mission statement,98 judicial 
accountability means the judiciary taking full responsibility for its actions and being 
always answerable to the people of Uganda and its partners. This connotes a 
requirement for judicial accountability by balancing formalism and flexibility. The 
reference to Uganda’s partners connotes judging by flexibly paying regard to the 
special interests and demands of investors and other development partners. On 
the other hand, reference to the people of Uganda implies judging formalistically in 
accordance with the expressions of people’s interests and values, which are 
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represented by the constitution, and laws enacted by people’s elected 
representatives.99 This tallies with the command of the constitution that judicial 
power is derived from the people and shall be exercised in their name, and in 
conformity with the law, people’s norms, values and aspirations.100 The 
coexistence approach to accountability in Uganda has recently been confirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Uganda in Attorney General v Gladys Nakibuule Kisekka,101 
where Justice Ekirikubinza declared that accountability is breached where a 
judge’s decision deviates too much from the generally recognised standard, as 
expressed through the law. Therefore, judicial accountability in Uganda is satisfied 
if the judge’s decision conforms to the law, but only to a reasonable degree. The 
person of the judge is therefore central in Uganda’s adjudication, which implies that 
besides rule of law values, judicial choice will also depend on values arising from 
their perceived roles in contract disputes.  
6.2.2   Values of Judicial Perception  
Although generally studied under virtues jurisprudence, which is not the main focus 
of this study, judicial perception values have been viewed as the most important in 
decision-making, which ultimately defines what motivates judges.102 Judicial 
perception refers to the way a judge employs other key values and concepts, in 
understanding the particulars of a case, and what should motivate him or her.103 
                                            
 
99 Article 1(4) of the Uganda Constitution, 1995.   
100 National Objective XXVI and Article 126 (1).  
101 [2018] UGSC 30 (Judgment of 11/07/2018).  
102 VE Flango, LM Wenner, & MW Wenner, ‘The Concept of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note, 
(1975) 9:2 American Journal of Political Science, 277, 277, 281; I. Van Domselaar, ‘The 
Perspective Judge’, (2018) 9:1 Jurisprudence: An Internal Journal of Legal and Political Thought, 
71, 78, 84; I. Van Domselaar, ‘Moral Quality in Adjudication: On Judicial Virtues and Civic 
Friendship’, (2015) 44 Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, 1, 26.    
103 I Van Domselaar, ‘Perspective Judge’ (2018) 9:1 Jurisprudence: An Internal Journal of Legal and 
Political Thought 78, 84. 
 269
This includes the facts, competing values and what norms have legal validity, or 
are otherwise relevant and applicable in resolving the dispute.104 Judicial 
perception pervades all other judicial virtues,105 and is acquired through training, 
practice and the experience of the judge.106 Therefore, it is a professional skill,107 a 
set of virtues-stable dispositions or sensitivities of judges, as well as a reference to 
a judge’s ultimate professional values.108 
The internal judicial criteria underlying formalism include certain values of judicial 
perceptions. These are the perception of contract law as certain and conceptually 
ordered logic, which has been discussed earlier;109 the perception of a judge’s role 
as mechanical application of law; and judicial non-interventionism – the perception 
of a judge as a neutral enforcer of contractual terms, as if the Police of Contract. 
The Mechanic Judge 
As elaborated earlier,110 formalism is partly motivated by particular judges 
perceiving their roles in the legal system as that of skilled mechanics. Such judges, 
with neutrality and impartiality, apply law as logically discoverable from statutes 
and precedents.111 They have no business with law making, experience, policy 
considerations or finding fairness in individual cases. However, in a coexistence 
way, such deductive judicial reasoning works alongside flexibility’s intuitive 
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reasoning, under what is termed realist formalism.112 This is where judicial intuition 
is acceptable as the first tool available to judges, but is overridden by judicial 
deliberations that involve the deduction of rules.113 Therefore, the mechanical mind 
of the judge acts as the fence defining how far his or her creativity and hunch 
should extend.  
Judicial Non-Interventionism  
The value of a judge having the role of a mere enforcer of bargain, as if a police 
officer enforcing traffic rules, arises from the value of freedom and autonomy of 
contract, which require contracting parties to reserve the complete choice as to 
whether, when and to what they bind themselves. As such there is no need for 
judges to invoke other values and justify a substitution of the parties’ bargain with 
what they deem fair or just in the circumstances. 
Lord Denning114 explained the role of courts in this case as upholding the parties’ 
freedom by finding the intention of the parties, not from their evidence or outside 
aids, but from the expressions conveyed by the words set out in writing or spoken. 
The courts should find and give effect to the grammatical meanings of the words 
and refuse to fill the gaps by implying terms or otherwise.115 Therefore the sub-
value of freedom of contract gives birth to such judicial perception, that some 
scholars have viewed as part of the higher value of non-interventionism;116the 
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other strand being statutory non-interventionism, which is discussed in the next 
section.  
Judicial non-interventionism is manifested by judges paying due regard to freedom 
of contract’s sister contractual sub-value – sanctity of contract.117 Where sanctity of 
contract holds, in the absence of extraordinary illegality, lack of capacity, fraud, 
misrepresentation, or mistake, otherwise known as vitiating factors, the courts are 
perceived as bound to give effect to whatever the parties agreed to. Further, the 
courts, without regard to considerations of fairness, reasonableness or other value 
or policy standards, enforce contractual terms. According to Goode, the court is 
philosophically not concerned with substantive fairness or justice, since in 
pursuance of freedom of contract and competition, English contract law knows no 
general duty to be fair, or other elements of morality.118 
However, the fact that there is a long list of exceptions to courts’ adherence to 
sanctity of contract is in itself evidence of the amenability of judicial non-
interventionism to flexibility considerations, thus coexistence theory. This is 
because the vitiating factors that legally justify intervention are essentially sub-
values of the wider flexibility values of fairness, equity and justice. In a structural 
sense, it is such values that make the divide between the internal and external 
criteria of judging difficult, although necessary for a logical analysis. On the 
borderline is also judicial responsiveness, which the following sub-section 
elaborates. 
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6.2.3  Judicial Responsiveness 
Responsiveness is an internal judging value; a norm recognised in legal theory but 
understood in two varying ways, which on its own points to the value’s influence in 
the tension. According to Sourdin & Zariski, judicial responsiveness is the 
acknowledgement by judges that the law is not neutral and autonomous, but a 
practice embedded in society, that is answerable to the desire for justice by 
members of that society.119 It therefore embodies sub-values like openness and 
public accountability, and sensitivity to the effects of adjudication both to the 
litigants and society. These point to flexibility-oriented internal judging values.  
On the other hand Fuller,120 Eisenberg121 and Oldfather122 advance an 
understanding of responsiveness that points to a formalistic, or at best coexistence 
perspective, also as further proof of support for the middle, non-extremist view this 
study pursues. In their view, responsiveness is the extent to which a court decision 
responds to the proofs; arguments and materials presented by the parties to the 
dispute; otherwise, the parties’ participation. The preferred norm is that courts 
should adhere to strong responsiveness, or else adjudication is without integrity 
and a sham.123  
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This study takes the view that the two meanings of judicial responsiveness speak 
to the formalism-flexibility divide the tension represents. The Sourdin& Zariski124 
sense is what flexibility proponents would view as the norm a judge should be 
motivated by, while intriguingly the Fuller,125 Eisenberg126 and Oldfather127 sense 
speaks to what formalists would expect of judges. It is intriguing because of Fuller’s 
known support for judicial flexibility; but again, it goes further to make a case for 
the real possibility of coexistence.  What this study proposes in chapter ten is that 
responsiveness is one of those norms to which both sides of the divide clearly 
agree, but one that needs an objective meaning that balances both formalism and 
flexibility values and interests.  
For now, the perceptions of responsiveness on each side inform the search for 
sub-values that have made it integral to Uganda’s judging culture. Accordingly, my 
view is that in the formalistic sense, responsiveness is the value referred to as 
acceptability by Weiler128 and Grey129 – the extent to which the judicial opinion 
conforms to the existing legal order. Weiler calls it acceptability, because to him the 
level of such conformity determines the decision’s acceptability by society,130a 
proposition whose validation calls for further research. For this reason, in this 
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study, understanding of responsiveness or acceptability is limited to the extent to 
which the judicial opinion responds to existing legal imperatives that define the 
legal order.  
Strong responsiveness therefore means judging in a purely formalistic way; weak 
responsiveness means mixed-approach judging, that makes an effort towards 
coexistence; while non-responsiveness means flexible judging. Non-
responsiveness in the formalistic sense therefore carries the same meaning as 
strong responsiveness in the flexibility sense – the Sourdin & Zariski meaning.131 
This understanding covers the two veiled formalistic-flexible scholarly views of 
responsiveness advanced above, and has helped in revealing the extent to which 
the value has played a role in the tension. The next section provides more light on 
the extra-legal values judges respond to, and other values, external to the 
institution and person of the judge, underlying formalism.  
The External Criteria  
The reference to externalism in judging criteria has been understood in two ways. 
Firstly is the view of scholars like Shapiro132 and Macneil,133 that values forming 
external judging criteria refer to any considerations besides the law, imposed by 
the external social matrix. This meaning is extended by Rosenfield134 and 
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Dorfman,135 to imply the consideration of fairness as being anything besides the 
dictates of positive law and contractual terms.  
Secondly, the meaning, which this study adapts, is the one given by Domselaar136 
and Lind,137 that external criteria are considerations, used by judges to reach 
decisions, which are external to the person and practice of the judge. These 
include rules of law, precedents, doctrine, and the moral or other contextual 
background to the principles of law.138 Lind139 extends this meaning to include the 
views of all scholars, such as Dworkin, Rawls and Locke, who expounded the 
theory that judges should be judged against their conformity to considerations 
outside judicial practice.140  
Such externalists are result-oriented, seeking conformity with matters like morality, 
political theory, activism, neutrality and integrity, which are external to 
adjudication.141 In this sense, adjudication is a matter of practice, which is the 
internal criterion, defined by conformity to conditions of adjudicative excellence, 
such as impartiality, reasoned explanations, articulative boundaries, cohesion and 
workability.142 This second view speaks more to what one would see during legal 
practice143 than the law/contractual terms yardstick. However, Lind’s proposition is 
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far from accurate, for he takes a narrow view of what adjudication and its internal 
criteria are, 144and is therefore adopted with the following exceptions. 
Firstly, adjudication is not mere practice, but rather includes practice as part of its 
internal criteria, the other aspects being the traditions and individual preferences or 
prejudices of judges; thus the reference in this study to internal criteria as judging 
culture. Secondly, not all the values Lind mentioned, as internally forming 
justification for the decisions,145are supported by the content analysis of judicial 
opinions in this study. Only coherence and workability were observed, and 
discussed in chapters seven and eight under responsiveness. On the other hand, a 
number of other values have been found to be part of the internal judging criteria, 
rendering part of his list of internal values merely theoretical and at best cosmetic 
in the Ugandan context. 
Therefore, external judging criteria are made up of values that influence judicial 
approach, not as a result of a judge’s preferences or prejudices, or the judicial 
institutional constructs and culture. Rather,they are the judicial motivating values 
that have been found to emanate from the legal and extra-legal environment, 
including the philosophies and general context in which both the judicial institution 
and individual judges have grown  and operated. The legal values include both 
doctrinal and systematic values, both of which are discussed in the next sub-
section. 
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Legal Values  
Formalism has been motivated by community values of a legal nature, which 
compete with flexibility values to produce the tension. In this sense, the tension is a 
problem generated by the legal system, whose solution lies in looking inwards, 
rather than searching for what causes it in external forces like changing economic 
circumstances. This section reviews the literature on both the doctrinal and 
systematic values of the legal system behind the formalism in the tension.   
6.4.1  Values of Contract Doctrine 
Formalism has been partly motivated by value categories within the anatomy of 
contract doctrine, which constrain judges to adhere to formalistically oriented rules, 
principles and concepts. Such value categories include market individualism, which 
refers to the closely related higher values of market conformism and 
individualism,146 reciprocity,147 propriety of means148 and promise,149 each of which 
deserves more elaboration. 
6.4.2  Free Market Conformism 
The growth of formalism was closely related to that of the market economy and the 
attendant ideas of political economists during the 1770 to 1870 period of English 
legal history.150 The free market economy precipitated a change, from specialised 
rules governing particular contracts, to the formalistic fundamental, general, and 
                                            
 
146Adams and Brownsword, Understanding Contract Law (n 117) 192,194; Adams and Brownsword, 
‘Ideologies of Contract’ (n 117) 206. 
147 Macneil, ‘Values in Contract: Internal and External’ (n 29) 374-375 
148 ibid, 378-379 
149 C Fried Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligations (Oxford University Press, 
2015) 1-8; Atiyah (n 28) 652-3.  
150 Atiyah (n 28) 389, 398. 
 278
abstract principles applicable to all types, as well as the parties’ will manifested by 
promise, becoming the source of obligations and rights.151 It is these developments 
that led to classical contract law being viewed as the law of the marketplace;152 one 
that stands to facilitate and ensure such fair play as would maintain conformity to 
the free market economy, by upholding the institutions of contract bargaining and 
competition.153 Contract law is in that sense an expression of political philosophy, 
formalistic judging being a reflection of support for freedom, in its tension with 
flexibility-engendering social control, such as through the notions of justice and 
equity.154    
Accordingly, contract doctrine that is modelled on classical contract law, as is the 
case with Uganda’s, having received it as part of the classical English law 
transplant,155 contains rules, principles and concepts that constrain judges to such 
formalistic market conformism. Typically, the law will command facilitation of 
exchange and competition as cornerstones of a free market. Therefore non-
disclosure and misrepresentation are seen as part of the competitive culture of 
value-free bargaining, and all freely entered bargains must be strictly enforced.156 
During adjudication, judges formalistically ensure conformity to such a free market 
economy by giving normative recognition to values through which its demands are 
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expressed and manifested in contract doctrine, such as predictability and certainty, 
as well as positive law’s superiority over practice and experience, transaction 
security and reciprocity. 
Speaking to another higher value of free market conformism, a number of such 
other values identified by scholars have been elaborated earlier,157which deserves 
no repeat here. They form part of the internal judging criteria as well, that arise 
from the judicial desire to maintain the rule of law as a higher value. In that sense, 
contract doctrine is part of law and therefore an offshoot of the rule of law values, 
which need no further elaboration.  
Predictability and Certainty 
Legal predictability and certainty being a value underlying formalism serves to 
maintain the market free of shocks from legal forces beyond the control of parties 
to transactions.158 Similarly, both formalists and flexibilists agree that in a free 
market economy, the parties require not only legal but also contractual certainty.159 
This is what Macneil calls planning est servanda – implementation of planning.160 
Therefore, in formalistic adjudication, predictability and certainty manifest in four 
ways.  
Firstly – using contractual certainty as a judging criterion, where uncertain 
contracts are declared unenforceable. Secondly – treating contract law as 
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conceptually ordered, in the sense that it is derived from general, value-free and 
fixed abstract principles, which create the order and predictability needed by the 
market.161 Thirdly – justice being viewed as legality and procedural fairness.162 
Judges are only concerned with adherence to predictable procedural rules, as 
opposed to the uncertain substantive fairness.  
Finally, – maintaining the market’s demand for calculability and accuracy, not only 
in commercial transactions but also in law and adjudication. This is done by 
employing money as a medium of ensuring accuracy in contract terms,163and 
awarding remedies. Additionally, predictability needs the support of legal sources, 
making the hierarchical ranking of norms, and not necessarily values, essential to 
market conformism and formalism.  
Superiority of Positive Law  
Positive law’s superiority is the judicial recognition of the superiority, of rules from 
statutes and precedents, superior to practice and experience. This implies that law 
should accommodate practice or experience and not the reverse flexibility 
philosophy.164 It is manifested by judges allowing implied terms only if effective 
notice of them was given; and invoking market convenience only when already 
built in, and flowing from the logic of rules, such as on the subject of when an offer 
is effective.165 Further, it manifests by the judicial rejection of practice or other 
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extra-legal considerations that are inherently uncertain, to uphold the predictable 
rules of law.  
Related to such rule of law, market conformism values also include transaction 
security;166 reciprocity; and contractual rights and obligations as based on 
choice,167 or sometimes called the autonomy of the will.168 Choice and autonomy of 
will are discussed later under individualism, for it speaks to a higher, and although 
related to the market, independent value. Therefore, only security and reciprocity 
are elaborated further in the next sub-sections. 
Transaction Security 
Transaction security connotes a strand of pacta sunt servanda, for it holds that in a 
market, persons who are parties to bargains should be protected by the law.169 
Judicial adherence is manifested in a number of ways. Firstly, is the formalistic 
objective approach to contractual intention as the determinant of rights and 
obligations,170 which implies apparent or legally defined intention, as opposed to 
evidentially based intention. Secondly, is the strict enforcement of contracts, while 
rejecting the subjective defences of mistake and third-party purchases,171 and for 
that matter other legally permissible vitiating factors that are subject to extraneous 
proofs. Thirdly, is the ordering of specific performance or employing the 
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expectation measure of damages.172 This is as opposed to indeterminate bases of 
remedies like reliance and restitution. Relatedly, in the measure of damages, 
actual loss will guide the judge and no value will be given to unliquidated or 
otherwise uncertain damages like pure economic loss or inconvenience.   
However, in a coexistence-judging paradigm, such judicial adherence to 
transaction security can still be served and is needed, for its absence would kill the 
institution of contract. This explains why it is supported by flexibilists as well, with 
Atiyah noting that where there is no time for further inquiry, even utilitarianism will 
be willing to treat rules as rules of thumb.173 Such utilitarianism accepts that prima-
facie, observing a promise as made, is best in advancing utilitarian goals. Promise 
will have furthered transaction security arising from the reciprocity between 
contracting parties, which leads me to elaborating the latter’s role in formalism.  
Reciprocity 
Underlying formalism is also the market conformism value of reciprocity, or what 
Barnett174 calls the bargain theory of consideration, a value speaking to the 
selfishness of human nature, that is many times only willing to give up something in 
exchange for something else.175 This mutuality of bargain characterises the 
essence of contracting in the market place, facilitated by contract doctrine that 
imposes the value on contracting parties, such as rules on employment benefits;176 
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the remedy of specific performance;177 and the requirement that without 
consideration, there is no valid or enforceable contractual promise.178 
According to Chen-Wishart, contracts are in this sense made up of negotiated 
terms as opposed to standard ones, and exchanges are distinguished from 
exploitation or compulsory acquisition by the requirement for consideration as 
evidence of neutrality and fairness of bargain.179 The formalistic courts will not be 
concerned with adequacy of consideration because of the values of freedom of 
contract and non-interventionism, which take contracting parties as the best judges 
of what they value most in particular contexts;180 plus the lack of a common-law 
duty to be fair.181 
However, Chen-Wishart’s view that normative recognition of standard term 
contracts would be flexibility as opposed to formalism is at odds with the view of 
other scholars like Goode, who attribute the evolution of standard term contracts to 
the need to accommodate high volumes of business, which led to their judicial 
recognition in a bid to maintain legal predictability/certainty.182 In this study, the 
latter view is preferred, in that judicial recognition and enforcement of standard 
terms is treated as part of formalism, for such is the reality in Uganda’s commercial 
adjudication. For example in Equinox Global Trading Co Ltd v. Panalpina Uganda 
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Ltd,183 such pre-printed terms were formalistically recognised by the judge as 
binding on the contracting parties.  
Because this is the reality, many contracts between parties with unequal financial 
strength, with the stronger party dictating unfair terms, will sometimes pass as 
market conformity, without a history of negotiations.184 Such reality in modern 
contracting being given normative recognition by courts speaks to reciprocity as 
being independent from bargaining. Therefore, contrary to that view by Chen-
Wishart, what matters is that something was given for something, not whether the 
parties actually engaged in real bargaining over contractual terms, for contracts are 
enforceable even without neutrality and genuine mutuality of bargaining.  
Coexistence is nevertheless viable because even the interventionist court 
protecting the workers or poor from exploitation will not seek to replace 
consideration with charitable gifts, but rather to ensure that reciprocity did not only 
exist but was also fair, in the sense that it did not amount to worthlessness.  The 
next section revisits individualism –the other doctrinal higher value underlying 
formalism – and the lower values that feed and manifest it.  
6.4.3  Individualism to Non-Interventionism   
The value of individualism is part of what leads to the formalistic judicial non-
interventionism, for it refers to contracting parties in a free market having the 
freedom to choose who to contract with (partner-freedom), the subject matter, and 
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contractual terms (term-freedom).185 The right to freedom of contract is 
accompanied by a duty to stick to the bargains, both of which are guaranteed by 
formalism in adjudication. Therefore, individualism is upheld by courts by paying 
due regard to its traditionally acknowledged underpinning values of freedom and 
autonomy of contract, otherwise called choice or will, and pacta sunt servanda –
sanctity of contract.186 However, in addition, scholars have recently propounded 
the overarching and coexistence-engendering values of promise187and 
consentualism.188 The two are meant to offer a basis for balancing individualism 
and values like efficiency that compete with it during adjudication.189 The following 
sub-sections briefly elaborate each of these individualism values and how they 
help in explaining formalism.  
Freedom and Autonomy of Contract   
Freedom and autonomy of contract has two aspects, one being that contracting 
parties have the right of choice on who to contract with and on what terms. Term 
freedom holds that as much space as possible should be left for the parties’ choice 
and free will to determine contractual terms, 190 as opposed to courts filling gaps in 
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contract terms. Further, courts should strictly treat the terms so agreed as binding 
on the parties,191thereby not allowing intervention for purposes of finding fairness, 
justice, efficiency or otherwise. 
The second aspect is that courts should strictly treat contract as autonomous from 
will and impositions external to those defined by the parties’ will. For instance, as 
was held in Thunderbolt Technical Services Ltd v Apedu Joseph & K.K Security (U) 
Ltd,192 and Tight Securities Ltd v Chartis Uganda Insurance Co. Ltd & Brazafric 
Enterprises Ltd,193 implied terms, whether by statute or common law, as well as 
social policy considerations like fairness, should have no place in contract. In this 
spirit, matters extraneous to expressed terms should never be admitted, to 
contradict, amend or explain them – the parol evidence rule.194 This leads me to 
elaborating the role-played by the second individualistic such value, sanctity of 
contract. 
Pacta Sunt Servanda – Sanctity of Contract 
Underlying contract law, and indeed courts’ formalistic insistence that contracting 
parties be held to their bargains, is the value of pacta sunt servanda, which means 
sanctity of contract. The value is so fundamental to contract because it is a golden 
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thread that runs throughout contract from formation to end.195 Further, like 
reciprocity, it is not only valued by commercial persons but, according to 
Macneil,196 speaks to human nature’s higher value called contractual solidarity –the 
belief in being able to depend on another person, which permits the acceptance of 
reciprocity over a long time. 
During adjudication, its influence in formalism manifests by contracting parties 
being treated as the masters of their bargains,197 such that the court will not 
interfere with the terms on any grounds, be it unconscionability, unreasonableness, 
worthlessness or other pleas of equity, fairness or justice. At the same time, the 
court will not release contracting parties from performance of bargains freely 
made,198 such as allowing withdrawal by one feeling disadvantaged by contractual 
consequences.  
Therefore, in the analysis of judicial opinions, judicial adherence to sanctity of 
contract will be manifested in three ways. First is by judges rejecting or limiting 
defences built on contract vitiating factors like mistake, frustration, economic 
duress, and uncertainty of contract.199Secondly, is the rejection of substantial 
justice pleas like inequality of bargaining powers, inadequacy of consideration, 
unreasonableness, economic waste, unmerchantableness and the like. Thirdly, 
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implied terms will be rejected, and only permitted in cases of necessity, for the 
contract to make sense.200    
Market individualistic values like freedom and sanctity of contract are generally 
looked at as motivating formalism in adjudication, with realist judging invoking only 
as opportunistic formalism.201 This is in contrast to flexibility judging and its 
engendering values that compete with formalistic ones to produce the tension in 
courts.202 However, efforts have been made towards a coexistence understanding 
of contract doctrine, by viewing individualism as speaking to contract theories that 
articulate unifying values like promise and consent. 
Contract as Promise  
Coexistence voices have put promise at the centre of contract, at least as 
formalistically understood and enforced, Fried203 terming it contract’s moral basis, 
thus the phrase, contract-as-promise.204 It refers to fidelity of contracting parties’ 
words that flow from their will,205 thereby choice being the dominant value 
underlying contract doctrine. Accordingly, traditionally, contract has been 
understood as the promises the law will enforce.206 However, this theory has 
limitations, that are even acknowledged by its contemporary proponents, such as 
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Goetz and Scott,207 and Fried,208thus: some promises are not legally enforceable; 
and at the same time modern contract law has discarded the classical restriction of 
enforcing only promise following bargainsextending contract premises to 
enforcing contracts backed by mere reliance and proof of benefits.  
Nevertheless, during adjudication, serving the value of promise manifests by courts 
recognising a promissory obligation to make the defendant perform or pay money’s 
worth of one’s promise, or compensate the plaintiff for having relied on the 
promise.209 In support of coexistence, Macneil attacks Fried for sacrificing flexibility 
values like restitution, reliance, good faith, conscionability, absence of duress, 
fairness, decency, and common sense as not being moral values, while promoting 
formalistic ones like discrete contracting, choice, consent and rationality; 210 – 
together speaking to order and consistency, which would imply promise being 
propounded as a purely formalistic value.  
However, Macneil’s attack is harsh, as Fried,211 and Goetz & Scott,212 in putting 
efficiency lower in the hierarchy than choice, in the event that the two clash, 
propose promise as a unifying value. They view promissory obligations as 
supporting exchange in a free market,213 and as products of market demands such 
as wealth maximisation and efficiency, yet also underpinned by the autonomy of 
the individual, expressed by choice, and the value of sanctity of contract.214 
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Relatedly, the view by Macneil, 215 that consent is a value that promise speaks to, 
but one that means real choice, ‘not just consent’, leads us to a brief elaboration of 
consentualism in contract.  
Contractual Consentualism  
Consentualism expresses consent as the moral basis of contractual obligations,216 
the prime value whose judicial recognition satisfies lower values represented by 
formalistic contract theories: will theory, which includes contract-as-promise;217 and 
consideration-as-bargain theory.218 It provides that contractual obligations come 
from the consent of the rights holders to the transfer of their entitlements. In a legal 
system of entitlements like the common law, the presence or otherwise of consent 
will guide judges in determining the validity of a transfer of one’s rights to freely 
own, use, possess and transfer entitlements.219 Therefore consentualism, like ‘will’, 
is one of the monist theories of contract, which expresses and emphasises the 
liberty of contracting parties.220 It articulates consent as a single prime value, 
subordinate to which the other values, in a hierarchical manner, play a role in 
determining rights and obligations, and those others only having value if supporting 
its fulfilment. 
The central difference between consent and will theories is that under the latter, 
contractual obligations only arise if there was, at the time of contracting, the will by 
the promisor to be bound, which implies proof of the substantive will of the parties 
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– their state of mind.221 Barnett222 cites difficulties like the possibility of fraud, 
damage to the security of transactions and reliance, and uncertainty of obligations, 
as grounds for consentualism being an alternative to Fried’s attempted cure of 
flipping back to reliance and thereby killing the essence of his contract-as-promise 
theory.223 Instead of mere promise or reliance, courts should enforce contracts 
because the parties consented expressly, or were implied to have consented by 
fact or law. Consent as a judicial criterion only requires the presence of a 
manifestation to be legally bound,224 thereby requiring demonstration of only a 
prima facie, rebuttable presumption of intention to be bound.  
During adjudication, its influence will manifest by judicial recognition of consent 
from the words, conduct, as well as context of the contract. From a coexistence 
perspective, this encompasses both formal and informal consent,225 and provides 
the elasticity autonomy theories require and accommodating the diverse 
contractual behaviours and contexts of modern times.226 By relying on the meaning 
of the words used, and considering the parties’ liberty, expressed through will and 
bargains as evidence of consent, consentualism provides objective justification for 
formalistic values like freedom of contract in commercial adjudication.227 This is 
expected to liberate contract doctrine from dilution by indeterminate, subjective and 
therefore uncertain flexibility criteria like wealth maximisation228 and substantive 
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fairness,229but while trying to avoid the problems judges find from formalistic 
rigidity, by accommodating contextual consent.  
Consentualism theory therefore aims at serving as a theoretical basis for 
coexistence. To confirm this, its proponents propose that basing contractual 
obligation on consent provides adjudication with an objective and coherent theory 
of contract,230 while at the same time catering for the values underpinning flexibility, 
such as economic and allocative efficiency,231 reliance,232 and fairness – although 
rejecting proof of efficiency beyond its being implied in consent, as well as 
substantive fairness for procedural fairness.233These limited flexibility value inputs 
are given room to be judicially considered during the process of arriving at answers 
to whether or not the presumption to be bound existed.  
However, viewed in coexistence terms, consentualism weighs more on the 
formalistic side, ending up acting as further support for classical contract theory,234 
rather than as a balancing theory of adjudication – rejecting anything that applies 
limitations to, while accepting all that tallies with, freedom of contract. As such, in a 
number of ways, consentualism fails to overcome the problems of traditional 
theories of contract,235 leaving unresolved the question of how to balance the 
competing values in the tension.  
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Firstly, reliance, which reflects the reality of some contracts being relational in 
nature, thereby calling for a flexible approach to understanding the basis of 
contractual obligations, is viewed as evidence of legalistic consent criteria,236 
without attending to the relational values. Secondly, substantive fairness is treated 
as irrelevant for its extreme indeterminacy, in favour of procedural fairness.237 
Accordingly, consentualism fails to account for justice as would be required by the 
contract’s substance, and instead proposes a hypothetical and opportunistic 
imposition of intention.238 This is at the expense of the parties’ real choices and 
will; leading Kalevitch to argue that such legalistic consent threatens the 
consensual transfer of rights, and the true basis of contract, which is party 
autonomy. 239 
Thirdly, efficiency is viewed as not containing a normative theory – wealth 
maximisation not being a value of the legal order,240 and not a determinant of 
contract validity, unless backed by consent.241 The reality is however that 
economic efficiency motivates judges towards flexibility, the presence or absence 
of consent notwithstanding.242 
Finally, consent theory fails to articulate how gaps in law and contractual terms 
should be dealt with, a limitation for which Barnett strongly criticises Fried’s 
contract-as-promise.243 The reality is that during adjudication judges will rely on 
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experience or contractual purposes,244rather than solely on the law and strict 
meaning of contractual terms, for in hard cases these latter two will not provide 
clear answers. However, consent theory is devoid of contract gap filling 
mechanisms. It rejects judicial resort to legal and extra-legal community values 
(reflected by experience, trade custom, practices, and usage), in favour of a 
singular consent-based interpretation of contractual terms.245 These are express or 
implied terms; the consentualist interpretation being part of a doctrine that allows 
use of the ordinary meaning of words, conduct and context of a particular contract. 
The impacts of political, social or economic contexts on contractual obligations and 
justice are ignored.  
Therefore, in the same way Barnett evaluates Fried’s promise thesis, 
consentualism does not fully account for the values underlying flexibility and 
formalism in the tension as factors of reality in adjudication. This study’s 
investigation of the values underlying the tension through the lens of adjudication 
as an institution enables looking beyond the possibility of a single value to explain 
contract doctrine. It allows one to also explore legal values of a non-doctrinal-
systematic nature, as well as extra-legal ones that underlie formalism and thereby 
more exhaustively reveals formalism values that compete with flexibility ones in the 
tension. 
6.4.4  Systematic Values  
Systematic formalism is a term adopted from the mathematical scholar Savageau, 
who used it in reference to the formalism of an organisationally complex system 
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with nonlinear features, but still amenable to mathematical analysis.246 Formalism 
critics have themselves taken it to imply that law is like a book of mathematics,247 
which makes it sensible to look at systematic formalism in a legal values context. 
Exploration of systematic formalism values is therefore part of the wider systematic 
or expository jurisprudence, which seeks to understand the foundations to 
formalism originating in the nature of existing and past legal systems.248 In this 
study, it refers to the formalism-engendering values of Uganda’s legal system.  
The systematic legal values underlying formalism include the values of legality; 
legal or proceduralas opposed to substantive justice; conceptual formalism; 
restraint to authority (the power value); and equalitarianism. Amongst these values, 
legal justice doubles as an internal judicial cultural value that has been discussed 
earlier,249 and therefore needs no further elaboration. The next sub-sections throw 
more light on the other systematic values. Before reviewing the literature on 
equalitarianism and the power value, more elaboration is made of the values of 
legality and conceptual formalism, both of which have also been discussed earlier, 
but which by nature transcend strict categorisation by being external systematic 
values as well.  
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The Values of Legality 
Another set of values that underlie the formalism in the tension are the values of 
legality, which, although they differ in terminology on the values, both Fuller250 and 
Grey referred to as ‘goals of legality that are implicit in the legal system’.251 They 
are values arising out of both the duty and the aspiration that human conduct is 
governed by rules of law.252 Grey253 treats values of legality as a direct offshoot of 
law’s nature being perceived formalistically, that in turn motivates formalism, a view 
Schauer supports by declaring formalism synonymous with rulism.254 Scholars 
have proposed a number of systematic legal values of such legality, all serving the 
higher value of perfection – rules being perfectly clear, consistent, certain to all, 
and never retroactive.255  
Firstly is comprehensiveness, which refers to the court’s dispute resolution role 
being the central role in the legal system, such that it enables all disputes to be 
resolved.256Secondly is completeness,257 or clarity,258 which implies the law 
providing a correct answer in all cases, hard or otherwise. However, due to the 
controversy regarding the possibility of there being a right answer in a hard case, 
as proposed in this study, the same scholars call for formalisation of the weighing 
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of competing values during adjudication, so that completeness or clarity become 
realisable in actual practice.259  
Thirdly is formality,260 a necessary condition for completeness, which stands for all 
decisions being dictated by rationally compelling reasons, as opposed to uncertain 
standards or subjectivity. Fourthly is conceptual ordering,261 or what Fuller terms 
the value of generality of law,262 which stands for the legal system having 
coherence arising from rules being derived from a few, general, discoverable and 
abstract principles and concepts. It also includes the law being classified and 
categorised, 263usually done according to subject matter and nature of the dispute, 
such as contract being different from tort and property law.  
Finally is acceptability,264 which has been discussed earlier as connoting judicial 
responsiveness,265 but which is viewed by Grey,266 and Weiler;267 as the most 
important value served by judicial adherence to rules. It stands for the legal system 
being able to satisfy the demands and needs of its subjects. In this sense, it 
includes the desire to be regulated by a legal order made up of established rules 
and principles; thereby other implicit values of legality being judicially adhered to, 
as well as extra-legal values of the community. However, in hard cases, such 
extra-legal values, as well as judges’ personal preferences and intuitions, are 
subject to developing forces within the law. Precedence should be given to the 
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formalistic rationalisation of decisions in line with legal tools like precedents and 
canons of interpretation.268 This implies a coexistence framework, in which 
formalistic legality is the default, and flexibility considerations the exception. 
Therefore, much as they propose it as a value of legality, Grey and Fuller’s 
arguments actually support Freeman’s view, that acceptability is a coexistence 
judging criteria that obliges judges to decide in accordance with the community’s 
agreed or verifiable legal and other standards.269 Grey himself admits that none of 
the values of legality fully accounts for its purport, notable lapses being realisable 
during hard cases, and that because of this, there is a need for a formalism-
flexibility balancing mechanism.270 Fuller also puts up a decent fight, demonstrating 
that values of legality also justify flexibility.271 An example is what Fuller272 calls the 
value of clarity of laws, and Grey calls completeness, which to him, can be satisfied 
even better when the law provides for common sense standards like good faith, or 
leaves fairness in contracts to be clarified by reference to actual practices and the 
conduct of the commercial community;273a job best done using flexible judging. 
Back at the foundations of formalism, the above values of legality are only 
realisable because implicit in the legal system is also conceptual formalism.   
Conceptual Formalism  
Conceptual formalism includes formalism being part of the nature and character of 
legal imperatives in statutory provisions as well as rules in precedents, which goes 
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beyond the values underpinning contract doctrine. Tamanaha explains it as an 
account of law, that views it as legal rules, concepts, and principles with 
necessary-predetermined content, and implications; are logical; and so 
interconnected, that they form a coherent, internally consistent, determinate and 
comprehensive body of law. These attributes create the binding effect of formal 
rules, principles and concepts that define formalism.274 Manifestations of such 
conceptual formalism attributes are observable during the analysis, and will 
accordingly guide this study. I will now elaborate the other two legal systematic 
values underlying formalism– judicial restraint and equality. 
Legal Power: Restraint of Judicial Authority  
Judicial restraint relates to the legal system placing of identifiable restraint on 
officers, such as judges.275 According to Posner, it is a chameleon rich with 
definitions, including: judicial modesty or institutional competence, as judges defer 
decisions to other organs or courts; constitutional restraint, being the reluctance of 
judges to declare statutes unconstitutional; and formalism or legalism, as judges 
restrict themselves to applying the law and not making it.276  
However, the sense in which this study views formalism as motivated by judicial 
restraint is one well alluded to by Posner,277 when he commented that the judge 
would say ‘the law made me do it’, and thus apply only the semantic surface or 
plain meaning of statutes.278 This implies that besides applying the law as is, which 
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refers to judges making a voluntary choice to be formalistic, the judge is also 
compelled to be formalistic by the value of legal power. It is akin to the power value 
Macneil observed as underlying formalism by underpinning discrete contracting,279 
the difference being that he perceived it as a value of contract behaviour, rather 
than one that is part of the nature of the legal system. However, as Macneil 
indicates, the power value is a common one, that can influence both formalism and 
flexibility, depending on the commands of the legal norms.280 This makes the value 
one that can be satisfied better by a coexistence of the two approaches, than by a 
preference for one, or by leaving them at tension.  
Equalitarianism  
The value of objectivity, expounded by Eisenberg, has already been discussed 
under the heading of internal judging culture.281 However, it is inseparable from 
equalitarianism, a legal value requiring rules not to be applied uniquely, but 
uniformly to everyone. Contracting parties are in this case not only treated as equal 
before the law, but also presumed to have been so at the time of contracting. 
Objectivity through equal treatment is a value of formalistic classical contract 
theory, adherence to which implies everyone having the same opportunity to enter 
any kind of transaction to improve his position in life.282 
Atiyah attributes the growth of such formalism to the feeling and demands that law 
should not discriminate between people, such as those whose fault it was in failing 
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to pay debt and those who failed out of misfortune.283 Chen-Wishart on the other 
hand, saw equality as having been the result of progressive society’s movement 
from status to contract in the terms Mains claimed, since opportunities to contract 
were now open to all, notwithstanding social status.284 The two scholarly 
explanations imply that within contract doctrine, equality manifests in, and has two 
dimensions. 
Atiyah’s explanation points to equalitarianism as a value of the commercial 
community, where attributes arising from commercial practices, such as 
insolvency, define the characters of men and women that the law should hold and 
treat equally. This in turn means that the court would shut its eyes and ears to 
attributes like insolvency while determining rights and duties under a contract. On 
the other hand, Chen-Wishart’s sense of equality is that of a value of society as a 
whole, where all men and women are deemed equal, and treated equally during 
adjudication, regardless of their real social, economic or political status. During 
formalistic judging, social-economic classification considerations are for that 
reason not on the judge’s table for weighing, as happens during flexibility 
judging.285 
However, as pointed out by Macneil,286 and Horwitz,287in many cases this can be 
deceptive, the reality being that contracting takes place between unequal parties. 
All the value does is presuppose and maintain the status quo in aid of the more 
powerful, as court will not interfere to make the necessary adjustments in 
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obligations for real equality to be realised. Because equality is about the parties’ 
status in society, the value doubles as a legal and an extra-legal one. Likewise, 
there are other underlying extra-legal underlying values to formalism.  
Extra-Legal Values 
Extra-legal values are the external judging criteria, besides legal values. They are 
products of the non-legal judging environment, such as the historical, political, 
social and economic contexts relevant to the dispute before court, or the institution 
of adjudication generally. The value of extra-legal judging criteria should not be 
misunderstood, as was done by Dworkin, who referred to the term ‘extra-legal’ as a 
dishonourable standard, to which positivists should not have relegated the use of 
principles as judging criteria in hard cases.288 To call them dishonourable is to 
insult the entire judging paradigm of Uganda, not to mention the entire flexibility 
philosophy, whose main source of acceptability is the relevance of extra-legal 
considerations to the pursuit of justice and fairness in contract. The better view is 
to acknowledge the influence of extra-legal values, in judicial choice between 
formalism and flexibility, and the fact that the dominant amongst those values need 
to be part of the equation in the search for a way to manage the tension. 
The nature of extra-legal values includes judging environmental values that relate 
to the general body politic of a particular jurisdiction, as neither judges nor the legal 
system generally operate in a social vacuum. They also include value categories 
that relate to contract  behaviour,289 the key being values of discrete contracting 
that motivate formalism on one hand, and relational contracting values that 
ordinarily engender flexibility. An investigation into the judging environmental 
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values is beyond the scope of this study, for it requires a dedicated social-legal 
inquiry that time and space does not permit in this case. Therefore, only extra-legal 
values of a contractual behaviour nature are elaborated, and have been observed 
during the subject of the content analysis.   
6.5.1  Values of Discrete Contracting 
Discrete contracting is one of the values of contract behaviour, conceptualised 
under the formalistic classical model of contract law.290 It is the model of 
contracting based on antagonism, with parties detached from one another, only 
connected by the assertion of contractual rights.291 The law commonly allows such 
discrete contracting with its corresponding notions of freedom of contract and 
property,292 making it one of the higher values underlying formalism.  
According to MacNeil,293 the lower values that underpin and manifest discrete 
contracting include freedom of contract, consent, and equalitarianism, which have 
been elaborated earlier in this section.294 In addition to these however, he suggests 
that formalistic recognition of contracting as discrete is also underpinned by four 
other values.  
Firstly is the value of precision, which stands for the human character of focusing 
on one thing at a time.295 However, Macneil admits that it is often resisted and not 
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a universal value,296 which points to the need to balance it with competing flexibility 
values. Secondly is the value of planning. Contracting parties not only plan, but 
also seek to implement the plans, making it one of the values underpinning the 
already discussed formalistic doctrinal value of pacta sunt servanda.297Thirdly is 
the value of efficiency, ordinarily a flexibility-engendering value, but which Macneil 
claims to be underpinned by the same values as those underpinning discrete 
contracting.298 In effect, parties discretely contract to achieve economic efficiency, 
which points to common ground between formalism and flexibility, that can be 
harnessed more using a coherent and rational set of coexistence judging 
guidelines.  
Finally is the value of presupposing and maintaining the status quo, as a necessary 
effect of valuing parties’ consent and its attendant freedom of contract, as well as 
looking at discrete contracting as a route to efficiency. The argument then, is that 
viewing contract as discrete leads to social and economic change, which would 
make flexibility judging groundless. Without going into the merits of the claim, it 
implies that even proponents of discrete contracting perception acknowledge the 
need to take care of social-economic change. However, adjudication should 
balance such flexibility values with formalistic ones, under a clear and more formal 
framework, rather than waiting for what contracting parties will come up with, which 
is many times not clear or certain to the judge. 
The next issue to consider is, whether the above-elaborated value postulates have 
relevance in explaining the prevalence of formalism that has contributed to the 
tension in Uganda’s commercial adjudication across judging history. This helps to 
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make a case for the logicality of coexistence in Uganda’s specific context, as well 
as contribute to a reliable scheme of values, the balance of which should inform 
any viable means towards coexistence.  Chapter seven proceeds to answer the 
issue by discussing the findings of the content analysis of Uganda’s commercial 
hard cases, revealing the dominant higher values represented by the sub-values 
observed during the content analysis as having motivated judges in formalistic 
opinions across Uganda’s judging history. The categorisation in chapter six was 
used during the coding and content analysis and is therefore followed in chapter 
seven as well.  
 
 
 The Values Underlying Formalism in Uganda 
Introduction: 
This chapter contributes to understanding the values defining the internal and 
external normative criteria responsible for the formalism at tension with flexibility in 
Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm. In accordance with the jurisprudence of 
interests,1 the weighing and balancing of the dominant amongst such values with 
flexibility-oriented ones should inform Uganda’s commercial judging guidelines as a 
way towards coexistence. Identification of the values to weigh has to follow the 
content analysis of Uganda’s commercial judicial opinions from the colonial era 
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(1894-1962) to date, the results for which this chapter discusses in answer to why 
formalism has prevailed. 
The coding of analytical units for the content analysis has been guided by the 
methodology described in chapter two, and the values advanced by the existing 
literature as underlying formalism in commercial adjudication.2 The coding has in 
turn guided value and sub-value observations and identification from the words 
used by judges. Observations as well as inferences  have produced the resultant 
data presented in the Appendices 1, 2 and 4, as well as Figures 9 and 10 below, 
that are constructed from the data in those appendices. The results have informed 
further understanding of the observed sub- or lower values and manifestations, by 
way of a third-level analysis. The findings of this third-level analysis are presented 
in the tables forming Appendix 7, indicating the higher values to which the lower 
values speak. It is these latter results that guide this fourth level of research output, 
an articulation of the internal and external values underlying formalism that should 
be weighed and balanced with flexibility values in the quest for coexistence.   
The Internal Judging Criteria  
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Figure 9: Judging Cultural Values in Formalistic Judicial Opinions 
The values making up the internal criteria, whose sub-values and manifestations 
appear in Figure 9, fall into the categories of rule of law values, values of judicial 
perception and responsiveness values. Each category has prevailed and 
contributed to the tension in varying measures at the different times of Uganda’s 
judging history, which in accordance with interests jurisprudence, should determine 
their relevance for purposes of qualification for weighing and balancing.3  The three 
categories are further elaborated in the sequence, in sub-sections 7.2.1, 7.2.3, and 
7.2.2.   
                                            
 
3 F. Powers ‘Some Reflections on Pound’s Jurisprudence of Interests’ (1953) 3:1 Catholic University 
Law Review 15-16. 
 308
7.2.1  Rule of Law Values 
As discussed earlier, existing literature reveals that the rule of law values 
underlying formalism are the conception of justice as legality, predictability and 
legal certainty, judicial objectivity, rationality, and accountability.4 The 
manifestations to these values are not exclusive. Practices or traditions that speak 
to more than one rule of law value have been observed, and used to articulate 
them. However, judicial accountability is discussed under judicial responsiveness, 
the two being closely related and informed by similar sub-values. Otherwise, the 
findings show that these rule of law values have motivated judges to decide 
formalistically across Uganda’s judging history, and were the most dominant in 
contributing to formalism being part of Uganda’s commercial judicial culture. 
Justice as Legality 
At the heart of the higher value of rule of law is the value of justice, whose 
conception by judges motivates them to judge formalistically, for example by 
practising non-interventionism.5 In such cases, the conception of justice as legality 
has defined the internal judging criterion. Judges have adhered to it by: following 
procedural justice, coded as ‘PJ’, but which in this study has been treated as 
adequately represented by procedural justice taking sway during adjudication, 
coded and appearing as PROCED-SWAY in Figure 9. However, because it speaks 
to both the internal and external criteria, procedural justice appears in appendices 
1-5 and 7 under the external values columns as ‘PJ’. The other sub-values of 
justice as legality are: treating extra-legal considerations as inferior to positive law, 
coded as ‘NON-LEGAL INFERIOR’; generally practicing legalism; and using 
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formality as a way to dispense justice, coded as ‘FORMALITY’ and presented in 
figure 10. With the exception of ‘FORMALITY’ – for having only appeared in 
colonial opinions, and even then insignificantly, at only 3%, – each of these values 
is discussed separately below. 
With regard to procedural justice, it has continued to motivate formalism to stay in 
the tension, even when substantive justice and therefore flexibility was 
constitutionally made superior to procedural justice,6 with some judges even 
treating the ‘article 126’ command as subject to the formalistic values of procedure, 
as Justice Madrama did in Nahurira v Baguma and 2 others.7 These are values 
speaking to justiciability of issues like fairness being subject to procedural 
propriety.8 Figure 10 indicates that is has appeared in 31% of colonial formalistic 
judging, 42% of early postcolonial-judging, and only reduced to 25% of late 
postcolonial-judging. The content analysis has revealed that such procedural 
justice has underpinned formalistic judging in a number of ways.  
Firstly is a judge measuring justice by the extent to which a party conformed to the 
due process of contract formation and or performance.9 Specifically, these cases 
support Bagchi, that as long as promise and consent are proved to have existed, 
no matter the contents, judges have treated contract as enforceable.10 
Secondly, disputes have been determined using the extent to which litigating 
parties have conformed to matters of formalities of contracting or court civil and 
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evidence procedures.11 In this regard, Lista’s demonstration that there exists a 
battle of forms in contract adjudication,12 is applicable to Uganda. Lista limits his 
analysis to the proof of whether standard terms are part of a contract and if so, 
when they so became. He proves the dominance of ‘the last shot doctrine’,13 
meaning that the party that presented the terms last, without subsequent actions 
by the adversary amounting to a counter offer, will carry the day. Ugandan judges 
have exhibited such procedural based formalistic perceptions of justice in a range 
of disputes.    
Both strands of procedural justice are represented and were coded together at 
stage two of the analysis as ‘PROCED-SWAY’, presented as such in figure 9, and 
are illustrated together. From colonial judging, as in K.B. Parekh v F. Mahomed 
and J. Esmail,14 formalities of contracting were treated as superior to the intention 
of the parties. The trend grew during post-colonial Uganda; in a number of cases, 
as procedure and process of contracting were relied on to determine disputes 
without taking care of the merits or fairness of the case,15 and in others, legalism 
was expressly declared the ultimate rule of recognition of normativity.16 
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Further, many cases were determined on the basis of how perfect pleadings were, 
and the pattern became to dismiss cases for want of proper pleadings.17 For 
instance in Take Me Home Limited v Apollo Construction Co. Limited,18 pleadings 
were rejected for lacking a signature and being uncertain, although there was 
evidence that both parties knew the matters of breach of contract in dispute.  
In late post-colonial Uganda, the trend has continued and the prevalence of the 
phenomenon has greatly increased, notwithstanding the reduction in formalism as 
a judging paradigm. Substantive justice has been ignored, and denied to parties, 
and rights/obligations have been allocated on the basis of process.19  Again, failure 
to strictly comply with court procedure has been used to declare many cases 
unjusticiable and dismissed.20 In Omega Construction Co. Ltd v Kampala Capital 
City Authority,21 where a party sought to amend the price agreed in a building 
contract, arguing that her manager erred during contracting and signed on an 
unfair amount, Justice Madrama openly ignored substantive justice in preference 
for procedural justice, noting that if a contract is clear, it has to be interpreted as is, 
and expositions of common law or equity or considerations of fairness of price 
could not be applied.22       
Furthermore, Coded as ‘ACTUAL LOSS’, contractual justice as procedural justice 
has been used by judges granting only actual financial loss suffered as damages, 
as opposed to pure economic loss or other losses arising from mere expectancy. 
However, this sub-value should not be considered for weighing because it was not 
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18 [1981] HCB 43. 
19 See Appendix 4: Cases 14, 16, 22, 30, 39, 40, 51 and 52. 
20 See Appendix 4: Cases, 1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 26, 31, 39, 44, and 48. 
21 HCCS 780/2015 (28/4/2017)). 
22 HCCS 780/2015 (28/4/2017) 
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observed before independence, and appeared insignificantly in early postcolonial-
judging, at 4%, and in late postcolonial-judging at 7%. However, the fact that in 
recent times it is growing while formalism is reducing, still points to the persistence 
and current relevance of procedural justice as a perception of contractual justice.  
The second indicative sub-value to justice as logic, non-legal values being treated 
as inferior to positive law, is very closely related to logical interpretation, being the 
value that completes ‘the law as value free puzzle’.23 One would therefore expect 
that it deserves no special attention, but the Ugandan paradigm proves otherwise. 
Under the code ‘Non-Legal Inferior’, it appeared in far fewer cases than ‘Logical-
Mechanic’, having appeared for the first time in late post-colonial judging, and even 
then counting for only 7% of judicial opinions. It means that in Uganda, as much as 
the judges have traditionally adhered to rule of law values, including perceiving 
justice as legality, and logically deduced law, they have not necessarily seen the 
law as value-free. This, amongst other values, helps to explain the story in Figure 
1, that alongside the decline in formalism, the judging culture informing mixed-
approach opinions, and therefore the tension, is constantly growingfurther 
demonstrating the significance of studies like this one, towards coexistence and 
management of the tension.  
Finally, and relatedly, justice as legality has been manifested by the judicial 
practice of legalism, prevalent especially from early post-colonial judging.24 
Legalism is the view of adjudication, which holds that judges interpret the law by 
                                            
 
23 G Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century’s End (New York 
University Press 1995) 14. 
24 See for example Appendix 2: Cases 10, 11, 17, 27. 
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reading the natural sense or plain meaning of its provisions,25 and has sometimes 
been referred to as the legalistic approach to adjudication.26 Its strict and complete 
observation has been propounded by Sir Owen Dixon,27 as the only safe guide to 
judicial decisions in great conflicts, implying hard cases.  
Ugandan courts have refused to enforce contracts not entered into in strict 
compliance with statutory formalities; for instance, advocates-clients remuneration 
contracts not being notarised and filed with the Uganda Law Council, in 
accordance with section 51(1) of the Advocates Act.28 Further, in Steam Aviation 
FZC v Attorney General29 and Kibalama v Alfasan Belgie CVBA,30 formalistic 
decisions were guided by the formality in section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act, as 
amended by section 10(5) of the Contracts Act, 2010, which meant that contracts 
were not enforceable unless in writing, if they exceeded 200 Ugandan shillings, or 
25 currency points.       
Such formalities of contract formation – hitherto spelt out by common law, but now 
part of the 2010 Contract Act–are still young, but are already being invoked by 
courts to reach formalistic decisions. This is evident from Batanda v Bollore Africa 
Logistics Limited,31 in which the judge refused to give effect to a contract for want 
of signatures by both parties, reasoning that the rules on offer and acceptance 
                                            
 
25 B Galligan, ‘Realistic “Realism” and the High Court’s Political Role’ (1989) 18 Federal Law 
Review, 42. 
26 TP Spiller and R Gely, 'Strategic Judicial Decision-Making', in Whittington KR and others (eds), 
The Oxford Hand Book of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 2008) 34. 
27 Australian Judge, Sir Owen Dixon’s 1952 swearing in speech, in Galligan B, Politics of the High 
Court: A Study of the Judicial Branch of Government in Australia (University of Queensland Press, 
1987), 30-31. 
28 Kituuma Magala & Co. Advocates v Celtel (Uganda) Ltd CA 39/2003; Pandit v Sekatawa [1964] 
EA 491. 
29 HCCS 9/2010 (25/1/2015). 
30 [2004] 2 EA 146. 
31 HCCS 182/2009 (Judgment dated 23/1/2017). 
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under the Act required that they be communicated in an effective way to result into 
a contract. 
Regarding the justiciability of disputes, the judicial reliance on legal technicalities 
has defined legalism in late post-colonial judging, especially before the substantive 
command in the 1995 constitution took effect. Following a plain interpretation and 
application of rules, contractual disputes were declared by judges as unjusticiable 
on the basis of improper pleadings32, and want of standing, such as cases brought 
by agents with known principles. In some of the cases that reached trial, proofs 
were rejected for being extraneous to written evidence.33 Cases like Auto Garage & 
Another v Motokov34, which formalistically declared standing as being limited to 
one having a right that has been violated and the defendant being the one liable, 
became fixtures on lists of authorities and court-kit of every litigation lawyer. 
From the author’s experience as a commercial litigation lawyer of twenty-four years 
standing, it was not until the 2000s that the impetus given to the flexibility 
movement by the 1995 Constitution,35 began to bear on judicial decisions. Before, 
formalistic decisions influenced by legalistic judicial inclinations had become so 
common, that with time, to be a successful litigation lawyer meant mastery of 
procedural and evidence rules, before even the art of advocacy, substantive laws 
or even preparation of evidence, and other litigation tools. One would rightly call 
the early post-colonial era the age of legal technicalities, in which non-legal values 
                                            
 
32 Appendix 4: Cases 1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 20, 21, 26, 31, 35, 44 and 54. 
33 Appendix 4: Cases 2, 3, 4, 11, 53 
34 (1971) EA 392 
35 Article 126 (2) (e), later buttressed by Section 4 of the Judicature Amendment Statute, 2002. 
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had no place in the creation of legally valid norms. The other way of explaining 
such formalism is that it is judging in the service of the value of judicial objectivity.  
Judicial objectivity 
As discussed earlier,36 formalism is generally known to result from and 
characterised by judicial objectivity, manifested by, among others, logical deduction 
of rules, treating law as value-free, deriving contract law from general principles, 
literalism, Pacta Sunt servanda, and adherence to the parol evidence rule. 
Observance of these sub-values and manifestations in the opinions has informed 
the conclusion that in Uganda, judicial objectivity has contributed to the formalism 
in the tension. However, by way of elaboration, treating the law as value-free 
needs no further discussion beyond its influence noted under justice as legality.37 
Likewise, to avoid repetition, the derivation of contract law from general principles 
and adherence to the parol evidence rule are noted as indicative of judicial 
objectivity, but discussed later, as indicative of judicial rationality and systematic 
external values respectively. Therefore, only deductive reasoning, literalism and 
sanctity of contract are elaborated here.  
The deductive logic of rules was coded as part of ‘LOGICAL-MECHANIC’, the 
other component being the related mechanical application of the law so deduced. It 
implies the terms of a rule being the main premise, the facts the minor, and the 
legal result is the conclusion from applying the two.38 It was observed in 48% of 
                                            
 
36 See text to sections 3.2.1; 3.2.3 and 6.2.1.3.and 2.5.   
37 See text to section 7.2.1.1. 
38 W Huhn, ‘The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism, (2003) 48:1 
Villanova Law Review 305, 309-10.     
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colonial cases, 30% of early post-colonial judging, and 29% of post-colonial 
judging.  
Further, the data in Appendix 1 reveal that, during colonial judging, logical 
deduction of law mainly served in restatement of English contract doctrine and 
asserting its applicability to Uganda.39 This is explainable by virtue of the English 
legal system having been newly transplanted to Uganda,40 such restatement 
having fizzled out during independent judging. Figure 9 indicates that in early post-
independence period, the influence of logical deduction of laws in formalistic 
judging was tremendously reduced. Underlying this pattern, the strict restatement 
of English contract doctrine, especially in sale of goods disputes, continued but at a 
far reduced rate  while other ways in which logical deduction manifested and 
defined judging culture have since become more prominent.41  
During the content analysis, literalism, the other indicative value to judicial 
objectivity, was coded as ‘LITERALISM’. It was found as one of the dominant 
values underlying formalism. As appendices 1, 2, 4 and 7 indicate, wherever it 
appeared, so did pacta sunt servanda, a formalistic view of contract, coded as 
‘PACTA’, although the latter appeared more frequently. This supports 
McLauchlan’s declaration that objectivity is deeply rooted in the common law of 
contract, and that without objectivity sanctity of contract and its attendant security 
of transactions would be seriously undermined.42 Therefore, although sanctity of 
contract is later revisited as indicative of individualism, it is inevitable to also 
                                            
 
39 See Appendix 1: Cases number 4, 27, 48, 49, 50, 51, 69, 69 and 70.  
40 The 1900 Uganda Agreement and the 1902 Uganda Order in Council. 
41 See Figure 8 and Appendix 2 Cases 24, 26,28,31 and 36. 
42 DW McLauchlan, ‘Objectivity in Contract’, (2005) 28 University of Queensland Law Journal, 479. 
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analyse findings relating to it, and literalism as part of one set of values that speak 
to judicial objectivity.  
Figure 9 reveals that during colonial judging, pacta sunt servanda appeared in 
about 35%, and literalism 22%, of the hard cases analysed. These opinions 
involved treating written terms such as insurance policy terms43 and sale of goods 
contractual terms,44 as sacrosanct. Pleas of fairness were disregarded in a number 
of such cases,45 a notable one being Twentsche Overseas Trading Company 
Limited v Uganda Sugar Factory Limited,46 where a plea of frustration was 
rejected, notwithstanding war having broken out and made delivery of the goods 
sold impossible.  
After colonialism, literalism grew to over 25% in early post-independence, while 
pacta sunt servanda shot up to become the most influential formalistic internal 
judging criterion throughout Uganda’s history, at 54%. Therefore, while formalism 
declined in prevalence, within formalistic judging culture the insistence on 
enforceability of contract terms was growing to become the dominant value 
underlying what was left of formalism. Judges continue to treat contract terms as 
sacrosanct, insisting on their literal interpretation and strict enforcement, while 
rejecting statutory restrictions,47 equitable pleas of the terms being harsh and 
unconscionable,48 vitiating factors like mistake,49 contextual fairness and business 
                                            
 
43 Appendix 1: Cases 29 and 37. 
44 Appendix 1: Cases 4, 25, 46, 50, 51, 53 and 67. 
45 See Appendix 1: Cases 4, 25, 37 and 50. 
46 (1945) 12 EACA 1. 
47 Appendix 2: Case 6. 
48 Appendix 2: Cases 3 and 23. 
49 Appendix 2: Case 13. 
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reality;50 and on several occasions refusing to fill gaps by implying terms in 
contracts.51  
The Motor Union Insurance Co. Ltd v Ddamba,52 and Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd. v 
John Sematengo,53were about whether knowledge of an agent should be imputed 
on the principal in insurance law, an issue that has internationally been a battlefield 
in the tension. In Ddamba,54 a proposal filled by the insurer’s agent and 
accompanied by a signed warranty failed to disclose all material facts, although the 
insured had made full disclosure. The court followed Newsholme Brothers v Road 
Transport and General Insurance Co. Ltd,55 to find the agent to have been an 
amanuensis of the insured. It allowed the insurer to avoid the policy on grounds of 
non-disclosure, reasoning formalistically that only the written contract could be 
looked at to ascertain the terms.  
That the judge followed Newshlome is significant, because under English 
insurance law there was, and still exists, a tension between two competing theories 
on imputation of knowledge of agent on the insurer. On the one hand is the 
formalistic Newsholme approach, and on the other, the flexible approach in 
Bowden v London, Edinburgh and Glasgow Life Insurance Co.56 Bowden was 
illiterate, like many Ugandans during 1963 when the Ddamba case was decided,57  
and on that basis the court held that the misrepresentation by the agent who filled 
the form could not be visited on him. Faced with a flexible option that would suit the 
                                            
 
50 Appendix 2: Cases 33 and 35. 
51 Appendix 2: Cases 7, 9, 34, 35 and 41. 
52 [1963] 1 EA 271. 
53 [1965] 1 EA 233. 
54 [1963] 1 EA 271. 
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social circumstances of the majority of Ugandans, the judge chose to adhere to 
pacta sunt servanda and judge formalistically.  
Formalism was also applied in similar cases, even when they involved illiterates. 
This is demonstrated by the judgment in Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd. v John 
Sematengo,58 where the Chief Justice held against the illiterate insured, and 
refused to impute knowledge on the insurer. He reasoned that illiterates were taken 
as having a duty to insist that the proposal form is read to them and interpreted. 
Failure of the illiterate to perform his duty, the proposal form was taken as having 
been read and so interpreted, and the falsehood had to be visited against him.    
The Ddamba case is also significant because the judge justified his formalistic 
decision by reasoning that the insured defendant was an intelligent man who knew 
the importance of telling the truth.59 This speaks to the judge having been 
motivated by considerations of the economic and social class of the insured (which 
considerations are analysed further in chapter nine) to formalistically find against 
him. Therefore, formalism sometimes represented political agendas, which calls for 
further investigations into the judging environment surrounding the invocation of 
observed values like literalism and pacta sunt servanda, a task beyond the scope 
of this study.   
During late post-colonial judging, the influence of both literalism and pacta sunt 
servanda has dropped to 14% and 50% respectively, but the latter has continued 
to be the most influential formalistic judging cultural value. The manifestations and 
manner in which the two values contributed to formalistic judging remained the 
same as in early post-colonial judging with a few notable exceptions.  
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Firstly, the sharp decline in literalism, while there was no significant decline in 
pacta sunt servanda, implies that judges could simply have reduced the tendency 
to justify their decisions with reasoning, which in this case would be the literal 
interpretation of contract terms. Indeed many of the opinions, in Appendix 4, that 
bear the code ‘PACTA’ do not go far enough to justify the decisions reached by 
assigning interpretations that would qualify for the label ‘LITERALISM.’ The 
explanation of this trend appears to be the significant rise of the judicial exercise of 
unrestrained authority. This is because, as Minda points out, reasoned elaboration 
is one of the neutral principles by which judges in common-law systems are 
restrained, and the tension thereby managed.60  
Secondly, as indicated earlier,61 while refusing to fill gaps in contracts by implying 
terms, in Kibalama’s case, Byamugisha J.A declared as the ultimate judging 
guideline the notion of treating competing norms and values hierarchically, 
formalistic values being the default and flexibility ones the exception.62 For 
instance, pacta sunt servanda should only be interfered with upon proof of flexibility 
enjoying public (business community) support.  
Thirdly, amongst vitiating factors that were ignored in the quest to uphold pacta 
sunt servanda, this period reveals blatant rejection of reliance on legality that would 
make contractual terms unenforceable.63 For instance in Suffish International Food 
processors (U) Ltd & Pan World Insurance Co. Ltd.  v Egypt Air Corporation,64 the 
Supreme Court rejected King v Victoria (1896) AC 250 PC, a common-law locus 
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61 See text to Section 2.5.1.  
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classicus for the principle that as long there was evidence of an insurance contract 
and indemnity, it was not open for the third party to question the insurer’s having 
indemnified the insured.65 Fairness and justice that barred allowing a transporter 
who delivered spoilt fish to escape liability; and the principle that in marine 
insurance the contract was provable by means other than the policy, were both 
also rejected. 
This disregard of legality in preference for pacta sunt servanda in late post-colonial 
Uganda does not appear to be plain judicial insistence on formalism in the classical 
sense, because if that were the case, upholding legality would be at the forefront. It 
is noteworthy that the practice coincided with the rise in purposive and contextually 
based judging, together with high levels of judicial law making, as demonstrated in 
Figure 10 below. This supports Tamanaha,66 in that judging has oscillated between 
formalism and flexibility, turning into a mish-mash of a system suspended in 
uncertain and shifting space, without a common criterion on when judges should 
follow or depart from the rules.67 This makes efforts like this, towards balancing 
and coexistence of the two pertinent. In that regard, the following sections illustrate 
that, the rule of law values of rationality, predictability and certainty are part of 
Uganda’s judging culture, and therefore part of the internal criteria that motivates 
the formalism in the tension, worth consideration in the balancing. 
                                            
 
65 [2002] SCCA 6 (19/6/2002). 
66 BZ Tamanaha BZ, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law (Cambridge University 




As discussed earlier,68 judicial rationality is manifested by the judicial recognition of 
contract law as conceptually ordered, which is informed by the sub-values of order, 
logic and consistency. These three are satisfied by the law being categorically 
ordered, and always derived by judges from general and fundamental abstract 
principles, that contribute to a holistic system.69 Categorical ordering, coded as 
‘LCategorisatin’, has been observed, although not above 10% in any judging 
epoch, but with notable significance, because cases where the reverse has 
happened were hardly observed either. Judges have declined to flexibly find 
contractual remedies in tort,70 as happened in David Dungu v East African Posts 
and Telecommunications.71 This case was decided around the time of Gilmore’s 
declaration of ‘the death of contract’ and the rise of ‘a new era of contort’.72 Under 
the contort era, tortious doctrine would be viewed as freely usable to determine 
contractual disputes, as contract was not rooted in the organic growth of common 
law from case law, but was a creature of Langdalle, who pieced together several 
disconnected branches of law and called them contract.73 The merits or otherwise 
of Gilmore’s thesis notwithstanding, in Uganda the findings reveal that the 
formalistic culture of judging contractual disputes according to strict and abstract 
rules of contract as laid down,74 with exclusion of tort, is far from dying. 
                                            
 
68 See text to section 6.2.1.4. 
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Deriving contract law from general principles, coded as ‘GENERAL PRINCIPLES’, 
was not observed amongst colonial judicial opinions. It starts appearing in early 
post-colonial judging, with about 13% of the opinions, and 14% in late post-colonial 
judging. In a number of opinions, rules and principles in statutes have been treated 
as cutting across and containing everything by which a judge should be guided. 
This was observed in opinions interpreting and applying statutory provisions 
regulating contract formation,75 contract enforcement formalities,76 the passing of 
property in the goods,77 the passing of title in the goods,78 implied terms, such as 
fitness of goods for purpose,79 duties, and remedies of the parties.80 In Batanda’s 
case,81 for example, the general principles of offer and acceptance were used to 
formalistically decide that without effective communication, which could be 
evidenced by signing, there was no contract. 
Rationality’s influence in formalism also manifested in judicial application of general 
common-law principles across different types of contracts. The examples are the 
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notions of freedom of contract82and privity of contract,83 and the rules on 
enforceability of contracts.84 The use of such general principles as applicable to 
cases with different sets of facts validates the effect of general principles as the 
basis given by formalists,85 for the proposition that law is conceptually ordered and 
therefore consistent. Therefore, it is significant enough to demonstrate that judicial 
rationality is one of the values underlying the formalism in the tension, although not 
as influential as justice as legality, judicial objectivity or even predictability and legal 
certainty. 
Predictability and Certainty 
As discussed earlier,86 and declared by Lord Bingham in Golden Strait Corporation 
v. Nippon Yusen Kubishka Kaisha,87 predictability and certainty of both the law and 
contracts is the prime value that permeates through all judicial motivations of 
formalism. In this sense, all findings on rule of law, as well as other values 
engendering formalism, are in a way findings of certainty as a value of both an 
internal and external nature. Therefore, the study contributes to knowledge by 
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 325
providing justification for departure from the claim by Frank,88 that the real problem 
of the law is the basic myth that the law is certain, and the claims of scholars who 
view certainty as an illusion, allegedly because repose is not the destiny of man.89 
These scholars make these claims to support the view that judging is always a 
flexible weighing of competing interests, and there is no need for efforts like this 
study trying to create certainty by having flexibility co-exist with formalism. 
However, in Uganda’s case, the findings presented in Figure 10 reveal that 
certainty, coded as ‘COL’, is a major rule of law value that has motivated formalism 
in 31% of colonial judging, 13% of early postcolonial-judging, and 29% of late post-
colonial judging. By way of manifestation, certainty of contractual terms and claims 
have been treated as conditions for contractual enforcement, as was the case in 
SDV Transami (U) Ltd v Nsibambi Enterprises Ltd.90 
Summarising the judicial approach in Uganda in Hope Mukankusi v Uganda 
Revenue Authority,91 Lameck-Mukasa J reasoned that the rule in Hadley v 
Baxendale,92 of only foreseeable damages being awardable, would prevail as the 
rule of assessment of loss by looking into the future, and that per Esso Petroleum 
Co. Ltd v Mardon,93was problematic, as it only provided a rough estimate of the 
loss.  This way, the judge was clearly motivated by certainty as the ultimate value 
that formalism would serve.  
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Certainty has occupied such a high place in motivating formalism that some judges 
have treated it as more valuable than legality. This was the case in Access 
Financial Services Plc Ltd v Khayongo Rutiba,94 where the judge decided that once 
certainty of terms existed, no plea of illegality based on mistake of fact could be 
entertained. This was notwithstanding mistake of fact or law having been a ground 
to declare a contract void at common law, a position since codified under the 
Contract Act, 2010. A similar decision was made in Nile Bank Ltd & Another v 
Thomas Kato & Others,95 in which illegality of a contract was ignored on the ground 
that it had not been pleaded. 
Accordingly, the findings also reveal that in many cases96 legal certainty underlies 
the strict rules relating to technicalities and formalities, like pleadings, and their 
blind application, disregarding pleas for fairness, or other would-be flexibility 
interventionist grounds like utilitarianism. For instance, in Kibalama v Alfasan 
Belgie CVBA,97 where the judge strictly adhered to Order 7 rule 1 (e) of the Civil 
Procedure Rules, requiring that the plaint should disclose full particulars of the type 
of contract, its terms, and subject matter.98 The judge rejected usage, as would 
imply utilitarianism, reasoning that it was not made known (predictable) earlier.  
That certainty was the motivator in such cases was confirmed by the Court of 
Appeal in Interfreight Forwarders (U) Ltd v East African Development Bank,99 
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which required parties to strictly adhere to pleadings as being the definition with 
clarity and precision of the real matters in controversy upon which parties can 
prepare and present their cases, and courts can adjudicate. 
However, as much as the theory that treats certainty as mere illusion is disproved 
by these findings, there is no evidence of its being the prime value that would 
support the viability of a judicial quest for absolute legal certainty, as propounded 
by Wolff100 and Truscott.101 Even in terms of prevalence, it does not appear to be 
exceptionally high, as one would expect of an ultimate value, the competition from 
flexibility notwithstanding. This implies that accommodating flexibility, alongside 
formalism, with the uncertainty the former brings, will not fundamentally affect the 
judging machine, especially when such uncertainty can be managed by certain and 
coherent judging guidelines, as is later proposed in this study.     
7.2.2  Judicial Responsiveness  
As indicated earlier, responsiveness, or acceptability as Weiler102 and Grey refer to 
it, is a value internal to the institution of judging, that to formalistic judges connotes 
accountability, and public acceptability of their opinions.103 These aspirations of the 
people, to which the Uganda constitution obliges judges to adhere,104 are viewed 
as represented by the law’s propositions, discoverable from the existing legal 
order.105 The analysis of the results, represented in Figure 9 reveals that on the 
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formalistic side, strong responsiveness has been practised through the mechanical 
and neutral application of rules.  
Judges have applied the ‘law as is’, without regard to considerations outside its 
corpus. The colonial era registered a 48% rate of strong responsiveness, which fell 
to about 30% and 29% in early and late post-colonial judging respectively. 
However, this has been declining in correspondence to the decline in logical 
interpretation of law, thus their being coded together as ‘LOGICAL-MECHANIC’. 
The observance of logical deduction always coincided with strong responsiveness 
to legal commands.106 For instance, in Hansa & Lloyds Ltd & Emmanuel Onyango 
v Aya Investments Ltd & Mohammad Hamid,107 Kiryabwire J not only admitted to 
the case being a ‘hard case’, but to having reached his decision using logic and 
mechanical application of rules. Further, in a number of cases, especially sale of 
goods disputes, judges openly declined to take into account considerations of 
fairness, and responded by formalistically applying the rules in the Sale of Goods 
Act, and precedent.108  
Strong responsiveness as a judicial cultural value also explains the considerable 
number of cases found to have been decided on the basis of technical rules, such 
as on the burden of proof, or the inadmissibility of extraneous evidence to 
                                            
 
106 See for instances Appendix 2: Cases 38 and 39; and Appendix 4: Cases 1, 10, 11, 41, 19, 38, 
52 and 53. 
107 (HCCS 857/2007 (26/8/2010). 
108 See for example:  Tajdin Hussein & 2 Others v HwanSung Industries Ltd [2006] HCB 101; Jade 
Petroleum Ltd v Salim Ramzanli & Another [2017] UGCOMMC 114(18/8/2017); Hansa & Lloyds Ltd 
& Emmanuel Onyango v Aya Investments Ltd & Mohammad Hamid (HCCS 857/2007 (26/8/2010); 
Congolese Rally for Democracy v Palm Beach Hotel (HCMA 279/2000); Batanda v Bollore Africa 
Logistics Limited (HCCS 182/2009 (Unreported-Judgment dated 23/1/2017). 
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contradict the written terms of a contract.109 One would expect that article 126 has 
reduced the rate of strong responsiveness,110 which indeed appears to be the 
case, as the majority of cases in which it was cited were decided flexibly. However, 
judicial opinions in which the article has been argued but expressly ignored in 
favour of formalism are still occurring, such as was the case in Nahurira v Baguma 
and 2 others.111 Justice Madrama found the suit unjusticiable and a nullity for want 
of standing, article 126 of the constitution notwithstanding, reasoning that the 
supremacy of substantive justice over technicalities under article 126 was subject 
to the substantive law. Therefore, responsiveness is significant enough to be 
treated as a major value underlying formalism as an internal criterion, which needs 
to be balanced during the construction of judging guidelines.  
However, the continuing increase in flexibility and mixed-approach judging, 
especially post article 126, means that the tension is inevitable. It also points to the 
role the judges have considered themselves as playing in the resolution of contract 
disputes. Are they passive bystanders, as Oldfather claims should be the case with 
strongly responsive judges, or interventionists, as is to be expected of weakly 
responsive judges?112   
                                            
 
109 See for instance: Monday Eliab v Attorney General (S.C.C.ASCCA 16/2010 (Judgment of 
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111 [2015] UGCOMMC 76 (30/4/2015). 
112 Oldfather CM, ‘Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty to Decide’, 94 
The Georgetown Law Journal (2005) 140, 145 &151. 
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7.2.3  Judicial Perception Values 
As discussed earlier,113 scholars claim that judicial perception values are the most 
important in motivating judicial choices.114 This would make that set of values 
eligible for weighing and balancing when determining the source of ultimate judging 
guidelines, subject to the claim’s relevance being verified in Uganda’s case. The 
findings represented in Figures 9 and 10 demonstrate that the component values 
of this category – the judicial perceptions of law as logic; the role of judges as legal 
mechanics; and non-interventionism in contract – have all played a role in 
motivating the formalism in the tension. Therefore they need to be part of the 
balancing, although their primacy is debatable. However, again to avoid repetitions, 
judicial non-interventionism will be discussed in the next part of the chapter, under 
market individualism.  
The Conception of Law as Logic 
The judicial conception of law as logic refers to the Langdallian view, which is that 
law is by nature: discoverable normative imperatives in printed texts;115 
conceptually ordered and therefore rational, and consistent; determinate; certain 
and predictable;116 formality;117 as well as neutral, autonomous, and value free 
                                            
 
113 See text to section 6.2.2.  
114 VE Flango, LM Wenner & MW Wenner, ‘The Concept of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note’ 
(1975) 9:2 American Journal of Political Science, 277, 277, 281; I. Van Domselaar, ‘The 
Perspective Judge’, (2018) 9:1 Jurisprudence: An Internal Journal of Legal and Political Thought, 
71, 78, 84; I. Van Domselaar, Moral Quality in Adjudication: On Judicial Virtues and Civic 
Friendship’, (2015) 44 Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 1, 26.    
115 CC Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contract with References and Citations, (Little, 
Brown & Company, 1871) Preface.   
116 Minda, (n 23) 13-14 and See text to section 2.2. 
117 Grey (n 85) 52-53. 
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rules definable by logic.118 The findings of content analysis presented in 
appendices 1-5, and 7, as well as Figure 10, illustrate the influence of sub-values 
and manifestations of this higher value, coded as ‘POSITIVISM’, ‘COL’, 
‘CONCEPT-FORMAL’ and ‘EQUALITY’, which is part of ‘EQUALITY 
PRESUMPTION’, presented in figure 9. ‘POSITIVISM’ represents perceptions of 
law as discoverable fact, determinate and autonomous, and appeared in 
approximately 50% of colonial opinions, 38% of early post-colonial opinions and 
40% of late post-colonial opinions. ‘COL’ stands for perceptions of law as certainty, 
and was observed in 31% of colonial opinions, reducing to 13% of early post-
colonial opinions, but sharply increasing to 29% during the late post-colonial 
period. ‘EQUALITY ’ stands for law as neutral, a perception that parties to 
contracts are equal at the time of contracting, and enjoy equal protection of the law 
during adjudication. It was not observed in any of the colonial opinions, was 
insignificant at 4% during early post-colonial judging, but has also sharply risen in 
significance at 18% during late post-colonial judging.   
‘CONCEPT-FORMAL’ stands for conceptual formalism, a perception that law is 
conceptually ordered, and contains legal imperatives that bind judges to being 
formalistic during adjudication. This sub-value was found to have been significantly 
influential throughout Uganda’s judging history, appearing in 28% of colonial 
opinions, 29% of early post-colonial ones, and also sharply rising, to 43%, during 
late post-colonial judging. These manifestations of the law as logic perception help 
to understand how it has motivated formalism.  
Judicial perception of law as discoverable fact is evidenced by the use of deductive 
reasoning to arrive at the law applicable to a dispute, which during the content 
                                            
 
118 Minda (n 23) 407. 
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analysis was observed under the code ‘LOGICAL-MECHANIC’,119 as well as 
‘POSITIVISM’. ‘LOGICAL-MECHANIC’ was used to observe the sub-value as an 
internal judging criterion that speaks to objectivity, as well as judicial perception of 
law as logic. On the other hand, ‘POSITIVISM’ helped in tracing it as indicative of 
an external and wider legal value, completeness, which will be attended to in the 
next section.  
At the second stage of analysis, the perception of law as logic manifested by 
judges restricting the source of normativity to written rules in statutes and 
precedents, and giving no room to extra-legal considerations. Examples are 
opinions on the law of sale of goods, which were found under colonial,120 early 
post-colonial121 and late post-colonial judging.122 These cases demonstrate that 
judges across judging history looked at the strict and literal interpretation of the 
Sale of Goods Act provisions, and cases that have so interpreted them, for 
guidance in reaching formalistic decisions. 
In other types of contract disputes, the restriction of normativity to rules is 
demonstrated by Commissioner of Income Tax v Jaffer Brothers Limited.123 The 
court admitted that it was a hard case, but since no legal authorities had been cited 
by counsel to show that payment by a tenant to secure a lease, was a contractual 
expense, there had been a capital expense. Another example is Samuel Hawaga v 
                                            
 
119 See Appendix 1: Cases 1, 3, 8, 11, 17, 40, 41, 48, 49, 50, 51, and 69; Appendix 2: Cases 9, 10, 
11, 16, 17, 28, 31, 39 and 40; and Appendix 4: Cases 4, 10, 38, 41 and 54.  
120 Vithaldas Haridas & Co. v Valji Bhanji & Co. [1920-29] 3 UPLR 217; Yoweri Musaka v Gulkam 
Mussein Velji [1920-29] 3 UPLR 255; Douglas v Carr Lawson & Co. [1920-29] 3 UPLR 234; Viram v 
Chorley (1920-29) 3 ULR 63.    
121 Sekayombya v Uganda Steel Corporation [1984] HCB 42. 
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Christopher Bisutu124, where the court, in enforcing a limitation of liability in 
insurance contracts, reasoned that however unfair a statute is, it has to be read as 
is, and the only other way was to have it amended by the legislative organ.  
The other sub-value of law as logic found influential in formalism was the positivist 
perception of law as value free and determinate, also observed under the code 
‘POSITIVISM’. It was manifested by judges ignoring or rejecting calls to invoke 
considerations of policy, fairness, social welfare or other flexibility-engendering 
sources of normativity other than written rules in statutes and precedents. This 
speaks to judges considering rules as having all they needed to reach decisions, 
even in hard cases. In a number of cases, judges treated non-legal norms like 
practices as inferior to, and inapplicable in the face of, written rules of law.125 For 
instance in addition to Suffish’s case discussed earlier,126 in Samuel Hawaga v 
Christopher Bisutu,127 the judge categorically reasoned that what mattered to the 
court was the wording of a statute, and not its purposes.  
In other cases,128 judges reached formalistic decisions, which they justified by 
expressly showing the perception of the superiority of positive law, which was 
value-free and determinate. In East African Plans Ltd v Roger Allan Rickford 
Smith129 and Arim v  Stanbic Bank,130 court orders were held as sacred ,and had to 
be obeyed even if irregular, null or void, implying that all other considerations and 
                                            
 
124 HCCS No. 839 of 1973. 
125 Appendix 1: Cases 8 and 40; Appendix 2: Cases 9 and 10; and Appendix 4: Cases 4, 12, 16, 29, 
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126 See text to section 7.2.1.2.  
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norms were useless in the face of commands from precedents. Related is the 
second high judicial perception value, judges viewing their role as mechanics of the 
law.  
Judges as Legal Mechanics  
Judges who perceived the law as logic were also found to have mechanically 
applied it, without allowing any flexibility. For this reason, this value was inferred 
from findings under the code ‘LOGIC-MECHANIC’. Therefore, the findings 
discussed above regarding results for this code apply to prove that formalism was 
to a large extent motivated by judges looking at their role as mere policing, where 
rules are applied strictly without assuming the responsibility to balance competing 
interests, or fill gaps, as would arise in hard cases. What is peculiar is that even 
after Article 126 (2) (e) of the 1995 constitution commanded judges to dispense 
substantive justice without regard to technicalities, some judges continued to 
perceive their role as legal mechanics, as demonstrated by the Justice Madrama 
decision in Nahurira.131 The implication is that it is not enough to widen judicial 
discretion, as did Article 126. The better way to manage the rigours of formalism in 
adjudication is the construction of commercial judging guidelines, stipulating under 
what circumstances, and the parameters of how, a judge can invoke substantive 
justice and other extra-legal considerations required to do fairness and justice. This 
brings us to articulating the values underlying formalism that are external to the 
institution of judging and the judges’ individual values.    
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The External Judging Criteria  
This part discusses the findings relating to values external to Uganda’s judical 
culture and  institutions, which have motivated the formalism at tension with 
flexibility in Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm. The findings reflecting these 
values or the constitutive sub-values that combine to define higher values at the 
third and fourth levels of analysis, are presented in Figure 10 below. The results 
show that the values are both legal values – those rooted in the nature of the legal 
system – as well as the extra-legal, informed by the contract behaviour in Uganda.  
  
Figure 10: External Values behind Formalism  
 Legal Values  
By ‘legal values’ is meant judging criteria that are embodied within or produced by 
the legal system. They include values embedded within Uganda’s contract 
doctrine, and systematic values produced by the nature and commands of the 
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general legal system, such as the meaning and nature of contract law;132 and legal 
imperatives used to limit and guide judicial choice, as contrasted with illegitimate 
policy considerations and other substantive goals of adjudication.133 Accordingly, 
the content of legal values is bound to depend on Uganda’s peculiar legal 
enterprise, which the courts play an adjudicative role to fulfil.134 The following 
section discusses the values underlying formalism, which are systematic by nature.  
7.4.1  Systematic Values 
The content analysis revealed a prevalence of all the five categories of systematic 
values underlying formalism proposed by the existing literature.135 The categories 
are: values of legality or perfectionism; procedural justice; restraint to authority (the 
power value); conceptual formalism; and equalitarianism. They are unpacked and 
discussed below, to demonstrate how each value has motivated formalism, and 
ascertain which of them qualifies to be part of the balancing towards coexistence. 
However, procedural justice is not given independent treatment because it is 
intertwined and adequately covered under the values of legality, as well as the 
internal criteria of rule of law values earlier discussed.  
Otherwise, the values or their sub-values have been coded and reflected in Figure 
10 and Appendix 7 as follows: ‘ROC-NONMAKERS’, which stands for the value of 
judicial restraint, by virtue of which a judge’s authority and role are restrained and 
limited to a formalistic resolution of disputes; ‘PAROL EVIDENCE’, which stands 
for the best evidence rule, that contractual terms can only be ascertained from the 
four corners of the contract, the refusal to read anything into the contract or accept 
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any extraneous considerations to determine the intentions of the parties; and 
‘FORMALITY’, which stands for law as formal, and all explicit commands of 
formality in litigation and adjudication. With the exception of ‘FORMALITY’, for 
having only appeared in colonial opinions, and even then insignificantly, at only 
3%, these values inform the discussion below. 
Perfectionism: the Values of Legality 
The ultimate value of legality is a perfect legal system, having rules that are clear, 
consistent, certain, determinate, and never retroactive.136 This has been 
demonstrated as internally motivating formalism in Uganda’s commercial 
adjudication, by illustrating the influence of rule of law values,137 as well as the 
judicial perception values of conceiving law as logic138 and the judges’ role as legal 
mechanics.139 However, as discussed earlier,140 such perfectionism has an 
external dimension, the dimension of being served by the systematic values 
identified by Fuller141 and Grey,142 all of which speak to the desire for rulism143 and 
a perfectly formalistic conception of law.144 The values inform the common law of 
contract applicable in Uganda,145 having grown as a necessary reaction to the high 
levels of disorder and indiscipline amongst the commercial and industrial classes, 
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which included refusal to perform contracts, that exists today in most of Africa, 
Uganda included146 
One of these values is comprehensiveness, manifested by the centrality of judges 
as solvers of legal disputes.147 Secondly, is completeness or clarity of the legal 
system, manifested by judicial recognition of rules as neutral, autonomous, value-
free and logically determinable.148 Thirdly, is conceptual ordering,149 or generality of 
law,150 manifested by derivation of contract doctrine from general principles and 
observance of law’s categorisation and classification.151 Fourthly, is the formality of 
the legal system.152 Finally is acceptability,153 or judicial responsiveness,154 
manifested by judicial response to maintaining the legal order as social desire, and 
viewed by Grey155 and Weiler as the prime value of legality.156 The manifestations 
of these values of legality have been observed during the content analysis of 
Uganda’s commercial judicial opinions, which proves their influence in contributing 
to the formalism in the tension. However, I do not intend to over-emphasise the 
influence of perfectionism by re-elaborating its underpinning values, beyond what 
is covered under sections 6.4.4.4, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.2.2.2, and 7.2.3.1. Instead, being 
the value that speaks to perfectionism itself, I will only illustrate how these values 
of legality have influenced formalism using the value of completeness or legal 
clarity.  
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The findings of the content analysis, presented in appendices 1-5 and reflected in 
Figure 10, illustrate the influence of sub-values and manifestations of 
completeness or clarity of the legal system in formalistic opinions. The sub-values 
are judicial deductive reasoning, and a positivist conception of law, coded under 
‘LOGICAL-MECHANIC’ and ‘POSITIVISM’ respectively.157 ‘POSITIVISM’ 
represents perceptions of law as discoverable fact, determinate and autonomous, 
and appeared in approximately 50% of colonial opinions, 38% of early post-colonial 
opinions and 40% of late post-colonial opinions. Relatedly, legal determinism is 
manifested by the judicial treatment of law as certainty, which has been observed, 
under the code ‘COL’, as appearing in 31% of colonial opinions, 13% of early post-
colonial opinions, and 29% of late post-colonial ones.   
Deductive reasoning has been discussed, in section 7.1, as representing an 
internal value. However, in this sense it was also found to always correspond with 
a positivist conception of law as discoverable fact, and determinate, thereby 
showing the two sub-values reflecting the judicial recognition of legal system 
completeness.  
These trends were found in sale of goods disputes during colonial,158 early post-
colonial,159 and late post-colonial judging.160 In these cases, judges across  judging 
history looked at the strict and literal interpretation of the Sale of Goods Act 
                                            
 
157 See Appendix 1: Cases 1, 3, 8, 11, 17, 40, 41, 48, 49, 50, 51, and 69; Appendix 2: Cases 9, 10, 
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provisions, or precedents, for guidance in reaching formalistic decisions.161 The 
influence of positivist conceptions of law as value-free and determinate were 
manifested by judicial disregard of the law’s purposes and other instrumentalist 
considerations; and treating non-legal norms like practices as inferior to rules of 
law.162 In a number of other cases,163 judges reached formalistic decisions, which 
they justified by expressly showing the perception of legal determinism.164 Such 
legal determinism would have been difficult without the legal system restraining 
judicial authority, thereby having the power value that makes judges decide 
formalistically. Therefore, next is an analysis of the power value’s influence in 
Uganda’s commercial formalistic opinions.  
Legal Power: Judicial Authority Restraint   
Also found as a key value underlying the formalism in Uganda’s commercial 
adjudication, is the value of legal power, summarised by Posner in the phrase, ‘the 
                                            
 
161 Completeness was also influential in other types of disputes, as demonstrated by Commissioner 
of Income Tax v Jaffer Brothers Limited.161 Although the court admitted it was a hard case, it held 
that since no legal authorities had been cited by counsel to show that payment by a tenant to 
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law made me do it’.165 Ugandan judges have been restrained by a number of legal 
instruments from being flexible, thereby being compelled to be formalistic by the 
power legal order. This value was coded as ‘JUDICIAL RESTRAINT’, later merged 
with other sub-values having the same implications, under the code ‘ROC-
NONMAKERS’. Appendix 7 shows that judicial restraint sub-value has manifested 
as progressively gaining more influence. It has appeared in 10% of colonial 
opinions, 17% of early post-colonial opinions, and 29% of late post-colonial ones. 
Such judicial restraints take the form of constitutional and non-constitutional 
restraints.  
In Uganda, constitutional restraint is not in sharp conflict with restraint by the law’s 
commands as suggested by Posner,166 but part of one legal power value 
motivating formalism in adjudication.167 This is because in Uganda, the constitution 
is not only law, in the sense of regular law that Posner speaks of,168 but is the 
supreme law and ultimate criterion for legal validity. Such legal power was cited as 
the motivation for formalistic decisions, in Jayuntilal S. Shah v Attorney General.169 
Since colonialism, Uganda’s successive constitutional regimes have commanded 
formalism in a number of ways. Firstly is the enactment of the doctrine of 
separation of powers, under which the judiciary is restrained to application and 
interpretation of law, and to refrain from law-making, which Posner attributes to the 
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belief that the legislature, made up of people’s representatives, is better on policy 
decisions. 170 
Secondly, Figure 2 demonstrates that under different constitutional regimes, the 
rate of formalism has varied, pointing to a link between the level of constitutional 
restraint and the prevalence of formalism in the courts. For instance, it was highest 
under the colonial regime. It dropped to almost non-existent under the 1962 
independence constitution, which restrained judges to exercising judicial power 
only in the name of the traditional and therefore flexibility-oriented rulers of the 
different kingdoms.171 
Formalism rose to very high levels between 1967 and 1995, when Uganda was 
governed by the 1967 constitution; although this has been branded a hybrid of 
flexibility and rigidity,172 it changed the judicial system to being formalistically 
oriented in design and philosophy.173 In the current era of the 1995 constitution, 
formalism has again considerably declined, although not to the 1962-67 levels; this 
coincides with the constitution’s failure to make upholding the rule of law obligatory 
to judges. What it did instead was to mandate judges to administer justice in the 
name of the people,174 and following not only the law, but also the norms, 
aspirations and values of the people.175 
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Although the 1995 constitution does not command unrestrained flexibility, but its 
coexistence with formalism, it contains no clear and coherent framework on how to 
achieve that coexistence. This can be inferred from its maintenance of the common 
law’s formalistic spirit, which has translated into the continued prevalence of 
formalism alongside flexibility, and thus the tension. For instance, the constitution 
extends equality before the law, earlier understood as non-discrimination on 
grounds of race, tribe, nationality and political opinion,176 but now to include 
economic and social standing.177 
The legal system exerts non-constitutional judicial restraint on judges through laws 
that regulate jurisdiction, and court procedures. In this sense, Ugandan judges 
have largely been restrained from flexibility by the Judicature Act, which provides 
for the order of precedence of applicable law, written law being at the top of the 
hierarchy, followed by precedent.178 This makes formalism the default approach; 
especially given that flexibility is only possible where formal rules do not exist.179 
However, there is still room for coexistence, as precedents with legal force include 
common law that existed before 1902, which by nature constituted customs and 
practices that reflected far-reaching values, ideology and ideals that call for 
flexibility, but also sometimes very rigid formalism.180 
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The second aspect of non-constitutional procedural restraints is the set of 
commands in civil procedure and evidence rules, which regulate the process 
judges follow to arrive at the correct answers.181 In Uganda’s case, they motivate 
formalism in a number of ways.  
Firstly, pleadings must meet the standards of legal formality and certainty, or 
otherwise be struck out by judges,182 which has been done in numerous 
commercial cases throughout judging history.183 To satisfy such standards, suits 
and defences must be filed by way of formal documents, called plaints184 and 
written defences,185 respectively.186 Further, a plaint for a contract suit must contain 
the documents containing the contract terms in issue,187 or a pleading as to imply 
terms if such are alleged.188 On the defence side, if a contract is alleged, its bare 
denial can only be construed as a denial of the express contract as a fact, but not 
denial of the legality or sufficiency in law of the contract.189 Therefore, once 
pleaded, contracts are presumed legal and valid, a position that restrains judges 
from flexibility and commands them to uphold the formalistic values of freedom, 
autonomy and sanctity of contract.  
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Secondly, judges must make written and formal orders,190 or decrees,191 as final 
decisions from adjudication.192 The decree must conclusively determine the rights 
of parties to the dispute, which it’s taken to include the formalistic rejection of the 
plaint or writ.193 The determinacy of rights is formalistic, because the same rule is a 
rider that such a decree may be final or preliminary, implying that the issue is not 
substantive determination of rights but procedural justice.  
Thirdly, reasoned elaboration of decisions, one of the tools by which legal systems 
restrain judges from unprincipled subjectivity,194 is a legal requirement in 
Uganda.195 The influence of this restraint is demonstrated in Figure 10, by cardinal 
doctrines, freedom and sanctity of contract being cited as grounds for formalistic 
decisions, in the majority of such opinions.  
Evidence rules have also contained judicial restraints thereby motivating formalism. 
The most outstanding restraint, which at the same time points to judicial objectivity 
and individualism as a value of doctrine, is the parol evidence rule; otherwise 
known as ‘the best evidence’ rule.196 It is a default rule for judicial interpretation of  
contracts that requires judges to be formalistic, in that if terms are written or 
required to be written, no evidence except the document itself or its secondary 
evidence (such as photocopies) is admissible to prove, clarify or contradict them.197 
Denning notes that, this restraint is derived from the market individualism freedom 
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of contract value, that requires parties’ intentions to be understood from the words 
spoken or written, not the adduced evidence or other external aids.198 This makes 
judicial adherence to parol evidence also indicative of the doctrinal value of 
individualism, which is discussed in the next section.   
During the content analysis this restraint was coded as ‘PAROL EVIDENCE’, and 
found to have been insignificant during colonial judging, at 3%, but rose above the 
threshold to 13% and 11% during early post-colonial and late post-colonial judging, 
respectively. In terms of contributing to a tension-management regime, this rule is 
already a check against unprincipled flexibility. However, its near-borderline 
prevalence indicates that judges have to a large extent ignored and overridden it to 
find space for policy and other considerations extraneous to the four corners of the 
contract. Beyond values of laws on judging – procedural, evidential and 
jurisdictional laws – conceptual formalism has also been found to underlie 
formalistic adjudication.  
Conceptual Formalism  
Conceptual formalism refers to formalism being the nature or command of sources 
of substantive law applicable to contracts. According to Freeman, 199such legal 
sources are the raw material of the judicial process.200 Judicial approach is 
therefore largely dependent on the nature of contract’s legal sources, in which 
case, orthodox formalist scholars,201 especially pre-Hart positivists and 
Langdallians, viewed the nature of legal sources as discoverable normative 
                                            
 
198 LJ. Denning, The Discipline of Law (Buttherworths 1979) 
199 M Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (Sweet & Maxwell 2014) 1550.   
200 ibid.   
201 See text to section 4.2. 
 347
imperatives in printed texts.202 The prevalence of formalism as part of the tension 
has in this sense been influenced by conceptual formalism being at the heart of the 
nature of contract doctrine and many laws on judging. The content analysis has 
revealed manifestations of conceptual formalism, as listed by Tamanaha, such as 
laws having predetermined content, and implications; as well as a logical, 
coherent, internally consistent and interconnected body of contract rules and 
principles.203  
Coded as ‘CONCEPT-FORMAL’, Figure 10 reveals that conceptual formalism was 
found influential, and increasingly so, throughout Uganda’s judging history, even 
when formalism has been on a constant decline. It appeared in 28% of colonial 
opinions, 30% of early post-colonial ones, and sharply rising to 43% during late 
post-colonial judging. Therefore, it is one of the key values underlying formalism 
being at tension with flexibility; although, that it is the kernel underlying formalism, 
as claimed by Tamanaha,204 is not supported by the findings in this study.205 By 
comparison, legal perfectionism, manifested by sub-values coded under ‘LOGIC-
MECHANIC’, although on the decline overall, scored higher than conceptual 
formalism in both colonial and early post-colonial judging.  
The influence of conceptual formalism manifested in a number of ways. Firstly, is 
the interconnection and consistency of all laws, effected by constitutional 
supremacy clauses,206 which have always made the constitution the supreme law, 
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and any other laws inconsistent to it being invalid, to the extent of their 
inconsistency207 The use of the word ‘consistency’ in the supremacy clauses points 
to Uganda’s adjudication happening in a formalistically-ordered legal system, being 
conceptually ordered, coherent and logical, with a Kelsenian philosophy of criteria 
for norm validity, where higher norms validate lower ones, as the default judging 
norm.208 Although Kelsen was arguably not a formalist, and did not support logical 
deduction and mechanical enforcement of law,209 in Uganda the findings reveal 
that such conceptual formalism as results from his model has guided judges 
towards formalistic decisions in a number of cases.210 For instance, in Jayuntilal S. 
Shah v Attorney General,211 the court refused to give effect to legislation that 
declared certain contracts void, and enforced them, reasoning that due to the 
supremacy clause, the constitutional right to property would override any legislation 
to the contrary. The other case is Burma Oil Co. Ltd v Advocate,212 in which 
compensation for war losses, ordered by the court were later declared 
unrecoverable by Parliament using retrospective legislation. However, the 
legislation was held to be irrelevant, as Uganda was different from Britain, because 
its constitution was supreme, and not its Parliament.  
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Secondly, although the strict observance of legal classification appeared in less 
than 10% of cases and during only one judging period,213 the finding indicates that 
judges have been influenced by it as an element of conceptual formalism.214 As 
was the case in David Dungu v East African Posts & Telecommunications,215 
parties to contracts have been denied benefit of the duty of care concept in 
negligence, formalistically citing law’s classification, that distinguishes contract 
from tort. Thirdly, Ugandan laws on judging and contract doctrine contain 
fundamental rules and principles that judges put to general application. That way, 
they formalistically reach similar decisions in cases with varying sets of facts.  
Relatedly, Uganda has detailed regulation of contract,216 leaving little room for 
judicial flexibility; which as indicated by Denning,217 Chen-Wishart218 and 
Goode,219is a recipe for formalism, as contract law content is spelt out and not left 
to judges during adjudication. For instance, the role of equity and other 
considerations of fairness have been rejected, to uphold freedom of contract, and 
the conceptual formalism in the statutes.220 In one such case, Dr Syedna 
Mohamed Burhannudin Saheb & 2 Others v Jamil Din & Others,221 significantly, the 
judge noted but disapproved the decisions of Judges Somerville and Denning in 
                                            
 
213 See text to Section 6.1.1 and Figure 9. 
214 See text to Section 6.1.1 and Figure 9. 
215 HCCA No. 84 of 1973. 
216 Both the Indian Contract Act, used to transplant English contract law to Uganda, and the current 
2010 Contract Act. 
217 Denning (n 198) 9. 
218 M Chen-Wishart, Contract Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 16. 
219 R Goode, Commercial Law in the New Millennium, the Hamlyn Lectures (Sweet & Maxwell 
1998) 16. 
220 Dr. Syedna Mohamed Burhannudin Saheb & 2 Others v Jamil Din & Others [1973] 1 EA 254; 
and Samuel Hawaga v Christopher Bisutu (HCCS No. 839 of 1973). 
221 [1973] 1 EA 254.  
 350
Stockloser v Johnson.222 If approved, the effect would have been that where the 
relevant terms of contract were harsh, unconscionable or of a penal nature, the 
court would intervene, irrespective of whether the other party was guilty of any 
fraud, sharp practice or other unconscionable conduct. 
Finally, formalistic judges have also indulged in a quest for principles, and even in 
cases where none clearly applied, avoiding making decisions based on pure 
flexible instrumentalism, as was the case in Kurji Anandji & Co. v Sojpal Punja 
Shah and Others,223 and Syedna’s case.224 In Syedna,225 the judge was clearly 
motivated by conceptual formalism towards formalism and certainty when he 
reasoned that he could not find the bargain unconscionable and interfere with it. 
The judge’s reasoning was that no principle appears to exist to determine what is 
unreasonable or unconscionable or unjust; these are emotive, rather than precise 
terms; and so, it is presumably a question of what shocks the conscience of 
whoever is trying the case; leaving equity to vary with the length of the judge’s 
foot.226 
Besides conceptual formalism, such judicial reasoning also indicates that, another 
external systematic value is at play. This is neutrality, practicality manifested by the 
presumptive equality and equal treatment of parties before the law.   
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Equalitarianism: Neutrality of Law   
Equalitarianism is a key value of the formalist understanding of the nature of 
contract law,227 having grown out of the market demand that the law should not 
discriminate between people, such as the insolvent.228 It stands for law as neutral, 
manifested by a perception that parties to contracts are equal at the time of 
contracting, and enjoy equal protection of the law during adjudication. Coded as 
‘EQUALITY’, the results in Appendix 1 and Figure 10 reveal its absence in colonial 
opinions, its insignificant at 4% during early post-colonial judging, but also its sharp 
rise to high significance at 18% during late post-colonial judging.229  The absence 
of equalitarianism in earlier years appears to be due both to the social context and 
law being underpinned by inequality as a value.230 The formalism represented by 
equality being made a condition of adjudication, in the colonising agreements that 
served as the constitution, was therefore the conspiracy‘’ sense of formalism that is 
in an actual sense instrumentalist.231  
By way of illustration, in employment contracts the courts were more willing to 
accept informality and flexibility with regard to formation. As was the case in Gulam 
Mohammed v E. Ethel,232 as 98% of Africans were illiterate local labourers, 
predominantly poor peasantry, working for the 2% Europeans and Asians who 
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controlled the commercial economy of the country.233 It would defeat the market 
structure of the economy if such employment were to be declared illegal by the 
courts in the name of chasing formalism and legal certainty. In early post-colonial 
judging, the 4% prevalence included two prominent cases, Yokana Sekandi v 
Yafesi Semakula,234 and Aloysius Kakande v Edward Nsimbi,235in which judges 
cited formalistic equality opportunistically by rejecting ignorance as a defence to 
breach of contract.  
Comparatively, in late post-colonial judging equalitarianism’s significant influence 
on formalism’s prevalence has manifested in two ways. Firstly, there is the 
continued presumption of literacy, or intellectual and cognitive capacity of the 
contracting parties, as was the case in Kenya Airways Ltd v Ronald Katumba,236 
and Aloysius Kakande v Edward Nsimbi.237  
Secondly, there is the more common presumption that contracting parties had 
equal bargaining powers, and thereby justifying the refusal to intervene in the 
freedom of contract guaranteed by formalistic judging.238 For instance, in Damba’s 
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case,239 where disparity in social-economic class of the parties was considered, but 
treated as unhelpful to the weaker party, this led to a formalistic decision.  
Such equalitarianism being invoked instrumentally tallies with the whole ‘mish-
mash’ that defines the tension, especially given that, as Holmes, noted, many 
times such reasons anchored in the social, economic or political realities 
surrounding a case are left inarticulate, and yet are the very root and nerve of the 
whole proceeding.240Although necessary to investigate, the full range of such 
forces is beyond the scope of this study. The positive part is that the value’s 
appearance at 18% in recent times qualifies it to be on the list of formalism values 
to be weighed and balanced with flexibility ones. The relativism of values thesis 
propounded by interests jurisprudence considers the scheme of values or interests 
to be balanced, as made up only those values with a high prevalence at the 
particular time.  
The above discussion demonstrates that legal values of a systematic nature have 
been influential in the prevalence of formalism as part of the tension over the 
years. In the next section, the chapter demonstrates that besides the systematic 
values, contract doctrine also contains values that motivate judges in deciding 
formalistically. These values too need proper understanding for one to ably find 
ways of balancing them with the flexibility values they compete with, to manage 
coexistence. 
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7.4.2  Doctrinal Values   
Doctrinal values are some of the most influential legal values underlying formalism 
in Uganda’s commercial adjudication. The findings market individualism, 
manifested by freedom, autonomy, and sanctity of contract are the dominant set of 
doctrinal values. Under the values of judicial objectivity,241 rationality,242 non-
constitutional restraints243 and conceptual formalism,244 I have already 
demonstrated the influence of freedom and autonomy, as well as sanctity of 
contract, as internal motivations for formalism. 
In the following sections, I demonstrate that alongside other sub-values, freedom 
and sanctity of contract have also influenced formalism as part of the external 
higher values, market conformism and individualism. Also articulated is the 
influence of external doctrinal values, promise, and consentualism. 
Market Conformism  
Market conformism refers to the value embedded in classical contract law – the 
desire to facilitate the free market economy, by maintaining the components that 
determine its proper functioning, exchange and competition. Atiyah245 relates that 
such conformism underpinned formalistically-oriented classical contract law. This is 
through values like contract law being derivable from general principles;246 
certainty and predictability being superior to equity, fairness and substantive 
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justice;247 and judges’ role being mere umpires to ensure procedural fair play.248 
That brew of contract law is what was transplanted to Uganda, and has regulated 
the country’s commercial transactions until the recent 2010 Uganda Contract Act. 
Therefore, during adjudication, judicial market conformism will manifest by 
adherence to market-oriented values of predictability and certainty; the superiority 
of positive law over practice and experience; security of transactions; and 
reciprocity in contract.249 Apart from reciprocity, all these values have been 
illustrated as prevalent in Uganda’s formalistic commercial opinions across judging 
history.   
The findings on predictability and certainty’s influence have already been 
discussed as a rule of law value,250 as they underpin both the internal criteria of 
judging in that regard as well. Further, as a sub-value of such certainty, the judicial 
recognition of law as conceptually ordered by deriving contract law from general 
principles, is already discussed under non-constitutional restraints251 and 
conceptual formalism;252 as well as procedural justice, already discussed under 
non-constitutional restraints.253  
However, certainty as a legal value in the market conformism sense equally refers 
to contractual certainty, adherence to which will move a judge to declare uncertain 
bargains invalid. This strand of the value only appeared in about 5% of early post-
colonial opinions, therefore its role in formalism is insignificant. However, the other 
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indicative value of certainty in doctrine is market conformism, which although 
revisited under external values, appeared in over 30% of colonial, dropped to about 
13% of early post-colonial but has again risen to almost 30% of late post-colonial 
judging.  Therefore, with exception of its not being contract behaviour oriented, it is 
a key value reflecting the higher value of market conformism, as underlying 
formalism; and therefore part of those to be balanced with flexibility values, to 
manage the tension.  
The other constitutive value of market conformism, security of transactions, is a 
strand of sanctity of contract.254 Its findings will be discussed in the next section 
under that main category. This leaves us with reciprocity, or what Barnett calls the 
bargain theory, the value of mutuality of bargain.255 In contract doctrine, it is 
represented by the requirement that contracts are only valid if supported by 
consideration, however inadequate.256 During the content analysis, reciprocity was 
hardly found the subject of judicial reasoning, which points to its being insignificant 
and disqualified from the values weighing scale, as with the other non-legal values 
underpinning market conformism discussed above.  
However, it could be a case of such values being so settled and leading to such 
straightforward answers, that cases in which they appeared did not qualify as hard 
ones, to be analysed in this study. The answer to this doubt cannot be arrived at 
without widening the type of cases reviewed in this study, and this constitutes one 
of the study’s weaknesses. The findings are clearer with regard to the second 
component of market individualism.        
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7.4.3  Individualism to Non-interventionism 
As earlier indicated,257 existing literature points to individualism as a key motivator 
of formalism, manifested by judicial adherence to the values of freedom and 
autonomy of contract, sanctity of contract, promise, and consentualism. The 
content analysis sought to test the prevalence of these indicative sub-values, and 
weigh their influence in Uganda’s commercial formalistic opinions, the results of 
which inform the discussion below.    
 Freedom and Autonomy of Contract 
Freedom and autonomy of contract is the notion of classical contract, that only the 
parties should determine the terms of contract they agree to, and the courts are 
restrained from interference.258 It is a value embedded in contract doctrine, and in 
this study’s categorisation, an external judging criterion that the legal system 
imposes on judges. Both statute and precedent constrain judges to recognise that 
the parties have freedom of choice, and only their will determines contractual 
terms, thus the title will theory. Therefore, its indicative judicial practices in hard 
cases are courts refusing to fill gaps in terms, or interfere to find fairness, justice, 
efficiency, or otherwise.   
The findings in Figure 10 reveal that freedom and autonomy of contract, 
represented by the code ‘FOC’, manifested as the single most influential legal 
value in formalistic judicial opinions.259 It appeared in approximately 38% of 
colonial judging, and sharply increased to 54% of early post-colonial judging. Since 
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then, it has reduced, although it remained the strongest formalistic legal value, at 
46% of late post-colonial judging.  
Earlier in section 6.4.3.1, illustration of its influence in formalism is made using 
Thunderbolt,260 Tight Securities Ltd261 and Photo Production Ltd,262 which 
demonstrate how it has contributed to the tension. Further, in cases like National 
Industrial Credit Uganda Ltd v PM Nsibirwa,263 where vitiating factors appeared to 
be proved or argued, as would loosen the strain on judges and allow a flexible 
approach, judges adhered to freedom and autonomy of contract and still decided 
formalistically.  
Another manifestation of its influence in formalism is the rejection of equity, as 
would allow intervention in some cases, as already demonstrated in Dr Syedna 
Mohamed Burhannudin Saheb & 2 Others v Jamil Din & Others,264 in which the 
learned Ugandan judge refused to follow the flexible reasoning by celebrated 
English judges Somerville and Denning in Stockloser v Johnson.265 In litigation, my 
experience is that citing Lord Denning will normally assure counsel of victory in a 
case, therefore such a departure points to the high value the judge attached to 
individualism in Uganda, as underpinned by freedom, autonomy, and sanctity of 
contract. 
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However the findings do not support Denning’s metaphor in George Mitchell 
(Chesterhall) v Finney Lock Seeds Limited,266 the metaphor of freedom and 
autonomy of contract as an idol formalistic judges worship, implying 
uncompromising faith in, and practice of adherence to it. Although the most 
influential formalism value, it has barely made it past 50% prevalence, which is by 
no means a sign of absolute dominance, even amongst formalism-engendering 
values. The better way to perceive freedom and autonomy of contract, is a key 
value at competition with others for representation in judging criteria, and therefore 
one that needs to be put into consideration when constructing commercial judging 
guidelines, that can create coexistence between formalism and flexibility.  
Sanctity of Contract 
The second indicative value to individualism, sanctity of contract or contract 
solidarity,267 refers to the notion directly resulting from freedom of contract, that in 
absence of vitiating factors like fraud, mistake, undue influence and the like, 
contracts as made, must be strictly enforced by courts.268 Judicial adherence to it is 
manifested by judicial non-interventionism in contracts, such that pleas of fairness, 
equity, reasonableness or other sympathy will be rejected. Further, a party will not 
be released from a bargain freely entered, and legally permissible vitiating factors 
allowed cautiously. In the same way, courts will not readily give legal force to 
implied terms.269 
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In the findings, as its by-product, whenever sanctity of contract appeared, so did 
freedom of contract. Sanctity of contract was coded and presented in Figure 10 as 
‘SANCTITY’, and amongst formalistic opinions, appeared in 34% of colonial 
judging, 42% of early post-colonial judging and 43% of late post-colonial judging. It 
has therefore been consistently growing, and a significant value underlying 
formalism throughout judging history, as the operative value to market 
individualism. It is operational in the sense that after judges recognise the value of 
freedom of contract, as well as other market conformism values, sanctity is what 
guides formalistic judges to strictly enforce the terms, to secure the other values.  
Therefore, as part of the external judging criteria, the formalism in the tension is 
significantly influenced by both systematic and doctrinal legal values. Figure 10 
reveals that these legal values outweigh extra-legal values numerically, and in 
prevalence during adjudication. This is not surprising, considering that under 
formalist theory judges regard the law as containing all they need to be guided by. 
Then the question is whether the alternative proposals of judges being motivated 
by promise on one hand and consentualism on the other are reflected in the reality 
of actual judicial opinions.  
Contract as Promise  
Contract as promise is supposed to be manifested by the judicial recognition of a 
promissory obligation to make the defendant perform a promise, or pay its money’s 
worth, or otherwise compensate the plaintiff for the value of reliance on such a 
promise.270 During the content analysis, it was coded as ‘PROMISE’, and was 
observed only during colonial judging, in about 7% of cases. Therefore, much as it 
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forms the basis of a plausible theory for coexistence, during the formalism that is at 
tension with flexibility in Uganda’s commercial adjudication, promise is not an 
influential value worth considering for balancing in a framework for coexistence. 
This leads to analysis of results for the other proposition, consentualism, as the 
ultimate value. 
Consentualism  
Consentualism refers to the value of contractual rights and obligations being 
determinable by existence of the consent of rights holders transfer or otherwise to 
deal with their entitlements. It is represented by a manifestation by a party to be 
legally bound, therefore during adjudication judges will recognise it not only from 
the wording of contractual terms, but also from the parties’ conduct and general 
context surrounding the contract.271 This can motivate judges to flexibility as well, 
thus a plausible theory to guide efforts towards coexistence. In the analysis of 
formalistic opinions, it was coded under ‘EXPECTANCY’. Figure 9 presents its 
findings as only having appeared in less than 5% of colonial formalistic judging. 
Therefore, its role in the prevalence of formalism is so insignificant as to disqualify 
it from balancing when formulating the proposed commercial judging guidelines. 
Further, the content analysis has also revealed some extra-legal values as 
responsible for the formalism at tension with flexibility, the findings for which the 
following section discusses. 
Extra-Legal Values  
With regard to extra-legal values, the institutional theory of law is relevant, 
particularly Carl Schmitt’s rejection of the normativity conviction that formal norms 
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already contain all that judges need in order to interpret and enforce them.272 
Instead, he put forward the view that the legal order is a product of social 
conditions and realities.273 Further, the findings indicate that although Dworkin 
rightly rejected the positivists’ undervaluation of the normativity of principles in hard 
cases, he also wrongly termed extra-legal judging values as ‘dishonourable’.274 
Figure 10 demonstrates that the extra-legal values discreteness, and accuracy as 
the nature of commercial contracting, as well as expediency, are part of the reality 
underlying formalism in the tension across judging history. They cannot be 
regarded as dishonourable when one of them, discrete contracting, has even had 
more frequency and therefore influence than some legal values.  
7.5.1  Discreteness in Contracting  
Discreteness in contracting refers to the classical nature of contracting, where 
parties are detached from each other, only connected by the assertion of contract 
rights.275 Their relationship is therefore based on self-interested individualism,276 
such that the terms agreed at the time of completion, and not future events or 
relations, will guide the judicial allocation of rights and obligations. This value’s 
influence appeared in a significant number of contracts that were the subject of 
formalistic opinions analysed,277 making up 24% of colonial judging, and 




274 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth & Co. Ltd 1977) 39. 
275 Chen-Wishart (n 218 ) 15; IR MacNeil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations 
under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law’ (1978) 72 Northwestern University Law 
Review 854. 
276 Chen-Wishart (n 218) 12-18 
277 Appendix 1: Cases 4, 25, 29, 31, 46, 49, 53, 60; Appendix 2: Cases 3, 5, 13, 14, 21, 32, 34, and 
35; Appendix 3: Case 29; Appendix 4: Cases 3, 6, 10, 11, 14, 15, 19, 23, 25, 27, 36, 41, 42, 44, 49, 
50, 54; and Appendix 5: Cases 50 and 87.  
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continuously growing to 33% and 43% of early and late post-colonial judging 
respectively.  
In many formalistic decisions, judges have refused to recognise relations beyond 
that of the two contracting parties as defined by the express terms. For instance, 
liability was not found from actions of third parties like agents of the parties,278 or 
relations that appeared to develop after and from the contract, although not 
explicitly provided for by the terms.279 
Further, contracts antecedent to others have been treated as discrete, such that 
the legality of the parent contract would not affect the sanctity of the resultant one. 
Such was the reasoning in Rwakatooke Muchope v Caltex Oil (U) Ltd,280 where a 
mortgage was enforced notwithstanding the illegality of the loan agreements; 
Mirembe Wire Products Ltd v Goldstar Insurance Co. Ltd,281 where the insurance 
policy was treated as distinct from the cover notes; and Greenland Bank Ltd (In 
Liquidation) v Express Sports Club Ltd,282 where a pre-incorporation contract was 
treated as discrete in relation to the memorandum and articles of association of the 
company.   
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Finally, courts have also treated the rights and obligations from contracts as being 
defined at completion of the contract, in many cases rejecting the effect of vitiating 
factors such as frustration, mistake and equity. Such factors would otherwise call 
for considerations like trust, cooperation-,and the futuristic relations.283 For 
instance, in Monas (U) Limited v Benzene (u) Limited,284 the defendant was 
obliged to supply bitumen ‘immediately’, and upon failure pleaded frustration of the 
contract by payments being blocked due to sanctions on Iran, the source of 
goods.285 The judge noted that the doctrine of frustration, and its effect of loss 
staying where it is, had been solidified under section 66 (1) and (2) of the 2010 
Contract Act as a defence to contractual obligations; however he formalistically 
decided that the frustration pleaded must have been the subject of contract, and 
not an extraneous occurrence. Similarly, in a number of other cases,286 where 
frustration was raised as a defence, formalistic decisions were made, contractual 
obligations being treated as sealed at contracting, no matter what happened 
afterwards.  
With regard to mistake and misrepresentation, in National Industrial Credit Uganda 
Ltd v PM Nsibirwa,287 the defences were raised, but the judge held that they would 
be construed as non-existent and the words in the contract read ‘as is’. He 
reasoned that misrepresentation could not have been made by a stranger to the 
man of a class, education and experience as the defendant. By use of the word 
‘stranger’, the judge was clearly mindful of relations that could be recognised as 
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accompanying the process of contracting, but was instead motivated to be 
formalistic by the discreteness nature of the contract.   
Discrete contracting is known to follow the growth and dominance of private 
property in society, a value that motivates formalism in law and adjudication.288 In 
Uganda, discrete contracting inevitably followed the colonial introduction of the 
value of private property and the attendant classification of society, in place of pre-
colonial common property and classless societies.289 Nsibirwa’s case reveals that 
judges recognised this socio-economic aspect of contracting and sought to judge 
formalistically, as a way of upholding the discreteness of contract and protection of 
economic interests, in this case the insurer’s business, which would otherwise be 
eroded by treating contract as relational. The fact that the judge highlighted the 
defendant’s strong education and economic class and used them to determine the 
rights and obligations of the parties supports the MacNeil claim that discrete 
contracting prevails to serve and protect private property interests.290 Such 
interests behind that nature of contracting also need attention if one is to fully 
understand why formalism has stayed at tension with flexibility.   
Unfortunately cases like Nsibirwa’s291 are the exception, as the content analysis of 
judicial opinions in the study could not reveal the social-economic forces that 
caused discrete contracting in all the cases, since they were very rarely articulated 
by the judges. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study, it is worth noting that 
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discrete contracting has been the most dominant extra-legal value influencing 
formalism, making it one of the values to be taken into account in formulating 
ultimate judging guidelines as a way to manage the tension. Other extra-legal 
values, although not as prominent, that underlie formalism, include accuracy in 
commercial contracting and litigation.  
7.5.2  Accuracy in Contracting and Adjudication 
Accuracy as a value of contracting and adjudication is realised using money as the 
measure for benefits and compensation in case of breach. Money is a social 
institution and psychological symbol of standardised value for goods and 
services,292 with an accurate, quantifiable and determined value, which informs 
rules and the attendant formalism judging.293 The study has in this regard tested 
the Dworkin294 v. Farber,295 debate as to whether wealth, represented by money, is 
a value competing in adjudication universally, so as to form an end to be pursued 
by judges. The results indicate accuracy, represented by money as a value, in 
support of Farber296 and Proctor’s claims.297 However, it is the most dominant 
value in the Farber sense, but one of many that should form the cocktail for 
coexistence.  
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 In Uganda, one of the fundamental changes introduced by colonialism was the 
establishment of money as a medium of exchange, which changed court awards 
as well, from flexible restitution to monetary,298 as a more realistic way to satisfy 
commercial purposes and expectations.299 This came to be reflected in statutes on 
contract.300 All this would in turn motivate formalism in place of the previous 
flexibility paradigm.301 In the findings, a comparison between Figures 1 and 11 
reveals that, although formalism has been declining, accuracy, coded as 
‘ACCURACY’, was at its peak during colonial judging, appearing in 14% of 
formalistic opinions; had a sharp decline in early post-colonial judging at 4%; but is 
on the rise in late post-colonial judging at 7%. Its prevalence has been against the 
bedrock of the conceptual formalism discussed above,302 because the procedural 
justice represented by strict application of procedural and evidential rules is partly 
informed by the pursuit of accuracy as a value and goal of adjudication.303 
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Lord Carswell of the House of Lords confirmed this, in Golden Strait Corporation v 
Nippon Yusen Kubishka, when he declared that in commercial cases 
considerations of certainty and finality have to yield the greater importance of 
accuracy in assessing damages.304 This was not only recognising the value of 
accuracy, but also treating it as the top of the hierarchy, which again the findings in 
this study refute; the highest prevalence it has had being 14%. Further, the courts 
have used accuracy as the guide in deciding cases relating to the conditions for 
granting injunctive reliefs,305 specific performance,306 special damages,307 
exemplary damage308 and claims for loss of expectations.309 
Therefore, money has motivated formalism by enabling the practice of Langdalle’s 
role of the judge as a legal mechanic.310 Further, contrary to Lord Carswell’s 
ranking, the above cases support Weber and Stinchcombe’s view that accuracy, 
like other formalism-engendering values, aims for certainty, as is therefore far from 
the prime value.311  However, one would also be right to argue that Llewellyn’s 
flexibility efficiency thesis is now applicable in Uganda because of the accuracy 
brought by money, which points to money having a role in the search for 
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coexistence, as it serves higher values on each side.312 Related is the value of 
expediency in contracting, as well as in adjudication.  
7.5.3  Expediency  
Expediency, coded as ‘EXPEDIENCY’, is the other outlier identified, having 
appeared in less than 10% of cases analysed overall. However, unlike other 
outliers, it can neither be merged with any dominant value, nor appear enough to 
form a key value on its own. However, its small frequency could be deceptive The 
reality is that the country is constantly trying to reduce a big case backlog in the 
courts, which by 2015 stood at 37,827 cases – these being cases that have stayed 
pending for more than two years.313 
Such a backlog calls for judges, the disputing parties and lawyers in litigation to 
attach high value to expediency as a motivation for formalism in adjudication, 
achievable through technical means and invocation of other formalistic quick fixes 
to dispose of cases. It is therefore not surprising that ‘expediency during 
adjudication’ is mentioned as a value of the commercial court, a division of the 
High Court of Uganda.314 This further confirms that expediency motivates 
formalism as a fundamental value of Uganda’s commercial justice system, dictated 
by the judging environment in late post-colonial Uganda. However, following the 
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10% threshold, its low frequency denies expediency an immediate place on the 
balancing table.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion therefore, the formalism in the tension is motivated by a number of 
values, which are both internal and external to the judicial institution and its 
players. The values vary in character, manifestations as well as weight. The 
dominant values include the internal values of rule of law – justice being conceived 
as legality, predictability and certainty of law and contract, objectivity, and 
rationality. Internally, formalism has also been motivated by the perception of law 
as discoverable fact from text, determinate, neutral, formal, certain, value-free and 
definable by logical deduction; judges’ perceptions of their role as legal mechanics 
and contract police; judicial perception values, and responsiveness. At the same 
time, the dominant external values, both legal and extra-legal, have motivated the 
formalism in the tension. They include perfectionism of the legal system, defined by 
clarity, certainty, and consistency, constituted by the values of legality; legal power 
or judicial restraint; conceptual formalism; and equalitarianism or legal neutrality. 
They also include doctrinal values-market conformism and individualism/non-
interventionism; and discrete contracting as an extra-legal value.  
The above values are the ones to be balanced with those underlying flexibility, 
which also need to be discovered. The next two chapters seek to ascertain such 
flexibility-engendering values, which will complete the answer to why the tension 
has prevailed and further contribute to showing the logicality and viability of 
coexistence. Specifically, chapter eight revisits the values advanced by other 
scholars as underlying flexibility, demonstrating the logicality of coexistence from 
such literature, and identifying the value postulates to guide the coding and content 
analysis for values underlying flexibility in Uganda.    
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 The Value Postulates Underlying Flexibility 
Introduction 
This chapter examines both internal and external values different scholars have 
articulated to justify flexibility as the antithesis and alternative to formalism.1 It 
articulates values other scholars have advanced as responsible for the flexibility in 
the tension, demonstrating that such presumptive values mainly arise out of 
perceptions that formalism’s foundations are unrealistic, unjustifiable or can be 
served while judging flexibly – without judges being bound to rules or strict 
enforcement of contract terms. Further, the nature of law; the dynamism in the 
commercial world, represented by the marketplace; and the role judges play, 
especially in real hard cases, combine to produce values that make flexibility 
inevitable.  
Secondly, the chapter further advances arguments that justify finding a way 
towards coexistence. In this regard it seeks to further show that hardly any scholar 
advances flawless arguments for a total judicial rejection of formalism-engendering 
values, such as certainty and predictability. Instead many of them, consciously or 
otherwise, support a coexistence-judging paradigm. The analysis of flexibility 
theory is also used to render more support to Eisenberg,2 Trebilcock3 and 
Schwartz & Scott,4 in saying that none of the single-norm or pluralist theories, 
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formalism or flexibility-oriented, articulating internal or external values, fully 
accounts for and should be the ultimate guide to judicial choice.  
Thirdly, this chapter further contributes to filling the knowledge gap on how to 
manage the tension, by elaborating presumptive values that could explain 
flexibility, and thereby compete with formalism-engendering values, in Uganda’s 
commercial adjudication. The internal and external presumptive values advanced 
by other scholars inform the coding and resultant content analysis of judicial 
opinions, whose findings are analysed in chapter nine, to earmark the key values 
underlying flexibility in Uganda, that need to be balanced with formalistic values in 
managing the tension.  
The Internal Criteria 
Internally, flexibility is motivated by major values underpinning judicial perception of 
the nature of law and its sources,5 as well as the judge’s role in contract disputes.6 
In summary, flexible judges subscribe to the determinate critique,7 which holds 
views similar to Holmes,8 Pound9 and James;10namely that the law is not 
determinate, not objective or neutral and cannot produce determinate results. 
Further, that it is unclear, not conceptually ordered or coherent, but rather, 
inherently uncertain; and that formalistic certainty is an illusion.11 Law’s sources are 
commercial practices, experience, morality and public policy, all ultimately 
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determinable by judges’ preferences and intuitions as lawmakers. Rules are dead 
letters only capable of gaining life upon being articulated and applied during 
adjudication, therefore the judge always has discretion and uses the law as an 
instrument to achieve purposes and results – a set of ends, of which the ultimate is 
social welfare. On the side of the judge’s role in disputes, judicial law making, 
judicial interventionism and judging by hunch emerge as the values underlying 
flexibility. All of these will be briefly elaborated in the following sub-sections.   
8.2.1  Values of Law’s Perception  
During adjudication, judges who operationalise the determinate critique 
perceptions of law’s nature serve an internal set of values, that need to be weighed 
and if found above the threshold, balanced with competing formalism values, to 
arrive at coexistence. The values of flexibility perceptions of law include 
adaptability and elasticity of law, retroactivity of law, realistic certainty, and 
instrumentalism. Each of them is elaborated, to understand how they motivate and 
manifest during flexibility judging, as well as their amenability to coexistence 
theory.   
Adaptability and Elasticity of Law 
Adaptability means the desire and belief that part of the law’s character and role 
lies in its fluidity and pliancy, achievable through dispensing justice during 
adjudication, by adapting to the ever-changing social, economic and political 
conditions.12 Related is the value of the elasticity of law, which implies the law 
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having the character of stretching to meet new demands as they appear during 
adjudication from time to time. This is achieved by the law containing normative 
standards like commercial reasonableness,13 merchantability, marketability, or 
practicability.14 Further, the law can give normativity to commercial practices,15 
such as trade custom, practices, or course of dealing, all of which speak to having 
regard for changing realities. 
The basis for this is that during the making of law, there cannot be prediction of all 
possible legal disputes so as to provide for their settlement. Judges and lawyers 
are used to continuously help adapt the law to changing realities.16 In the High 
Trees case,17 Lord Denning was for instance motivated by this value to judge 
flexibly, when he extended the rule that ‘promises should be kept’, to cover 
promises that were not supported by consideration and the fact could not fit the 
description of estoppel, thus the notion ‘promissory estoppel’. In reaching his 
decision, he referred to developments that had taken place in the fifty years leading 
to High Trees, noting that there had been a fusion between law and equity in 
English law.  
Therefore, judges deem themselves to be acting within the law’s province if they 
venture to stretch its meaning or fill gaps when faced with grey areas, in case of 
legal uncertainty, or otherwise if the circumstances a rule was meant to regulate 
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have changed. However, coexistence is still possible, for, adaptability does not 
have to translate into unprincipled flexibility; Frank himself admits that law should 
not be changed lightly, even though adaptability in law is vital, and uncertainty is 
not an accident but a social value.18 A middle way can be found, using judging 
guidelines that will contain certainty on when, and following which variable, the law 
can be stretched to suit changed circumstances.  
Retroactivity of Law 
Retroactivity of law was articulated by Fuller, as a value of legality, in the sense 
that to advance legality there is need for the law to speak to the future.19 It justifies 
the filling of gaps and other flexibility judging tools, on the ground that no legislation 
or rule can be perfect. Because of this, laws have to and do leave room for dispute 
resolution using adjudication as the best mechanism – what Frank calls the social 
value of legal uncertainty.20 However, both Frank21 and Fuller22 water down their 
arguments, when they add that under legality, people should not only know the 
rules, but also a reliable method should be available for resolving disputes, the 
best being judicial discretion. Leaving it to judges cannot be called such a 
predictable and certain method, for it implies an open licence to unprincipled 
flexibility and judicial absolutism. Instead, the two scholars should have gone 
further to articulate the possibility of a rational and coherent mechanism for 
balancing formalism and flexibility, as is being done in this study.  
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Utilitarianism to Instrumentalism  
Instrumentalism is the value of viewing the law as only alive when acted upon by 
judges and the community, as well as being judged by its practical utility –
utilitarianism. The law is in this sense a means to an end – an instrument available 
to judges for achieving ends like social policy, determined during adjudication. This 
is manifested by judicial practices like relation-back judging – the practice of 
starting with the solution and finding a way to make the law validate it.23 Similarly, 
there are cases where judges will appear to satisfy ends not reflected within the 
meaning of rules, such as business efficiency, but use those rules to justify the 
decision; as well as unexplainable decisions where the judge appears simply to 
have found a way to grant certain remedies.24 
The prevalence of judges perceiving law as a means to ends, articulate or 
otherwise, implies the existence of instrumentalism as a judicial philosophy, where 
legal certainty is satisfied by rules being articulable to particular ends, or their 
grounds being explainable.25 The philosophy explains judicial law making through 
the circumvention or stretching of existing rules, and legality being completely 
ignored or subjected to contextual findings based on commercial practices or 
experience. This brings us to the values that underlie flexibility, that are informed 
by the role judges perceive themselves as having to play in disputes. 
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8.2.2  Values of the Judicial Role 
Scholars have advanced values that underlie flexibility as a result of judicial 
perceptions of court’s role in commercial disputes, as well as judging culture with 
regard to it. The key values proposed are judicial interventionism, judicial law 
making, and judging by hunch.  
Interventionism in Contract: The End of Idol Worship 
The value of judicial interventionism connotes the devaluation of freedom of 
contract that Lord Denning referred to in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) v Finney 
Lock Seeds Limited.26 He opined that traditionally, freedom of contract was a 
doctrinal idol, worshipped by judges, which had begun to lose its status. 
Interventionist courts could now interfere with agreed terms to do fairness and 
justice in particular cases, and not in the classical sense, where courts interfered 
only in cases of fraud, illegality, and duress or where one’s freedom was rendered 
nugatory, like slavery cases.27 Judicial interventionism will usually manifest in two 
ways. 
The first mode of interventionism is when judges interfere with freedom of contract, 
to find fairness, justice or equity, for instance when they deem the terms unworthy, 
unreasonable or inequitable to a party, especially the weaker one. By way of 
intervention, in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd,28 Lord 
Denning recommended that there was need to consider fairness of contracts, and 
fuse law with equity, for instance by accepting promissory estoppel over settled 
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principles, such as contracts only being valid if supported by consideration.29 
Following this, today equity is a key normative criterion that underpins flexibility in 
contracts, emphasising fairness and compassion over certainty, and even 
utilitarianism.30  
However, despite enduring controversy about fairness in contract, and international 
demand, little has been done towards constructing a standardised judging criterion 
or general doctrine of commercial fairness.31 Instead, using the lens of the 
formalism-flexibility divide, there are two divergent senses in which judges are 
viewed as motivated by its existence or the lack of it.  
The formalistic view is that judges have no business with substantive fairness, or 
matters like efficiency. They should perceive an exchange as fair, if the procedure 
of contracting was fair, that is to say, there was equality in bargaining, voluntary 
consent, and the freedom to choose the other party, and the terms.32 On the other 
hand, under flexibility, judges are concerned with the substantive fairness of 
contract terms,33 the absence of which, according to Fuller,34 Gordley35 and 
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Benson,36 will invalidate a contract, the freedom of contract notion notwithstanding. 
In this sense, a contract is fair only if a judge deems its contents just,37 fair and 
good faith dealing;38or corresponding with the common usage, since in an ordinary 
competitive market parties agree on fair terms;39 or the consequences of the 
contract and court’s decision are deemed fair.40  
Although some law and economic theorists propound a substitute to formalism’s 
certainty, and flexibility’s fairness values‘efficiency as a means to the common 
good’ thesis;41 the consequentialist understanding of fairness has been viewed by 
others as including the efficiency normative criteria. Looking at fairness as 
efficiency is said to produce the best results, since it will be about assessing the 
end result of a contract.42 The judicial criteria for fairness are therefore dictated by 
what is ‘good for society’;43 as measured by the gain from a decision being bigger 
than the aggregate loss; and its meaning in judicial opinions always loaded with 
social, economic and behavioural norms.44 
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This study does not offer room for a detailed theoretical analysis of what Ugandan 
judges should properly refer to as fairness, but it suffices to note that, it should 
reflect the historical, social, political and economic contexts that combine to shape 
judicial institutional and individual reasoning. For example, ubuntu is the traditional 
ideal of justice and fairness prevalent in many African cultures,45 including 
Uganda.46 In essence, this is a value connoting compassion, reciprocity, dignity, 
harmony, humanity, humanity being interconnected, creating a community of 
justice, in which people are caring for and being responsible to each other, and 
have a consciousness of natural desire for the common good.47 According to a 
South African judge, Lamont J, in Afri-Forum  & Another v Mulema & Another,48 
during adjudication, judicial motivation by ubuntu is manifested by placing a high 
value on and respect for the life of a human being, compassion, dignity and 
humanness, promotion of reconciliation, harmonious relationships, good attitude, 
shared concerns and win-win judgements. 
Ubuntu has therefore been recognised as a sense of fairness applicable not only in 
Africa but also worldwide.49 Judges use it to justify flexible commercial 
adjudication, to counter the common-law legal traditions, as did Yacoob J, in 
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Everfresh Market Virgina (PTY) Limited, v Shorprite Checkers.50 He opined that 
ubuntu had to be relied on to interfere with freedom of contract in cases, such as 
where a contract was between a powerful and more resourced party, and a weak, 
poor and vulnerable one.  
However, in this study, ubuntu does not act as the presumptive Ugandan sense of 
fairness and justice. Instead, the different theoretical perceptions of fairness have 
guided the content analysis, to enable an objective search for what the underlying 
values of fairness and justice meant in cases of Uganda’s commercial flexible 
judging. 
However, it’s worth noting that from inception, Lord Denning’s appeal was as much 
for coexistence as for flexibility, when he called for interference only with 
unreasonable terms,51 implying a measured interventionism that has since become 
part of Uganda’s commercial judging.52 Interventionism is mainly resorted to in 
protection of the weaker party Lord Denning talked about, a reaction against 
inequality in contracting.53 This in turn explains the development of contract 
vitiating principles,54 not only in judge-made law but also contract legislation.55  
The second mode of intervention is by way of gap filling in contract terms that is 
mainly done by judges implying terms, a practice that has been prevalent 
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throughout Uganda’s judging history.56 In Ernest Windt v Gordon Parrot, 57Allen J 
clarified that implied terms were not necessarily derived from predictable sources 
like statute, but were often the product of social-economic conditions. The 
uncertain and indeterminate nature of such conditions will result in flexibility, 
uncertainty and the tension. Gap filling does not stop at contractual terms but also 
extends to the law, which brings us to the value of judicial law making, discussed in 
the next sub-section. 
Judicial Law-making 
Underlying the flexibility in the tension is also the value of the judges being the 
main players in making, sourcing and defining the law, thus the famous 
pronouncements by Holmes,58 Frank59 and Llewellyn,60 that what judges do about 
rules and cases is the law itself. The parties’ rights and duties are to be understood 
through predictions of judicial behaviour.61 In practice, laws are dead letters, only 
qualifying to be called law after being verified and declared applicable to concrete 
disputes during adjudication. 
Such judges will not be declaring law from abstract rules and principles, but build it 
from their weighing of competing interests and social choices, informed by the 
continuous changes in social policy, practices and other matters of human 
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experience and reality.62 Both this value of judicial law making and the extra-legal 
grounds relied on should be openly articulated as the motivations behind judicial 
opinions, for they are part of the law’s province.63  
However, even within flexibility jurisprudence, leading scholars like Pound64 and 
Fuller,65 have expressed scepticism about judges playing the role of absolute 
lawmakers, and promoted coexistence. Fuller for instance proposes a coexistence 
view, that legality should be respected; but seen as including the standards of 
common sense and other effects of judicial deliberation and consultations that the 
law leaves room for.66 Related to such judicial law making is the value of judging by 
hunch. 
Judging by Hunch  
Judging by hunch is a reference started by Hutcheson67 and supported by Frank as 
a correct description of the judges’ role in the legal system.68 It speaks to an 
attitudinal judging culture, where flexible judging is motivated by judges’ personal 
intuitions and preferences as normative criteria. The real judicial opinion and 
lawmakers, which lawyers should learn about, are the hunch-producer, the judge’s 
personality, informed by his or her dispositions, biases and habits.69 By way of 
manifestation, judges’ personal cognitive attributes and sense of indeterminate 
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standards, like fairness and reasonableness, as well as the implications of the facts 
before them, underlie flexibility judging. The extreme is Frank’s claim that the law 
keeps changing from case to case, following the particular judge’s personality.70  
However, this value is not a social value, nor does it appear to be one embraced 
by a wider community, let alone the institution of judges generally, as Frank wants 
us to believe. It will be investigated for, it nevertheless speaks to reality in 
Uganda’s case. But from the onset, judging from the recent declaration by 
Uganda’s Chief Justice, that judges are required to realise the rule of law, and 
while doing so are constrained by legal instruments like the constitution; 71 judging 
by hunch appears at best a random value held by a few judges. What is more 
plausible is flexibility judging being motivated by the value of judicial 
responsiveness. 
8.2.3  Judicial Responsiveness 
In the sense proposed by Sourdin & Zariski,72 flexibility commercial judging in 
Uganda appears to have had, as one of its foundations, judicial responsiveness to 
the desire for justice by members of society. Such society, according to initial 
cases analysed,73 is the commercial community, to which judges have appeared to 
be sensitive and at times accountable. 
 These preliminary findings tell us that what Eisenberg regarded as a process of 
social ordering, besides adjudication, in which the value of responsiveness is 
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absent;74 is in reality a form of adjudication in Uganda. In this form, the decision 
maker consults the parties affected and attends to their arguments and proofs, but 
does not necessarily base his decision on them. Sometimes judges respond to 
evidence collected, institutional and personal preferences, and to rules neither 
addressed nor adduced by the parties.  
Likewise, Eisenberg wrongly claimed that there would be a conflict between strong 
responsiveness and the rulemaking function of judges.75 This fear certainly 
emanated from the formalistic perception of responsiveness, and would have the 
opposite implication, were responsiveness perceived in the flexibility sense. 
Nevertheless, in Uganda, even with strong responsiveness, judicial rulemaking 
actually appears to be freely going on, especially given that it has a green light 
from Article 126 of the constitution, which obliges judges to decide not only in 
accordance with the law, but also the norms, aspirations, and values of the people. 
Responding to it amounts to formalistic responsiveness, and therefore an element 
of coexistence. 
Further, amenable to coexistence theory, Eisenberg warns of the conflict that could 
arise from issues, calling upon judges to be responsive to the needs of the 
disputants, as well as distant persons in society to whom judge-made laws would 
apply.76  The cases he refers to fit the description of hard cases, in resolution of 
which judges have used different criteria including both formalistic and flexibility 
responsiveness, again the latter being the responsiveness to values, institutions 
and other circumstances peculiar to the dispute. The fact that a court may be 
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called upon to be responsive to both formalistic and flexibility institutions simply 
confirms there are cases in which the tension between formalism and flexibility 
clearly manifests – hard cases that call for a way to manage the coexistence of the 
two. 
 Beyond such internal judging criteria, legal and extra-legal values external to the 
judiciary are also responsible for the flexibility in the tension and need to be 
articulated. This will guide the content analysis in search of external values 
underlying flexibility in Uganda and help to understand how coexistence can be 
managed.  The following section undertakes this task.    
The External Criteria: Legal Values 
As Macneil argues, with regard to flexibility values like those underpinning 
relational contracting; the divide between internal and external is arbitrary and only 
partial.77 This caveat also applies to the legal v extra-legal divide, because the 
essence of flexibility philosophy is to disregard such boundaries. But for ease of 
reading, and organisation, the values advanced by scholars are categorised as 
such. First, I elaborate the legal values underlying the flexibility in the tension, 
which are of both a doctrinal and systematic nature.   
8.3.1  Doctrinal Values 
Flexibility jurisprudence has advanced consumer welfarism, economic efficiency, 
and wealth maximisation as sets of values that are embedded in contract doctrine, 
motivating flexibility during adjudication. The judge applies rules, principles, 
concepts and standards that command flexibility judging as the natural approach 
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for serving these values, whether implicit or expressed, resulting in flexibility 
staying at tension with formalism. I proceed to briefly elaborate each, arguing that 
each of them, or their constituent lower values, can be satisfied using formalism, or 
that their satisfaction is not in conflict with a coexistence judging paradigm. 
Consumer Welfarism 
Friedman,78 Adams & Brownsword79 have advanced consumer welfarism as the 
prime higher doctrinal value underlying flexibility in commercial adjudication. It 
stands for legal and judicial protection of consumers, in the form of close regulation 
of and intervention in contracts, as opposed to the values of formalist market-
individualism.80 Consumer welfarism is manifested by the normative recognition of 
its following underpinning lower values. 
Firstly is fairness of exchanges, a value classical contract adjudication had no 
room for,81 but which has been recognised by neo-classical, modern and 
postmodern contract theory as one underlying flexibility judging.82 Fairness of 
exchanges is represented by a bundle of judicial practices and sub-values that 
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form the end of law that flexibility judging seeks to satisfy.83 These include 
protection of consumers from sharp practices, misrepresentations or fettering of 
their contractual rights.84  
However, fairness is compatible with coexistence theory. It has received general 
acceptance by formalist theory as well, leading to Llewellyn,85 Cardozo,86 Collins87 
and DiMatteo,88 calling for coexistence, by balancing of its flexible sense with 
formalism. Phang goes a step further by proposing that we ignore the difference 
between procedural fairness and substantive fairness, by for instance looking at 
defects in bargains, like duress and mistake, as procedural unconscionability, or 
unfairness.89  
Secondly is the value of reliance or constancy, which stands for not allowing 
parties to act inconsistently with their having led others into certain expectations or 
actions, such as the belief that certain rights and obligations exist.90 This is 
irrespective of there being a contract, legally so-called, as was the case with Lord 
Denning’s justification of promissory estoppel.91 However, in essence, the 
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underlying spirit of reliance and the formalistic, but also coexistence compatible  
values of consent and promise are the same. They all speak to not allowing parties 
using adjudication to escape from their promises, express or implied. Lord 
Denning’s High Trees opinion, which Adams & Brownsword use to justify reliance, 
clearly talks about promise; not just reliance, but promise with or without a 
contract.92 In that sense, it also points to the gist of Barnett’s coexistence theory of 
consent.93 This nexus indicates room for the coexistence of formalistic and 
flexibility values, the only question being how to achieve it. 
Thirdly, consumer welfarism is underpinned by the value of good faith, which 
stands for parties entering and performing contracts without intending to take 
advantage of legal niceties. The value therefore extends to disputes, such that one 
should not invoke a rule or principle, such as uncertainty of contract, to justify 
withdrawing from the contract.94 According to Kull, good faith speaks to fairness, 
order, justice and reasonableness, 95 thereby occupying an important place in 
motivating flexibility, which includes influencing new and old doctrine. This is 
especially because it is derived from constitutional provisions like Uganda’s,96 
which allow the invocation of equity by requiring courts to decide in accordance 
with justice, public norms and commercial values (morality), practice, as well as 
judging laws.97 Therefore, judicial invocation of equity to flexibly find remedies in 
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contract also manifests adherence to good faith,98 as well as equity being a value 
underpinning consumer welfarism in its own right.  
Fourthly, there is the value of equity, which Adams & Brownsword have expressed 
by advancing a number of equitable principles as underpinning and manifesting 
consumer welfarism, making it a motivator for flexibility during adjudication.99 The 
principles they express are: proportionality, which connotes parties being awarded 
remedies proportionate to the effects of the breach; good faith; baring parties from 
profiteering from their own wrongs; the principle against unjust enrichment; having 
the stronger party bear the loss in cases it has to be shared. Others are: the 
principle against exploitation; ensuring that parties at fault are held responsible; 
and paternalismwhich relates to relieving from bargains, parties that entered into 
imprudent or unfair contracts.  Besides consumer welfarism, efficiency, informed by 
wealth maximisation, having been advanced as a doctrinal value underlying 
flexibility, also needs elaboration.   
    Economic Efficiency  
Law and economics scholars articulate efficiency, expressed through wealth 
maximisation, as the prime value underpinning contract doctrine, whose 
satisfaction guides judges in choices regarding validity, interpretation and enforcing 
both the law and terms of contract.100 As discussed earlier, economic efficiency is 
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one of the prescriptive theories advanced for managing the tension.101 Its character 
is not methodical, but a social value that has influenced contract doctrine and 
judicial choices, in the sense that laws and adjudication are viewed as aimed at 
achieving the most efficient allocation of resources to the optimal use to achieve 
the law’s end – wealth maximisation.102 Judges are guided by what actions or 
results will allocate resources to a higher value in determining rights and 
obligations in contract, a cost-benefit analysis otherwise called Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency.103 Llewellyn suggests judicial elaboration of commercial practice in the 
form of custom, usage of trade, course of dealings, as servants of efficiency.104 
Therefore, judicial reliance on such practice, alongside open or indirect reference 
to efficiency, will be used to observe the value during the content analysis. 
However, efficiency theory has supported coexistence;105 for instance, Posner’s106 
justification of the value’s influence in contract, using his ‘presumed consent to 
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efficiency thesis,’ implies that efficiency does not contradict, but supports and can 
coexist with autonomy of contract, defined by consentualism.  
 Wealth Maximisation 
The influence of efficiency as the prime value is watered down by Posner’s claim 
that instead, wealth maximisation is the ultimate value,107 which is not only different 
from but also superior to efficiency and utilitarianism. It is a value that balances the 
individual autonomy behind efficiency, as well as pure utilitarianism, without 
attracting the practical limitations of, for instance, measuring and justifying the 
basis of efficiency.108 Therefore court decisions, including the rules they make in 
precedents, are efforts – conscious or otherwise – to achieve wealth 
maximisation.109 Relatedly, courts also try to redistribute wealth, by judging  based 
on which side should receive more resources; although this is a role courts are not 
really competent to perform.110  
Kronman strongly attacks Posner’s claim that wealth maximisation balances 
efficiency and utilitarianism, for being devoid of practical utility.111 Further, to 
portray it as the prime value underlying law and adjudication is hyperbole. 
Nevertheless, wealth maximisation is certainly part of the motivations of the 
flexibility in the tension, but one that requires a coherent set of normative 
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guidelines for balancing with other competing values. That it can be part of such a 
coexistence regime is supported by the fact that from conception, it is 
accommodative to formalistic interests of market conformism as well. Besides 
doctrinal values, systematic legal values – key among which are substantive justice 
and legal pluralism – have also contributed to influencing the flexibility in the 
tension. 
8.3.2  Systematic values 
Systematic values underlying flexibility judging are the ones judges adhere to, not 
as internal judicial criteria, but because they are embedded in the legal system 
generally; such as the substantive conception of justice and legal pluralism. They 
are external to the institution and person of the judges, because they stand 
independent of the two, although by virtue of judges being integral to any country’s 
legal system, there is a crossover of values between internal and external 
categories.  
 Substantive Justice   
Substantive justice has been cited as the key systematic value produced by the 
legal system that motivates judges towards flexibility. It is a conception of justice 
that has been presented by leading scholars on justice,112as an alternative to 
procedural justice but without a detailed articulation that can convey any commonly 
acceptable definition. As observed by Herman, earlier legal scholars, especially 
positivists, failed to articulate the connection between the basis of any legal system 
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and the requirement for substantive justice.113 Instead, scholars across the 
theoretical spectrum have held the view that the formalistic procedural justice, 
which merely defines justice as the outcome of a certain procedure;114 is the 
prerequisite to, and acts as a safeguard for substantive justice.115 Their ground is 
the defeatist argument that as human beings, we cannot agree to principles and 
concepts of substantive justice or values that can be formulated into general laws 
applicable to all similar cases with certainty.116  
However, Herman rightly proposes a theory of substantive justice for contemporary 
societies; in which shared values are emerging and can be discovered.117 The 
shared values should be grounded in human existence and the sense of 
community and common human nature. During adjudication, using reflection and 
justification, these shared values should be elucidated and used as standards for 
the infusion of practical judgement and subjective attitudes, thereby creating 
coexistence between the formalistic procedural and flexible substantive justice.118 
Herman’s theory is limited by leaving the discovery of shared values to mere 
reflection by judges, without safeguards against unprincipled subjectivity defining 
shared values. It is however persuasive to one seeking to understand substantive 
justice as a constitutionally set judging criterion in Uganda,119 where the concept 
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has defined the apex of the constitutional mandate of judges in adjudication, during 
colonial Uganda, under the Order in Council;120 since its re-enactment in the 1995 
Uganda constitution;121and section 4 of the Judicature (Amendment) Statute, 2002.  
No constitutional regime has clearly defined the principles, standards, concepts or 
values that make up substantive justice in Uganda, and how they can be 
recognised. The nearest combination, although still very indeterminate and not 
exhaustive, is the rule that adjudication shall be performed without undue regard to 
technicalities,122 along with the National Objectives and Directives of State 
Policy.123 These two are however far from being an exhaustive set of guidelines 
courts can follow, especially with regard to what constitutes substantive justice, or 
the shared values from which such guidelines can be formulated.  The national 
objectives and directives merely recognise Uganda’s pluralistic society, legal 
pluralism aspirations for an independent jurisprudence, distributive justice, the 
country’s experiences, social, political and economic contexts, plus the aspirations 
for libertarianism (democracy, freedom and justice), and instrumentalism.  
Besides aspirations for independent jurisprudence and libertarianism, the rest are 
indeterminate bottomless vessels in which judges can justify dumping an endless 
list of considerations to aid flexibility. This study therefore contributes to knowledge 
not only by identifying substantive justice as a value underlying flexibility, but also 
by revealing how judges have viewed it in commercial hard cases. Its 
manifestations and sub-values are identified, extrapolated and explained following 
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an objective content analysis of texts of judicial opinions. Its attributes also point to 
legal pluralism as the other value at play during flexible judging. 
Legal Pluralism 
As explained earlier,124 legal pluralism arises when the state recognises that there 
is law beyond law, in the sense that non-state normative orders are as much a 
source of normativity as are state ones. Uganda is one of the societies in which, 
according to Griffiths, legal pluralism is a factual state of affairs.125 The formalist 
account of law as hierarchically ordered normative propositions, or otherwise 
systematically ordered and unified, determinate and discoverable fact, that resides 
within the texts of statutes and precedents, is inapplicable. But so is the purely 
instrumentalist account of law as always indeterminate, a matter of experience, 
purposive and utilitarian; otherwise termed as law being a means to an end.  
Instead, the Ugandan legal system validates the observation by Minda, that post-
modern jurisprudence reflects a course of thinking where a more pluralist, 
contextual and non-essential explanation of law and legal decision-making is 
developed for multicultural societies.126 To say ‘more’ means without discarding the 
value of normativity of positive law, which is still at the core of judicial criteria, but 
rather infusing it with other sources of norms to find justice. Legal pluralism is a 
source of judicial flexibility as it justifies, and renders acceptability to, otherwise 
improper decisions; decisions that are not responsive to rules of law, by which the 
judges ordinarily expected to be guided. It is therefore not surprising that key 
                                            
 
124 See text to Section 3.7.4. 
125 J Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism’, (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism, 4. 
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flexibility schools of thought have embraced it.127 This study uses the 
manifestations listed above, to examine whether it is one of the key values behind 
flexibility, that qualify for balancing with formalistic ones to achieve coexistence in 
the Ugandan context.  
Further, flexibility is also motivated by values of an extra-legal nature, values 
created by the body politic that has surrounded commercial adjudication over the 
years. As is the case with formalism values, understanding many of such flexibility 
values requires a social legal inquiry, which is beyond the methodology and scope 
of this study. Therefore, the following section merely offers a brief insight into the 
key of such values. 
8.3.3  Extra-Legal Values 
Because of its philosophical basis of accommodating extra-legal considerations in 
the meaning and nature of law, as well as adjudication, flexibility judging is 
motivated by extra-legal external values. However, many of these cannot be 
uncovered or fully understood using content analysis of judicial opinions alone, as 
they require examination of the contractual and judging environments. Therefore 
the following part only reviews literature on the few that can be understood by way 
of inferences from the results of a content analysis, the relational nature of 
contracting, and judicial absolutism.  
Judicial Absolutism 
Absolutism is a value of political culture, where the rulers are deemed to have final 
authority on all matters including law and adjudication, and are not answerable to 




anyone, not even the subjects.128 According to Wells, such authoritarianism breeds 
judicial absolutism, which in turn motivates flexibility judging, as judges do not 
respect legal boundaries that would otherwise restrain them to a single answer in 
all similar cases.129 For instance, as noted earlier, in medieval France, flexibility 
thrived, because of such absolutism,130 and the same has continued in the French 
High Court, for over eight hundred years.131  
Uganda’s history reveals minimal periods of democratic governance, as the 
country has been largely ruled under constitutional and political instability, 
insecurity, outright authoritarianism and dictatorships,132 following successive 
presidents having taken power by force, accompanied by illegitimate and illegal 
constitutional amendments,133 abrogation, and creation of new constitutions.134 
Such absolutism has resulted in a perpetual normativity crisis, being the 
uncertainty as to what organ, between the president and parliament, was the 
sovereign,135 as well as the usurpation of judicial authority by the executive.136  
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According to Wells,137 Holmes138 and Oloka-Onyango,139 that political culture 
should have influenced judges to flexibly adjudicate disputes, as they have to serve 
the political ideology of the time.  
 In other words, according to Oloka-Onyango,140 courts in Uganda have since 1966 
done politics, instead of defending the rule of law.141 Oloka-Onyango focused on 
constitutional and political cases, where the influence of absolutism in judging was 
more readily evident,142 which may not necessarily hold in commercial cases. 
Therefore, absolutism is coded and its presumed influence examined during the 
content analysis.  
However, it has to be noted that the influence of authoritarianism as a political 
philosophy, and absolutism, cannot be fully appreciated from a mere content 
analysis of judicial opinions. Two aspects demonstrate that doing so leaves the 
actual inner relationship between the executive and the bench, and its impact on 
judicial approach, inarticulate.  
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Firstly, this study’s preliminary findings, presented in Figure 2, do not support the 
authoritarianism-judicial absolutism-flexibility birth chain. Periods of extreme 
authoritarianism did exhibit an increase in formalism and not flexibility. For 
instance, as Figure 2 demonstrates, during 1967-95 when the country was ruled by 
the dictatorships of Milton Obote and Idi Amin’s, that had power over all matters 
including the constitution and other laws, formalism in commercial adjudication 
grew and flexibility reduced.  
Secondly, both Chief Justice (emeritus) SW Wambuzi143 and Justice 
Kanyeihamba,144 claim that the authoritarianism and militarism of past 
governments did not have a direct effect on adjudication, or judicial independence. 
Moreover, a review of other literature on the impact of Uganda’s political history 
indicates that the issue is more complex than the two former justices of the Uganda 
Supreme Court make it appear. Further, Uganda has recently experienced the best 
illustration of how judicial absolutism is a major influence on judging, in the form of 
a letter from Court of Appeal judge Bamugemereire, now heading a commission of 
inquiry on land administration. 
In a letter to the Chief Justice,145dated 26th October 2018, she complained of a 
mafia in Uganda’s judicial system (which for the purposes of this study includes the 
commercial justice system), that is responsible for the issuance of bogus 
judgments, rulings and court orders, contrary to the law and evidence before court, 
following connivance between land grabbers and judges to evict bonafide  tenants 
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and grab forest land.146 She therefore called for judicial practice to be managed by 
setting criteria for decision-making and reviewing all decisions made in that 
manner, which implies a mechanism to manage the tension.  Therefore, the 
question of whether Uganda’s commercial adjudication has been affected by 
judges doing politics remains to be investigated, as Oloka-Onyango did with 
political and constitutional adjudication.147 
It suffices for this study to highlight evidence that adjudication did not remain a 
protected island when authoritarianism and militarism took over the social, political 
and economic institutions of Uganda. Therefore, in this study, notwithstanding the 
nonconformity with the common view on political culture being the cause of judicial 
absolutism, and whatever its social-political foundations, the content analysis is 
intended to reveal if judicial absolutism is one of the values behind the flexibility 
judging trends. In that sense, it is manifested by judges exercising unrestrained 
authority and exhibiting a lack of accountability by reaching decisions based on 
extra-legal and at times unarticulated considerations, or mere hunch.  
Relational Contracting 
MacNeil’s claims that court decisions in East Africa indicate that contracts are 
relational, and that they even act as instruments of social change.148 The wider 
claim, as put by MacNeil149 and Barnette,150 is that underlying the modern era’s 
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flexibility in adjudication is the relational nature of contracting. In this sense, 
contracts are non-simultaneous, non-discrete but futuristic exchanges, the parties 
to which expect to have long-term relationships;151and they create a network of 
relations in the community.152 
During adjudication, the courts give effect to such relationships, the end goal being 
built on trust and cooperation-as opposed to strict definition of legal rights. 
Therefore, courts allocate rights and obligations based on the need to satisfy lower 
values underpinning such relational contract, namely: reliance and 
expectationsthus enforcing pre-contractual preferences, visible from the contract 
and its performance, all types of damages for intangible losses like inconvenience, 
being deemed primary and fully recoverable, as opposed to formalistic principles 
like remoteness and the arbitrary public policy;153 preservation of relations, 
manifested by contractual solidarity;154 peace, which relates to a harmonious 
resolution of conflicts;155 and procedural propriety.156  
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From a coexistence perspective, a balance of formalism and flexibility can serve 
the value of relational contracting, for, the value demands both. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that formalistic interests underpinned it as well, such as 
the desire for procedural propriety. Further, is Macneil’s claim, that there are values 
commonly underpinning both relational and discrete contracting, such as 
reciprocity, planning, contract solidarity and restraint of power; 157 which implies the 
possibility of coexistence. At the same time, Macneil argues that relational is better 
than discrete contracting at articulating and serving the individual autonomy on 
which formalism theory is based, as individualism connotes the collectiveness of 
an individual as part of society, rather than the selfish misconception.158  
The influence of relational contract in adjudication is dependent on the peculiar 
aspects of such societies, as is the nature and survival of contractual relations. 
Macneil cites Uganda – before, during and after Amin’s era (1971-1979)– as an 
excellent example of contractual relations disappearing, as the nation and its 
economy fall apart. However, he does not base his claim on a detailed study, and 
in any case, not of commercial adjudication in the country. Nonetheless, the claim 
should trigger an investigation like this one to understand the values underlying the 
tension, including those created by contractual behaviour.  
The following chapter discusses the findings from the content analysis of judicial 
opinions, guided by an examination of the claims of the scholars discussed above, 
of values that underlie formalism and flexibility in the tension. It therefore 
contributes to making a case for the viability of the interests jurisprudence model of 
managing the tension-by helping to identify and understand the dominant values 
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behind the flexibility in Uganda’s commercial adjudication; which values will then 




















 The Values Underlying Flexibility in Uganda 
Introduction 
This chapter further contributes to understanding why the tension has prevailed, a 
necessary step towards coexistence.  It discusses research findings for values 
underlying flexibility, throughout Uganda’s judging history. The findings reflect the 
relevance to Uganda of the value postulates as presumptive values, and their 
indicative lower values or manifestations discussed in chapter eight; the content 
analysis having used them to code for and objectively uncover the real values 
underlying flexibility in Uganda. 
The chapter articulates such values uncovered by the content analysis, elaborating 
the sub-values found to have underpinned them, and how judges have adhered to 
them during adjudication. This brings better understanding to the theoretical and 
practical foundations of flexibility within contexts like Uganda’s. It also 
demonstrates how the identified flexibility values compete with formalistic ones, as 
well as amongst themselves in an interweave that contributes to the tension. This 
is meant to further prove that under Uganda’s reality, both formalism and flexibility 
have been necessary, and practised at the same times; that the tension results 
from competing values underlying such judicial choices; and that the tension can 
be managed by finding rational and coherent ways of balancing the multiple 
competing values.  
During the discussion, the values, frequencies and trends observed are used to 
further support three key arguments. Firstly, flexibility theory is relevant in 
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explaining the flexibility judging contributing to the tension in Uganda.1 However, 
the space occupied by such flexibility judging and the values underlying it are 
exaggerated, the findings instead manifesting that coexistence of formalism and 
flexibility is both necessary and possible.  
Secondly, scholars like Friedman2 and Adams & Brownsword,3 who attribute 
flexibility to purely doctrinal values, as well as MacNeil4 and Barnette,5 who 
attribute it to contract behavioural values like relational contracting, mistakenly 
focus on only contract theory. Rather, they should have paid attention to other 
perspectives like adjudicatory theory. This limitation leads them to leave 
unarticulated some of the values motivating judges towards such choices. Through 
this study focusing on adjudication, which includes but is not limited to contract 
theory, the findings reveal internal values underlying flexibility, informed by 
Uganda’s judging culture and developed from the judges’ practices and traditions 
over the years. They also reveal external values, informed by the legal contexts 
surrounding adjudication, including contract doctrine and theory; and the extra-
legal contexts, that include the nature of contracting.  
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Thirdly, Posner,6 Llewellyn,7 Farber,8 Eisenberg,9 MacNeil,10 Trebilcock,11 
Trakman12 and Schwartz & Scott,13 rightly propose that monist prime-value 
conceptions do not fully account for the reality in adjudication. Instead, managing 
the tension requires studies this one, on how coexistence can be reached, against 
the backdrop of weighing and balancing multiple values both within flexibility 
theory, and across the formalism-flexibility divide.  
Therefore, in line with interests jurisprudence,14 the values observed from the 
content analysis across the different historical epochs are weighed, using their 
relative rates of prevalence. The findings are indicated in Figures 11 and 12. The 
dominant ones are earmarked for balancing, articulated and elaborated in this 
chapter; while the outlier values, consistently appearing in less than 10% of 
opinions, are forsaken but briefly expanded as well to give clarity.  
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The Internal Judging Criteria 
The findings for the internal judging values behind flexibility are presented in Figure 
11 below, and discussed in the following sections. However, because flexibility 
connotes recognition of normativity beyond rules, some values cross over the 
internal/external boundary, as well as the legal/extra-legal one.  Otherwise, the 
findings support much of the literature on value postulates,15 validating their  
presumptions−as internal values, both of law’s perception and of the judicial role, 
were found to be motivators of flexibility in Uganda. Therefore, the discussion 
below follows the categorisation used in chapter eight, to articulate the presumptive 
values, their indicative sub-values, and other manifestations underpinning them.  
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Figure 11: Judging Cultural Values in Flexible Judicial Opinions 
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9.2.1  Values of Law’s Perception 
During adjudication, judges who operationalise flexibility perceptions of law’s 
nature serve an internal set of a value, which includes adaptability and elasticity of 
law, retroactivity of law, realistic certainty and instrumentalism.16The following sub-
sections discuss findings to illustrate that in Uganda, such presumptive values 
have, but only to an extent, been underlying the flexibility at tension with formalism 
in commercial hard cases. I begin by articulating judicial adherence to the desire 
for the law to be fluid, elastic and adaptable to changing circumstances.  
Adaptability and Elasticity  
The desire for law to have a fluid and elastic character that enables it to adapt to 
changing realities in particular markets is a key motivator for flexibility judging.17 Its 
influence manifests by judges recognising normativity in standards expressed or 
implied in rules, as well as in commercial practices like trade custom, usage, or 
course of dealings between the parties. However, even without the law itself 
exhibiting such elasticity, judges have, during flexibility judging, sought to serve its 
perceived adaptability, and have ended up making law. Such judicial law making 
will be discussed in the next section, as a value of judicial role perception, which it 
speaks to as well. In this section, the phenomenon of judges recognising 
normativity in standards and commercial practices is illustrated and elaborated.    
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Commercial practices are a major source of normativity in flexibility jurisprudence, 
as a pillar of Llewellyn’s theory of contract; the other one being the historical and 
contractual context.18 Efficiency as the end of law judges should pursue in 
interfering with contracts is derived from practices like trade custom, usage,19 and 
commercial reasonableness.20 In this case, the findings in Figure 11 reveal that 
commercial practices, coded as ‘PRACTICES’, have been used by Ugandan 
judges to serve law’s adaptability, at the expense of positive law. This code 
appeared in 21% of colonial cases, and 11% and 9% of early and late post-colonial 
judging, respectively.  The influence of practices normative recognition in flexibility 
manifested in a number of ways.  
Firstly, was the recognition of the parties’ ordinary course of business, as a 
determinant of rights and duties, notwithstanding the terms of the contract or 
relevant legal doctrine, as in United Garment Industry Limited v Notco,21 and 
Busongola Stores Limited v Barclays Bank D.C.O.22 In this case, the displaying of 
a bank’s working hours was held as overridden by the practice of customers 
handing over money to a member of staff outside banking hours,  and the bank 
was found liable for breach of contract due to its misappropriation. Further, in early 
post-colonial Uganda, Sir Charles Newbold expressly declared in Patel & Others v 
National & Grindlays Bank Ltd,23 that terms of contracts should always be 
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interpreted, guided by the course of dealings and the nature of the contract. The 
trend has continued in late post-colonial judging.24  
Secondly, the practices of trade usage, custom and commercial reasonableness 
have been given normative recognition, at the expense of freedom of contract, or 
legality. In the opinions analysed, neither trade usage nor custom was commonly 
expressed as a motivator of flexibility, but it could be inferred from wording that 
pointed to their being viable and alternative explanations of the legal norm.25 
However, in some cases, these practices were directly treated as superior to 
positive law, as happened in Amosh. S. Ghata v Tarbhain Haji Jamal & Co. 
Limited26 and Kabona Brothers Agencies v Ugandan Metal Producers & 
Engineering Company Limited.27 In Amosh, Dickson, J, flexibly decided that there 
is normativity beyond legality, as he reasoned that there was no contract between 
the parties, ‘not even a void one’. By calling ‘a void contract’ ‘a contract’, the judge 
was flexibly stretching the rule in N.R. Lakhani v H.J. Vaitha & Another Limited,28 
that a void contract is not capable of producing any legal consequences. Likewise, 
in Kabona, reasonable commercial contemplation was treated as superior to the 
contractual parties’ rights.   
 
                                            
 
24 See Huq v Islamic University In Uganda [1995-98] 2 EA 117; Sugar Corporation Uganda Ltd v 
Lawsam Chemicals (U) Ltd [2003] 2 EA 679; and British American Tobacco (U) Ltd v Francis 
Mulindwa & Others (HCCS 767/2004 (24/4/2013). 
25 Christopher Sekimpi v Uganda Breweries Limited [1972] HCB 216; Kintu v Kyotera Coffee 
Growers Limited [1976] HCB 362; Amosh.S. Ghata v Tarbhain Haji Jamal & Co. Limited (HCCS 
354/68, LDC 82/70); Kabona Brothers Agencies v Ugandan Metal Producers & Engineering Co. 
Limited [1981] HCB 75; and AM Jabi v Mbale municipal Council [1975] HCB 190. 
26 HCCS 354/68, LDC 82/70. 
27 [1981] HCB 75. 
28 [1965] EA 452. 
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Accordingly, trade usage/custom normativity was recognised during colonial 
days,29 and is still continuing in late post-colonial judging,30 where it has been 
acknowledged and glorified by Ogoola J, in Tobacco and Commodity Traders 
International Inc. v Mastermind Tobacco (U) Ltd.31 A case was filed on behalf of a 
company, using documents that offended procedural and technical rules against 
hearsay. The judge observed that the case represented the battle between 
flexibility and formalism, and chose to be flexible, reasoning that in commercial 
cases the intricacies of modern commercial intercourse dictated that no one person 
in a company knew all the facts, as directors could be all over the world.  
The judge thereby decided flexibly, motivated by the desire to make the rules 
adaptable to the changes and realities of modern business, which he 
operationalised using trade usage and custom, plus their twin value of commercial 
reasonableness. Relatedly, the latest apparent reduction of ‘PRACTICES’ below 
the 10% threshold is deceptive, considering that adherence to commercial 
reasonableness, observed frequently as part of normative standards, is actually 
part of practices normative recognition as well. In any case, standards and 
practices combine to make law’s adaptability qualify amongst the values to be 
weighed and balanced to arrive at coexistence. 
Coded as ‘NORMATIVE STANDARDS’, Figure 11 shows that judicial recognition 
and invocation of normative standards were found in 15% of colonial cases, 22% of 
early post-colonial cases, and 17% of late post-colonial cases. This frequency, 
especially added to the one for commercial practices, makes law’s adaptability and 
elasticity one of the dominant values underlying flexibility, which should be part of 
                                            
 
29 R. Rouge v L. Besson & Company (1920-29) 3 ULR 90. 
30 See Appendix 5: Cases 44, 49, 55, 58, 69, 75 and 88. 
31 HCC C 18/2002(9/5/2003). 
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the weighing and balancing in finding ways for coexistence. The normative 
standards found to underpin law’s adaptability included a number of sub-values: 
commercial reasonableness; contractual terms not being harsh or unconscionable; 
decisions having to conform to public interest; and substantiality of justice or 
performance.  
Firstly, commercial reasonableness was the most dominant throughout history, 
until 1995, after which substantiality rose to challenge its dominance. During 
colonial judging, for instance, in Bloedow v Renton32, implying terms in contracts 
was held by King Farlow J to be acceptable if doing so was reasonable in view of 
the nature of the contract, in this case nature of employment, and the local 
circumstances surrounding the dispute. In early post-colonial judging, commercial 
reasonableness became more practiced,33 with judges using what they considered 
to have been reasonably expected or contemplated by the parties to give effect to 
standard terms,34 and refusal to award lost profits;35 and in determining whether 
agents had ostensible authority.36 In late post-colonial judging, it has continued to 
be given normativity, in all types of commercial contract hard cases.37  
That commercial reasonableness has been applied to serve the perceived 
adaptability of law in hard cases was expressly declared in Edmund Schluter & Co. 
                                            
 
32 (1910-20) 2 UPLR  44. 
33 See Appendix 3: Cases 4, 17, 20, 25, 32, 34, 38, and 42. 
34 Jupiter General Insurance Co. v Kasanda Cotton Company Limited [1966] 1 EA 252; AM Jabi v 
Mbale Municipal Council [1975] HCB 190. 
35 United Garment Industry Limited v Notco [1977] HCB 151; Kabona Brothers Agencies v Ugandan 
Metal Producers & Engineering Co. Limited [1981] HCB 75. 
36 Credit Finance Corporation Ltd v Alalani,36 and; Ian Peters Limited v House of Novelties Limited 
(1968) EA 19 
37 See Appendix 5, Cases 1, 13, 15, 30, 41, and 59. 
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(Uganda) Ltd v Patel.38 The judge declared it the ‘general principle’, informed by 
reasonable assumptions from the circumstances surrounding the contract, to be 
applied, where no cases or rules were relevant to the issue. Therefore, commercial 
reasonableness has been used to find justice, not by looking at the rules of law, but 
at the demands of the contractual context, and the circumstances surrounding its 
performance or adjudication.  
It was also found dependent on what commercial men and women in the work 
place would ordinarily be deemed to have expected or done. As such, in Magezi & 
Another v Ruparelia,39 Karokora, JSC, reasoned that in commercial contracts, it is 
certainly right that courts should know the purpose of the contract, which 
presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transaction, the background, and the 
market in which the parties are operating. More fundamentally, he declared the rule 
on determining intention of the parties as ‘what reasonable people would have had 
in place in the situation of the parties.’ It is not clear what the judge meant by 
‘situation of the parties.’ However, if coexistence-oriented judging guidelines were 
in place, this could be declared with certainty, for instance as implying commercial 
people, and not the non-trading bystander, such that what the business community 
see from their practices as the standard of commercial reasonableness, the courts 
will use to decide rights and duties of contract.  
Secondly, judicial intolerance, to harsh and unconscionable bargains, as a 
normative standard, has been used to make the law adaptable and elastic. It 
mainly flows from the statutory discretion to interfere with contracts, that provides 
                                            
 
38 [1969] EA 239. 
39 [2005] 2 EA 156 
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for interests judges may deem harsh and unconscionable.40 The courts have 
exercised such discretion to interfere with and rewrite contractual terms on 
interest,41 notwithstanding freedom and sanctity of contract pleas.42  
Thirdly, recognising and reliance on the normativity ‘public interest’ is the other 
sub-value, by adherence to which law’s adaptability has been served. 
Indeterminate in meaning and scope as it is, public interest has been found to be 
part of the internal judging criteria underlying flexibility. It has prevailed since early 
post-colonial judging,43 and continues during late post-colonial judging.44 For 
instance, in Attorney General v Afric Cooperative Society Ltd,45 the public was at 
risk of losing money to the respondent, if the rules barring the calling of fresh 
evidence in the Supreme Court were adhered to. The contracts, as well as orders 
of the lower court were thereby interfered with, in the service of public interest.   
Finally, substantiality has since 199546 become one of the major sub-values and 
manifestations of law’s adaptability and elasticity. The findings reveal this change 
in judging culture post 1995, because substantiality does not appear in any of the 
analysed hard cases prior to the 1995 constitution, but became common 
                                            
 
40 Section 26 of the Civil Procedure Act; and 12, 89 (1)(c) of The Tier 4 Microfinance Institutions and 
Money Lenders Act. 
41 Bagoka v Kibwaijana [1976] HCB 364; Highland & Agriculture Export Ltd & Another v Alpha 
Global 21st Joint Venture & 5 Others [2017] UGCOMMC113 (18/8/2017); and R.L Jain v Kamugisha 
[2015] UGCOMMC 77 (Dated 14/4/2015). 
42 R.L Jain v Kamugisha [2015] UGCOMMC 77 (Dated 14/4/2015). 
43 Aniello Ciella v Cassman Brown & Co. Limited [1973] E.A. 358. 
44 See for example SDV Transami (U) Limited v Agrimag Limited & Jubilee Insurance Co. of 
Uganda, HCT-00-CC-AB-002-2006 [2008] UG COMM. 33; and Attorney General v Afric 
Cooperative Society Ltd (SCMA 6/2012). 
45 SCM.A 6/2012. 
46 The promulgation of Article 126 (2)(e) of the 1995 Uganda Constitution, that obliges judges to 
decide cases with regard to not only the law, but at a parallel level, substantive justice and not 
technicalities. 
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thereafter.47 Further, apart from NEC Health World Pharmaceuticals Ltd v 
Engineering Construction Co. Ltd, 48in which the court held that where a contract is 
substantially performed, minor faults will be ignored and the contractor awarded 
the full price under the doctrine of substantial performance, in the rest of the cases, 
substantiality was derived from the provisions of article 126 (2) (e) of the 
constitution.  
Substantiality’s value in law’s adaptability is mainly highlighted by cases where the 
courts have used it flexibly to cure defects in what would otherwise be illegal and 
untenable contracts or court proceedings.49 In all these cases, defects that would 
make a formalistic judge dismiss a case or declare it unjusticiable were held as 
mere technicalities and cured for not going to the substantive justice of the 
disputes. Therefore, the desire for law’s adaptability and elasticity has been a key 
internal value underlying flexibility and the tension. However, it does not account 
for all the flexibility judging across history, not even from the internal perspective. 
Retroactivity of law has also been observed as one of the other values competing 
to influence judges.  
Retroactivity of Law  
Closely related to its adaptability, is the value of law having to be retroactive, by 
speaking to the future.50 Retroactivity of law is underpinned and manifested by 
                                            
 
47 See Appendix 5: Cases 28, 33, 39, 43, 44, 61 and 66. 
48 HCCS 809/2012(24/4/2013). 
49 Pan African Insurance Co. (U) Ltd v International Air Transport Association HCCS 667/2003 
(25/01/2008); Attorney General v Afric Cooperative Society Ltd (SCM.A 6/2012); Eclipse Edil Soil 
JVC Co. Ltd v Kampala City Council (HCCS 256/2005 (9/2/2007); Tobacco and Commodity Traders 
International Inc. v Mastermind Tobacco (U) Ltd (HCCC 18/2002(9/5/2003). 
 
50 LL Fuller, The Morality of Law, (Yale University Press, 1969, Revised Edition) 51-63. 
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judicial recognition of normativity in standards, and ever-changing commercial 
practices, as well as directly filling gaps in law. As illustrated in section 9.2.1.1, 
normativity of standards and practices has had high prevalence, which renders 
evidence to law’s retroactivity being a value underlying the country’s flexibility 
judging, and the resultant tension. 
However, we are yet to see the effect of the 2017 change to judicial choice – in 
contracts for sale of goods and supply of services, the normativity commercial 
practice has been subjected to positive law.51 The findings and conclusions in this 
regard are therefore weakened by the law having changed, from being overtly 
retroactive to having legality as the front-stop for commercial practices normativity. 
Nevertheless, for now, the findings on adherence to law’s retroactivity, that include 
filling gaps in law, illustrated in the next section, hold because they represent 
judging culture up till today. The value is therefore worth weighing and balancing 
as one of the key internal values of law’s perception underlying flexibility. The 
others include utilitarianism and therefore an instrumentalist judicial perception of 
law.  
Utilitarian Instrumentalism 
Instrumentalism has been a part of flexibility judging, not only as a value intrinsic in 
the country’s legal order, but also part of the internal judicial culture. That the legal 
order is based on an instrumentalist perception of law is evidenced by Uganda’s 
laws on judging, including the constitution,52 the Judicature Act53 and the Code of 
                                            
 
51 Section 67 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act, 2017, replacing section 54 of the 
Sale of Goods Act, 1932; section 54 which provided for supremacy of commercial practice over 
rights and duties implied by law, was re-enacted as section 67 but the word ‘not’, was added, to 
reverse the precedence of these norms. 
52 The 1995 Constitution, Articles 126(1), 126 (2)(e) and 132 (4). 
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Judicial Conduct,54all of which oblige judges to follow an instrumentalist conception 
of law, including the pursuit of substantive justice and contextual in normative 
recognition. For instance, Article 126 (2) (e) of the constitution obliges judges to 
pursue substantive justice, and the National Objectives and Directives of State 
Policy, command them to judge while taking into account Uganda’s pluralistic 
society, aspirations for an independent jurisprudence, distributive justice, the 
country’s unique experiences, social, political and economic contexts, plus the 
aspirations for libertarianism (democracy, freedom and justice).55  
Armed with such an instrumentalist-oriented legal order, the findings reveal that 
flexible opinions have been motivated by instrumentalism, manifesting through 
judicial adherence to a number of instrumentalist sub-values. These are: the law 
being used as ‘a means to ends’, which in the content analysis was coded as 
‘LMEANS’; the conception of ‘law being the predictions of what judges will do about 
rules and disputes’, coded as ‘LPREDICTIONS’; the conception of ‘law as 
experience’, coded as ‘LEXP’; and economic efficiency and wealth maximisation as 
the ends of law and judging, jointly coded as ‘EFFICIENCY’. Efficiency and wealth 
maximisation are discussed later, as doctrinal values underlying flexibility. 
Likewise, law as experience is discussed under external values, where it is more 
relevant, and law as predictions is later tackled under perceptions of the judges’ 
role.  Therefore, in this part only law as means to ends is elaborated.  
                                                                                                                                     
 
53 The Judicature Act of Uganda (Laws of Uganda, 2000, V 1), Sections 14(2)(c), 14(3), 33, 39 (2) 
and Section 4 of the Judicature (Amendment) Act, 2002 operationalising the substantive justice 
norm in Article 126 (2) (e) of the Constitution. 
54  Section 1 of the Uganda Code of Judicial Conduct 2003.   
55 The 1995 Constitution, Objective and Directive No.1; Objective and Directive III (ii); Objective & 
Directive IV (ii); Objective & Directive XI (iii) & XIV; and Objective & Directive XXIV 
 420
The most dominant of instrumentalist sub-values observed is the conception of law 
as a means to an end, which  appeared in 24% of colonial judging, 32% of early 
post-colonial judging and 43% of late post-colonial judging. The findings partly 
support the claim by the instrumentalists Pound56 and Holmes,57 that flexible 
judging is motivated by the jurisprudence of ends as opposed to conceptual 
jurisprudence,58 or the niceties of law’s internal structure.59 Utility, and not the 
logical and rational deduction of principles, is the source of and will override 
legality,60 as judgments are treated as more rational if the rules they produce can 
be articulated and definitely referred to particular ends they serve, and the grounds 
for those ends can be or have been clearly stated.61  
However, the claim by both Pound62 and Holmes that the ultimate end of judging is 
social policy, is insufficient to explain the ends in all or even a majority of the cases 
in which LMEANS was observed.63 Beyond social policy, a detailed understanding 
of the ends and grounds flexibility serves, requires a more extensive uncovering of 
the interaction between judicial criteria, the judging environment and law’s 
purposes. From the findings in appendices 1-5, Figure 11 and Figure 12, this study 
makes a contribution by revealing that the flexibility in the tension was partly 
motivated not by social policy-oriented instrumentalism, but by utilitarian 
instrumentalism, represented by the perceived purposes of the law64 or the 
                                            
 
56 R Pound, ‘Mechanical Jurisprudence’, (1908) 8:8 Columbia Law Journal, 611. 
57 OW Holmes, Jnr, ‘The Path of Law’ 10(8) Harvard Law Review  (1897) 457,466-9. 
58 Pound ‘Mechanical Jurisprudence’ (n 56) 611. 
59 ibid 609. 
60 ibid 609-10. 
61 Holmes, ‘The Path of Law’ (n 57) 469. 
62 Pound, ‘Mechanical Jurisprudence’ (n 56) 609 
63 Holmes, ‘The Path of Law’ (n 57) 466-67 
64 See Appendix 1: Cases 7, 10, 12, 20, 36, 58; Appendix 3: Case 14; and Appendix 5: Cases 13, 
17, 45, 72, 75, 80, 81, 93, and 94. 
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contract65 and the functionality or practicality of decisions;66many times unrelated 
to social policy.  
By way of illustration, normativity of the law’s purposes was recognised during 
colonial judging in Semu Kiseka Mukwaba & Others v Daudi Musoke Mukubira,67 
where the dispute was whether the colonising agreements were constitutional 
instruments. The judge declared them so, while acknowledging a vacuum in the 
law. He used the purpose and practical utility of the regulations made under the 
agreements to recognise them as law. Further, in the Bhimjani case,68 the judge 
declared that in hard cases, judicial discretion should be guided by ‘the general 
scheme and purpose of the Act.  
Similarly, courts interfered with exorbitant interest rates, to avoid borrowers failing 
to repay loans.69 The trend continued in early70 as well as late post-colonial 
judging, as the Supreme Court declared in Postbank (U) Ltd v Ssozi,71 that the 
criterion for deciding cases under the summary procedure rule was its purpose, of 
expeditiously handling financial and commercial contract disputes, and avoiding 
any obstructions to adjudication.72  
Utilitarianism as adherence to contractual purposes was also observed, although 
mainly in post-colonial judging. It has been prevalent in sale of goods cases, where 
                                            
 
65 See Appendix 1: Cases 56 and 63; Appendix 3: Cases 21, 41, 42, 43; and Appendix 5: Cases 1, 
5, 11, 14, 15,16, 18, 21, 25, 31, 41, 46, 51, 59, 77, 82 and 93. 
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67 (1952-56) ULR 74. 
68 (1956-57) 8 UPLR 164. 
69 SK Ndugwa, Gulu v The Buganda Butchers Limited (1936-51) UPLR 150. 
70 See Kayanja v India Assurance Company Ltd [1968] EA 295. 
71 [2017] SCCA 1(9/1/2017) 
72 Order 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules 
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courts would be called upon to determine whether implied terms such as fitness for 
purpose were proved to have existed. In Magezi & Another v Ruparelia,73 the 
Supreme Court’s Karokora JSC’s declared that in commercial contracts it is 
certainly right that courts should know the purpose of the contract, from the 
genesis of the transaction, through the background, the contract itself and the 
market in which the parties are operating. By the word ‘operating’, the judge 
indicated motivations from ends defined by the circumstances surrounding both 
formation and performance of the contract. 
Further, in late post-colonial judging, it is illustrated by the Supreme Court 
reasoning in Goustar Enterprises Ltd v Oumo, that mere knowledge of the purpose 
of a contract for sale of goods is adequate proof that the buyer relied on the seller’s 
skills and judgement, to trigger an implied condition that the goods would be fit for 
purpose.74 Contractual purposes as criteria were also found in other types of 
disputes, such as those over the passing of property in the goods, where 
normativity was given to commercial purposes,75 and cases like SDV Transami (U) 
Ltd v Nsibambi Enterprises Ltd, 76where the applicability of exemption clauses was 
treated as subject to the purposes of the contract.  
Finally, practicality and functionality of either the rules or contractual interpretations 
also motivated flexibility judging. It was observed under the code ‘PRACTICAL’, 
appearing since colonial judging at 18%, 16% in the early post-colonial era, and 
28% in late post-colonial Uganda. Amongst colonial opinions,77 it is demonstrated 
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75 See Jane Bwiriza v Osapil [2001-2005] HCB 52. 
76 [2008] HCB 93. 
77 See Appendix 1: Cases 56 and 63. 
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by H. White Wilson & Co. v the Barnet Soda Factory.78 In this case, the court held 
that standard terms printed on the indent were not binding, because it ‘would be 
too strong to expect a Goanese (one of the Asian groups in Uganda at the time) to 
have taken note of such terms printed by the British seller’.  
A number of post-colonial opinions also reveal adherence to practicality and 
functionality, as a sub-value of law as a means to ends.79 This sub-value has been 
more prevalent in late post-colonial judging, becoming one of the most motivational 
values for flexible judging.80 For instance, in Eden International School Ltd v East 
African Development Bank Ltd,81 the court rejected a claim that the interest of ½% 
per annum compound was harsh and unconscionable. The reason was that the 
purpose of interest was to protect the defendant against economic vagaries and 
compensate her for the consequences of delayed payment, such as loss of 
opportunity cost, depreciation of currencies, inflation and risk.  
The other manifestation of practicality and functionality as key sub-values was 
judges not recognising the conceptual ordering of contract law, as is otherwise 
reflected by the categorisation of law,82 which was coded as ‘NO CATEGORIES’. 
This practice follows Lord Denning’s suggestion in Central London Property Trust 
Ltd v High Trees House Ltd,83 and later Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v Mardon,84 that 
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courts should end the idol worship of freedom of contract, and instead find fairness 
by overriding such categorisations.  
 In Uganda, judges have declassified law to flexibly find remedies, with Mardon’s 
case for instance specifically quoted with approval as a source of normativity, in 
Hope Mukankusi v Uganda Revenue Authority.85 The findings in Figure 11 indicate 
that such declassification of law has mainly been practised by negligence being 
applied to resolve contract’s hard case, since the colonial days where it appeared 
in 6% of opinions. It grew to 8% in early post-colonial, and 9% in late post-colonial 
judging respectively.  
For instance, economic negligence has commonly been treated as part of contract 
in carriage and other bailment cases,86 in which courts have generally interfered 
with clear contractual terms under which the carrier or other bailee would not be 
liable, to flexibly find liability under negligence. In one such case the author 
handled, SDV Transami (U) Limited v Agrimag Limited & Jubilee Insurance Co. of 
Uganda,87 the judge, citing fairness and justice, upheld the award by the arbitrator, 
Chief Justice Wambuzi (emeritus), under which although he had found no 
negligence proved, he invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to infer gross 
negligence and make an award. However, the contract expressly stated that goods 
were carried at the owner’s risk, and the carrier would only be liable if there was 
evidence of gross negligence. Such flexibility however points to other values of 
perceptions, besides those relating to law’s nature – values of perceptions of the 
judicial role.  
                                            
 
85 HCCS 438/2005(19/7/2010) 
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9.2.2  Perception Values of the Judicial Role 
Flexibility has also been motivated by judges perceiving their role as lawmakers, 
guarantors of contractual fairness and justice (interventionists), and settlers of 
disputes through ‘judging by hunch’. These perception values speak to a tension 
with the formalist value of ‘the judge as a mechanic’, already also found to have 
prevailed during the same judging periods.88 The following part elaborates the 
findings for each of these flexibility-engendering values.  
9.2.3  Judicial Law-making 
As discussed earlier,89 instrumentalists like Holmes90 and Frank,91claim that judges 
make and change law. Figure 11 however reveals that the higher value of judicial 
law-making has had a more significant influence on flexibility, appearing in 24% of 
colonial flexible opinions, 38% of early post-colonial judging and 28% of late post-
colonial judging. The other ways it manifested are by judges filling gaps92 and 
sidestepping, or stretching the meaning of,93 existing rules of law.  
Rule Gap Filling 
Gap filling was for instance done during colonial and late  post-colonial judging.94 In 
the colonial Bhimjani case,95 the reasonableness provision judges invoked to 
refuse a landlord possession in other jurisdictions was found non-existent under 
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Ugandan law. The judge exercised discretion to presume it was part of the law, 
pending his recommendation for such amendment. Likewise, in Hamud Bin 
Suleman v Visinji Ganji,96 section 49 of the English Sale of Goods Act was deemed 
part of Ugandan law, although it was not, since the purpose of the Indian Contract 
Act was to codify English law. 
During early post-independence judging, the trend appears to have died out, but 
the sub-value has resurged in late post-colonial judging. Justice Irene Mulyagonja 
acknowledged this, in her declaration that, ‘in a jurisdiction where legal reform by 
amendment and enactment of statutes is slow, case law becomes a most valuable 
source of law which will set precedents that will guide law students, legal 
practitioners and the Magistrates Courts’.97 Further, the sub-value’s influence is 
illustrated by two notable cases on statutory gap filling. One is Nipunnoratiam 
Bhatia v Crane Bank Ltd,98 where the judge declared as illegal and unenforceable 
contracts where goods had third party encumbrances, contrary to lighter remedies 
under the Sale of Goods Act. The other is Karangwa v Kulanju,99 where different 
sections of the Contract Act appeared to contradict one another as to whether a 
guarantee contract has to be in writing; the judge reasoned that he had to 
harmonise the Act and gave the word ‘may’ in section 68 the same mandatory 
effect as the word shall ‘shall’ in section 10 (6) of the Act.  
Gap filling has also extended to changing rules settled by precedents. A classic 
example is Steam Aviation FZC v Attorney General,100 where a High Court judge 
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contradicted a rule in United Assurance Co. Ltd v Attorney General [1995] VI KALR 
109, a Supreme Court precedent, whereby even without a resolution a company 
can authorise an act. Such has been the courage exhibited by flexible judges in 
law-making, that even without gaps being observed, in many cases clear rules 
have been simply sidestepped, thereby creating new rules with alternative or 
modified normativity.  
Rule Sidestepping 
Rule sidestepping has throughout judging history been constantly used to arrive at 
normativity, by declaring legal positions besides known rules.101 For instance with 
regard to formalities of mortgage contracts, in the colonial case of Harshad Limited 
v Globe Cinema Limited and Others,102 the rules on formalities of mortgages were 
sidestepped, by holding as valid an unsigned mortgage deed. Sidestepping 
continued in the early post-colonial, as demonstrated by Olinda De Souza 
Figueiredo v Kassamali Nanji.103 In this case, the judge was faced with a choice 
between the Mortgage Act, which provided that for a mortgage to be valid, it was 
enough that only the mortgagor had signed the deed; and the Registration of Titles 
Ordinance, which provided that for any registrable instrument to be valid it had to 
be signed by both parties. The judge sidestepped the latter rule, reasoning that the 
precision required was not that of a court order, and lack of signature was a mere 
procedural technicality and not a matter of substance.   
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In late post-colonial judging, in Belex Tours & Travel v Crane Bank Ltd & 
Another,104 Byamugisha, J. A held that the rule requiring pleadings to mention and 
particularise was old law. She reasoned that in such (‘hard’) cases, the courts had 
to stand firm at the gates of justice. The metaphor of judges as ‘gatekeepers’ used 
by the judge speaks to the flexibility-engendering value of judicial law-making 
having become an integral part of judicial culture, with judges deciding when to 
open or close the province of the law, the only guiding tool being the search for 
what a judge would take to be fair and just.  With such quests for fairness, justice, 
and judges taking themselves as gatekeepers, it is not surprising that they have, 
alongside law-making, played an interventionist role in contract. 
9.2.4  Judicial interventionism 
Judicial interventionism in contract is one of the key internal values that scholars 
claim to motivate the flexibility in the tension.105 Judges are authorised to correct 
and fill gaps in contracts by implying terms, as well as by intervening in contracts in 
search for substantive fairness, justice, equity, or otherwise, replacing ‘what was 
agreed with what would have been agreed in the circumstances.’106 Contracts 
deemed unconscionable or unworthy are written into and replaced with terms that 
would guarantee ends like substantive fairness.107 As such, the formalistic ‘worship 
of the freedom of contract idol’ will be defied.  
The findings in this study support judicial interventionism being a key value 
underlying flexibility in Uganda, that needs to be weighed and balanced with 
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formalistic values to achieve coexistence. Figure 11 reveals that it featured in 33% 
of colonial, 27% of early post-colonial, and 28% of late post-colonial flexible 
opinions. However, these findings do not support Lord Denning’s claim in the 
George Mitchell case,108 that commercial judges intervene using ‘the true 
construction notion’ as a secret criterion. The notion points to flexibility judging 
being a matter of interpretation, such that even considerations external to the 
contract would have to be justified using a form of construction of contractual 
terms. This claim by Denning is contradicted by this study’s findings, as Ugandan 
courts have been found often to override contractual terms, substituting the parties’ 
intentions with what they perceived a fair109 or equitable.110 Judicial interventionism 
has also been manifested by judges playing the role of filling contractual gaps, 
thereby writing into or rewriting the contract.111 To better understand how 
interventionism has motivated flexibility, one needs to elaborate how these sub-
values and manifestations have influenced judging choice.  
Justice as Fairness and Fairness as Ubuntu 
In Uganda, although the formalist/procedural sense of fairness has guided judges 
in some cases,112 commercial judges have often been motivated by the competing 
instrumentalist sense of fairness; 113thus the tension. For instance, in Mohanlal 
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Gandhi v Suleman Mithah,114 the court interfered with contract, reasoning that it 
was unfair and ‘a hard bargain’, although there was no proof of fraud, trickery, 
pressure, mental or other incapacity or undue influence.  
In S.K Ndugwa, Gulu v The Buganda Butchers Limited,115 the judge acknowledged 
the contribution to the tension brought by the two senses of fairness, and tried to 
reconcile them using interpretation and logic. The judge reasoned that section 26 
of the Civil Procedure Act, which permitted courts to interfere and reduce harsh 
and unconscionable rates, was a codification of equity, but did not strike at the 
hardness of the bargain, rather the means employed to reach the bargain. Further, 
that the hardness of a bargain was evidence of unscrupulous use of power not of 
itself ground for relief, which meant that the end justified the means, and therefore 
substantive unfairness would have to imply procedural unfairness. This attempt at 
reconciliation did not bring certainty to the values of fairness and justice, but rather 
put flexibility fairness in a dominant position, leaving the tension unmanaged. To 
arrive at a balance of the two, one needs first to understand how the values have 
been perceived and used in Uganda.   
The dominant flexibility-engendering sense of fairness practised by Ugandan 
judges is what is known as ubuntu, which fits the common instrumentalist fairness 
narrative.116 The content analysis has revealed that a number of flexible decisions 
across the judging periods were motivated by the ubuntu sense of fairness, as sub-
values that combine to form ubuntu were either directly or indirectly invoked to 
justify judicial choice. During colonial judging, Smith J was evidently motivated by 
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compassion, an ubuntu value, in the H. White Wilson & Co. case, 117 by rejecting 
the applicability of exemption clauses on the basis that a person from a particular 
community that was backward could not have been expected to take note of and 
perceive them as contractual terms.  
Its influence has grown in post-colonial judging, accounting for the majority of 
decisions based on fairness. For instance, during early post-colonial judging, 
humanness and compassion as aspects of fairness under ubuntu was used as a 
criterion for normativity. This was in cases judges decided on grounds such as the 
reasonableness118 or soundness,119 of the decision’s consequences. In Grayson & 
Co. Ltd v AH Wardle (Uganda) Ltd and Others,120 such humanness was employed 
to declare the words ‘we undertake to guarantee’ as fairly conceivable to mean that 
there was a binding guarantee from the onset. Likewise, in Muwema & Mugerwa 
Advocates v Shell (U) Ltd,121humanness motivated the judge’s invocation of the 
principle, ‘Justice should not only be done but be seen to be done, in that the right-
minded people should not go away thinking, the judge was biased.’ Further, that all 
circumstances should be looked at ‘in the eyes of a reasonable man’,122 a notion 
that on its own speaks to the connectedness of ubuntu as a criterion for normativity 
responsible for flexibility.  
During late post-colonial judging, ‘fairness as ubuntu’ has become most prevalent, 
especially under the 1995 constitution, which promulgated the ideal as part of 
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Uganda’s law on judging.123 Humanness and compassion continue to be a means 
of arriving at what is fair and just in flexible judging;124 for instance, the judge 
allowing a plaintiff to recover in Construction Engineers and Builders Limited v 
Attorney General,125 on the grounds that she rightly abandoned work, as no one 
would have been expected to work during war.  
The ubuntu sub-values of ‘good attitude and dignity’ have also motivated flexible 
judging in Highland & Agriculture Export Ltd & Another v Alpha Global 21st Joint 
Venture & 5 Others,126where they were referred to as ‘prudence and justice’. 
Likewise, reciprocity as a sub-value of ubuntu has also been observed as 
influential in flexibility, such as was the case in Sendege, Senyondo & Co. 
Advocates v Kampala Capital City Authority,127 where services having been 
consumed, court invoked it to decide that even if a contract was void, the 
consuming party should pay a quantum meruit. 
Human attributes and senses have also been relied on in place of the contract or 
statute’s language, as was done in Kitayimbwa Salongo v Peggy Garments Ltd,128 
where the judge held that in a sale of goods by sample, the eye is the best test to 
check differences and resolve imperfections, as language cannot fully describe the 
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particulars of the goods. Another attribute similarly invoked is convenience of all 
concerned, not of a commercial but human nature.129  
However, even with such dominance, ubuntu is nowhere near an ultimate judging 
philosophy that can provide certainty in hard cases. Instead, its growing popularity 
makes it more pertinent that a mechanism for coexistence be sought. This is not 
only because of the competition from the prevalence of the formalistic value of 
fairness, but also the tension created by ubuntu itself, as a measure of fairness and 
justice. In a heterogeneous society like Uganda, ubuntu’s underpinning sub-values 
will not only vary from community to community, but are  also inherently flexible 
and ever-changing, 130which will always be a recipe for legal uncertainty. This was 
acknowledged by Okumu-Wengi J, in East African Development Bank v Ziwa 
Horticultural Exporters Ltd, where having been motivated by ubuntu, he further 
declared that, although it may not be court’s desire to intervene in contract, 
circumstances arise when it is essential, such as to stop hardship or delays, and 
the list is endless.131 
Besides the ubuntu, other theoretical perspectives of fairness appear to be at play 
in motivating flexibility and therefore the tension. Fairness as common commercial 
usage has motivated judges who interfered with interest rates charged by lenders, 
on grounds of unfairness, notwithstanding the freedom of contract.132 However, 
even in such cases, judges used fairness, not as a commercial efficiency value, but 
one that permits ubuntu to be the internal judging criterion. The only other 
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observed key perception sub-value amongst alternative senses of fairness and 
justice, is judges treating fairness in commercial disputes as coextensive with 
equity, which I proceed to elaborate.  
Justice and Fairness as Equity  
In Uganda, equity is part of the law formally applicable to contract in Uganda, 
having been received as part of the English law transplant133 and later incorporated 
by the judicature Act.134 This puts Ugandan jurisprudence at the level Lord Denning 
described in the High Trees case, 135as the fusion of law and equity – a counter to 
the rigours of freedom of contract. This way, the law on judging creates the 
platform for equity’s role as a normative criterion during flexible judging.  
The opinions analysed reveal that judges have not only used the equitable platform 
to fill gaps in written and common law as commanded by the enabling laws, but 
also to make new rules and intervene in contracts by filling gaps in their terms.  
Judges have been motivated towards flexibility, by adherence to interventionism, to 
find fairness, perceived as equity.136 In all these cases, judges did not draw a line 
between relevancies of either criterion but rather treated the two as part of a single  
criterion, the yardstick for justice. The three values have motivated judges in an 
interdependent way, as justice and fairness have also been used to mean 
equity.137 English law equitable principles were used to reach flexible decisions in 
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the face of freedom of contract, such as estoppel,138 avoiding unjust enrichment,139 
money had and received,140 avoiding harshness and unconscionableness141 and 
substantiality of performance in building contracts.142 
Therefore, perceiving fairness and justice as equity, in the common-law sense, is 
one of the  perception values, which in a significant way underlie flexibility being 
part of the tension, values that should be balanced with formalistic ones to find 
coexistence. In another sense, such influences speak to judges playing a central 
role in the justice system not only in an institutional sense, but also, as the next 
sub-section will show, in the sense of their individual attributes being key in the 
survival and growth of flexibility.          
9.2.5  Judging by Hunch: Law as Predictions 
Coexistent with the perception value of judges as lawmakers is the ideal held by 
flexibility judges and its other proponents, which is that, in reality laws are mere 
prophecies of what judges will do about rules and disputes. Parties’ rights are 
determined by the predictions of judicial behaviour,143 and rules of law are deemed 
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dead letters, that only come alive once enforced by courts or acted upon.144 During 
the analysis, manifestations of law as predictions of judicial behaviour, however, 
were originally independently coded as ‘LPREDICTIONS’. The cases used to infer 
its existence are those in which the judges determined normativity by means of 
individual prejudices, policy preferences or other values brought to bear by intuition 
and abductive reasoning. Therefore, it equally connotes the acceptance and desire 
to maintain in the judge the discretion to decide cases by mere hunch. Accordingly, 
although coded differently, findings for the two analytical units are discussed 
together as evidencing ‘judging by hunch’, which Hutcheson145 and Frank claim to 
be the best perception of the judges’ role during adjudication.146  
According to the findings presented in Figure 12, law as predictions motivated 
flexibility in 28% of colonial cases, 10% in early post-colonial judging and 28% of 
late post-colonial judging. Further, Figure 11 reveals that judging by hunch has 
been prevalent across all the deferent judging periods, continuously increasing in 
weight. It appeared in 6%, 8% and 12% of colonial, early post-colonial, and late 
post-colonial opinions respectively. The findings render limited support for Frank’s 
claim that judges decide disputes and make law, motivated by their personality, as 
informed by their dispositions, biases and habits.147 The support is limited because 
Frank viewed those hunch-producers as the sole motivations behind all judicial 
decisions,148a monist perspective to values underlying the tension, which the 
discussion in chapter seven and in this chapter disprove. Otherwise, in line with 
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Frank’s claim,149 the influence of judging by hunch in flexible opinions manifested 
in two ways. 
Firstly, Uganda’s commercial judges have often relied on personal intuitions as 
normative criteria for allocation of rights and obligations.150 In extreme cases, 
judges found a contract, where none had been proved;151and openly relied on 
personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding contract performance, or the 
dispute, to flexibly grant or deny remedies otherwise provided by freedom of 
contract.  
Uganda Wildlife Authority v Hon. Francis Mukama152 is a good example, where the 
issue was whether becoming a member of parliament qualified as alternative 
employment, as would mitigate loss from unlawful dismissal. Twinomujuni, JA, 
found in the negative, reasoning that in Uganda members of parliament spend a lot 
of money to win and often never recover it due to social expenses they incur to 
help constituents. The judge determined contractual rights using his personal 
knowledge and intuition regarding the institution and office of a member of 
parliament within Uganda’s specific context, apparently informed by the commonly-
known costs and bribery that people engage in during campaigns.   
Secondly, judging by hunch took the form of flexible judging being motivated by 
judges’ personal cognitive attributes, such as personal emotions153 and 
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sentiments,154 and senses of indeterminate standards like fairness155 and 
reasonableness.156 To this extent, the results validate Frank’s claims that: judges 
apply personal idiosyncratic biases and prejudices, and that the experiences they 
have gone through will influence how they view other people, and therefore judicial 
choice; in turn leading to flexible judging.157  
Therefore, underlying judging by hunch is what the scholars Tuzet158 and Frank,159 
referred to as abductive judicial reasoning, being covered by explanations inferred 
from the pursuit of non-legal but rarely declared ends. The real reasons for the 
decisions are values personal to the judge, or influenced by the body politic 
surrounding judging, to which judges have perceived themselves as having to 
respond. This leads me to analysing the influence of responsiveness in Uganda’s 
flexibility judging. 
9.2.6  Judicial Responsiveness 
In the sense proposed by Sourdin & Zariski,160 the findings in Figure 11 reveal that 
flexibility commercial judging in Uganda is also motivated by judicial 
responsiveness to the desire for justice by members of society. These findings to 
an extent support Holmes’ declaration that law is not logic, but prejudices of judges 
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and other men, as well as experience, the felt necessities of the time, the moral 
and political theories, and the stories of a nation’s development.161 Underlying the 
flexibility at tension with formalism is evidence of judicial responsiveness to 
Uganda’s social, economic and political experiences, as well as contractual 
contexts. Likewise are the manifestations of responsiveness to the policies or 
purposes underlying the contract or rule of law in dispute.  
During the content analysis, two analytical units were used to trace judicial 
responsiveness as a values underlying flexibility; revealing that it qualifies to be 
considered for balancing with formalistic values in finding coexistence. The first 
was the judicial perception of law as experience, coded as ‘EXP’, which was 
observed in 24% of colonial opinions, 30% of early post-colonial, and 20% of late 
post-colonial ones. Secondly was contextual responsiveness, coded as 
‘CONTEXTUAL’ and observed in 46% of colonial cases, 30% of early post-colonial 
and 40% of late post-colonial ones. It is important to note here that the number of 
hard cases found, and therefore analysed in the late post-colonial judging era, was 
almost double the number in each of the earlier periods. Therefore, the 40% in 
reality represents an unprecedented frequency of contextual responsiveness.  
That flexibility judging has been motivated by contextual responsiveness is evident 
from the colonial case of Moulvi Shah v Farley & Tranter;162 Barrett-Lenard J 
declaring that, in such hard cases, the intention of the parties can only be derived 
from the totality of the evidence and no secondary principles can be universally 
true. Another example is the late post-colonial judging case of Magezi & Another v 
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Ruparelia.163 The appellant had sold their contract to supply roadside parking 
meters, and paid a deposit, the balance payable ‘upon commencement of the 
business’, a phrase whose meaning became contentious.  Karokora, JSC, held 
that to understand the meaning and intention of the parties, ambiguity in the 
wording of the terms should be resolved following the intention reasonable people 
would have agreed in the circumstances, guided by Lord Wilberforce’s reasoning in 
Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen Tangen.164 That is to say, the ultimate guide was 
the ‘circumstances surrounding’, which included the purpose of the contract, its 
background, and the market in which the parties operated. 
A number of contextual elements to which courts have responded and given 
normative criteria are revealed by the Ruparelia case,165 and further elaborated by 
the content of other legal opinions in Uganda’s commercial judging history. Firstly, 
is market responsiveness, which can be inferred from judges having made 
decisions based on ‘commercial sense’.166 For instance, in the Ziwa case,167 
decided in the early post-colonial days, the judge was even bolder than others in 
manifesting motivation by contractual or judging contexts. The judge reasoned that 
being a commercial transaction, the owner of goods should have been expected to 
accompany his goods carried on a pick-up vehicle, and therefore should be 
deemed an insured. The judge was appealing to the sense of commercial men and 
women in Uganda at the time, thereby using the context of contract performance 
as a normative criterion by which to judge flexibly.  Further, in Ernest Windt v 
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Gordon Parrot168 and Shenoi & Another v Maximov,169 whether equity would be 
relied on to resolve the disputes, was based on commercial sense.  
Secondly, is responsiveness to ‘business reality’.170 This is another inference one 
gets from the Shenoi case,171 and the practice also appeared in the early post-
colonial case of East African Plans Ltd v Roger Allan Rickford Smith,172 where the 
judge interfered with a contract made and confirmed by endorsement of court, 
increasing the amount agreed as payable by the judgment debtor, reasoning that in 
equity and reality it was fair to do so.  
Thirdly, is responsiveness to circumstances, surrounding the making and 
performance of the contract, which were not necessarily represented in the terms 
agreed.173 For instance, many sale of goods decisions were motivated by their 
peculiar circumstances. It often appeared where the issue was whether there had 
been an implied condition as to fitness for purpose, and the buyer relied on the 
seller’s skill and judgement.174 Others included cases in which courts dealt with 
imputation of a party’s agent’s authority to transact,175 or buyers becoming 
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insolvent and sellers taking steps to protect their interests.176 A similar trend exists 
in employment cases,177 as well as insurance and bailment cases.178  
Finally, judges have been found responsive to the judging environment, 
represented by the political, social and economic context in which the contract or 
adjudication took place.179 An example is the colonial case of Bhimjani v Patel,180 
where a tenant having defaulted to pay rent, sued the landlord to challenge his 
right to get possession. The court found no law applicable in Uganda, specifically 
on the norm of ‘reasonableness of grounds’ as used in other jurisdictions. He 
reasoned that in such cases, courts had to be guided by special conditions, 
including matters of so domestic and social a character, per McCardie, J. in 
Chiverton v Ede;181 all relevant circumstances as at the hearing date; and a broad 
common-sense way as a man of the world, per Lord Greene, M.R. in Cumming v 
Danson;182 and courts must consider, not whether the landlord’s desire for 
possession is reasonable, but whether it is reasonable to make an order for 
possession, for ‘because a wish is reasonable it does not follow that it is 
reasonable in a court to gratify it’.  
The judge in this case used phrases so wide in meaning as to constitute the entire 
body politic surrounding adjudication as an internal judicial criterion for normativity, 
responsible for flexible judging in hard cases, thereby contributing to its being at 
tension with formalism. The words ‘common sense way as a man of the world’, 
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even took the judge’s source of normativity recognition beyond circumstances in 
Uganda, to encompass whatever might be happening in the world generally; 
matters like globalisation, free trade, the international nature of modern 
corporations and the like.  
The trend continued in post-colonial judging, as in the Lewis Ralph case,183where 
the judge is seen declaring that although there was no bailment law in Uganda, 
common law was only applicable, as far as the circumstances of Uganda permit, 
meaning that English authorities had to be relevant, reasonable and applicable to 
the circumstances of Uganda. Further, post-colonial judges are giving normativity 
to the changing social attitudes of Ugandans, as was done in the British American 
Tobacco case.184  
They have also given normativity to changes in economic conditions, attitudes and 
policies, as demonstrated by Ogoola, J, in Amrit Goyal v Hari Chand Goyal & 
Others.185 In this case, a contract was signed in India under the Exchange Control 
Act of 1951, which required prior ministerial consent to transfer shares and was 
meant to be enforced in Uganda. The judge held that the requirement in the statute 
had been overtaken by the government policy of liberalism in foreign exchange 
trading, and the liberalism allowed a free transfer of shares. Further, that 1951 was 
very long ago, and the law had to be updated to match the changing times. The 
judge boldly referred to the tension, and used contextual responsiveness to justify 
flexibility over formalism, reasoning that, as article 126 of the constitution required, 
technicalities should not defeat litigants in 2013 Uganda, when in England courts 
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held against this 116 years previously, per Pearce, L.J in Pontin v Wood, who 
wrote that this was not possible even in 1887 England.186   
Such judicial responsiveness to changing conditions also explains why in some 
flexible opinions judges have used government policy, personal intuition, 
preferences, and sense of what surrounds their role, as normative criteria. This can 
be inferred from the fact that no case was found where litigating parties were found 
to have led evidence of such changes, to justify such normative recognitions. 
Instead, in the Amrit Goyal case,187 the judge clearly referred to changing 
government policy as a normative value. But most evident was the Traces SA 
case,188 where such public policy was not only used as a normative criterion, but 
also used to give normativity to the political wishes of the country’s president, 
communicated at a political rally.  
Therefore, judges have relied on contextual responsiveness as motivation for 
judging flexibly, which together with responsiveness to purposes and personal 
attributes of the judges, all sub-values of an external nature, has maintained the 
strength of flexibility in the tension. However, a deeper understanding of some of 
the external values cannot be achieved in this study, as it requires a social-legal 
investigation. Therefore, only findings for the legal and extra-legal external values 
the content analysis could reveal are discussed in the next section, elaboration 
being made to the extent allowed by inferences from them.  
                                            
 
186 [1962] 1 QB 5940 
187 HCCS 767/2004 (24/4/2013)). 
188 HCCS No 525 of 2006. 
 445
The External Judging Criteria  
This section discusses the external values underlying flexibility, both legal and 
extra-legal. However, that legal/extra-legal divide is in this case merely for ease of 
reading and not as a strict theoretical divide, as  flexibility theory holds that judges’ 
extra-legal considerations, like shared community values, are part of the law,189 
that define its indeterminate character.190 In turn, such flexibility in law’s nature 
enables judges to use it instrumentally to serve ends like social welfare.191 Judges 
do so by adherence to rule utilitarianism, public policy as informed by human 
needs,192or always having discretion to find normativity and fairness without 
limitations from contractual terms and black-letter law.  
Judges instead draw motivation from values of culture, defined by experiences, 
social policy and realities,193 thus Holmes’s famous declarations that the life of the 
law embodies the stories of a nation’s development, its experiences, the law’s 
purposes, the extra-legal considerations judges take into account such as 
economic efficiency, morality like consumer welfarism, and political ideology as 
well as their personal prejudices.194 Further, that real laws are the prophecies of 
judicial conduct and nothing more.195 
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Guided by these theoretical attributes,196 and the presumptive values articulated in 
chapter eight, the external values underlying flexibility’s role in the tension were 
coded and the results of the content analysis presented in appendices 1-5 as well 
as Figures 11 and 12. The following sub-sections discuss the legal and extra-legal 
values inferred from such preliminary findings.    
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Figure 12: External Values behind Flexibility in the Various Periods 
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Legal Values 
The legal values that have been found to underlie flexibility are categorisable under 
doctrinal values, and systematic values. However, the values from the nature of 
law, which would ordinarily be part of systematic values, are already discussed 
under values of judicial perceptions about law’s nature,197 and need no further 
elaboration. This leaves the rest of doctrinal values, and systematic values as the 
subjects of this section. 
9.4.1  Doctrinal Values  
Consumer welfarism, economic efficiency and wealth maximisation are proposed 
by other scholars as doctrinal values underlying judicial flexibility, 198and have been 
made the focus of the content analysis for this category of flexibility values 
competing with formalistic ones. The findings with regard to each of them guide the 
discussion in the following sub-sections, the exception being that economic 
efficiency and wealth maximisation are discussed together under subsection 
9.4.1.2. Their joining arises is because the coding structure of the content analysis, 
which was informed by the literature on value postulates, treated them as part of 
the same phenomena.   
Consumer Welfarism  
Consumer welfarism is the doctrinal value of flexibly protecting consumers, by 
statutes and adjudication, effected through regulation and intervention in 
contracts.199 This section demonstrates that the Ugandan experience supports 
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claims by Friedman200 and Adams & Brownsword, 201 that it is a key value 
underlying flexibility, but not the prime value as those scholars claim it is. Rather, it 
is part of a cocktail of flexibility values at competition with formalistic ones that 
need to be understood, weighed and balanced to achieve coexistence. 
During adjudication, consumer welfarism is known to manifest through adherence 
to four lower values that underpin it, namely: fairness in exchange; reliance or 
constancy; good faith; and equity.202 During the content analysis, the above 
manifestations were observed by searching for their indicators, considered as 
direct statutory intervention in contracts to protect consumers, judges exercising 
discretion created by normative standards to protect disadvantaged parties, as well 
as the wider judicial pursuit of contractual justice. 
Contractual justice covers cases where judges were motivated by the four sub-
values of fairness, reliance, good faith, and equity, as well as other connotations of 
interventionism, to help the weaker or disadvantaged party. Coded as ‘CONJUS,’ 
findings on judicial pursuit of contractual justice reveal that overall, it represents the 
most dominant set of values underlying flexibility in Uganda’s commercial 
adjudication. It appeared in 52% of colonial, 32% of early, and 34% of late post-
colonial opinions. Appearing at such high frequencies qualifies contractual justice’s 
higher value consumer welfarism for balancing with formalistic values, as a way 
towards coexistence.  
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The influence of these contractual justice sub-values has already been discussed 
under judicial interventionism,203 and there is no need to make further illustrations 
of it being a motivator of flexibility. What is vital here is to note the sub-values as 
manifesting judicial individualism, as well as consumer welfarism, and recognise 
the latter as a key value underlying the tension, that needs consideration in efforts 
towards co-existence. However, to appreciate consumer welfarism as a doctrinal 
value, one needs to further examine its influence in flexible opinions, from the other 
two dimensions. That is, consumer welfarism as a result of direct statutory 
intervention in contracts, as well as the exercise of discretion created by normative 
standards in rules.  
As shown in Figure 11, one way in which judges exhibited consumer welfarism was 
by adherence to direct statutory intervention in contract to protect consumers, 
using statutory implied terms. However, coded as ‘SINTERV’, this only appeared in 
14% of early post-colonial opinions, when the country was regulated by a 
command economy, a sub-value coded as ‘COMM_ECON’ as opposed to a free 
market economy; with the state corporations and two Asian families monopolising 
key business activities.204It manifested in three ways.  
Firstly, were cases involving judicial enforcement of statutory criminalisation of 
contractual wrongs,205 as contained in statutes regulating the sale of essential 
goods. The other category also related to government interference with the market.  
Essential cash crops were not freely exportable, as statutory bodies were charged 
with the buying and exporting of cash crops like coffee. As demonstrated in Coffee 
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Works (Mugambi) Limited v Coffee Marketing Board,206 courts used such 
regulation to interfere with the parties’ freedom of contract, by implying the price of 
goods payable.207 Similarly, in other key commercial sectors, statutes regulated 
contractual terms, which motivated courts to interfere with the formalistic freedom 
of contract and enforce the purposive nature of the terms so implied. Such judicial 
decisions include those involving third party liability insurance,208 leasing of land 
from an African by a non-African,209 and Gaming.210  
The appearance of judicial adherence to consumer welfarism through statutory 
intervention in only early post-colonial opinions points to the judging environment 
having a role in flexibility judging.  The trend supports scholarly claims that political 
dictatorships and interference with the free market economy, as happened in 
Uganda during the late 1960s and 1970s, are not fertile soils for formalism, which 
is facilitated by the free market values of market individualism.211 However, 
although such external influences could not be fully investigated in this study, its 
findings point to contract having been alive during the period, albeit not built on the 
basis of will and individualism theories. This contradicts Macneil’s claim, that 
contract in Uganda disappeared as a result of the dictatorships and market 
interventionism.212 
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Further, although it appears in one judging historical epoch, adherence to direct 
statutory intervention is significant when treated as just one of the manifestations of 
sub-values underpinning consumer welfarism. Completion of the puzzle calls for 
discussion of the other dimension of manifestation, the judicial use of discretion 
from normative standards.  
The influence of normative standards in flexibly was discussed earlier, under the 
value of law’s elasticity.213 What this section adds is emphasis that the attribute 
speaks to consumer welfarism as a doctrinal value.  Therefore besides such 
standards being internal criteria, their invocation to protect consumers speaks to a 
value of the legal framework judges find themselves obliged to follow. In all judging 
epochs, judges have been motivated by the discretion given, in open-textured rules 
in statutes, to interfere with the formalistic freedom of contract.214  
In line with the claim by Frank,215 the discretion left to the judges to determine 
conditions that would trigger normativity of rules resulted in flexible judging, to 
protect consumers.216 The trend was observed more in opinions that had to apply 
rules relating to defining the intention and rights of parties under a sale of goods 
contract;217 the constitutional substantiality doctrine;218 and the court’s discretion to 
interfere, with interest rates deemed as harsh and unconscionable.219  
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By way of illustration, in Bwiriza v Osapil,220 the parties’ intention’, as an exception 
to implied terms on passing of property in the good,221 was invoked by the judge to 
hold that the seller’s retention of a logbook, insurance certificate and road licence 
signified a contrary intention. Without doubt, another judge could have interpreted 
the fact differently, especially given that a logbook had at the time been declared 
not a document of title, in Matayo Musoke v Alibhai Garage.222  
In Uganda, consumer welfarism has not been appreciated at as high a level as 
Adams & Brownsword perceived it, 223a level that defines it as the prime value 
underpinning flexibility. For instance, the country does not have legislation 
specifically protecting consumers, as do countries like the United Kingdom.224 Until 
the recent 2010 Contract Act, and the 2017 Sale of Goods and Supply of Services 
Act, whose impact in adjudication is too early to judge, judges seeking to protect 
consumers mainly relied on the transplanted pre-1902 common law, and scattered 
provisions in statutes regulating commercial contracts like sale of goods. However, 
these legal sources were not embedded with full consumer welfarism, as 
consumers have no legal right to quality or safe goods or services, and the 
common-law judges favoured the sellers and suppliers who controlled the 
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market.225 The motivation for protectionism was safeguarding honest traders 
against unfair competitors.226 
Nevertheless, these statutes contain a number of normative standards like 
reasonableness and good faith, which emit the discretion that judges use to protect 
consumers.227 I do not subscribe to the nightmare legal realists’ club instituted by 
scholars like Frank Jerome.228 However, the reality spoken by the 2017 Sale of 
Goods and Supply of Services Act, is that apart from section 67, which subjects 
commercial practice to legal norms, the increase in conceptual flexibility implies 
judges having discretion not only to determine the facts, but ultimately to protect 
consumers by having a final say on the validity of legal norms.  
Relatedly, contract doctrine has, among its values economic efficiency and wealth 
maximisation, which flexibility judging seeks to serve. Findings relating to the two 
are discussed together in the next section, because they were coded together as 
‘EFFICIENCY’, and the content analysis did not reveal a clear divide between 
them.  
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Wealth Maximisation and Efficiency as Commercialism 
Jointly coded as ‘Efficiency’, the findings in Figure 12 reveal that, economic 
efficiency and wealth maximisation appeared in 37% of colonial judging, reducing 
to 27% of early post-colonial judging, and again experiencing resurgence to 32% of 
late post-colonial judging. Although such influence is significant, these findings 
show that efficiency is not the prime value underlying adjudication, let alone 
flexibility as claimed by Llewellyn.229 Rather, it is one of the key flexibility values 
competing with formalistic ones to produce the tension, whose management 
resides in achieving their coexistence.  
However, the findings point to flexibility in Uganda being underpinned by 
commercialism, as a sense of efficiency narrower than is articulated by the 
economic analysis theory. Commercialism is the emphasis on profit maximisation, 
at the expense of any other value;230 even social welfare, that realists deemed the 
end of wealth maximisation.231 In this case, judges adhere to it without being 
motivated by proof of unconscionability of terms, the consumer welfarism sub-
value realists see as the trigger to efficiency.232  
Such commercialism motivated the British colonising Uganda and transplanting the 
English contract law, which has regulated commercial transactions and guided 
judging since. They aimed at commercial benefits for Britain’s businesspeople,233 
by the opening up of trade opportunities, creating markets for their goods, and 
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securing a source of raw materials for manufacturers.234 Accordingly, in making a 
case for the colonisation of Uganda, Lugard,235 the chief architect of the project, 
supported the London Chamber of Commerce, in the contention that the 
investment of colonising Uganda would invariably pay off in the long run.236 
Therefore, right from colonial times, the efficiency and wealth maximisation 
pursued during adjudication has been the individualised quest for commercialism 
and not a wider social welfarism. 
Adherence to this narrower, individualised sense of efficiency and wealth 
maximisation needs articulation, not only to understand how it manifests and 
contributes to flexibility, but also to understand how the two are perceived in 
Uganda. Further, that they are part of values that qualify to be balanced with 
values competing in adjudication to achieve coexistence, and not the prime or 
ultimate values. 
 As indicated earlier,237judges expressly revealing economic or business efficiency, 
as well as wealth maximisation, manifest adherence to efficiency, which in 
Uganda’s case reflected commercialism. However, it is also manifested in the 
indirect way Llewellyn indicated,238with judges giving normativity to commercial 
practices like trade custom, usage, ordinary course of business, and commercial 
reasonableness. Both these manifestations of commercialism have been observed 
in the opinions analysed, with the direct manifestation being coded as part of 
‘EFFICIENCY’, while the indirect manifestation is the set of results revealed under 
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the code ‘PRACTICES’, already discussed under the internal value of law’s 
adaptability.239 
No further elaboration is necessary, save that judicial recognition of normativity in 
commercial practices points to the value of law’s adaptability, equally as well as 
commercialism, as a value underlying flexibility. In the latter sense, the value 
connotes judges recognising normativity in the perspectives, needs and business 
culture of the contracting parties, as well as the wider business community.  
Besides doctrinal values, the findings on legal values behind Uganda’s flexibility 
judging reveal motivation by systematic values, which are discussed in the next 
section.  
9.4.2   Systematic Values  
Systematic values have also been at play in motivating flexibility. This section 
discusses these systematic values, identifying the key ones to balance with 
formalistic ones. It also seeks to further support the multivalued theory of 
understanding the tension, and the possibility of its management through 
coexistence. The systematic values observed include conceptual flexibility; 
substantive justice as the conception of justice; and legal pluralism.   
Conceptual Flexibility   
Conceptual flexibility relates to flexibility in the form of indeterminate normative 
standards, being an intrinsic feature of the rules and principles contained in the 
law. In Figure 12, and appendices 1-5, it is reported under the code ‘CONCEPT-
FLEXTY’. It appeared significantly, in 24% of colonial flexible judging, and has 
                                            
 
239 See text to Section 9.2.1.1. 
 458
since been on the rise, reaching 30% and 32% in early and post-colonial judging 
respectively. Conceptual flexibility has motivated flexible judging as a requirement 
of the laws on judging and sources of contract law. Regarding the nature of 
contract law sources, the above discussion of flexibility having been motivated by 
efficiency, law’s adaptability and consumer welfarism partly render support for the 
claim that uncertainty and the tension exist because by nature, rules are capable of 
multiple judicial interpretations.240For example normativity of standards gives 
judges the discretion to determine not only the true facts as is the case in 
formalistic judging, but also what is permissible under the law,241 derived from what 
Frank rightly viewed as influenced by non-legal considerations in the mind of the 
judge.242  
For its part, conceptual flexibility as a rule of recognition appeared as a motivating 
value in a number of cases throughout history.243 As discussed in chapter four, 
colonialism brought a dual legal system, with both the formalistically dominated, 
but flexibility accommodating common law system and the native flexibility.  Such 
conceptual flexibility became a motivator in a number of the flexible decisions, 
including those on jurisdiction of courts;244 and the content and mode of 
determining normativity in contract cases.245 For instance purposive judging was 
used in Chatabhai M. Patel v Chaturbhai M. Patel & Another.246 Further, 
conceptual flexibility influenced flexibility judging, by reasonableness being used as 
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a rule of recognition, as declared by the judge in Bhimjani v Patel,247 that 
reasonableness had to be implied in the law and the general scheme of a statute.  
In post-colonial Uganda, the incorporation of English common law in, and law 
merchant being applicable alongside, the 1932 Sale of Goods Act,248 watered 
down the legal certainty Sir Chalmers’s codification of sale of goods law had 
brought. It has since given room to judges to wriggle out of legal provisions using 
what should have been non-legal norms, by virtue of their having been made pre-
codification.249 Further, following the conceptual flexibility in the 1995 constitution, 
and more recently in the Contract Act 2010, it has already started motivating 
judges to decide flexibly. In Senoga J, in Tamp Engineering Consultants Ltd v 
MacDowell Ltd,250 the judge justified measuring damages using the opinion of 
reasonable men, invoking Section 61 (4) of the Contract Act. It provides that 
circumstances and means that can help remedy inconveniences caused by breach 
are relevant consideration during adjudication.  
The other aspect relates to the notion of substantialism epitomised by the 1995 
constitution. It being a normative value forming an internal criterion of judges, as 
discussed in chapter eight, is just part of the story. The value is further discussed 
below because it is anchored in the constitution as the supreme law of 
Uganda,251which elevates its value beyond values in subordinate laws. It also 
forms the engine of the wider conception of justice as substantive justice, which 
                                            
 
247 (1956-57) 8 UPLR  164 (Appendix 1: Case 36). 
248 Section 58 of the Act. 
249 Were Fred v Kaga Ltd (HCCS 530/2004(23/12/2005) (Appendix 5: Case 54). 
250 HCCS 224/2010(25/01/2016 (Appendix 5: Case 59). 
251 Article 1 of the 1962, 1967 and 1995 Constitutions. 
 460
forms one of the principle values of the Ugandan legal system that have guided 
judges towards the flexibility in the tension. 
Substantive Justice 
Substantive justice and its operational doctrine of substantiality have been 
articulated as a sub-value of both law’s adaptability252 and utilitarianism,253 both 
internal values underlying flexibility. Additionally, the findings reveal that it is an 
external value of a systematic nature, as it constitutes the constitutional conception 
of justice courts are obliged to administer, not only in pre-colonial Uganda, but also 
during colonial254 and post-1995 judging.255  
After enactment of Article 126 (2) (e) of the 1995 constitution, litigants sought 
courts’ recognition of the value’s superiority over the formalistic procedural 
justice.256 However, in Kasirye257 and Utex,258 the Supreme Court showed support 
for the view that procedural justice was a guarantor and pre-condition to realisation 
of substantive justice, as propounded by Rawls259 and Fuller.260 This was by 
declaring that substantive justice meant looking at all circumstances surrounding a 
case, but unless it is proved otherwise necessary, was subject to the law, including 
the handmaidens of justice, procedural rules. In Dr J. Rwanyarare v Attorney 
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General,261 the constitutional court relied on Kasirye and Utex, adding that all the 
constitution did was to enact an old common-law doctrine of substantiality.  
However, the findings further reveal that the initial cautious approach did not last 
long, as substantive justice has been a key influence behind flexibility throughout 
judging history. Coded as ‘SJ’, it appeared in 40% of colonial flexible opinions, 35% 
of early post-colonial and 46% of late post-colonial ones, where it has been 
invoked to recognise the normativity of extra-legal considerations, and ignore 
procedural rules.  
Although it’s below 50% average frequency dispels any claims to the value being 
the ultimate or prime value behind flexibility, substantive justice as a conception of 
justice has been used to justify instrumentalism and other forms and values of 
judicial flexibility, legal and extra-legal. Ugandan courts have thereby adapted the 
theory of substantive justice propounded by Thomas, 262viewing it as requiring 
adherence to ‘substantialism’, a natural law value that simply means anti-
formalism, or better termed, instrumentalism and a licence for judicial flexibility.  
The above understanding manifested in three ways. Firstly, in a number of 
cases263 substantive justice took the form of basing decisions on the cases’ merits, 
at the expense of procedural and other technical rules of law, while using Article 
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126 (2) (e) to cure defects, to serve higher values like public interest,264 or 
otherwise.  
Secondly, judges invoked equity and fairness to help litigants escape the rigours of 
legalism, the concept of fairness in such cases being exhibited as the ubuntu.265 
Finally, and most commonly,266 as declared by the Supreme Court in Attorney 
General v Afric Cooperative Society Ltd,267 substantive justice has motivated 
flexibility by means of courts giving consideration to circumstances peculiar to a 
particular contract, or dispute, or the wider judging environment.268 
In Commodity Traders International Inc. v Mastermind Tobacco (U) Ltd,269 the 
judge, having acknowledged that it was a hard case, and that the tension between 
formalism and flexibility was at play, invoked Article126 (2) (e) to declare that there 
is superiority of substantive justice over technicalities. Such is realisable by taking 
into account ‘intricacies of modern commercial intercourse’, over rules of law, 
informed by demands of the market place and the ends of law being superior to 
positive law. Further, in Magezi & Another v Ruparelia,270 Karokora, JSC clarified 
that although the surrounding circumstances from which substantive justice is 
derivable  are impossible to define, they can be illustrated as contracts are  not 
made in a vacuum. The court should always consider the contract’s purposes, 
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informed by its genesis and the market, all ultimately guided reasonable people’s 
expectations in such circumstances.  
Therefore, substantive justice which has been elevated to being superior to, and 
the pre-condition for, the validity of procedural justice, has motivated judges in 
many of the flexible opinions analysed, making it one of the key values to inform 
balancing and coexistence efforts.  At the same time, its enactment into law and 
judicial adherence means that in Uganda, legal pluralism is not only a value 
motivating flexibility, but also a constitutional and legislative mandate.  
Legal Pluralism  
Legal pluralism refers to the value of a community’s normativity being derivable 
from more than one order, usually the state legal order and non-state normative 
orders.271 During the content analysis, although it was coded as ‘LP’, legal 
pluralism was treated as also represented by ‘SYSTEM-FLEXTY’. ‘SYSTEM-
FLEXTY’ stood for systematic flexibility, which in this sense is the set of flexibilities 
resulting from the rule of law’s internal attributes and the interrelationship between 
the legal system and extra-legal forces.272 The normative aspect of this 
interrelationship is part of the legal pluralism Uganda’s constitution requires judges 
to give due regard.273 In the findings, legal pluralism appeared minimally, in 6% of 
the colonial opinions, but increased to about 11% of early post-colonial judging and 
17% of late post-colonial judging. This is above the 10% threshold used by this 
study; therefore it qualifies to be in the scheme of values to be balanced towards 
achieving coexistence.    
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Legal pluralism manifested by judges being guided by the normativity of business 
practices,274 the history and other experiences of Ugandans275 and public 
interest.276 Particularly, as earlier discussed,277 legal pluralism has influenced 
flexibility by judges using assumptions from experience, represented by the 
circumstances surrounding a case;278 using circumstances surrounding a contract 
to determine what is acceptable and legitimate;279 and taking judicial notice of and 
adhering to the non-legal norms.280  
Therefore, legal pluralism is a reality of the Ugandan legal system, recognised by 
the law, and increasingly motivating flexibility judging, with enough to be 
considered a competing value in adjudication, to be balanced. However, like its 
sister value substantive justice, legal pluralism opens the legal floodgates for 
instrumentalism, and other judicial practices based on extra-legal considerations, 
which calls into question the external extra-legal values underlying flexibility.  
Therefore, discussion in the following part of the chapter focuses on articulating 
those extra-legal values the content analysis could uncover as needing attention in 
the value balancing.  
Extra-Legal Values 
This section brings understanding to key extra-legal values that have motivated 
flexibility in Uganda’s commercial judging. Such values include public interest, 
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relational contracting, judicial absolutism, and inequality between contracting 
parties. However, according to the content analysis, class struggle, represented by 
inequality as a basis for allocation of rights and obligations has been insignificant, 
other than in early post-colonial Uganda. This disqualifies it from the final scheme 
of values to be weighed and balanced towards achieving coexistence. Therefore, 
only findings relating to the other two are discussed below.    
Relational Contracting  
This section validates, but only in part, MacNeil’s claim that court decisions in East 
Africa indicate relational contracting, contracts being instruments of social 
change.281 The findings in Figure 12 reveal that relational contracting was not 
recognised by courts during colonial judging of hard cases, but appeared in 16% of 
the early post-colonial and 9% of late post-colonial opinions. The reasons for the 
decrease in influence of relational contract recognition are beyond the scope of this 
study. What is vital is the value’s prevalence and manifestations. It has manifested 
in three ways.  
Firstly, judges recognised long-term relations that appeared to flow from contracts, 
and flexibly made decisions to give them normative effect.282Secondly, trust, 
cooperation-, and therefore the norm of reliance, have been recognised by judges 
as having a normative effect, and flexibly used to intervene in contracts.283 Finally, 
in support of Macneil’s claim,284 courts have recognised social relations as arising 
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from contract, and flexibly made decisions to give such relations normative 
effect.285  
Probably, no judicial opinion illustrated contract as a social instrument more than 
British American Tobacco (U) Ltd v Francis Mulindwa & Others,286 a suit 
challenging the legality of summary dismissal of an employee on grounds of 
alleged misconduct causing financial loss. Kiryabwire, J, found for the employer, 
but most importantly reasoned that, whether the misconduct was sufficiently grave 
to amount to a repudiation of the employment contract depended on the 
circumstances of each case, the nature of employment and possibly the terms of 
the contract; further, that society’s attributes are dynamic and honouring them is 
incompatible with the rigidity of formalism, thus precedents being of limited value.  
However, even with such manifestations, relational contracting is not the prime 
value-underlying flexible judging, as claimed by MacNeil287 and Barnette,288 
generally and more so in East Africa,289but one competing with formalistic ones 
alongside other flexibility values. Compared to other flexibility values, its sub-value 
recognition of relationships has had equal influence with the normativity of 
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commercial practices and the absence of legal categorisation, and sub-values like 
normative standards appeared much higher. Secondly, relational contracting does 
not pass the threshold to qualify as a key value for balancing with formalism 
values, especially having appeared in less than 10% of late post-colonial flexible 
opinions.  
Turning to the other extra-legal value behind flexibility, in American Tobacco,290 the 
judge putting little value in precedents and contractual terms, having referred to the 
terms as ‘possibly’ important, speaks not to an isolated and wild act of a rough 
judge, but to a deeper feeling of absoluteness of judicial power. The following 
section discusses such judicial absolutism’s influence in judicial flexibility, to the 
extent that the findings in the study are informative.  
Judicial Absolutism 
As discussed earlier, judicial absolutism is the value of judges exercising 
unrestrained authority in ways that negate any form of value of judges exercising 
unrestrained authority, and showing no form of accountability.291 Coded as JA, and 
merged with the trend earlier coded as ‘ROC-NONLAWMAKERS’ the findings for 
which,292 presented in appendices 1-5 and Figure 12, support the proposition by 
Wells,293 Holmes294 and Oloka-Onyango,295 that judicial absolutism breeds judicial 
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flexibility, as judges are motivated by the ruling political ideology not to respect 
legal boundaries that would otherwise restrain them to a single answer in all similar 
cases. In Uganda, flexible opinions influenced by judicial absolutism appeared in 
49% of flexible colonial opinions, 38% of early post-colonial and 34% of late post-
colonial ones. This makes it one of the dominant ones to be part of the balancing 
equation in the search for coexistence.  
Judicial absolutism has manifested through judges making decisions without citing 
any law, evidence or reasoning in the line of pursuing substantive justice, but 
rather grounds which point to a sheer sense of judicial absolutism, such as 
common sense,296 business or social realities,297 political realities298 or just 
convenience.299 By way of illustration, as far back as colonial times, in Tota Ram v 
Mistry Waryam Singh,300 the judges, while referring to the common law regulating 
contracts, declared that our law was rapidly degenerating into common sense. 
Much more recently, in East African Development Bank v Ziwa Horticultural 
Exporters Ltd,301the judge declared that the list of instances when a court can 
interfere with contracts is endless, but it included there being a need to stop 
hardships or delays, otherwise here taken to mean inconvenience.  
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However, the role absolutism has played in flexibility cannot be fully appreciated 
from mere content analysis of judicial opinions, for there is support for Holmes, that 
at times, other extra-legal interests consciously or otherwise influenced judges’ 
minds.302 Elements of the country’s history point to a judging environment where 
judges would be constrained to instrumentalism, or if they decided formalistically, 
they would be constrained to opportunistic formalism. 
Firstly, there have been incidents of direct interference in commercial justice by the 
executive directing judicial decisions,303 especially during the 1971-79 Idi Amin 
military dictatorship,304 when the judiciary was militarised and its traditional system 
left spent and impotent.305 The militarisation was meant to circumvent rule of law-
based decisions.306 The military tribunals, the Military Police and the State 
Research Bureau (an Intelligence organ)307 became the overseers and enforcers of 
flexibility in commercial adjudication, as acknowledged by the High Court in 
Uganda v Gerald Ngulumi.308 These adjudicators neither understood nor respected 
the law, formality, or due process,309 as unprincipled flexibility ruled, without them 
following any rules of law.310 
Secondly, there have been intimidation and coercion of judges to influence against 
making rule of law formalistic decisions;311 this included the murder of Chief Justice 
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Ben Kiwanuka, and the president of the Industrial Court.312 The epitome happened 
in what the former Principal Judge has described as the darkest days in Uganda’s 
history and the rape of the temple of justice.313 On the 16th of November 2005 and 
1STst of March 2007 the military besieged the High Court during hearings, in Kiiza 
Besigye and others v Attorney General,314to influence the decisions of the court. 
Although a political case, this demonstrates the judging environment in Uganda, as 
the effects could not have stopped with judges handling similar cases. To expect 
the events to help the executive tame the judiciary and extend absolutism and 
service of political ideology to all manner of judging is not wild imagination.  
Thirdly, the executive has made issuance of court orders they do not agree with 
futile. For instance, during Amin’s regime,315 Obote’s regime (December 1980 to 
July 1985),316and the current government (since 1986),317 even lawyers involved 
have been harassed and at times reportedly killed, as in the Samson Ddungu 
case.318 Relatedly, and fourthly, accession to the office of a judge has in many 
cases depended on one’s degree of support for the ruling government and 
ideology,319 with each change of president coming with a change of the chief 
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justice.320 This phenomenon and its status as a foundation of flexibility adjudication 
was recently confirmed by Tsekoko, Justice of the Supreme Court (emeritus),321 
thus: 
Yes, that thing [cadre judges] is there. It seems to be increasing 
…you get some judgments and you can’t understand if they are from 
judges who are supposed to be independent… some judges consult 
some politicians when they have cases with political implications to 
get a shape of the ruling. This is terrible! It is not proper.322 
Accordingly, the increasing trend of cadre judges is meant to increase the influence 
of absolutism and promote flexibility by judges who can represent the wishes of the 
executive during adjudication. It is therefore not surprising that judges have made 
decisions bearing the hallmarks of judicial absolutism. The case of Traces SA v 
Attorney General323 appears to be one of such results, where the wishes of the 
same President, expressed at a political rally, were invoked by court as public 
interest and policy that overrode the rules of law in legislation and terms of the 
contract between the foreign investor and the government. 
Another example of this is far back as colonial days, in Tota Ram v Mistry Waryam 
Singh.324 While referring to the common law regulating contracts, the judge 
declared that our law was rapidly degenerating into common sense.325 A plain 
reading of such decisions will tell a story of judges being incompetent, for failure to 
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make decisions justifiable from the law, evidence led or otherwise within the known 
boundaries of adjudicatory acceptability.  
However, the high frequency and persistence of the practice disqualifies the theory 
of incompetence. Besides, a preliminary reading of the judicial opinions reveals no 
evidence of any particular judge having consistently exhibited absolutism, as well 
as incompetence. Rather, the trend speaks to flexibility being founded on a higher 
value – judicial absolutism, which could have motivated judges alongside other 
factors like the nature of legal training, or religious and cultural beliefs, which are 
beyond the scope and methodology of this study. Nevertheless, besides such 
indefinable considerations, courts have also been motivated by social support, 
which has of late translated into public interest.  
From Social Support to Public Interest 
Social support, a value behind flexibility in pre-colonial law and adjudication, 
continued to have relevance and motivate flexibility after the transplant of the 
English common law system. In National Social Security Fund & Sentoogo v Alcon 
International Ltd,326 Odoki CJ defined being contrary to public interest as being 
contrary to public policy; anything against the constitution, national interests, justice 
or morality. Likewise, in Attorney General v Afric Cooperative Society Ltd,327 
Katureebe, JSC invoked the need for court to make decisions in public good as the 
end of law and justice. These decisions, being made at the highest level of judicial 
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precedence, amongst many others,328 also serve to demonstrate social support 
having been a moral value motivating Ugandan judges towards flexibility.  
In the findings, social support has been treated as coextensive with public interest, 
because public interest was often used to connote social support. However, 
because the latter could be articulated as a related but independent value, the two 
were coded separately and only merged here in the discussion. Social Support 
was coded and presented in appendices 1-5 and Figure 12 as ‘SOCIAL 
SUPPORT’, appearing in 10% of colonial flexible opinions, 14% of early post-
colonial, and 5% of late post-colonial ones. Public Interest was coded and 
presented as ‘PUBLIC INTEREST’, and not observed in colonial opinions; but 
appeared in 14% of early post-colonial flexible opinions, and 11% of late post-
colonial ones.  
The appearance of both codes in Figure 12 with the same frequency during early 
post-colonial judging makes one think that there has been duplication of the same 
value. However this is not the case; as Appendix 3 shows, both public interest and 
social support were simultaneously observed in only one case. In other cases, 
each code appears without the other, implying that the greatest influence of social 
support was in early post-colonial judging at about 27% (adding the two codes). 
Further, again adding the two, as public interest grew to replace references to 
social support, the value has since dropped to about 16% of late post-colonial 
judging.  
The influence of social support in flexibility judging manifested through adherence 
to a number of sub-values. Firstly, judges gave due regard to community 
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perceptions of the meaning of rules. For instance, in Bhimjani v Patel,329 amongst 
the judging criteria in hard cases, the judge used what he called the relevant 
‘special conditions of a social character, as well as broad common sense.’  
Secondly, judges gauged the validity or enforceability of contractual terms, on 
common standards like reasonableness, especially in early post-colonial 
judging,330 unconscionability,331 common sense332 or sensibleness.333 Such 
common standards represented the support of the community as a ground for 
acceptability and validity of flexible decisions. Thirdly, public interest was directly 
cited as the sub-value providing criteria for allocation of obligations in contract.334 
However, as noted earlier,335 the use of public interest as a sub-value of social 
support at times smelt of a wider and unarticulated political agenda. This 
proposition is supported by the different senses in which the courts invoked it. In 
the Alcon case336 it was taken to mean constitutionalism, morality and justice; and 
in the Afric case,337 common good; but then it was taken to mean state policy in 
Concorp International Ltd v East & Southern African Trade & Development 
Bank,338 and the Traces SA case.339 Therefore it is not surprising that public 
support has increasingly been served by public interest being invoked to justify 
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flexibility judging, as the judges hide behind it the pursuit of different agendas, at 
the cost of legal certainty.  
However, once again, the real agenda behind each use of the value could not be 
investigated in this study, as it would call for methodology that can investigate the 
judges’ minds beyond the reasons articulated in the texts of the opinions analysed. 
Factors like corruption, which has been reported as rampant in the Ugandan 
judiciary,340 could be the real reasons behind a decision, but indeterminate values 
like public interest were being cited and given a convenient sense. Nonetheless, 
what is clear is that social support is a key value underlying flexibility, and should 
be part of the balancing towards coexistence. As demonstrated throughout this 
study, and demonstrated in the next chapter, these efforts are better served by 
devising ultimate judging guidelines made up of rules, principles and standards that 
can make the two approaches coexist, thereby achieving realistic legal certainty. 
Conclusion 
My conclusion is that, the flexibility in the tension has been motivated not by any 
single value as the prime, but a number of values, which are also both internal and 
external to the judicial institutions and its accompanying players. The most frequent 
of these values should be part of the scheme of values to inform the balancing that 
judging guidelines will aim to achieve, as a way towards coexistence. Foremost 
amongst such internal values are the perception of law as elastic and adaptable to 
a changing market and other realities, coextensive with its retroactivity; utilitarian 
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instrumentalismpurposiveness, practicality and functionality of the law and 
contractual terms; the concept of justice as fairness and fairness as being ubuntu, 
as well as equity; judges’ perceptions of their role as lawmakers, guarantors of 
fairness and justice, and absolute settlers of disputes, including judging by mere 
hunch; and judicial responsiveness. On the other hand, legal and extra-legal 
external values include values of a systematic nature, legal pluralism, a substantive 
conception of justice, and conceptual flexibility. Others are doctrinal values like 
consumer welfarism, as well as efficiency and wealth maximisation, which as 
however perceived as commercialism. Finally, are extra-legal external values; 
judicial absolutism and social support, relational contracting having appeared 
insignificantly.  
The next chapter proceeds to complete the puzzle. It not only summarises the 
study, but also makes recommendations on how the competing values can be 
balanced, as the end goal of judging guidelines, that could in turn bring 




 Towards Management of the Tension  
Introduction 
This chapter concludes the study, as well as making recommendations on how the 
tension can be managed. It demonstrates that the research question and 
objectives of the study have been answered and attained respectively, and 
completes the main thesis of the study – that formalism and flexibility can and 
should coexist. The chapter first makes a recapitulation of the study’s theoretical 
framework, research process and key findings, and ends by proposing that 
balancing the key competing values identified should be done during the 
construction of possible commercial judging guidelines.  
The guidelines should be made up of rules, principles and standards providing for 
rational and coherent criteria for when and how judges can practise formalism and 
flexibility, thereby acting as a mechanism for their coexistence and a way to 
manage the tension. Examples of principles and standards that should be part of 
Uganda’s commercial judging guidelines are proposed. Finally, this chapter 
highlights the study’s major contributions to knowledge, its limitations, and areas 
for further research. 
Recapitulating the Subject of Study  
Using a content analysis of Uganda’s commercial contract hard cases, this study 
makes a contribution to literature that searches for legal certainty, through 
managing the age-old tension between formalism and flexibility in adjudication. 
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Both approaches serve vital values in jurisdictions like Uganda; as such they have 
been concurrently practised throughout judging history and are therefore both 
needed at the same time. However, the Ugandan legal system lacks, as do many 
common-law systems, a coherent and rational mechanism to guide judges hearing 
commercial hard cases on when to decide formalistically or flexibly, or use a 
mixture of both.1 This is worsened by the insufficient knowledge on how a 
mechanism can be formulated, or the tension otherwise managed, 2 a gap this 
study contributes to filling.  
Many of the scholars in this field have concentrated on making a case for either 
formalism or flexibility judging, leading to the dominant irreconcilable view, that the 
two cannot coexist.3 Contrary to that irreconcilable school of thought, this study’s 
central argument contributes to knowledge by expanding the validity of the thesis 
that formalism and flexibility can and should coexist,4 through advancing four 
propositions.  
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Firstly, in Uganda the tension is a reality, informed by a history of concurrent but 
incoherent practice of both formalism and flexibility. Secondly, underlying the 
tension are multiple internal and external competing values served by each 
approach, as opposed to there being a single ‘prime’ value accounting for all 
adjudication, formalistic or flexible. Thirdly, the competing values are not 
irreconcilable, but rather they are compatible, and their coexistence, and therefore 
that of formalism and flexibility, requires that they are uncovered from actual 
judicial opinions, weighed and the dominant ones balanced.  
Finally, the balancing of values should not be left to judicial discretion, but 
independently done, and used to formulate ultimate judging guidelines, as a way 
towards managing the tension and enhancing certainty.  
Therefore, the main question of the study is, ‘How can the tension between 
formalism and flexibility in Uganda’s commercial contracts adjudication be 
managed?’ The answer has been sought using three sub-questions, namely: 
(a) What is the nature of Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm? 
(b) Why has the tension between formalism and flexibility prevailed in Uganda’s 
commercial adjudication? 
(c) How can formalism and flexibility coexist?  
To answer the research question, the study has pursued four objectives.  
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Taxation Research Paper Series No 2012-07 3; MA Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law, 
(Harvard University Press, 1988); PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon 
Press 2008) 388; R Goode, Commercial Law in the New Millennium, the Hamlyn Lectures (Sweet & 
Maxwell 1998); Tamanaha (n 1) 232-233. 
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Firstly, it set out to ascertain Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm across 
judging history, to verify if the tension is a problem and reality and understand its 
roots in a general sense.  
Secondly, the study aimed at making a case for the coexistence of formalism and 
flexibility, as part of the theoretical foundation for finding a way to manage the 
tension. Thirdly, it aimed at understanding the foundations for the tension not by 
seeking the reasons for lack of coherent and rational tension management 
mechanisms, but rather, why the formalism and flexibility competing in the tension 
have prevailed.  
Therefore and fourthly, the study also aimed at finding ways to manage the 
tension. It sought to do this by working towards a mechanism for coexistence 
between formalism and flexibility, contributing to filling a knowledge gap left not 
only by the sceptics, but also scholars who support coexistence, without offering 
proposals for how it can be done.5 Tamanaha,6 Zagler & Zanzottera7 and Evans & 
Gabel8 all admit the existence of this knowledge gap, with Tamanaha conceding to 
not being sure if such a mechanism can actually be formulated.9 
Accordingly, the study also aims to expand on knowledge regarding how the 
tension can be managed. The few scholarly attempts at answering this question, 
such as by Burton,10 Cardozo,11 Dworkin12 and Posner,13 have mainly proposed 
                                            
 
5 PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press 2008) 388); Evans and 
Gabel  (n 2) 7; R Goode, Commercial Law in the New Millennium, the Hamlyn Lectures (Sweet & 
Maxwell 1998); Tamanaha (n 1) 232-233;  
6 Tamanaha (n 1) 233. 
7 M Zagler and C Zanzottera, ‘Corporate Income Taxation Uncertainty and Foreign Direct 
Investment,’ Wien University Taxation Research Paper Series, No. 2012-07, 3. 
8 Evans & Gabel  (n 2). 
9 Tamanaha (n 1) 233. 
10 SJ Burton, Judging in Good Faith (Cambridge University Press 1992) 15; and SJ Burton, An 
Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning (Little, Brown & Co. 1985) 95-98, 136, 138-43 & 205-08. 
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entrusting the task to judicial discretion, which is deemed to make no difference. 
On the other hand, scholars like Eisenberg,14 who have proposed autonomous 
guidelines, as is done in this study, have not based their findings on analysis of 
real judging practice, informed by judicial opinions. Further, no literature has been 
found on how the tension can be managed in underdeveloped former British 
colonies like Uganda.  
The Research Process 
The research has employed the content analysis methodology, analysing the texts 
of three hundred and three hard commercial contracts decisions. The key 
indicative values ascertained from both formalism and flexibility legal theory in 
chapters three, six and eight acted as value postulates in informing the coding for 
units of analysis. After deriving the primary findings, further coding and analysis 
was done using the researcher’s legal knowledge, and inferences from the primary 
findings, guided by legal theory and the judging environment, as could be 
ascertained from the existing literature. This helped in identifying elaborating, and 
articulating categories of values behind both formalism and flexibility, and the 
higher values they speak to, as well as the ways in which they have manifested 
during adjudication. The dominant of those higher values were weighed using their 
respective frequencies to arrive at the proposed scheme of values. 
The study thereby operationalised the proposition from interests jurisprudence, that 
the tension results from a competition of interests and values, which should be 
                                                                                                                                     
 
11 BN Cardozo, ‘The Nature of the Judicial Process’ (Yale University Press 1921) 141. 
12 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth & Co. Ltd 1977) 81-130; R. Dworkin, A Matter of 
Principle, (Harvard University Press 1985) 119-180; and R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana 1986). 
13 RA Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3d ed.), (Little, Brown & Co. 1986). 
14 MA Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law, (Harvard University Press, 1988) 8-13.  
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discovered, weighed, and articulated. The dominant ones identified for balancing 
as a way towards certainty,15are those that prevailed in more than 10% of cases 
analysed overall and continued to be so influential in late post-colonial judging.  
The higher values were then analysed and at the third level, wider and more 
abstract categories of values, such as rule of law values, values of perception of 
the judicial role, responsiveness, systematic values, and doctrinal values. Finally, 
further analysis was made to reveal institutional and structural categorisation of 
values, revealing internal vis-à-vis external judging criteria, as well as legal vis-à-
vis extra-legal values as underpinning the tension in Uganda.  
The above steps were used in presenting the results of the study in chapters five, 
seven and nine, but also the values were further discussed, elaborated and 
articulated to explain their meaning, manifestations, and how they influenced the 
respective judging approaches. From the further analysis and discussion of 
findings in chapters seven and nine, the dominant competing values representing 
both sides have been identified for balancing during the formulation of ultimate 
judging guidelines, as indicated in the following summary of findings.  
Key Research Findings    
This part recaps the study’s findings in chapters five, seven and nine, that have 
provided answers to the sub-questions of what Uganda’s judging paradigm is; and 
which values manifest the tension as a real problem. The findings in chapter seven 
and nine specifically answer why the tension has prevailed.  
                                            
 
15 M.M Schoch, (translator and editor), The Jurisprudence of Interests: Selected Writings of Max 
Rumelin, Philipp Heck, Paul Oertmann, Heinrich Stoll, Julius Binder & Hermann Isay (Harvard 
University Press, 1948) 31; F. Powers ‘Some Reflections on Pound’s Jurisprudence of Interests’ 
(1953) 3:1 Catholic University Law Review 10, 15-16. 
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10.4.1  The Tension in Uganda 
Chapter five examined Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm, laying the 
foundation and demonstrating the justification for the study. It established that, as 
in other common-law jurisdictions,16 the tension has been a persistent problem 
facing the country’s commercial justice system. However, expanding such 
knowledge, the way the tension has manifested in Uganda has reveals five 
fundamental findings.  
Firstly, that Uganda’s commercial judging paradigm is characterised by a 
concurrent practice of both formalism and flexibility, throughout post-colonisation 
political and legal judging periods, albeit incoherently and irrationally, leading to 
uncertainty, supporting Evans & Gabel’s declaration,17 that both formalism and 
flexibility are needed at the same time. Further, the paradigm supports Klabbers, in 
saying that where neither side emerges the winner, we need to find coexistence.18 
The courts have seldom followed one approach predominantly, and those few 
trends have been countered by the ever-rising patterns of mixed-approach judging. 
Therefore, although a gap in knowledge is admitted by Tamanaha,19that in the 
west, it is not evidentially clear whether formalism or flexibility dominated different 
                                            
 
16 Evans and Gabel (n 2) 333, 349-50; A Phang, 'A Passion for Justice: The Natural Law 
Foundations of Lord Denning’s Thoughts and Work' (2006) (2) Global Journal of Classical 
Theology; WC Whitford, 'Faculty Perspectives: The Rule of Law', (2000) Special Issue, Wisconsin 
Law Review 723, 726; R Goode, Commercial Law in the New Millennium, the Hamlyn Lectures 
(Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 9, 16, 31. 
17 Evans and Gabel (n 2) 7, 26-33. 
18 Klabbers J, ‘Towards A Culture of Formalism’, Martti Koskenniemi and The Virtues’, (2013) 27:2, 
Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, 415. 
19 Tamanaha (n 1) 26-27. 
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historical epochs; the conclusion he shared with Horwitz,20 and Kenny, and 
Devenney;21 that the tension is defined by periodical swings between formalism 
and flexibility, is not applicable to Uganda. Instead, the findings render support to 
Duxbury’s statement that the alleged constant pendulum swing of competing 
formalism and flexibility theories is exaggerated.22 However, the findings in chapter 
four challenge his addition, that the merely practicing the two concurrently 
amounted to their coexistence. Such concurence merely evidences the tension, 
beyond which, this study has sought for a way towards genuine and principled 
coexistence.  
Secondly, contrary to the irreconcilable view that the tension is as old as 
adjudication23 and will always be there,24 in Uganda the tension started with the 
transplant of the English legal system, which was already affected by it. The 
judging paradigm in the pre-colonial era was purely flexible, which points to the 
possibility of a tension-free paradigm, and a contextual explanation to its 
foundations.   
                                            
 
20 Horwitz M, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Harvard University Press, 1977) 1-
2, 253-255. 
21 M Kenny and J Devenney ‘A Comparative Analysis of Bank Charges in Europe: OFT v. Abbey 
National Plc through the looking glass’, in J Devenney and M Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt, 
and Investment in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 212, 222. 
22 N Duxbury N, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press, 1997), 2. 
23 Evans & Gabel (n 2) 2-3. 
24 LC Wolff, 'Law and Flexibility –Rule of Law Limits of Rhetorical Silver Bullet' (2011) 11 The 
Journal of Jurisprudence 549 
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Thirdly, the judging paradigm in Uganda supports the interests jurisprudence view 
of competing values underpinning the tension.25 For every dominant formalistic 
value, there is an equally strong value or set of values motivating flexibility, 
although each value is not necessarily the reverse of the other.  
Fourthly, ascertaining and understanding the competing values should be guided 
by the legal and general contexts in which adjudication took place, as  judging 
phenomena changed with changing political and legal/constitutional contexts; and 
by evidence of internal judging culture’s influence, as the patterns and trends 
varied in the different court levels’ history. Accordingly, the search for foundations 
to the tension followed the internal/external, as well as legal/extra-legal 
dimensions.  
Finally and fifthly, domestic and international attempts at coexistence and tension-
management mechanisms were identified as being part of the commercial justice 
system. However, besides their inadequacy, the international ones have been 
ineffective. On the other hand, domestically, no coherent or rational mechanisms 
have been found. Rather, lone judges have infrequently, declared what they 
consider to be ultimate judging principles. Such principles include: the rule of law 
and its attendant formalism being viewed as the default approach; while in 
exceptional cases the totality of circumstances, backed by proof of public support 
and business practices, would be used to guide flexibility.26 Further was 
                                            
 
25 R Pound, Interpretation of History (Harvard University Press, 1946) 142-151; R. Pound, New 
Paths of the Law (University of Nebraska Press, 1950) 24-27; M.M Schoch, (translator and editor), 
The Jurisprudence of Interests: Selected Writings of Max Rumelin, Philipp Heck, Paul Oertmann, 
Heinrich Stoll, Julius Binder & Hermann Isay (Harvard University Press, 1948) 31. 
26 Kibalama v Alfasan Belgie CVB [2004] 2 EA 146. 
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substantive justice being subjected to procedural justice;27 the judicial ethical 
norms like civility, professionalism and good manners as limits to flexibility;28 
assumptions from general circumstances surrounding a caseas experience as a 
guide in recognising normativity of non-legal orders;29 the legitimacy of 
circumstances surrounding contract formation as a determinant to flexible 
judging;30 using the ‘taking judicial notice of notorious facts’ rule to decide flexibly;31 
utilitarianism as the ultimate guide;32 judicial consensus as the ultimate guide to 
acceptability and rule of recognition;33 and international best practices as a guide to 
judicial choice.34  
However, there has been no consistency, as no evidence of replication of these 
principles was observed. Nevertheless, both formalism and flexibility having been 
practiced concurrently throughout judging history speaks to both being 
indispensable. The incoherent judging choice criteria were in that case an attempt 
at coexistence of the two, which leads me to the second key finding; the theoretical 
possibility of coexistence. 
                                            
 
27 Tobacco and Commodity Traders International Inc. v Mastermind Tobacco (U) Ltd (H, C.C. 
CHCCC 18/2002(9/5/2003)). 
28 Muwema & Mugerwa Advocates v Shell (U) Ltd, (CA 18/2011 (Appendix 5: Case 30); Highland & 
Agriculture Export Ltd & Another v Alpha Global 21ST21st Joint Venture & 5 Other [2017] 
UGCOMMC 113(18/8/2017) (Appendix 5: Case 70). 
29 Edmund Schluter & Co. (Uganda) Ltd v Patel, [1969] EA 239 (Appendix 3: Case 20). 
30 Magezi & Another v Ruparelia [2005] 2 EA 156 (Appendix 5: Case 15). 
31 Mbale United Transporters Ltd v Town Clerk, Mbale Municipal Local Government Council & 
Others (HCCS 267/2004(30/9/2005),) Appendix 5: Case 55. 
32 Atom Outdoor Ltd v Arrow Centre (U) Ltd (HCCS 448/2003 (17/12/2004) (Appendix 5: Case 46); 
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33 Belex Tours & Travel v Crane Bank Ltd & Another [2013] CACA 13 (24/10/2013) (Appendix 5: 
Case 5). 
34 Commodity Export International Ltd & Another v MKM Trading Co. Ltd [2015] CACA 
81(6/10/2015) (Appendix 5: Case 80). 
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10.4.2  The Theoretical Possibility of Coexistence 
In pursuance of objective two, the study has made out a case for coexistence of 
formalism and flexibility, in a number of ways. Firstly, as indicated in the 
proceeding section, both have been concurrently practiced, but incoherently and 
irrational; with sole judges making attempts to find coexistence, pointing to its 
possibility. Secondly, the values underlying the tension are both internal and 
external, including legal and extra-legal considerations, and this has been so for 
generations, many times in the same case (mixed approach cases).  
Thirdly, a review of descriptive theory in chapter three shows more room for 
convergence of the seemingly divergent views than meets the first eye. Fourthly, 
there is significant direct scholarly support for a coexistence-judging paradigm on 
both sides.  
Fifthly, a review of contract theory in chapters six and eight points to no single 
monist theory fully accounting for formalism, flexibility, or the tension. Instead, 
many of the proponents of monist theories indicate support for the values they 
propound being capable of satisfaction by the other judging approach, as well as 
the influence of other values. Finally, singular explanations to adjudication, those 
that attribute judicial approach to purely doctrinal or contract behavioural values, 
leave many other values, inarticulate. 
 This has not only shown that coexistence is a necessity and theoretically possible, 
but also demonstrably viable. What is lacking to actualise it, is constructing a 
contextual, source based and practically responsive adjudicatory theory, as is done 
in this study. The competing values underlying the tension have been ascertained 
using content analysis of judicial opinions, guided by value postulates identified 




10.4.3  Foundations to the Tension: Value Postulates 
Against the above background, the values proposed by other scholars as 
underlying formalism and flexibility have been revisited in chapters six and eight, 
helping to identify presumptive values to inform the coding and content analysis of 
values underlying the two judging phenomena. This was in line with content 
analysis and interests jurisprudence, both of which require that such a search for 
values is informed by jural postulates, hypotheses or presuppositions.35 These 
should be informed by the relevant the theoretical and social context. In this case, 
Uganda being part of the global commercial village, such a society being the 
commercial law community, whose presuppositions are, as well as theoretical 
hypotheses, represented by the views of the different scholars in the field. 
Therefore, the working hypotheses to guide the content analysis have been the 
value postulates appearing in existing literature on values underlying the tension; 
discussed in the two chapters−chapter six with respect to formalism, and eight with 
respect to flexibility.  
Besides, the two chapters served to further make a case for coexistence, in the 
sense that hardly any value propounded by other scholars as justifying formalism 
or flexibility was found incapable of serving the opposing approach. Relatedly, 
arguments by scholars, who advanced monist approaches to understanding the 
values underlying commercial adjudication, were found wanting, if not generally, to 
account for the tension in Uganda. These include the efficiency, utilitarianism, 
fairness, market-individualism, relational, discreteness, responsiveness and 
                                            
 
35 R. Pound, New Paths of The Law (University of Nebraska Press, 1950) 32; F Powers (n 16) 
‘Some Reflections on Pound’s Jurisprudence of Interests’ (1953) 3:1 Catholic University Law 
Review 14, 15; J. Stone, ‘A Critique of Pound’s Theory of Justice’, (1935) 20:3 Iowa Law Review 
537 (Interests jurisprudence); Krippendorff K, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, 
(Sage Publications Inc., 2004) 33 (Content Analysis).   
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predictability and certainty theories of contract adjudication. Instead, further 
opportunity was observed, in chapters three, six and eight, for both sides of the 
formalism-flexibility divide acknowledging the necessity and possibility of 
coexistence. Therefore, in line with the mechanics of interests jurisprudence,36 
guided by the presumptive values, a scheme of interests (in this case values) to be 
balanced was identified in chapters seven and nine. These chapters have revealed 
the dominant competing values in Uganda’s commercial adjudication, the details of 
which are summarised in the next section. 
10.4.4  Foundations to the Tension: The Scheme of Values  
Pound proposed that the categorisation in the scheme of values, or interests as he 
termed them, should have individual, public and social interests.37 However, such 
categorisation does not account for all the values revealed from the content 
analysis. Therefore, the internal/external categorisation has been used to report 
and articulate findings in this regard. Chapters seven and nine reveal that 
underlying the tension are sets of key competing values that combine to define the 
internal and external judging criteria, competing in two ways.  
In the first place, neither formalism nor flexibility is fully or even substantially 
accounted for by any single value. Rather, their underpinning values have always 
competed amongst themselves for dominance. No single value has been observed 
as the ultimate or prime one influencing decisions in actual judicial practice, at least 
not in Uganda. Therefore, this study contributes to knowledge by supporting 
                                            
 
36 See text to section 2.5.1; R. Pound ‘A Survey of Social Interests’ (1943) 57 Harvard Law Review 
1; R. Pound, Outline of Lectures on Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press, 1943),) 97-112. 
37 R Pound ‘A Survey of Social Interests’ (1943) 57 Harvard Law Review 1; R. Pound, Outline of 
Lectures on Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press, 1943), 97-112 
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Posner,38 Llewellyn,39 Farber,40 Eisenberg,41 MacNeil,42 Trebilcock,43 Trakman44 
and Schwartz & Scott,45 who argue that the way to manage the tension does not lie 
in monist approaches.  
Relatedly, the study contributes to knowledge by validating Eisenberg’s claim, in 
demonstrating that singular theories, such as those that view judging phenomena 
as motivated by purely doctrinal values, leave many values underlying judging 
approach unarticulated.46 Instead, the pluralist approach, 47 that enables looking for 
                                            
 
38 RA Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (n 13); T Zywicki and EP Stringham, 'Common Law and 
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42 IR Macneil, ‘Values in Contract: Internal and External’ 78 Newyork University Law Review 340-
418; IR Macneil, ‘Relational Contract: What we do and do not know’, (1985) Wisconsin Law Review, 
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205, 206-222; A. Hutchinson, ‘Reciprocity in Contract’ (2013) 24 Stellenbosch law Review, 3; M 
Chen-Wishart, Contract Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 11, 16-17; C. Fried Contract as 
Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligations (Oxford University Press, 2015) 1-8; C.J. Goetz & 
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Georgia Law Review 15,16; I.R. Macneil, ‘Values in Contract: Internal and External’, (n 43) 340; 





answers to the tension’s prevalence from within judging cultures, doctrine and the 
external judging environment is demonstrated as more exhaustive, viable and 
realistic.48 Therefore, this study helps in developing a multivalued and pluralist 
approach, with a scheme of the dominant competing formalism and flexibility 
values.  
This bring us to the second level of competition, a level where the dominant values 
underpinning formalism and flexibility compete with each other to influence the 
judge’s choice, thereby resulting in the tension. In this sense, the study contributes 
to knowledge, by validating and expanding the applicability of the interests 
jurisprudence view that underlying the tension are competing interests,;49 in this 
case observed under the wider notion of values, as appears in the tabulated 
scheme of values below. 
Table 1: Scheme of Competing Values  
No. Values Underlying Formalism No.  Values Underlying 
Flexibility 
1.  Non-Interventionism  1. Interventionism in Contract 
                                                                                                                                     
 
Lectures (Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 12-14, 23-24, 26-29, 31-32; TC Grey, Formalism and Pragmatism 
in American Law (Koninklijke Brill, NV, 2014) 51-56; Denning LJ, The Discipline of Law (Butterworth 
1979); L.M.LM Friedman ‘Contract Law and Contract Research’ (Part 1) (1968) 20 Journal of Legal 
Education, 452; Tamanaha (n 1).    
48 This includes: McDougal  (n 46) 15,16; I.R. Macneil, ‘Values in Contract: Internal and External’, (n 
43) 340; Atiyah (n 5) 390-391, 650-652; R Goode, Commercial Law in the New Millennium, the 
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of Legal Education, 452; Tamanaha (n 1).    
49 Minda (n 3) 33; Holmes, OW Jnr, ‘The Path of Law’ 10(8) Harvard Law Review  (1897) 457, 465-
466; R. Pound ‘A Survey of Social Interests’ (n 37) 97-112. 
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2. Judges as Legal Mechanics 2. Judicial Law making  
3. Perception of law as logic 3. Utilitarian Instrumentalism 
4. Justice as Legality (including 
procedural justice) and legal 
perfectionism  
4. Substantive Justice 
5. Judicial Objectivity 5. Adaptability, Retroactivity 
and Elasticity of Law 
6. Judicial Rationality 6. Legal Pluralism 
7. Predictability and Certainty 7. Social Support 
8. Judicial Responsiveness to the 
legal order 
8. Judicial Responsiveness to 
society’s desires 
9. Legal Power: Judicial Authority 
Restraint 
9. Law as Predictions and 
judging by hunch 
10. Conceptual Formalism 10. Conceptual Flexibility 
11. Market Conformism 11. Consumer Welfarism  
 
12. Individualism 12. Efficiency as Commercialism 
13. Discreteness of contracting 13. Ubuntu and perceptions of 
judges as guarantors of 
justice, fairness and dispute 
settlers. 
14. Equalitarianism 14.  Judicial Absoluteness 
 The competing values in the above scheme represent the varying demands on the 
legal system, which adjudication needs to satisfy in Uganda’s commercial 
adjudication. They have been arrived at by making inferences from sub-values and 
practices observed during the content analysis of words, phrases and themes in 
real judicial opinions. The competing values identified have been weighed, and the 
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dominant ones, which are proposed for balancing to achieve coexistence, have 
been elaborated, as summarised below. 
The Internal Judging Criteria 
As part of Uganda’s internal commercial judging culture, judicial perception values 
of law’s nature, the judicial role and responsiveness are the key internal sets of 
competing values identified as underlying the tension in Uganda. In the first place, 
there was the competition between the formalistic rule of law values and the 
flexibility perceptions of law’s nature.  
The rule of law values found dominant are: justice being conceived as legality, 
especially manifested by treating procedural justice as superior to all other 
considerations, as well as formality and logic being the rules of recognition of legal 
validity; predictability and certainty of law but not as contractual terms; objectivity, 
especially manifested by judicial adherence to the logical deduction of law, 
literalism in contract interpretation, and the notion of sanctity of contract; and 
rationality, signified by the derivation of contract law from general principles. 
Relatedly, formalistic judging has been motivated by the Langdallian perception of 
law,50 which views it as discoverable fact from texts, determinate, formal, certain, 
and definable by logical deduction. However, the law is not perceived as value 
free, as this element hardly surfaced.  
Some peculiarities appeared with regard to the role these rules of law values play 
in motivating formalism in Uganda’s case. Notably, rationality had the least 
frequency, implying that the claim, that the derivation of contract law from general 
                                            
 
50 CC Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contract with References and Citations, (Little, 
Brown & Company, 1871),) Preface; see text to section 3.2.1; 3.2.2; see text to section 7.2.3. 
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principles is central to formalism,51 is exaggeration or not universally applicable. 
Further, conceptual ordering of law as an indication of rationality in Uganda’s case 
did not include respecting the strict legal categorisation and classification, such as 
between contract and tort, although the two have not been fused to create ‘contort’.  
Furthermore, contrary to claims by scholars like Frank,52 certainty is not mere 
illusion by judges, but one of the key values motivating judges towards formalism, 
that should be balanced with flexibility values to find coexistence. However, it does 
not include certainty of contract, but law; as the former was insignificant. 
On the other hand, flexibility has been motivated by perception of law as elastic 
and adaptable to changing market and other realities, coextensive with its 
retroactivity – being adaptable to accommodate future demands. These manifested 
by judicial recognition of normativity in commercial practices, as well as standards 
like reasonableness.  
The other key internal flexibility value of law’s perception identified is utilitarian 
instrumentalism, which partly supports claims by Pound53 and Holmes,54 that 
flexibility is motivated by the jurisprudence of ends as opposed to conceptual 
jurisprudence. It is only partially supported, because in Uganda, such 
instrumentalism is actually permitted by the law on judging. Further, the social 
policy indicated by Pound,55 and Holmes,56is not what instrumentalism in Uganda 
serves. Rather, pure utilitarianism−manifested by adherence to the purposes; as 
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53 R Pound, ‘Mechanical Jurisprudence’, (1908) 8:8 Columbia Law Journal, 611. 
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55 Pound, ‘Mechanical Jurisprudence’ (n 54) 609. 
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well as practicality and functionality of the law and contractual terms, have 
contributed to motivating the flexibility in the tension.  
Judges’ perceptions of their role in commercial disputes have also contributed to 
the tension. In formalistic opinions, judges have perceived themselves as legal 
mechanics and contract police, who fix bolts in defined holes, and oversee the 
strict enforcement of rules and contractual termsfreedom of contract and non-
interventionism. This is without intervention in contract, no matter the calls for 
fairness, justice, equity and the like. On their part, flexible opinions have exhibited 
judges’ perceptions of their role as including lawmakers, guarantors of fairness and 
justice, and absolute settlers of disputes, otherwise interventionists. At times this 
included judging by mere hunch, fitting the claim by Holmes, that law is merely 
predictions of what judges will do about disputes.57 Accordingly, judges have filled 
perceived gaps in, stretched or sidestepped, rules of law or contract terms, as well 
as interfered with contractual terms to find fairness and equity as a means to 
justice. The dominant sense of justice and fairness observed was a continuation of 
the pre-colonial ubuntu an African traditional ideal that emphasises compassion, 
interconnectivity of humanity, the common good, and restitution and dispute 
settlement.58  
Formalism in the tension has also been motivated by strong judicial 
responsiveness to the desire that the legal order regulates commercial 
transactions; otherwise expressed as judicial accountability or acceptability. It was 
mainly manifested by a value-free and mechanical application of rules, which 
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remained resilient even after the 1995 constitution commanding courts to 
administer substantive justice at the expense of technicalities.59  
For its part, flexibility has been motivated by judicial responsiveness to people’s 
desire for justice, informed not by formal rules and technicalities, but experience, 
utility and peculiar contexts surrounding contractual formation, performance or 
adjudication. Accordingly, this study contributes to validating Holmes’s declaration, 
that the life of the law is not logic, but amongst others thing, experience and the felt 
necessities of the time.60 However, more validation appears from the study having 
extended the search to values external to the institution and person of the judge – 
the external judging criteria. 
The External Judging Criteria 
External to internal judging culture, the tension has been motivated by competing 
key systematic and doctrinal legal values, as well as extra-legal ones. In the 
systematic legal category, the legal system has been found to produce values that 
motivate judges towards both formalism and flexibility, but without mechanisms to 
reconcile the two. In this regard, four key values have been found to underlie 
formalism. 
Firstly, related to the judicial rule of law values, is perfectionism of the legal system, 
defined by clarity, certainty, and consistency61 constituted by the values of 
legality.62 These include comprehensiveness, completeness or clarity, conceptual 
order, formality, and acceptability or responsiveness. Secondly is the value of legal 
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power or judicial restraint, standing for constitutional and non-constitutional 
compulsion; adherence to which makes judges decide formalistically, in 
compliance with legal provisions.  
Thirdly, conceptual formalism has motivated formalism, although not as the kernel 
claimed by Tamanaha.63 Rather, alongside other formalism values, judges have 
adhered to constitutional interconnectivity and consistency, the legal classification 
of laws, detailed statutory rules regulating contracts and general contract 
principles. Fourthly is the growing influence of equalitarianism and legal neutrality, 
as judges presume equal bargaining power, and ignore social and economic 
classification; although this trend could have a political agenda, and therefore be 
instrumentalist.  
On the flexibility side, three key systematic values were found to motivate judges  
in the opposite direction, of anti-formalism practices. Firstly is conceptual flexibility, 
manifested by normative recognition of indeterminate standards. Secondly is legal 
pluralism, especially manifested by the normativity of non-legal orders like 
business practices, experience and circumstances surrounding adjudication and 
contracting. Thirdly is the superiority of substantive justice over procedural justice, 
not only as an indication of law’s adaptability and utilitarianism, but the 
constitutionally required ultimate sense of justice, practically perceived as 
substantialism/anti-formalism, and a licence to instrumentalism. 
Besides systematic values, the competing external legal values identified as 
underlying the tension included those embedded in contract doctrine. First and 
foremost, the findings do not support scholarly claims that at the heart of 
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commercial adjudication are judicial adherences to contract as promise,64 
reciprocity/bargain65 or consent.66 All these values appeared insignificantly in the 
opinions analysed, which casts doubt on the universal application of the theories 
propounding each of them as being the ultimate value underlying contract 
adjudication, formalistic or flexible.  
Instead, on the formalist side, the findings support Adams & Brownsword’s thesis,67 
that market individualism is the set of values underlying both the nature of contract 
doctrine, and trends in adjudication.68 It has been articulated under the sub-
categories of market conformism and individualism, otherwise expressed as non-
interventionism. Supporting the market through values like predictability and 
certainty, as well as enforcement of contracts/transaction security, has significantly 
motivated formalistic decisions. Likewise, the individual will, and autonomy of 
contracting parties, has been very influential; manifested by, among other things, 
adherence to freedom and autonomy as well as sanctity of contract or contract 
solidarity. However, in Uganda, although the most prevalent formalistic values, 
they still motivated formalism in combination with other key values, having barely 
accounted for more than 50% of opinions analysed.   
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On the other hand, the claim by Friedman69 and Adams & Brownsword,70 that 
consumer welfarism is a major motivator of flexibility, has been supported but not 
to the extent of being the prime value. It manifested by judges interfering with 
contracts to find contractual justice, fairness equity, and good faith for consumers, 
following statutory requirements or in exercise of discretion allowed by doctrinal 
aspects like normative standards, a phenomenon on the increase.  
Flexibility has also been motivated by efficiency and wealth maximisation as values 
of contract doctrine, but not as means to social welfare, dependent on proof of 
unconscionability or even the prime values, in the sense in which law and 
economics scholars like Llewellyn understood them.71 In Uganda, courts have 
adhered to these values and their manifestations, in service of commercialism, the 
individualist quest for maximum profits, as the higher value.    
Finally, competing extra-legal values have also motivated the tension. On the 
formalistic side, the key one has been discreteness in contract behaviour, 
expediency and accuracy having appeared below the threshold. Courts have 
predominantly treated contracts as discrete, without recognising the resultant 
relationships, besides the rights and duties parties defined by rules of law or the 
agreed terms.  
On the other hand, flexibility decisions have not been significantly motivated by 
recognition of relational contracting, for its relative frequency did not even pass the 
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10% threshold. However, even without relational contracting, contract has 
persisted even during the authoritarian regimes, with adjudication being not only 
formalistic due to the discreteness of contract behaviour. This finding disproves 
Macneil’s singular contract-behaviour explanation to flexibility, which made him 
claim lack of contract in authoritarian regimes, citing Uganda’s 1970s.72 The key 
motivating value categories were identified as judicial absolutism and social 
support. Judges were found to be exercising unrestrained authority, by ignoring not 
only legality but also professionally fundamental values like accountability. Instead, 
in such cases, decisions have been based on absolutism-oriented values like 
common sense, convenience or social-political realities, supporting the proposition 
that the political ideology of the time influences judging.73 This is especially 
because judicial absolutism is a side effect of political absolutism,74 which has 
been the dominant political culture in Uganda.75 
Likewise, social support, sometimes termed public interest, has motivated judges 
in flexible decisions, in the pre-colonial sense of public acceptability of laws and 
judicial decisions. However, it has also featured in the political sense of decisions 
having to conform to ‘public policy’, understood as ‘state policy’. This political 
sense needs further investigation, like other values whose wider attributes were not 
readily observable by a content analysis of judicial opinions. Meanwhile, it suffices 
to acknowledge social support as one of the values underlying flexibility, which 
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need to be balanced with competing formalistic values to arrive at coexistence, as 
a way to manage the tension. 
Balancing Competing Values for Coexistence 
This section makes recommendations on how coexistence between formalism and 
flexibility can be achieved, as a way to managing the tension. Essentially, efforts 
should be made towards formulation of ultimate commercial judging guidelines, 
containing rules, principles and standards that achieve a balance between the 
competing values indicated in the scheme of values.76 The content of these 
guidelines should aim to achieve three tasks.  
In the first place, the guidelines should define the ultimate ends Uganda’s 
commercial justice system aims to serve, because although western scholars 
advance social welfare as the goal legal systems aim to achieve,77 in Uganda it 
has been found insignificant as a judging motivator. Instead, the dominant goals 
seem to be fairness and justice, articulated as both procedural and substantive 
justice. However, the parameters of substantive justice, which is even a 
constitutional standard, need to be clearly defined. My recommendation is that 
ubuntu-a traditionally and judicially acceptable conception of justice; should be 
formally adopted as the measure of substantive justice, and its socially acceptable 
constituent norms clearly elaborated. 
Relatedly, the norms, values and aspirations of the people, which Article 126 (1) of 
the constitution provides as an alternative source of normativity to the law, should 
be investigated, synthesised, and clearly defined. Although a starting point, the 
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results of such a project should act as jural postulates, and thereby help in further 
understanding of the values underlying adjudication; and result in a more 
exhaustive scheme of values than appears in section 10.4 above. Judging with 
reference to judging guidelines derived from this scheme of values caters for 
constitutional legal pluralism, while at the same time serving formalistic competing 
values like predictability and certainty. This is however subject to interests 
jurisprudence’s notion of relativity, which is to the effect that the significance of 
values depends on acceptability and recognition by a particular society, reflected 
by its current civilisation.78 This should be satisfied by the scheme of values being 
not only elaborated through further research, but also modified periodically, 
following a content analysis of judicial opinions.  
On the other hand, rather than the blind worship of predictability and certainty, the 
guidelines should aim at achieving realistic legal certainty. This is certainty that is 
contextual, taking into account the tension as a reality, in which legal certainty as a 
motivator of formalism has faced strong competition from flexibility, as well as other 
formalism-engendering values. Absolute certainty can mean unfair rigidity; 
however, it should not be a matter of case-by-case, rather a deliberate articulation 
of what realistic certainty should mean in Uganda’s legal system, and how it should 
be secured during adjudication. The goal should be certainty as to what factors, 
legal and extra-legal, will guide judges in interpreting laws and contractual terms, 
rather than the actual nature, content and meaning of laws.   
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Guidelines aimed at achieving the above goals will help regulate against both 
unprincipled flexibility and blind formalism. I make the following propositions, as 
samples of what could form the content of viable judging guidelines.  
Firstly, similar to the mechanism in Articles 31-33 of the Multilateral Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties,79 but even more exhaustively, the guidelines 
should formalise, standardise and make hierarchical sets of norms, for the 
interpretation and application of contract laws and terms. They should provide for 
not a single norm, but the rules of law values being the default judging criteria, and 
clearly define when and how to resort to flexibility as the exception. Such an 
interpretation and application protocol is in essence the principle laid down by 
Byamugisha, J.A in Kibalama v Alfasan Belgie CVB,80 and supported by US 
Justice Scalia.81 
If adopted, the principle will not contravene the constitutional requirement for 
substantive law being superior to technicalities, because not all laws are mere 
technicalities. This explains the original support by the Supreme Court for the view 
by Rawls,82 and Fuller,83 that substantive justice should be subject to the law; and 
procedural justice its guarantor, and requirement for its application during 
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adjudication.84 Further, as indicated in the scheme above, the values of Ugandans 
that the same constitution obliges judges to adhere to, include values of legality.  
Secondly, to resort to flexibility, the guidelines should define triggers for the 
applicability of experience, utility, and a judge’s personal attributes, as well as 
requiring proof of both the primary and normative facts. Triggering normative facts 
like impending absurdity from the literal interpretation of the rule, or inadequacy of 
the law to regulate the dispute, should be clearly defined, and requirement be 
made that they are proved before courts have authority to invoke flexibility 
considerations. This will guard against blind formalism, and unprincipled flexibility, 
by for instance taking care of both certainty and the high dominance of individual 
will, as values underlying formalism, while leaving room for the normativity of 
experience and utility. 
 Beyond the triggering facts, even the flexibility-engendered uncertainty 
surrounding the content of law will be managed, by defining what extraneous 
considerations judges can invoke, thereby serving the interests of formalism. This 
will not be new, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has so far tamed the 
tension; by following the 1969 Multilateral Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties restrictions on such considerations, to the facts defining the contract’s 
evolution, as well as current and future commercial practices. Similarly, the 
American Commercial Code has defined the nature of commercial practices judges 
can invoke to find efficiency.  
Thirdly, the parameters beyond which a flexible judge cannot jump should be 
constructed. This will secure formalistic judicial restraint, as well as acceptability 
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and responsiveness, both in the formalistic and flexible senses. For instance, even 
where judges find themselves having to make law, consistency with existing laws 
should be a requirement, such that they can only fill gaps to maintain contract 
doctrine’s consistency, rather than side-stepping, or stretching law beyond its 
province.   
Fourthly, in the same vein, is adoption of proof-based discretion. For instance, 
regarding contract interpretation and enforcement, flexibility-triggering facts like 
bad faith, impending involuntary significant loss, or other absence of free will, 
requirement should be made for their proof. The viability of this principle as a 
judging guideline is supported by its would-be sceptics. The realists have proposed 
that unconscionability should be proved before judges invoke economic 
efficiency.85 Likewise, in the High Trees Case,86 Lord Denning only called for 
intervention with unreasonable terms to protect the weaker party; which implies 
measured intervention, backed by proof of enabling facts. Such a requirement for 
proof-based discretion will guard against interventionism for sheer hunch or 
commercialism, observed as underlying the tension in Uganda.  
Fifthly, judges should be restricted to flexibly looking for answers within the context 
of the contract, to avoid absurdities such as happened in Muwema & Mugerwa 
Advocates v Shell (U) Ltd.87 The judicial code of conducted cited by the Court of 
Appeal in that case, as forbidding the unprofessional manner in which the case had 
been decided in the High Court, does guide actual judicial choice in seeking 
answers to disputes. This principle will check the free ride judges use in judging by 
hunch or being motivated by inarticulate, but otherwise extra-legal considerations 
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like political ideology.  Decisions like the one in Traces v Attorney General, where 
the judge treated a President’s political pronouncement at a rally as defining 
government policy and overriding statutory law and contractual terms, would be a 
nullity and automatically appealable. Therefore, judges would refrain from invoking 
unpredictable extra-legal considerations, without failing to intervene in unfair 
contracts, as it would be clear how experience, utility and the like can be used.  
Sixthly, the guidelines should bring certainty to key indeterminate standards and 
concepts, by assigning them Uganda’s context-specific meanings. For instance, 
reasonableness should be defined to mean what is proved to be ordinarily 
acceptable in the Ugandan marketplace, as opposed to leaving it to judges’ whims. 
Likewise, social support and its coextension of public interest should be interpreted 
only within the context of the objectives and directives of state policy in the 
constitution. These are not entirely certain themselves but provide a framework 
within which courts should understand social support as a basis of normativity.   
Finally, another key guideline for adjudication should be responsiveness to both 
the legal order as the default, and social aspirations as the exception. 
Responsiveness should be understood as acceptability of judicial decisions, as 
opposed to the sense proposed by Eisenberg, which requires judicial 
responsiveness to legality and the discourse from the legal profession.88 
Eisenberg’s proposal leaves the ends of public aspirations and acceptability of 
judicial decisions beyond rules not served and the tension untamed. To achieve 
coexistence, a decision should be acceptable depending on how strongly it 
responds to the legal order, which will now include judging guidelines aimed at 
coexistence goals. 
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However, in cases where flexibility-triggering facts will have been proved, then the 
decision would be acceptable depending on how strongly it also responds to social 
aspirations, ascertainable not by open-ended judicial discretion, political 
manoeuvres or hunch. Rather, judges should use reasoning that conforms to the 
national objectives and directives of state policy forming the preamble to the 
constitution, as the grundnorm proposed by Kelsen, the conformity to which 
determines the validity of any judge-made laws.89 A more predictable and certain 
legal framework will involve resolution of the indeterminacy in those objectives and 
directives, by for instance defining how they rank amongst themselves, as well as 
formalising informal normative sources like custom. But even before this 
refinement is done, formally declaring the objectives as the grundnorm will provide 
certainty to the users of commercial law, as this will become the arena within which 
flexibility reasoning is justifiable and legally permissible.  
Such a view of responsiveness achieves a balance between the formalism-
engendering values of conceptual formalism, legal order responsiveness, and rule 
of law values, on one hand, and the flexibility values of conceptual flexibility, 
adaptability, retroactivity of law, and social support, on the other.  A case in point is 
Dr Syedna Mohamed Burhannudin Saheb & 2 Others v Jamil Din & Others,90 
where the judge was motivated to give service to conceptual formalism, judicial 
rationality, as well as freedom and sanctity of contract, representing market 
individualism, refusing to interfere with contract on grounds of failure to find clear 
principles on unconscionability or justice in bargains.  
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However, if the guideline was in force, such formalism values would be served by 
the guidelines permitting strict adherence to contractual terms and rules of law, but 
also creating such cases as exceptions in which the judge has to go beyond the 
existence of principles or what appears on the face of the contract. Accordingly, 
flexibility values like adaptability, social support, legal pluralism and the relational 
nature of contracting would also be served. This is because judges would look at 
whether the terms agreed should be viewed as harsh and unconscionable, taking 
into account Uganda’s history, experiences and customs relevant to the particular 
community the contracting parties belong to, as required by the national objectives. 
The guideline on proof of normative facts would in this case combine with 
responsiveness to manage the tension, and reduce legal uncertainty, as 
acceptability of judicial opinions based on social responsiveness would still have to 
be proof-based.  
The above examples serve to demonstrate the viability of coexistence of formalism 
and flexibility, managed by formulation of commercial judging guidelines that target 
the balancing of competing values in the tension between the two judging 
phenomena in Uganda. More guidelines can be constructed along this course, and 
the above examples can be further refined or elaborated, but the time and space in 
this study could not permit doing so. Nevertheless, it suffices that the sample 
guidelines support the viability of a mechanism for attaining coexistence between 
formalism and flexibility, and thereby have the tension managed, towards realistic 
legal certainty in Uganda’s commercial adjudication. Therefore, the study has a lot 
of relevancy and impact on knowledge and practice relating to commercial justice 
in Uganda, as well as other common law jurisdictions.  
Relevance and Impact of the Study 
The study has contributed to knowledge by expanding on research that supports 
the possibility of coexistence between formalism and flexibility, as a way towards 
managing the tension between them. Secondly, it expands the applicability and 
therefore validates the jurisprudence of interests, to the extent that the theory 
attributes prevalence of the tension to competing values within adjudication. 
Thirdly, it operationalises the theory’s thesis that the solution to the tension lies in 
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discovering the competing interests, from court cases, weighing them, and 
balancing the dominate ones. Fourthly, the study expands knowledge by 
overcoming the weaknesses of interests jurisprudence, especially the failure to 
articulate how the competing values can be discovered and elaborated, as well as 
the way they should be balanced, the approach of leaving it to the judges being 
self-defeating.  
Fifthly, the study contributes to knowledge by applying content analysis 
methodology to the mechanism for tension management recommended by 
interests jurisprudence, demonstrating their natural affinity and using it to explain 
phenomena in real court cases.  Therefore, it thereby also validates Hall & Wright’s 
claim that content analysis is the appropriate methodology for understanding what 
underlies judicial opinions.91 
Sixthly, the study contributes to knowledge of the tension as a reality in Uganda’s 
commercial adjudication, as well as its foundations, being the values competing for 
sustaining both formalism and flexibility. It is a rare inquiry into how and why judges 
reach decisions, not only in Uganda but also globally.92  
In this case, and seventhly, the study expands the challenge to monist 
jurisprudence, as well as the exclusive doctrinal understanding of adjudication, by 
validating a multivalued understanding of the values underlying the tension. A 
scheme of values is therefore identified, detailing the foundations to the tension.    
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Eighthly, the study demonstrates how the tension can be managed, and how the 
mechanism to do so can be formulated/constructed; hitherto a gap in knowledge 
admitted by many notable scholars. The recommendations made can be 
developed further and made the basis for a comprehensive set of commercial 
judging guidelines for managing judicial choice, thus the tension. Therefore, the 
study is useful to the Ugandan judiciary, as well as adjudicatory theory generally; in 
helping to streamline the way commercial cases are decided and help to manage 
the tension.  
Ninthly, it will help enhance certainty in commercial law, if the recommendations 
are adopted, but even before that, by bringing understanding to what motivates 
judges in Uganda to decide either flexibly or formalistically. Such certainty will 
benefit private counsel in advising clients, as well as the business community, 
including foreign investors, about what to expect in Ugandan courts. Finally, the 
study has been carried out within certain limits, as well as  areas for further 
research it provokes that I proceed to acknowledge.  
Extent of the study’s Contributions 
For this study to be accomplished within the time and space permitted, while at the 
same time attaining research depth, validity and replicability, it has been restricted 
within certain parameters. Firstly, it has focused on hard cases, which may not be 
representative of the general commercial justice system; yet judging guidelines 
cannot be formulated to only work in hard cases. This is especially true when these 
cases are defined by the difficulty of their resolution, rather than the subject matter, 
or other legally recognised form of categorisation.  But even then, it is in hard 
cases that the tension can be clearly and easily demonstrated. Further, it is in hard 
cases that the tension is more likely to manifest, as judges have the legal 
professional discourse as a compelling guide to what answer is available in a 
straightforward dispute.   
Secondly, the findings from the content analysis were dependent on the 
researcher’s inference capabilities, which on the face of it creates room for different 
results if another person considered the same observations. The theory and 
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literature relied on to guide inferences could also be understood differently by 
different people. However, it is the nature of content analysis methodology that 
inferences be drawn from words used in texts to arrive at findings. In this case, 
validation is made by detailing the theoretical premises relied on, as was done in 
chapters three, four, six and eight.  
Thirdly, the research does not investigate or offer a mechanism for ascertaining the 
role of the wider political, social or economic judging environment in influencing the 
tension. Doing so would have helped explain the deeper meaning and contextual 
setting of the values observed during the content analysis. However, that would 
require a dedicated investigation that employs techniques for eliciting results 
beyond judicial opinions. But even then, without a prior understanding of what 
judicial opinions reveal as the values motivating formalism and flexibility, such a 
wider inquiry would be merely theoretical, without grounding in the reality of 
adjudication.    
Fourthly, in operationalising the interests jurisprudence ‘mechanics’, a 10% 
prevalence has been used as the threshold, in weighing and determining the 
dominant values to discuss and recommend to the scheme of values. One could 
however argue that this does not guarantee conclusiveness. It for instance fails to 
guard against the possibility of a value having appeared minimally, or even not 
appeared at all, but being a strong influence that is simply not being articulated in 
the opinions. Therefore, suppressive phenomena like judges fearing their decisions 
being overturned on appeal, or even public backlash, are not catered for.  In any 
case, the 10% threshold may arguably be too high a bar to disqualify a value. 
However, a bar had to be used for coming up with dominant values, and since the 
space left to 100% is much higher than the one to 0%, 10% presents a safe bottom 
line, that ensures a substantial portion of all key values being captured.  
Fifthly, the content analysis took into account multiple influences that certain 
indicative values and manifestations had. Content analysis methodology 
guarantees reliability and validity of results by treating each analytical unit as 
having one relevance, subject to the field of study, just as interests jurisprudence 
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propose to treat all values as equal. The multiple relevance was adapted as such 
an exception, since in law one variable, be it a value, principle or rule can have 
multiple implications in the same set of facts, thus the very essence of hard cases. 
Nevertheless, the values identified can be further tested through a social-legal 
inquiry, which would involve interviewing judges. Therefore, the study presents 
material for the further research it may provoke. 
  Areas for Further Research 
The study invites research into what judges themselves have to say about their 
motivations, and therefore the foundations to the tension. The results in this study 
need to be used as the beginning and not the end of the investigation into the 
competing values in Uganda’s commercial adjudication, so as to more exhaustively 
identify the scheme of values for balancing. 
In the same way, the linkage between the values observable from contents of 
judicial opinions and the wider historical, social, political, and economic contexts 
surrounding judging needs further investigation. Such an investigation should be 
guided by exploratory social-legal research methodologies capable of tapping into 
all relevant sources of data.  
Finally, investigation also needs to be done into whether judging guidelines will 
actually help manage the tension, or simply create another source of judicial 
restraint engendering further formalism at the expense of justice and fairness. 
Likewise, which rules, principles and standards should constitute judging 
guidelines, needs more examination as a deliberate pre-regulation study.   
Final Conclusion  
In conclusion, the tension between formalism and flexibility is a problem and reality 
facing Uganda’s commercial adjudication. It has manifested by the two judging 
approaches having been concurrently practised across judging history, 
engendered by competing values, without a coherent, certain and rational 
mechanism that would allow them to coexist. Contrary to the dominant theoretical 
view, coexistence between the two is not only necessary in Uganda, but also 
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theoretically, and demonstrably viable, as a way to managing the tension and 
enhancing legal certainty.  
The way to arrive at coexistence is to operationalise interests jurisprudence, to the 
extent that there is need for discovering the competing values underlying the 
tension, from judicial opinions; then weigh them, and in relation to the time in issue, 
balance the dominant ones. The balancing should be done through the 
construction of hierarchically ordered ultimate judging guidelines, informed by 
clearly defined goals that should include clarifying Uganda’s conception of justice, 
jural postulates, as well as a realistic-contextual and institutionally based 
conception of legal certainty.     
In terms of competing values to be balanced, a content analysis of Uganda’s 
judicial opinions has revealed a scheme of values, demonstrating that both 
formalism and flexibility have been motivated by values internal and external to 
judging culture. In the internal category, the tension has been motivated by the 
conflict between values of perception of law’s nature, as well as the judge’s roles in 
disputes, plus judicial responsiveness to legality on the one hand, and socially 
perceived justice on the other. Likewise, conflicting legal external values of both a 
systematic and doctrinal nature have been at play, such as the competition 
between substantive and procedural justice, as well as consumer welfarism and 
market individualism.  In the extra-legal category, formalism has been motivated by 
discreteness in contracting, while judicial absolutism and social support have 
competed to maintain flexibility.   
It is proposed that the tension can be managed by making formalism and flexibility 
coexist, through formulation of commercial judging guidelines. These should, 
among other things, contain rules, principles and standards that help to 
standardise and formalise law and contract interpretation, while allowing 
adaptability, utility, fairness and justice to be served, whenever the case qualifies. 
Also, indeterminate standards like substantive justice, fairness, and 
reasonableness should be contextually and with certainty defined, as should the 
parameters and circumstances for invoking extra-legal norms. Such guidelines 
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should aim at creating realistic legal certainty, while avoiding unfettered formalism 
or flexibility.  
Therefore the study contributes to knowledge by expanding adjudicatory theory. It 
expands understanding of the tension as a real problem in commercial 
adjudication, as well as its manifestations and foundations, generally, and 
particularly in Uganda. The study also demonstrates that management of the 
tension, through the coexistence of formalism and flexibility, is not only necessary 
but theoretically and demonstrably viable. This can be achieved by 
operationalisation of interests jurisprudence’s normative prescriptive theory.  
The study adds that the judging guidelines should be not only hierarchical, or 
doctrinally focused, but more importantly, multiple-value and institutionally inspired. 
The search for and weighing of such multiple competing interests/values proposed 
by interests jurisprudence can be undertaken, using content analysis methodology; 
the coding being informed by contract theory; legal theory on formalism, flexibility 
and management of the tension as well as other existing literature, on both the 
tension and its foundations. The findings should follow both direct observation, as 
well as inferences, guided not only by the value postulates; but also the institutional 
theory of law’s thesis of understanding all legal phenomena through their 
surrounding contexts. Accordingly, the study provides a good foundation for further 
research into how the tension between formalism and flexibility can be managed, 
not only in Uganda, but also universally. 
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APPENDIX 1:  Formalism And Flexibility In Hard Cases During Colonial Uganda (1894-1962) 
No. CASE 
TITLE 
CITATION COURT & 
JUDGE 
CASE SUMMARY JUDICIAL 
APPROACH 









Vol. 1 41 
 
HC The court held that the 1900 
Uganda Agreement was a source 
of rights in law, and as such 
specific performance could not be 
ordered where under native law the 
Lukiiko had to give consent before 
a private transaction like the 
purchase of land could be made 
and where such consent was not 

























It was declared that without the 
need to rely on any legal principles, 
common sense was enough in 
interpreting the law, such that 
where an enactment stated that 
‘where the principal though 
disclosed cannot be sued,’ it meant 
that where the principal cannot be 
sued at the time the contract is 
made.  
The Chief Justice reasoned that:  
‘After all, as a certain distinguished 
jurist once said, our law is rapidly 
degenerating into common sense’. 
Flexibility 
o Abductive Reasoning 
in interpretation of 
statute or precedents 
(ABDUCTIVE): 
Judge’s Prejudices 
and Intuitions Used 
to apply law i.e. The 
judge applied the law 
with regard to what 
made sense to him 














o Social Support as 
a Rule of Validity 
and Recognition 




3. Mwenge v 
Migadde 
(1932-35) 
UPLR Vol. 5, 
98 
 
HC Notwithstanding the pleas for 
justice based on customary law, 
the court held that: 
If the provisions of any law were 
repugnant to the continued 
existence of any custom, that 
custom must be treated as 
abrogated and destroyed even if it 
was not done expressly.  
The repugnancy test of the validity 
of customary law was taken as 
literally understood. 
Formalism  




application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 




hierarchy of norms 
under the Uganda 
Order in Council and 






















UPLR Vol. 5 
130, 133 
HC The words ‘in a running condition’ 
describing the quality of goods sold 
were interpreted to mean that the 
seller had to supply equipment to 
the buyer’s ginnery and leave it 
running.  
Arguments about fairness that 
would allow the seller to merely 
supply goods of merchantable 
quality without regard to the end 




o Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC):  
Judicial Non-
Interventionism; 









UPLR Vol. 5 
193 
HC No evidence of fraud, trickery, 
pressure or undue advantage had 
been adduced and the plaintiff was 
proved to have been of merchant 
age with no mental incapacity.  
The court held that the defendant 
Flexibility 
o The judge making 
law (LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the 












(lender) still had to prove that the 
borrower was even then, not 
entitled to relief on the ground that 
it was “a hard bargain”.  Therefore, 
the equitable  doctrine of 
unconscionable bargains had been 
invoked.  
Fairness and equity 
invoked to Interfere 
with contract terms. 
(EFFICIENCY); 
o Law as 
Experience 
(LEXP).   
6. Gulam 
Mohamme
d v E. 
Ethel. 
(1932-35) 
UPLR Vol. 5 
ULR 290 
HC In an employment contract case, 
the court accepted informality and 
flexibility by accepting informal 









terms as rebuttable 

















as valuable as 















Under a contract for the sale of 
goods, the seller appropriated 
goods to the contract in a 
deliverable state but the seller only 
took delivery of some and refused 
to take the rest. The seller then 
sued for the price of the balance. 
On appeal, the respondent sought 
the appeal to be dismissed on 
ground that the point being argued 
Flexibility 
 
o Undue regard to 










o Law as a Means 









was not pleaded in the first place.  
He also relied on Hassan Merali v. 
Nanji khimji UHCA 4/1917 that had 
decided that the unpaid seller in 
such cases had no right to bring an 
action for the price, as that 
amounted to specific performance, 
yet damages would suffice.   
o The court held that 
notwithstanding the Sale of 
Goods Ordinance, the Indian 
Contract Ordinance could be 
invoked to determine a sale of 
goods dispute; 
o The unpaid seller could exercise 
the right to bring an action for the 
price as the most obvious remedy 
but reserved the right to exercise 
other subsidiary remedies like 
lien of the goods, stoppage in 
transit, rescission and resale of 
the goods with its contingent right 
to sue for damages; 
o The sale of goods having been 
for unascertained goods, they 
were appropriated to the contract 
and thereby delivered 
constructively; 
o In Uganda, unlike England and 
South Africa, courts were not so 
strict on pleadings, so the appeal 
would not be dismissed.  
 






(1933) 5 HC The court restated the law that in 
any dispute between natives the 
Formalism 








ULR 55 native courts had exclusive 
jurisdiction.  
The court further noted that there 
was a lot of injustice from delays of 
the 20 months before a vesting 
order could be enforced and the 
inability of native courts to enforce 
their judgments, but regretted it 
could not help.  
interpretation, or 
mechanical 






o Role of Courts as 
implementers not 
makers of the law 
(ROC-
NONMAKERS); 
o Certainty of Law 
(COL). 






The East African Court of Appeal 
held that traditionally in Buganda 
no individual or group of individuals 
could modify the original customs 
of a native community, not even the 
court, without the assent of the 
native community. This had the 
effect of modifying Buganda’s 
customary law through judicial 
flexibility, by removing the King’s 
power to amend the law. 
Note: 
The flexibility of the court here was 
to introduce formalism in customary 
law by making its rules fixed and 
only changeable by a rigorous 
process of obtaining public support. 
Flexibility 
o The judge making 
law (LAW MAKING): 





o Social Support as 
a Rule of Validity 
and Recognition 





o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 
Gaps in the Law. 
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HC The court highlighted the 
uncertainty in the indeterminate law 
on jurisdiction of the courts by 
holding that in view of s.8 of the 
Native Courts Ordinance, business 
associations like companies, even 
if wholly owned by Africans, were 
not deemed African and if an 
African was party to a dispute, it 
could be tried by the protectorate 
courts.  
Therefore, Africans who traded 
under corporations would be able 
to ouster the jurisdiction of native 
courts.  
Flexibility 





Application of the 









o Law as a means 


















 In commercial matters, the 
protectorate and African courts had 
concurrent jurisdiction in provinces 
outside Buganda and a plaintiff 
would have a choice of forum, 
whereas in Buganda, the High 
Court had no jurisdiction to 
entertain a commercial dispute 
where all the parties were African.  
In this case, the High Court held 
that even a decree of the Lukiiko 
(native legislature and superior 
court) could not be filed for 
enforcement in the High Court.  
Formalism 




application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 


















HC In this case, it was considered 
whether under Article 6 of the 
Uganda Agreement that acted as 
Formalism & 
Flexibility  
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM); 


















the colonial constitution, 
recognition of the native King 
(Kabaka) was to be guaranteed on 
condition that the Kabaka followed 
Her Majesty the Queen’s laws and 
cooperated with her. 
 The Kabaka opposed British plans 
to create an East African 
Federation, and for that reason, he 
was deposed and exiled.  
Mukwaba challenged the colonial 
government’s actions and partly 
argued that the Uganda Agreement 
could not override Buganda’s 
tradition under which the Kabaka 
was the sovereign, and that it was 
not a source of law.   
The court: 
o Interpreting the terms of the 1900 
Uganda Agreement and its 
amendments effected by the 
Laws Agreements of 1910 and 
1935, declared them as part of 
the constitution of Uganda, and 
thereby a source of law and 
rights in Uganda. 
o On the question of whether 
Article 6 of the 1900 Uganda 
Agreement conferred power on 
the protectorate to make vague 
regulations regulating the 
appointment of Regents, decided 
to give effect to the intention of 









Application of the 
words of rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): 
Meaning of Law 
based on 
Necessities and 
Political Interests of 
the time; 
o The making Law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Filling gaps in the 
law; 
o Law understood and 
Applied Purposively 
(PURPOSIVE); 
o Contract viewed as a 
network of or other 
relations 




validity of norms; 
o Conception of 
law as a means 
to an end 
(LMEANS); 
o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 
Gaps in the Law; 




o Conception of 
Law as a means 













considered to be their practical 
use. 
o Court further reasoned that it had 
to take a practical view of filling a 
vacuum because of the 








































In a dispute where defective goods 
had been supplied, the court 
agreed that the plaintiff was entitled 
to reject them or treat the breach 
as a mere breach of a warranty and 
claim damages.  
The court, however, went on to 
hold that since the plaintiff had 
refused to take the goods offered to 
him in mitigation of the loss, he was 
not entitled to damages with regard 
to the loss. This was a resort to 
what appeared to be just in the 
case, notwithstanding the black 












Application of the 





























UPLR Vol. 5 
ULR 363 
HC The court held that notwithstanding 
the Sale of Goods Ordinance, the 
Indian Contract Ordinance could be 








o Legal Classificatory 
Categories ignored 
(NO CATEGORIES). 
o Conception of 
Law as a Means 













HC The native court had insisted on 
having jurisdiction and heard a debt 
recovery dispute in which the 
question of the existence or 
otherwise of a partnership had 
arisen. This was notwithstanding 
the law being that native courts 
could not hear cases that required 
the application of the Partnership 
Ordinance.  
 
The High Court agreed with the 
position taken by the native court, 
both courts looked at the 
substantive dispute being a debt 
contract and refused the case to be 
dismissed on a mere technicality, 
although this was possible. 
Flexibility 
o Inductive Reasoning 
in interpretation of 
statute or precedents 
(INDUCTIVE); 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects to 
do substantive 
justice (PROC-















HC In an application for injunctive 
reliefs, it was held that one of the 
grounds courts would consider was 
whether the applicant would suffer 





Application of the 
words of rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 








which meant injury that would not 
be atoned by way of an award of 
money  
as damages.   
o Considering money 















[1953] 1 EA 
591 
HC The term African had a different 
meaning in section 3 of the 
Interpretation and General Clauses 
Ordinance (Chapter 1), from that 
contained in section 2 & 3 of the 
Buganda Courts Ordinance 
(Chapter 77). 
 
The court took the definition in the 
Buganda Courts Ordinance to hold 
that the Principal Court of Buganda 
had no jurisdiction over limited 
liability companies. 
Formalism 























Sections 49 (12) and 50(1) of the 
Bills of Exchange Ordinance 
required reasonable notice of 
dishonour of a cheque to be given 
to the issuer and Section 50(2)(b) 
provided for waiver as excusing the 
failure to give notice.  
According to court: 
o There was evidence of waiver, 
but it was not pleaded, therefore 
not available as a defence; 
o It would be unfair and unjust to 
Formalism 
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY): 








o Certainty of Law 
(COL).   
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allow the plea of waiver being 
raised at a late stage, so court 













A contract and payment where a 
taxpayer paid a tenant in order to 
secure the premises for business 
was held as unallowable as a 
deduction.    
 
The court reasoned that: 
 
o No authorities had been cited to 
show that although this was a 
borderline case, it was a capital 
and not a contractual expense; 
o Mitchell v. B.N Noble Limited 
[1927] 1 KB 719, in which a 
payment by a company to an 
employee to get rid of him and 
avoid a scandal was treated as 
an allowable deduction was not 
identical, therefore not applicable.  
Formalism 
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY): 
Strict adherence to 
pleadings  
 












M. Patel v 
Chaturbhai 
M. Patel & 
Another 




A bill of sale was in issue, having a 
date that was after the action had 
commenced and tendered in 
evidence as evidence of third party 
rights over the allegedly secured 
chattels.  An issue arose as to the 
applicability of the English 
Fraudulent Conveyances Act of 
1571 in Uganda.  
Flexibility 
o The making Law 
(LAW MAKING): 




Application of the 
words of rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 
(The applicability of 






o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 
Gaps in the Law; 
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The judge held that although the 
said Act had been repealed in 
England and re-enacted in the Law 
of Property Act of 1925, which was 
not an Act of General Application 
received in Uganda in 1902, it was 
still law in Uganda.  
 
The Judge reasoned that since the 
object of the law was to render 
avoidable dispositions in fraud of 
creditors including bills of sales, it 
would apply in Uganda.  
 
subject to local 











o Law to be judged 




















In an action for recovery of a 
liquidated sum between Africans, 
court held that the Buganda Courts 
had jurisdiction, reasoning that: 
o In the pleadings, the plaintiff did 
not mention any particular section 
of the Sale of Goods Ordinance, 
and need not invoke one; 
o It was extremely difficult to say 
with certainty what suits were not 
triable by African courts, and no 
general rule could be laid down.  
Note: 
o The formalism was used in the 
conspiracy sense, as court 
acknowledged the uncertainty 
and ambiguity in the law on 
Flexibility & 
Formalism 
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY); 
Strict adherence to 
pleadings; 
o Flexibility recognised 














o Conception of 
Law as A Means 




jurisdiction, and sought to use it 
for ends of allowing African 













In the plaint claiming consideration 
for labour and materials supplied, 
there was no averment that the 
charges and prices were either 
agreed upon or reasonable. 
The court held that the defect in the 
pleading was curable by 
amendment and refused to dismiss 
the suit.  
Flexibility 
o Undue regard to 










o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 













A claim for the price of goods sold 
to a Mohamedan (Muslim) minor 
originally from Kuwait but already 
married, and whole family had 
worked and settled in Uganda for a 
while. 
 
The court held and reasoned that: 
o The age of majority should not be 
looked at under the common law, 
but the country of the defendant’s 
domicile, which was presumed to 
be Kuwait, since the law always 
presumes against change of 
domicile; 
o Under Islamic law in Kuwait, 
there are different schools of 
Flexibility 
o The judge making 
law (LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping rules to 
justify decisions seen 
by judge as fair; 
o Inductive Reasoning 
in interpretation of 
statute or precedents 
(INDUCTIVE) i.e. 
Rules and Concepts 
determined Post, not 
Pre-decision and 
Different normative 
sources used to find 
the law).  
 




o Conception of 
Law as a means 
to an end 
(LMEANS); 
o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 





thought with different ages of 
majority, ranging from 15-18; 
o Since the defendant alleged that 
he did not know his age but was 
not more than 16 years, he was 












A mortgage deed that was not 
signed by the mortgagee but 
registered was held to be 
enforceable. Court reasoned that:  
o The defendants could not rely on 
mere technicalities when they 
acted upon the deed; 
o The requirement under the law 
that both signatures should be 
there was merely a matter of form 
not substance.   
Flexibility 
o Undue regard to 




o The judge making 
law (LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the 
Rules of Law (i.e. 
Prescribed Statutory 
Formalities waived 







o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 


























Under the sale of goods contract, 
the parties agreed to the appellant 
selling rails to the respondent, 
specifying them as Krupp. The 
specified goods were known to be 
only manufactured by a Germany 
company and the appellant alleged 
a collateral agreement that the rails 
would be sourced from that 
company. War broke out between 
Britain and Germany making it 
impossible for the appellant to 
procure the rails from Germany as 
contemplated by the parties, thus 
sought to have the contract 
declared frustrated, impossible to 
Formalism 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written 
terms as sacrosanct;  




o Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of 
Contract 
(SANCTITY); 






perform and void. 
Court held that, there was nothing 
in the contract requiring that the 
rails would be procured from 
Germany, so the source did not 
constitute the basis or foundation of 
the contract, and the defence of 
frustration failed.   
26.  Doola 
Singh & 









Sir Gray & 
Manning J 
Under a contract for sale of goods, 
the respondent, a known dealer is 
saw-benches sold different parts to 
the appellant, for the latter to 
construct a saw-bench. Upon 
construction, some of the parts 
were discovered unserviceable and 
therefore not fit for purpose. The 
lower court awarded a quantum 
meruit for the unserviceable parts, 
thus the appeal. Court held that: 
o Section 16 (2) of the Sale of 
Goods Ordinance applied to the 
effect that a contract with a seller 
who deals in goods of a particular 
description, has an implied 
condition that the goods will be of 
merchantable quality, and the 
proviso doesn’t apply because 
the buyer had no opportunity to 
inspect the goods; 
o Merchantable quality means that 
a reasonable man, acting 
reasonably would, after full 
examination accept the goods 
under the circumstances of the 
Flexibility & 
Formalism 




Reasonable Man & 
Reasonableness; 
o Contract viewed as a 
network of or other 
relations  
(RELATIONS): 
Using Reliance to 
find contractual 
obligation; 








o Role of Courts as 
implementers not 






















case, in performance of his offer 
to buy that article; 
o Without some parts being 
serviceable and fit, there would 
be no saw-bench, therefore a 
quantum meruit was not 
adequate, for the buyer would not 
get use from the rest of the parts 
to constitute part performance; 
o The seller was in breach of a 
warranty, because property in the 
goods had already passed to the 
buyer, under section 13 (1) (c) of 
the Sale of Goods Ordinance.   
27. Hassan 
Merali v. 






Under a contract for sale of goods, 
four bales of Amerikani clothes 
were tendered in accordance with 
the contract. The buyer refused to 
take delivery of them and the seller 
sued for the purchase price. Court 
held that an action for the price 
was not maintainable, and the 
seller should have claimed 
damages, since in English law 
specific performance is not 
available when damages would 
adequately remedy, and specific 
performance is only available 
where chattels are unique or of 
peculiar value.     
Formalism  




application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 
o Considering money 




o Role of Courts as 
implementers not 
makers of the law 
(ROC-
NONMAKERS); 

















Bennett, J.  
A contract for sale of goods was 
made and concluded by telephone, 
and the defendant resided and 
carried on business in Mombasa 




Application of the 
words of rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 








it had been made from, and 
therefore whether the court had 
jurisdiction.  
Court used analogy with 
contracting through post, and held 
that the place of contracting was 
where the person making the 




















J.   
In a motor insurance policy dispute, 
court had to interpret the words 
“consequential loss”, that was used 
in exemption to liability under the 
terms of the policy.   Court held 
and reasoned that:  
o Consequential loss included loss 
from lack of use; 
o An insured is bound by the policy 
terms, even if he had not seen it, 
where a letter from the insurer 




o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written 
terms as sacrosanct;  
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM). 




o Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of 
Contract 
(SANCTITY); 



















Bennett, J.  
The defendant agreed to create a 
debenture over its assets to secure 
money owed to the plaintiff but did 
not sign it, to constitute a novation. 
The plaintiff sued on the original 
contract. The defendant sought to 
rely on the novation/debenture to 
preclude recovery on the original 
contract. The defendant claimed 
that she had not signed the 
debenture because the signatory 
Formalism  
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY): 











was ill, but all parties had agreed to 
its contents.  
Court held that, the defendant 
could not rely on the debenture to 
preclude recovery on the original 
contract, as she had not signed it 
and it was therefore inoperative.  











(1956-57) 8  




Under a written contract for the 
sale of goods, the plaintiff claimed 
that the time for delivery had been 
extended orally, and sought an 
order to force the defendant to take 
delivery of the goods.   
 
Court held that, Where a contract 
was required to be or evidenced in 
writing, parol evidence which 
contradicts, varies or adds to its 
terms was not admissible.   
Formalism  
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written 
terms as sacrosanct. 
o Procedural 
justice superior to 
Substantive 
Justice (PJ); 
o Writing as the 
















During negotiations for the sale of 
goods (cattle), the defendants 
asked if the cattle were healthy, the 
plaintiff replied in the affirmative. 
Also why the cattle had watery 
eyes, and the seller relied that it 
was due to the tall grass affecting 
them. The cattle later died due to 
rinder-pest whose symptom were 
watery eyes. The plaintiff sued for 
the price, the defendant insisting 




Application of the 
words of rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 
o Contract viewed as a 
network of or other 
relations  
(RELATIONS): 
Using Reliance to 
find contractual 
obligation; 













o Accuracy in 
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Court held,  
o That affirmations or 
representations made at any 
period before the negotiations 
were concluded amounted to 
warranties; 
o The test is if the seller assumes 
to assert a fact of which the buyer 
is ignorant or merely states an 
opinion on a matter he has no 
special knowledge of and on 
which the buyer may have been 
expected to have his opinion and 
make his judgement; 
o The intention of the parties can 
only be got from the totality of the 
evidence and no secondary 
principles can be universally true; 
o In the circumstances of the case, 
the seller’s affirmations were not 
casual and he was in breach of a 
warranty and awarded damages 
to the plaintiff.  
















Ag. J.   
Under a contract for sale of goods, 
goods were sold and delivered and 
it was printed on the receipt that 
interest of 9% per annum was 
payable on overdue payments. The 
plaintiff claimed interest on the 
unpaid price. Court held and 
reasoned that:  In absence of 
evidence of course of dealings 
showing interest as payable, or 
written notice that the debt would 




Application of the 
words of rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 















be allowed.       
34. Bloedow v. 
Renton  
(1910-20) 2  
UPLR  44 
HC-King-
Farlow, J.  
In a suit by an employee for 
wrongful dismissal, the parties had 
disagreed as to the meaning of a 
paragraph in the agreement, 
headed “details of engagement”, 
thus the defendant treating the 
contract as at an end. The court 
held and reasoned that: 
o The ambiguity was not patent as 
to render the contract void; 
o A party accepting an agreement 
on condition that further terms 
are to be supplied by a third party 
is bound when they are supplied; 
o The exception is that there is an 
implied term that the details are 
reasonable as per the nature of 
employment and the local 
circumstances; 
o In the circumstances, the terms 
imposed by the defendant of 
specifying acreage to be worked 
by the plaintiff were reasonable, 
so the defendant entitled to treat 
the contract as at an end upon 




Application of the 
words of rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 







Filling gaps in 
contracts i.e., with 
implied terms; 





































J.   
Following breach of a hire 
purchase agreement by the 
defendant, the defendant gave the 
plaintiff a personal guarantee in 
consideration of non-seizure of the 
car, for any failures to pay.  Upon 
failure to pay the arrears, the 




Application of the 













the guarantee. The defendant 
claimed that the guarantee lacked 
consideration. Court held and 
reasoned that: 
o The consideration for the 
guarantee was the non-seizure of 
the car, something she wanted; 
o In the circumstances, the 
guarantee was construed as 
















(1956-57) 8  





Bacon, J.A.   
A tenant defaulted to pay rent and 
on the plaintiff suing for 
possession, the tenant deposited 
the arrears arguing that the delay 
was due to a disagreement as to 
the terms of contract. The issues 
were partly whether parol evidence 
was admissible to prove waiver of 
some written terms, and whether 
the court had discretion to refuse 
the defendant possession, if so 
should it have been exercised? 
Court held and reasoned that: 
o The Rent Restriction Ordinance 
is where the defendant could find 
a remedy against the judge 
exercising discretion to refuse 
possession, however the 
exception of refusal to pay having 
been reasonable, which is a 
ground in other jurisdictions was 
not part of the law; 
o The law required amendment to 
put the reasonableness provision, 
Flexibility 
o The judge making 
law (LAW MAKING):  
Sidestepping of 
Rules of Law and 
Implying new rule to 
fill gap in law; 





Application of the 
words of rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 




o Internal Judicial 
Guidelines 
(JUDGING GUIDE): 
discretion to be 
exercised with 
regard to purpose of 






o   Judicial 
Absolutism (JA); 





































but in the meantime, court would 
follow principles laid down in 
precedents to guide discretion, 
thus discretion must be exercised 
in a judicial manner having 
regard to: the general scheme 
and purpose of the Act (which 
in this case implied that the 
reasonable provision is implied to 
be part of the law); special 
conditions including matters 
so domestic and social 
character, per McCardie, J. in 
Chiverton v. Ede [1921] 2 K.B. 
at 44-45; all relevant 
circumstances as at the 
hearing date; and a broad 
common sense way as a man 
of the world, per Lord Greene, 
M.R. in Cumming v. Danson 
[1942] 2 ALLER at 655; and 
court must consider, not 
whether the landlord’s desire 
for possession is reasonable, 
but whether it is reasonable to 
make an order for possession, 
for, “because a wish is 
reasonable it does not follow 
that it is reasonable in a court 
to gratify it” .   










o Social Support as 
a Rule of Validity 
and Recognition 









Ubuntu as the 














In an insurance contract, where the 
insured failed to disclose previous 
accidents in an application, and 
signed a form filled by the insurer’ 
agent, Court held and reasoned 
that: 
o When a person signs willingly an 
application filled by another’s 
agent, he adopts the answers 
and is bound by them; 
o Failure to disclose the previous 




o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written 
terms as sacrosanct. 
 
o Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 










UPLR  12 
HC-
Pearson, J.   
This was a suit involving a contract 
between an African and a 
partnership where all partners were 
African, and the issue was whether 
the High Court or the Buganda 
Courts had jurisdiction. Court held 
that an all-African partnership was 
deemed an African, and in all 
contracts between Africans, the 
Buganda Courts had jurisdiction 
and the High Court had to transfer 
cases involving simple commercial 
contracts to Buganda Courts.   
Formalism  








o Role of Courts as 
implementers not 
















Two Africans entered a transaction 
resembling a mortgage, and the 
issue was whether equity was 
applicable to the contract. Court 
Flexibility 
o The judge making 
law (LAW MAKING): 
Implying new rule to 
fill gap in law; 
o Contextual 
o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 
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held that: 
o Equity was applicable since 
native law and custom did not 
know mortgages in Teso 50 
years back, therefore the natives’ 
courts had no jurisdiction; 
o Courts would not interfere with 
the District Commissioner’s Order 
on Appeal from a Native merely 
because the Native Court had no 
jurisdiction.  
Interpretation and 
Application of the 





Equity invoked to 
Interfere with 
contract terms. 




















Gamble, J.  
The issue was whether the Statute 
of Frauds of England was 
applicable to regulate contracts in 
Uganda. Uganda not having an 
independent law of contracts, the 
exception in the Indian Contracts 
Act, to applicability of s. 4 of 
Statute of Frauds of England was 






























A contract was entered with a 
minor that was over 18 years and 
therefore of majority age in India, 
but below 21, the majority age in 
Uganda at the time. The judge 
held and reasoned that: 
o The burden to prove that minor or 
his father had changed domicile 
to Uganda was on the plaintiff, 
and long stay plus doing 
business were not enough, as 
Formalism  




















those circumstances of the case 
were not persuasive to support a 
change of domicile.  
  
42.  A. H. 
Kaderbhoy 
& Co. v. C. 
Parakah & 






Under a contract for sale of goods, 
the plaintiff was meant to supply a 
third party with goods, on behalf of 
the defendant. The third party 
obtained the goods without 
acknowledging that he had already 
received delivery of the full 
consignment agreed. The plaintiff 
sued the defendant for the price. 
Court held that the third party had 
gone behind the defendant and 
cheated both parties, therefore the 




Application of the 





























Gamble, J.  
The parties entered a sale of goods 
contract on C.I.F terms. The seller, 
alleging that the buyer had delayed 
to pay, without tendering the 
shipping documents resold the 
goods and claimed damages for 
the shortage in value received. The 
Court held that: 
o The seller under a C.I.F contract 
had to present the documents as 
a condition precedent to 
payment; 
o The condition precedent could be 
waived by proof of some usage of 
trade peculiar to East Africa, but 
since none was proved, the 
general law of C.I.F contracts 
Flexibility 






Application of the 





















The plaintiff had advanced the 
price for buying two vans, on 
condition that the defendant should 
work it off by transporting cotton for 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff instead 
breached and started working for 
others thus the suit, seeking 
interalia an injunction. Court held 
and reasoned that when damages 
are not sufficient to compensate 
the plaintiff, especially if a trust is 
involved, courts would enforce a 
negative but not a positive 





Fairness invoked to 
Interfere with 
contract terms; 


























The testator contracted to supply 
sugar and was paid the full price. 
He died before supplying all of it. 
The executor supplied some sugar 
but before finishing the estate was 
declared insolvent. The receiver 
sued claiming for the sugar 
delivered and the defendant 
counter claimed for damages for 
the undelivered sugar. Court held 
and reasoned that; 
o Under section 10 of the 
Judicature Act and 54 of the 
Bankruptcy Act, the receiver 
could disclaim the onerous 
contract and the defendant would 
then be entitled to prove in 
bankruptcy for the damages; 
Flexibility 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 




o The judge making 
law (LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the 
















o The receiver had not disclaimed 
and technically remained liable; 
o Because had duty to protect the 
general body of creditors, the 
judge felt duty bound to allow the 
receiver to regularise.  








The plaintiff bought goods by 
sample from the defendant who 
sent them to his agent in Kampala, 
Uganda. The agent sold the goods 
to a third party and informed the 
plaintiff that his goods had not 
arrived thus this suit. The court 
held and reasoned that: 
o When the second consignment 
arrived fitting the sample, the 
inference is that they were 
intended to meet the plaintiff’s 
contract; 
o The plaintiff was entitled to treat 
the agent as having repudiated 
the contract and sue for 
damages, the promise to replace 
the goods not being good 
enough.  
Formalism  
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written 
terms as sacrosanct; 
o Considering money 




o Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of 
Contract 
(SANCTITY); 

















A plaint in a suit for breach of 
contract that merely alleged an 
account between the parties had 
the suit dismissed for want of a 
cause of action. On appeal, Court 
held that:  
o When an account is set out 
showing that one owes the other, 
a promise is created, therefore it 
is actionable in contract as an 
Formalism  
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written 
terms as sacrosanct;  
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY) 
o Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 







o Certainty of Law 
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account stated; 
o The procedure code the 
Magistrate referred to was 
procedural law, which could not 
amend substantive law, 
especially in a sweeping way.    
(COL); 




48.  Vithaldas 
Haridas & 







Under a sale of goods contract, the 
plaintiffs were to weigh the 
cottonseed, bag them and book 
them. Before they could be booked, 
the medical officer ordered for their 
destruction to prevent a plague. 
Court held that since something 
was left to be done to the goods, 
the property in the goods had not 
passed to the defendant and 
therefore the loss be born by 
plaintiffs.   
Formalism  






















The defendant bought ginneries 
subject to confirmation by court. In 
anticipation, they contracted the 
plaintiff to keep a fleet of vehicles 
ready to transport for them. The 
sale was not confirmed and the 
ginneries sold to third parties. The 
court held that, the contract had 
not become impossible to perform 
within the meaning of section 156 
of the Contract Act, therefore the 
defendants were liable in damages.  
Formalism  




application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written 
terms as sacrosanct.  
 
o Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 

























Under a contract for sale of goods, 
it was agreed that one wheel of 
lorry had to be replaced and the 
vehicle insured. Before doing 
these, the seller allowed the buyer 
to drive the lorry and would return 
to effect them. It got an accident on 
the way. Court held that the 
property in the goods had not yet 
passed to the buyer and therefore 
the risk and loss was with the 
seller.  
Formalism 




application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written 
terms as sacrosanct 
and disregarding 
fairness of the case.  
o Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 




















Under a sale of goods contract, a 
motor vehicle had been bought 
under a trade name, and the 
defendant admitted having 
warranted that the car was suitable 
for touring purposes and insisted 
that it was actually suitable. It 
turned out not suitable. The court 
held that, since the contract was 
based on the seller’s skill of 
suitability, under s. 14 (1), of the 
Sale of Goods Act of England, the 
requirement was not a mere 
warranty but a condition entitling 
the plaintiff to rescind the contract.   
Formalism  




application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written 
terms as sacrosanct 
and disregarding 
fairness of the case; 
o Contract viewed as a 
network of or other 
relations  
(RELATIONS):  




o Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 
































Hooper, j.  
This was a claim for delivery-up of 
shares, Detinue and conversion. 
Proof was adduced that a 
constructive trust existed for 
shares, and that a letter had been 
posted giving notice. The Court 
held that: 
 
o A non-party to the case could not 
be ordered to be removed from 
the register, even though the 
constructive trust had been 
proved; 
o In a service by post, there is no 
presumption of delivery of notice 
because there is no evidence of 
dispatch.  
    
Formalism  
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY); 








o Certainty of Law 
(COL).   











Under an agreement for sale of 
goods, the seller (Objector) was 
entitled to retake the lorry upon 
default of payment.  It was to 
remain in the names of the seller 
until full payment, and if seized, it 
had to be sold to pay the balance 
owing. The plaintiff attached the 
lorry because it was in possession 
of the defendant, thus the 
objection. Court held that: 
o The contract was a sale out and 
not a hiring, and the lorry 
therefore liable for attachment for 
debts of the buyer; 
o The agreement regarding 
security for payments was a bill 
Formalism  














o Certainty of Law 
(COL); 
o    Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of 
Contract 
(SANCTITY); 





of sale and void for want of 
registration.  
54.  K.B. Kalu 
v. Ambalal 
Shankerbh
ai & Co.  
[1920-29] 3 
UPLR 27.  
HC-
Hearne, 
Ag. J.  
The claim was wrongly described in 
the plaint and the lower court 
dismissed the suit. Court held 
that, 
  Wrong pleading is not enough to 
dismiss a suit, if is a primafacie 
case has been established. The 
court should examine the parties 
and frame the issues in dispute, 
and call the defence to defend the 
case.  
Flexibility 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects to 
do substantive 
justice (PROC-
DISREGARD).   
 












UPLR 71.  
HC-Gray, 
J.  
A contract was made in Kenya, and 
the defendants appointed the 
plaintiff’s Kenyan agents.   The 
agreement was silent on how and 
where the payment of commission 
would be made, although the 
timber was to be sold in Uganda. 
The issue was whether the courts 
in Uganda had the jurisdiction to 
hear the case. Court held that, It 
was implied that the payment 
would be effected in Uganda where 
the timber was to be sold, therefore 







































J.   
In a contract for the sale of goods, 
the defendant, a farmer in Uganda 
ordered unascertained goods 
through an agent in England. There 
was a clause in the indent form 








Application of the 
o Inequality before 
the law 
(INEQUALITY); 





Factory himself to take delivery of the 
goods upon arrival and accept the 
bill of exchange. Before the goods 
were appropriated, the buyer gave 
notice to the agent to cancel the 
order, but the agent refused, and 
had the goods shipped to the 
buyer. The buyer refused to accept 
the goods, thus the suit. The Court 
held and reasoned that: 
o The buyer was not bound by the 
special terms printed on the 
indent, for there was no evidence 
that the buyer was familiar with 
the system of the agent, and it 
would be strong to hold that a 
Goanese gentleman be expected 
to have carried in his mind the 
complicated and involved 
phraseology of the indent form; 
o  The agents failed in their duty to 
the principal to cancel the order, 
and therefore would not recover.    

















meaning of parties’ 
actions: Business 









o Conception of 
Law as a means 






Utility ;  
















UPLR 46.  
HC-Smith, 
J.  
Under a contract for the sale of 
goods (hides), the offer and 
acceptance were communicated by 
post. Upon the goods being 
delivered, the buyer rejected them 
and the seller sued for the price. 
The buyer argued that the contract 
was not complete and if so, the 
seller should have resold the 
goods, and sued for the loss if any. 
The Court held that: 
o An acceptance by post is 
Formalism & 
Flexibility 
o The judge making 
law (LAW MAKING): 
Implying new rule to 
fill gap in law; 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating terms as 
sacrosanct, and 
disregard fairness; 
o  Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY): 
Rules of service by 
post strictly applied.  
o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 
Gaps in the Law; 
o Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 






complete upon being dispatched; 
o Where property in the goods had 
passed to the buyer, the seller 
had the right to sue for the price 
or resell and claim the loss. He 
was not bound to any. The 
decision in Virji v. Merryweather, 
2 ULR 363 was approved. ; 
o Section 49 of the Sale of Goods 
Act, 1893 of England grants the 
right to sue for the price, and 
even though the Indian Contract 
Act omitted the right, since it was 
meant to codify English law, it 
was assumed to have intended to 
contain it.  
 superior to 
substantive 
justice (PJ); 









UPLR  150.  
HC-Ainley, 
J. 
The parties agreed on interest rate 
of 60% per annum, and the 
defendant sought court intervention 
to reduce it under the provisions of 
s. 26 of the Civil Procedure 
Ordinance for being harsh and 
unconscionable. Court held and 
reasoned that: 
o The section is a codification of 
the English rules of equity as to 
unconscionable bargain, even 
ruinous bargains where there has 
been nothing in the nature of 
unconscientious  use of power  
by one of the parties; 
o The section strikes not at the 
hardness of the bargain but the 
means employed to bring it 
about, the hardness being mere 




Application of the 





Fairness invoked to 
Interfere with 
contract terms; 




o Law understood and 
Applied Purposively 
(PURPOSIVE); 





















o Conception of 
Law as A Means 




power, but not of itself ground for 
relief; 
o In the present case, there was no 
inequitable or unscrupulous 
behaviour by the plaintiff; 
o The plaintiff was an African in 
Government service, and though 
intelligent, had no experience in 
business, and the defendant 
company was represented in the 
transaction by the managing 
director who was foolish and 
reckless but with considerable 
business experience and could 
not be regarded as a helpless 
man imposed on by an 
unscrupulous money lender; 
o In equity, no relief would be 
granted but section 26 of the Civil 
Procedure Ordinance granted 
court a power not given by equity 
to grant relief against interest 
rates so exorbitant as to shock 
the conscience of court, 
irrespective of the equality or 
otherwise of bargaining power of 
the parties; 
o There was need in the 
protectorate that such powers to 
be given to the courts, and 
interest of 60% was found so 
exorbitant in the circumstances 
and reduced to 24%, as a 
butchering was not expected to 
afford paying back interest of 
60% per annum, and remain 
solvent; 






class as criteria to 
access justice, in this 













defendant company but could not 
countenance such a ridiculous 
rate of interest that was beyond 
all reason.      
 










J.   
A customer to a bank deposited 
money to the cashier when the 
bank was already closed, and the 
bank denied liability for the money. 
The Court held that, even though 
the bank displayed a sign stating its 
banking hours, it had given the 
impression that the clerk could 
receive money after banking hours, 
therefore, the bank had conferred 
ostensible authority on the cashier, 
and therefore the deposit validly 
made, thus the bank liable to the 
customer.   
Flexibility 

























A firm manufacturing lorries 
published in their catalogue 
vehicles for sale, and added that 
they reserved the right to change 
materials, dimensions, and design 
and did not guarantee that the 
vehicles supplied would strictly 
conform to the specifications. The 
defendant bought one lorry and 
ordered another of the same 
specifications. The second lorry 
delivered was of different pistons 
that did not have readily available 
spares, and the defendant rejected 
it, thus the suit for the price.  
Formalism  
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 





o Considering money 




o Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of 
Contract 
(SANCTITY); 












The Court held and reasoned 
that: 
o The breach of warranty was no 
defence to the action, for section 
117 of the India Contract Act did 
not create the right to avoid the 
contract but only claim damages; 
o The defendant had not relied on 
the plaintiff’ skill and judgment, 
therefore the latter could not be 
held to have warranted that the 
















Bacon, J.A.   
Under a sale of goods contract, the 
buyer sold goods to the sub-buyer, 
who rejected them for not being of 
merchantable quality. During 
arbitration, it was agreed that the 
sub-buyer buys the goods at a 
reduced price.  Court held that: 
o In the circumstances of the case, 
there was no evidence that any 
sub-buyer would buy the 
groundnuts at a price higher than 
the sub-buyer accepted, there 
fore the buyer was entitled to 
recover the loss for the original 
seller; 
o In commercial cases, once an 
offer to pay is made before the 
action, it should, for purposes of 
exercising court’s discretion to 
allow interest be treated as 




Application of the 





















62.  British 
Trading 







ULR 1.  
HC-Ennis, 
C.J.  
In a suit against the government as 
an entity carrying on the business 
of transport, the Court held that: 
o The government was not a 
common carrier, and subject to 
the law on contract of bailment; 
o A notice published in the gazette 
that goods were carried at 
owner’s risk was not binding on 
the plaintiff until proved as having 
been communicated to him; 
o Owner’ risk meant that the carrier 
had to prove that she was not 
negligent during the course of 
bailment.  
Flexibility 






used to justify 
liability; 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 







































A curator of an imprisoned buyer of 
goods accepted a bill for the value 
of the goods from the shipper as 
was the usual practice, but 
afterwards, the goods never 
arrived. Court held that: 
o The acceptance of the bill was 
given in the ordinary course of 
business, so the convict was 
liable for the price; 
o From the ordinary course of 
business, it had to be inferred 
that the curator had had 
constructive possession of the 
goods; therefore, he was liable to 
Flexibility 























o Conception of 
Law as a means 
to an end 
(LMEANS); Law 
to be judged by 
its Practical 
Utility; 




the convict as if the goods were 












In an employment contract, it was 
provided that the employee could 
be dismissed for “grave cause 
issuing from his action, such as 
insubordination”. The Court held 
and reasoned that: 
o That neglecting to obey important 
orders amounted to grave cause 
to justify dismissal; 
o   Writing to the head office in 
France to complain on how the 
company was being run by 
management, amounted to an 
act subversive of all discipline 
and no business concern that 
had any regard for the due 
carrying on of its business would 
tolerate it, thus grave misconduct 
too.   
Flexibility 








Application of the 
words of rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 
o Abductive Reasoning 
in interpretation of 


























In an action for short landing in a 
carriage of goods, the defendant 
only denied the shortage. No 
issues were framed but court found 
for the plaintiff. The High Court 
then held that, the neglect to 
frame issues was immaterial since 
the parties and the judge knew the 
question in dispute.    
Flexibility 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects to 
do substantive 
justice (PROC-
















In an action for sale of goods, the 
damages were sought to be proved 
by showing the market using 
evidence of other dealings in the 
same commodities and letters from 
firms in London and Mombasa. The 
Court held that, only experts could 
prove the market price, and such 
experts in their work could use the 
evidence adduced instead.   
Formalism  











o Certainty of Law 
(COL). 
67.  H. White 
Wilson & 
Co. v. 





An agency agreement contained a 
clause referring all disputes to 
arbitration, and the defendant 
repudiated the contract. On an 
action by the plaintiff, the defendant 
objected to court’s jurisdiction, 
arguing that the matter should have 
been referred to arbitration. Court 
held that since the defendant 
repudiated the contract, he could 
not insist on arbitration.  
Formalism  
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written 
terms as sacrosanct;  
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM). 
o Freedom and 
Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 















Smith, J.   
An action was brought for work 
done over six years, and the issue 
whether the statute of Limitation 
applied to Uganda. The Court held 
that as a procedural law, the 
provision in the Order in Council 
that the courts in Uganda were 
bound by the practice and 
procedure of the courts of England 
meant that the Statute of Limitation 
applied to Uganda.  
Formalism  




application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 



























Under a contract for sale of goods, 
the defendant agreed to purchase 
a second hand lamp and it was 
agreed that the plaintiff would put it 
in working order. The court held 
that  
o There was an implied warranty 
that the lamp would give light, 
and on breach of the warranty, 
because section 114 of the Indian 
Contract Act imposed a warranty 
of fitness for purpose if goods 
were sold for their usual purpose; 
o The remedy was to sue for 
damages and not rescission of 
the contract.  
Formalism  




application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 
o Considering money 



























In an action for sale of goods, 
where a breach of a warranty was 
alleged, the defendant objected to 
jurisdiction on ground that the 
breach occurred in Nairobi. The 
Court held that the Ugandan 
courts had no jurisdiction since the 
breach occurred in Nairobi.   
Formalism  




application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 













APPENDIX 2:  Formalistic Adjudication In Hard Cases (Early Post-Colonial Era 1962-1986) 




v Tajdin Kara 
[1962] 1 EA 
285 
HC In a suit to enforce guarantees given 
by an Asian defendant to cover non-
payment under three hire-purchase 
agreements between the plaintiff and 
Africans, the court denied the 
defendant a right to avail himself the 
defence that the plaintiff’s attempt to 
recover consequential damages 
could not be entertained in an action 
on guarantees, but one on indemnity. 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
Restricting litigant’s case 
to Pleadings. 
o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Inequality before the law 
(INEQUALITY): Class 
Oriented Conception of 
Justice; 
o Procedural Justice 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ). 
2. AM Dharas & 
Sons Ltd v 
Elys Ltd 
 [1963] 1 EA 
573 
HC Having rented out a shop and store, 
the plaintiff did not give vacant 
possession of the store to the 
defendant. The defendant claimed for 
refund of the rent he had paid. The 
court agreed with the defendant, but 
dismissed the claim on ground that, 
the plaint claimed only part of the 
rent, without specifying how much. 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
Restricting litigant’s case to 
Pleadings. 
o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Role of Courts as 
implementers not makers 
of the law (ROC-
NONMAKERS); 
o Procedural Justice 









HC In a sale of goods action, the 
equitable doctrine of 
unconscionability of the price was 
raised. The judge held that:  
o It was not the court’s province to 
consider matters of adequacy of 
consideration; 
o Oral evidence that had been 
  Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms as 
sacrosanct; and No Filling 
gaps in Contract terms 
i.e.,  Refusal to Interfere 
with terms deemed harsh 
and unconscionable. 
o Freedom of Contract; 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY): Judicial 
Non-interventionism; 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
(DISCRETE); 
o Writing as the best 
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adduced in proof is rejected, citing 
the parol evidence rule, that by 
virtue of sections 90 to 99 of the 
Evidence Act of Uganda, written 
agreements could not be 
contravened by oral evidence.  
 
evidence of parties’ 
intentions (PAROL 
EVIDENCE).  
4. The Motor 
Union 
Insurance 









[1963] 1 EA 
271 
HC An insurance proposal form that had 
been filled in by the insurer’s agent 
and accompanied by a signed 
warranty failed to disclose all material 
facts. Although the insured proved 
that he had made full disclosure to 
the agent, the court allowed the 
insurer to avoid the policy on grounds 
of non-disclosure. The judge: 
o Reasoned that only the 
written contract could be 
looked at to ascertain the 
terms of contract; 
o Followed Newsholme 
Brothers v Road Transport 
and General Insurance Co. 
Ltd [1929] ALLER 442, 444, 
refusing to impute 
knowledge on the insurer, 
and found the agent to have 
been an amanuensis of the 
insurer; 
o Reasoned that the insured 
defendant was an intelligent 
man who knew the 
importance of telling the 
truth. 
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM)  
o Writing as the best 
evidence of parties’ 
intentions (PAROL 
EVIDENCE); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC): 
Judicial non-
interventionism; 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
(DISCRETE); 
o Inequality before the law 
(INEQUALITY): Class 


































In an insurance dispute on imputation 
of knowledge of the agent, the Chief 
Justice held against the illiterate 
insured, and refused to impute 
knowledge on the insurer. 
He reasoned that: 
o Illiterates were taken as having a 
duty to insist that the proposal 
form is read to them and 
interpreted; 
o Failure by the illiterate to perform 
his duty, the proposal form had to 
be taken as having been read and 
so interpreted, and the falsehood 
visited against him.    
o Pacta Sunta Servanda 
Applied (PACTA), i.e. 
Treating written terms as 
sacrosanct; 





o Writing as the best 
evidence of parties’ 
intentions (PAROL 
EVIDENCE); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 











[1974] 1 EA 
165 
HC Where the insurance policy was 
compulsory under statute, the insurer 
was held to be entitled to exercise 
her right to repudiate a contract for 
breach of a condition. The judge 
reasoned that; 
o The fact that the contract was 
required and regulated by statute 
did not affect the effectiveness of 
the between the insurer and the 
insured;  
o Therefore, the insurer could 
repudiate the contract due to the 
insured’s delay to lodge a claim. 
o Pacta Sunta Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Rejection of statutory 
intervention in Contract. 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC): 
Judicial Non-
Interventionism; 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY). 
 




[1970] 1 EA 
155 
HC The plaintiff claimed to have been a 
permanent employee of the 
defendant, on account of an implied 
term arising out of having been made 
o Pacta Sunta Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms as 
sacrosanct; and No Filling 
gaps in Contract terms, 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 











part of an employee pension 
scheme.  
The court held that no implied terms 
could be presumed unless there was 
evidence that they had been 
intended by the parties, and 
necessary to give business efficacy. 
i.e., Refusing to imply 
terms; 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL), i.e. 
Invoking Necessity for 
Business Efficacy. 
interventionism; 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY); 
o Commercialism and 
Wealth Maximisation 
(COMM-WEALTH)); 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP): 
Commercial Reality as 
the Rule of Recognition  




35 of 1974 
HC The accused was charged with an 
offence under a statute criminalizing 
breach of contract for sale of 
essential goods. The case was 
dismissed by court for a defective 
charge sheet. 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
Strict adherence to form of 
court documents. 
o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Procedural Justice 













decision).   
HCCS No. 
839 of 1973 
HC The defendant had insured his car 
with the government owned National 
Insurance Corporation (NIC), and the 
plaintiff, a turn boy on the vehicle 
was injured in an accident. In a suit 
between the parties, NIC admitted 
liability, while the defendant was in 
prison, but later invoked the statutory 
limitation of liability under section 32 
of the Traffic and Road safety Act, 
1970. 
Allen Ag. J made a strict 
interpretation of the section and 
enforced the limitation of liability.  
He reasoned that: 
o Although the statute was unfair, 
however unfair a statute was, it 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC): Disregard 
of the law’s purposes; 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY); 
o Pacta Sunta Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): No 
Filling gaps in Contract 
terms, i.e. Refusing to 
imply terms; 
o Applying Formalism with 
flexible ends in mind 
(OPPORTUNISTIC 
FORMALISM) i.e. the 
willingness to strike out 
contract terms  
o Tension Management 
Mechanism (MGT):  
Restraint to Judicial 
Authority; 
o Role of Courts as 
mechanical deduction, 
implementers, and not 
makers of the law (ROC-
NONMAKERS); 
o Statutory Interventionism 
(SINTERV); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 




o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
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had to be read as is, and the only 
way out was to amend it; 
o The court could not amend the 
law; 
o Save for cases where statutes 
regulated the contracts, the courts 
had power to remove unjust 
clauses in contracts; 
o The purpose of a statute does not 
matter, but its wording; 
o Uganda was different from 
England in the sense that the 
latter did not have statutory 
provisions restricting liability of 
parties to contracts. 









106 of 1974 
HC The accused was caught 
overcharging toothpaste, arrested 
and prosecuted. The judge held that 
toothpaste was not amongst the 
commodities, whose over pricing was 
mentioned in the law as prohibited. 
The judges reasoned that 
overcharging was a social evil that 
public policy intended to fight using 
the law, but declined to be flexible 
and extend the premises of the law to 
cover tooth paste.  
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC): Disregard 
of the law’s purposes;  




o Tension Management 
Mechanism (MGT):  
Restraint to Judicial 
Authority;  
o Role of Courts as 
implementers not makers 
of the law (ROC-
NONMAKERS); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM). 
 
11.  Ruby 
General 
Insurance 








The defendant was appointed as an 
agent of an insurer in India and was 
to be remunerated by way of 
commission. Bennett J, in finding that 
Ugandan courts had jurisdiction to 
hear the case, held the Defendant 
not to be a commission agent.  
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM);               
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 
o Dehumanization of law 
(DEHUMAN); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 




Agencies Ltd The judge reasoned that the words 
‘commission agent’ had to be 
interpreted strictly and not in the 
ordinary sense. 













[1970] 1 EA 
121 
 A managing director of a coffee 
hauling company guaranteed its 
indebtedness to the defendant bank.  
The agreement contained a clause 
making it a continuing guarantee and 
circumventing the rule in Devaynes v 
Noble (1816) 1 Mer.529) 35 ER 767 
(Clayton’s case), that would bind the 
bank to applying any money put on 
new accounts to the repayment of 
the old debt, to the prejudice of the 
plaintiff.  
The bank opened new accounts after 
the plaintiff had terminated his 
engagement with the borrower, and 
without his consent, on which more 
money was banked and loans 
advanced, leaving the old debt 
unpaid. Upon the borrower’s default, 
the defendant bank went to the 
plaintiff to recover.  
The court, although took note of the 
circumvention of Clayton’s rule, 
insisted on enforcing the actual terms 
of the contract and held the plaintiff 
liable to repay the debt, reasoning 
that: 
The arguments that actions of the 
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM); 
o Pacta Sunta Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
o Disregard of contextual 
or Business reality; and 




o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): i.e. 
Conformity with Business 
Reality and /Practice; 
o Recognising inequality 
amongst contracting 
parties: Using economic, 
social or political class as 
criteria to access justice 
(NO-EQUALITY); 
o Contract Law understood 
as including Practices 
(PRACTICES). 
  
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY): Judicial 
Non-Interventionism; 
o Conception of Contract 
relations as Discret 
o Inequality before the law 
(INEQUALITY): Class 
Oriented Conception of 
Justice, i.e., Protection of 
the Weaker Party; 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP): 
Commercial Reality; 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
(DISCRETE); 
o Conception of Justice: 
Law as a Means to An 
End (LMEANS); 






bank were unfair were not valid; as 
such actions had no effect on the 
guarantees. 
Dissenting judge Sir Charles 
Newbold, flexibly reasoned that: 















735 of 1971 
HC The defendant raised a defence of 
mistake to a hire purchase 
agreement claim, maintaining that he 
had signed it without reading 
through.  
The judge held that mistake must be 
construed as non-existent and the 
words of a contract enforced strictly 
even in the face of mistake, unless it 
is a reasonable one.  
The Judge reasoned that, 
misrepresentation could not have 
been done by a stranger to a man of 
the class, education and experience 
of the defendant.    
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM); 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): vitiating 
factors, i.e. Mistake 
defence rejected and 
written terms treated as 
sacrosanct; 
o Recognising inequality 
amongst contracting 
parties: Using economic, 
social or political class as 
criteria to access justice 
(NO-EQUALITY).  
o Freedom and Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC); 
o Conception of Contract as 
Discrete (DISCRETE); 




Conception of Justice i.e. 
Access to Justice 
Determined by Social and 
Economic Class. 
 
14. Dr. Syedna 
Mohamed 
Burhannudin 
Saheb & 2 
Others v 
Jamil Din & 
Others 
 [1973] 1 EA 
254 
HC Under an agreement for sale of 
property, there was a default in 
payment and in an addendum, the 
parties agreed on a deadline, failure 
of which the plaintiff could forfeit the 
deposit paid. 
The court: 
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM); 
o Recognition of general 
principles applicable to all 
manner of contracts 
(GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES); 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA):  
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY): Judicial 
Non-interventionism; 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL): 
The Conception of Law 
as Conceptually 
Ordered, i.e., based on 
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o Rejected the claim by the plaintiff 
to be availed the equity against 
forfeiture or the defence of 
unconscionable bargains; and 
o Noted and rejected as 
inapplicable, the decisions of 
judges Somerville and Denning in 
Stockloser v Johnson [1954] 1 
ALLER 630, to the effect that 
where the relevant terms of 
contract were harsh, 
unconscionable or of a penal 
nature, the court would intervene, 
irrespective of whether the other 
party was guilty of any fraud, 
sharp practice or other 
unconscionable conduct.  
The judge reasoned that:  
o There were two positions: the rigid 
(formalistic) common law position 
making time of the essence; and 
what he called the softer (flexible); 
o Formalism is preferred because, 
the terms of the contract had to be 
strictly enforced; otherwise the 
court would be substituting the 
terms agreed with the judge’s 
individual sense of fairness; 
“No principle appears to exist to 
determine what is unreasonable or 
unconscionable or unjust, which are 
emotive rather than precise terms 
and so it is presumably a question of 
what shocks the conscience of 
whoever is trying the case, leaving 
equity to vary with the length of the 
Disregard of Vitiating 
Factors; Disregard of 
fairness; and No filling 
gaps in Contract terms 
i.e., Equity rejected as 






o Role of Courts as 
implementers not makers 
of the law (ROC-
NONMAKERS); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
(DISCRETE); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Tension Management 
Mechanism (MGT):  




judge’s foot.”  
o  Equity could only be allowed if 
there was evidence of fraud, 
undue influence, or oppression. 
15. Kurji Anandji 




 [1964] 1 EA 
3 
CA The High Court had allowed the 
plaintiffs to succeed in a suit on bills 
of exchange, where several had 
been issued, and only a few 
dishonoured. 
The Court of Appeal stated that, the 
question should not be whether the 
judge reached the right decision or 
conclusion on the principles applied, 
but whether he applied the right 
principles.    
o Recognition of general 
principles applicable to all 
manner of contracts 
(GENERAL PRINCIPLES) 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL): 
The Conception of Law 
as Conceptually 




























84 of 1973 
HC The plaintiff sued the defendant for 
breach of a contract to reward the 
plaintiff for giving information that 
would lead to the arrest of thieves 
and recovery of stolen wires. The 
plaintiff had provided the information 
but the defendant negligently failed to 
prosecute the thief, and the plaintiff 
wanted court to find that for that 
negligence, the defendant was liable 
for breach of the duty of care.  
The court refused to find a duty of 
care and used ingredients of tortious 
negligence to find that the defendant 
was not liable.  
o Legal Classificatory 
Categories ignored (NO 
CATEGORIES): Treating 
Economic Negligence as 
Contractual and used to 
justify liability; 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 




of the Negligence rules 
o Conception of Law as 
Means to an End 
(LMEANS); 
o Conceptual Flexibility 
(CONCEPT-FLEXTY); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM).  
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[1963] 1 EA 
408 
HC An illegal contract had been signed 
between the parties, on account of 
not having got the government’s prior 
consent for a non-African leasing and 
taking possession of land from an 
African. The African wanted to 
override the contract and have his 
land back, and the non-African asked 
court to uphold freedom of contract.  
The court held in favour of the 
African by strictly adhering to the 
words of the statute.   
In his reasoning, the judge 
considered public policy as having 
been to protect a class of people to 
whom the defendant belonged from 
the class of foreigners, and that a 
contract could be defeated by statute 
protection.  
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC);  
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY); 
o   Contract viewed as a 
network of relations 
(RELATIOINS): Contract 
used as an Instrument of 
Social Relations; 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): Public 
Policy seen as the need 
to protect a class of 
foreigners; 
o Social Support as a Rule 
of Recognition i (SOCIAL 
SUPPORT); 
o Statutory Interventionism 
(SINTERV);  
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 




Oriented Conception of 
Justice; 
o Conception of Contract 
as Relational 
(RELATIONAL); 
o   Procedural Justice 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ).  
18. Robbialac 
Paints (U) 









decision).   
[1976] HCB 
49-50 
HC The defendant, a building contractor 
abandoned work and the Plaintiff 
treated the contract as repudiated, 
thus the claim for damages. 
The court awarded damages based 
on the value of work left undone by 
the defendant, plus general damages 
for inconvenience.  
Court reasoned that damages for 
inconvenience were foreseeable as a 
result of the breach.  
o Assessing damages 








Guarding Jurisdiction, i.e., 
award of general 
damages i.e. for 
unquantifiable prejudice; 
o Abductive Reasoning in 
interpretation of statute or 
o Accuracy in Contracting 
and Adjudication 
(ACCURACY); 
o Conception of Law as a 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); Legal 
Validity and Contractual 
Obligation judged by 
Practical Utility ; 




used resolve competing 
answers.  





HC  An exemption of liability clause was 
carried on the notice board of a 
garage. In a suit for breach of duty of 
a bailee, court held that the 
exemption was neither part of the 
contract nor brought to the attention 
of the plaintiff.  
Court reasoned that even if the 
exemption had been part of the 
contract, it had to be construed very 
strictly.  
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms as 
sacrosanct;  
o Rejection of exemption 
clauses and 
o Imposing strict standards 
on exemption clauses 
o Freedom and Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC). 











The lender of the plaintiff had insured 
the plaintiff’s machinery held as 
security machinery against explosion. 
In this claim for indemnity, court held 
that:  
o There was no privity of contract 
between the parties, so the 
plaintiff could not enforce a 
contract of insurance; 
o The peril was not covered, 
because the tank did not explode. 
Instead, it cracked owing to 
pressure from the oil inside, 
leading the tank to burst into an 
explosion 
o Recognition of general 
principles applicable to all 
manner of contracts 
(GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES): Applying 
the Privity of Contract 
Doctrine; 
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM). 
o Writing as the best 
evidence of parties’ 
intentions (PAROL E 
VIDENCE); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete (DISCRETE). 
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22. Dr. Sydna 
Burban 
Nudin Saheb 
& 2 Others v. 








In a sale of property transaction, the 
plaintiff delayed to pay and the 
defendant refused to take the 
balance claiming that time was of 
essence, and he was entitled to 
retain the deposit. 
The issue was, whether a court can 
interfere with a contract if the terms 
are deemed harsh and 
unconscionable.  
Court held that in absence of a 
contrary intention by the parties, 
although equity took a less rigid view 
and court could interfere with the 
contract, in this case court would 
strictly construe time as of essence 
and refuse to interfere.  
The reasoning was that: 
o The tension between formalism 
and flexibility in these cases 
appeared in Stockloser v. 
Johnson (1954) 1 ALLER 630, 
where Justices Somerville and 
Denning took the view that once 
terms are found to be harsh, 
unconscionable, or punitive, even 
if the vendor was at the time of 
the contract not guilty of fraud, 
sharp practice or other 
unconscionable conduct, and 
irrespective of whether the 
purchaser was ready and willing 
to perform, courts would interfere 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms as 
sacrosanct: Refusal to 
Interfere with terms 
deemed harsh and 
unconscionable; 
o  Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM). 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC): 
Judicial Non-
Interventionism; 
o Sanctity of  Contract 
(SANCTITY);  
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
(DISCRETE); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL): 
indeterminate concepts 
of harsh and 
unconscionable ignored 
for want of evidence of 
fraud, which was viewed 
as the condition to 
equity’s assistance to 
interfere with contract 
terms; 
o Role of Courts as 
implementers not makers 
of the law (ROC-
NONMAKERS)  
o Positivist conception of 
law (POSITIVISM) i.e. 
Equity no place in 
contract.   
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and order a refund; 
o Romer L.J, in Stockloser v. 
Johnson (1954) 1 ALLER 630 
instead held that no such equity 
existed as above, unless there 
had been unconscionable conduct 
at the time of the contract and the 
buyer was ready and willing to 
pay the price; 
o Romer’s view was more 
acceptable in Uganda; 
o Court cited as support Holroyd 
Peace, LJ and Bremen LJ in 
Campbell Discount Co. v. Bridge 
(1961) 2 ALLER 97, for the 
position that it would be a novel 
extension if courts used equity to 
interfere with contracts freely 
entered into with no duress or 
mistake, merely on ground that in 
certain circumstances, it turned 
out harsh or disadvantageous for 
parties who later wished or were 
compelled to abandon the 
contract.  
o Court held as still true Lord 
Nottingham’s view in Maynard v. 
Mosley (1676) 3 Swan, 655 that 
“equity mends no man’s bargain”, 
and that mends should be made 

















Judge noted that the plaintiff may be 
regretting having entered into the 
contract, which on the face of it was 
over generous to the defendant, but 
still held that: 
The plaintiff could not resile from the 
contract because inadequacy of 
consideration is not a ground for 
setting aside a contract. 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms as 
sacrosanct, i.e.; no filling 
gaps in Contract terms; 
Refusal to Interfere with 
terms deemed harsh and 
unconscionable 
(Inadequacy of 
consideration not an 
issue); 
o  Presumption of Equality 
of Contracting Parties 
(EQUALITY 
PRESUMPTION). 
o Freedom of Contract 
(FOC); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Equality before the law 
(EQUALITY). 
 









In a claim for the sale goods sold and 
services rendered, against a claim for 
failure to complete the contract in 
time, court held that: 
The Magistrate’s court was wrong to 
impute its knowledge that the work 
required a high level of skill and 
intricacy, and could not be done 
hastily.   
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, or 
mechanical application of 
rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC): Refusal to 
base decision on Court’s 
own intuitions and 
preferences.  













Mechanism (MGT):  
Restraint to Judicial 
Authority. 








HC In a claim for the value of lost goods 
under contract of carriage, court held 
that: 
o Where no conversion or mis-
delivery is involved, the measure 
o Assessing damages 
based on actual financial 
loss (ACTURAL LOSS); 
o Legal Classificatory 
Categories ignored (NO 
CATEGORIES): Treating 
Economic Negligence as 




o Conception of Law 









of damages is the value of goods 
at the point and time of delivery; 
o A common carrier is liable for the 
loss of non-delivery even where no 
negligence is proved, and a mere 
accident without proof of 




Both formalism and Flexibility applied 
instrumentally to achieve what the 
judge perceived as just and fair 
Contractual and used to 
justify liability;  
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 




of the Negligence rules. 
 
 



























HC Section 4 of the Illiterates Protection 
Act provided that a contract made on 
behalf of an illiterate had to contain 
certification that it had been read 
over to him or her in a language her 
or she understood. In this case, the 
contract had been translated to 
Luganda (the defendant’s) language 
before signing, but the defendant 
claimed that he had signed the 
contract in ignorance of its nature. 
Court held that: 
o The defence was not available if 
the scenario was brought about 
by the negligence of the signer, in 
failing to take reasonable 
precautions by insisting that the 
contract be read to him in a 
language he understood; 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Disregard of Vitiating 
Factors; 
o Presumed equality of 
contracting parties (EQU         
ALITY PRESUMPTION); 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
i.e. evidential rules 
invoked to deny defence 
of protection of the 
weaker party; 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC);  
o Using indeterminate 
doctrines (INDETERM- 
DOCTRINE): 
o Procedural Justice 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ); 
o Equality before the law 
(EQUALITY); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Conceptual Flexibility 
(CONCEPT FLEXTY): 
Dehumanisation of law; 
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 o Section 4 creates a mere 
presumption that the contract was 
read once if it states so, to be 
rebutted by the illiterate, which 
was not done.  
Reasonableness and 








Katinti, J.  
The plaintiff bought iron sheets from 
the defendants, which were not 
delivered. The receipt got lost during 
the 1979 war, but the debt 
acknowledged in the defendant’s 
books. 
The Court held that: 
o Under section 51(1), (2) and (3) of 
the Sale of Goods Act, Chapter 
79, Laws of Uganda, if the seller 
wrongfully neglects to deliver 
goods, the buyer is entitled to 
maintain a suit for damages for 
non-delivery; 
o The measure of damages is the 
estimated loss directly and 
naturally resulting in the ordinary 
course of business from the 
seller’s breach; 
o Where the market is available, the 
value is primafacie the difference 
between the market price and the 
price when the goods ought to 
have been delivered, or delivery 
was refused.  
Note: 
The rule in section 51 contained 
conceptual flexibility, obliging judges 
o Assessing damages 
based on actual financial 
loss (ACTURAL LOSS); 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY).  
o Accuracy in Contracting 
and Adjudication 
(ACCURACY); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Procedural Justice 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ). 
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to consider the ordinary course of 
business/ practical reality in judging 
whether a loss qualified to be paid.   

















J.   
The plaintiff sued the defendant for 
breach of contract and damages for 
non-delivery of a motor vehicle under 
section 51 (2) of the Sale of Goods 
Act, the car bought having been 
delivered damaged.  
The Managing Director of the plaintiff 
bought the car before the plaintiff 
was incorporated, and although 
damages were claimed, they had not 
been pleaded. The court held that: 
o Although the defendant company 
was incorporated after the 
contract for sale of the motor 
vehicle was already concluded, 
the defendant was liable for the 
debt; 
o Although the law entitles the 
plaintiff to damages, the same 
must have been pleaded, and a 
mere plea for any other relief is 
not sufficient; 
o The plea for any other relief 
should not be used as cover-up 
for sloppy, inadequate and 
incompetent pleadings.  
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the Rules of 
Law, i.e. Rule of law 
invalidating 
reincorporation contracts 
sidelined to find a remedy; 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
Rejection of uncertain 
pleadings.  
o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Procedural Justice 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ); 














In a contract for carriage of goods, 
most were delivered damaged. Court 
held that: 
o The defendant was a common 
carrier and failure to deliver the 
goods means she breached the 
contract of carriage; 
o Primafacie, the common carrier is 
strictly responsible for all the 
losses suffered. 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY). 
o Positivist Conception of 
law (POSITIVISM); 
o Procedural Justice 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL): 
The Conception of Law 
as Conceptually 



















Under a hire-purchase agreement, 
the defendant hirer agreed to be 
responsible for loss or damage to the 
vehicle, howsoever caused. The 
vehicle was stolen and the defendant 
pleaded frustration to a claim for the 
unpaid installments, alternatively 
arguing that the insurer was liable for 
the balance, although the insurance 
cover had expired, and the defendant 
had the duty to insurer the vehicle. 
The court held that, frustration by 
theft was a defence to liability under 
hire-purchase contracts, but since 
under the agreement the defendant 
indemnified the plaintiff, the 
agreement was not frustrated.  
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Disregard of Vitiating 
Factors; 
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM) 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC): 
Judicial Non-
Interventionism; 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY);  
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete (DISCRETE). 
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The plaintiff sued for damages for 
breach of contract, for supply of 
matches with a picture of Dictator 
President Iddi Amin, for sale on 
what the judge referred to as ‘the first 
anniversary of the second Republic 
of Uganda’, the 25TH January 1972. 
This was the first anniversary of 
Amin’s military capture of power. The 
defendant had written to the plaintiff 
conditioning performance on 
availability of labels and the plaintiff 
bearing their cost. Both condition 
precedents were not met.  
 Notwithstanding the political element 
of the contract, court held and 
reasoned that, there was no clear 
and unqualified offer by the 
defendant capable of acceptance, 
therefore no contract existed.  
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY). 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Disregard of contextual or 
Business reality; 
 
o Procedural Justice 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ); 












A contract of employment provided 
for the right of the employer to 
suspend an employee but was silent 
on whether salary would be paid 
during suspension. The court held 
and reasoned that:  
o The natural meaning of 
‘suspension’ was that the 
workman ceased to be under any 
duty to work and the employer 
under a duty to pay (Bird v. British 
celanese [1954] 1 ALLER 488 
cited with approval); 
o There was no custom of 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Disregard of Vitiating 
Factors; 
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM) 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC): 
Judicial Non-
Interventionism; 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY);  
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete (DISCRETE). 
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corporation employees receiving 
half pay; 
o It was the employer’s discretion to 
pay. 
35.  George Hall 







Under a contract for sale of a bar, the 
plaintiff seller did not disclose that he 
only had a tenancy and not a bar; 
assured the defendant that he would 
get a licence; and sold a going 
concern but the furniture later found 
not justifying the price. The plaintiff 
was a non-African and not allowed a 
bar licence. The court held that: 
o The buyer never exercised due 
diligence to know it was a mere 
tenancy, therefore had no claim; 
o Since as an African, the buyer 
was entitled to be awarded a 
licence, there was no 
misrepresentation; 
o  The business was sold as a 
going concern and no inventory 
taken, Therefore the claim failed 
too.  
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Disregard of Vitiating 
Factors; and Disregard of 
contextual or Business 
reality   
 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC): 
Judicial Non-
Interventionism; 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY);  
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete (DISCRETE). 
 
36.  N.R. Lakhani 










Benett, J.  
A gaming contract was entered, 
under which security was given. The 
plaintiff brought a suit to declare the 
security unenforceable and the debt 
irrecoverable under the Gaming Act. 
The court held and reasoned that: 
Under s. 1 of the Gaming Act 1835, 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC):Illegality 
overrides all proof and 
procedural 
matters/justice.   
o Statutory interventionism 
(SINTERV) i.e. 
International Treaties 
regulating contracts have 
force of law; 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM): 
o Formal legality as 






securities for money lost at a dice 
were deemed to have been for an 
illegal consideration, therefore the 
plaintiff was seeking to set aside an 
illegal transaction to which he was a 
party, which he could not do, without 
proving undue influence or pressure 
(per Jones v. Merionethshire 
Permanent Benefit Building Society 
[1892] 1 Ch. 173).  
recognition. 
 








Ag. J.  
Under a contract for the 
transportation of cattle by rail, there 
was a clause that the carrier was 
only liable in cases of willful 
misconduct of its employees. The 
plaintiff brought the suit without 
pleading it, argued negligence of the 
defendant.  The court held that: 
o Willful misconduct was not 
pleaded therefore the defendant 
could not be liable; 
o Even if willful misconduct had 
been pleaded, the action was 
misconceived, as it had not been 
pleaded.  
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
Restricting litigant’s case 
to Pleadings, and strict 
observance of rules of 
evidence; 
o Recognising Law’s 
Classificatory Categories 
(LCATEGOTIN): 
Negligence as basis of 
contractual liability 
rejected.  
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL): 
The Conception of Law 
as Conceptually 





o  Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Procedural Justice 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ). 











The defendant’s goods/wires were 
stolen and she ran an advert offering 
to pay however would provide 
information leading to the arrest and 
prosecution of the thieves. The 
Plaintiff provided information in 
response but the defendant did not 
follow through to have the thieves 
prosecuted. The plaintiff sued for 
breach of contract, and negligence in 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
formalities; 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC):Illegality 
overrides all proof and 
procedural 
o Procedural Justice 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ); 




failing to prosecute the thieves and 
pay his dues. Court held and 
reasoned that: 
o There was no negligence as there 
was no duty of care to pursue 
prosecution on the part of the 
defendant that was breached and 
damages incurred; 
o Although the advert amounted to 
an offer, the information provided 
that led to the arrest was not the 
exact information in the terms of 
the advert and all the conditions 
therein were not satisfied. 
  
matters/justice.   





[1976] H.C.B.  
105      
HC-Allen, 
J.   
A mechanic repaired a car and the 
owner disputed the amount charged, 
thus the mechanic retaining the car. 
The owner sued, and the court held 
that the onus was on him to prove 
that the charges were excessive, and 
without expert evidence, he had 
failed to discharge it.  Further, that he 
had a right of retention of the car. 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY); 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC):Illegality 
overrides all proof and 
procedural 
matters/justice.   
o Procedural Justice 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM). 
 






Ag. J.  
In a negligence suit, the defendant 
pleaded want of majority age to bring 
action in court. The general majority 
age was 21, and the plaintiff was 20. 
The plaintiff pleaded that under s. 3 
of the Contract Act, the majority age 
of 18 in England had been made law 
in Uganda. The court held that 
Contract Act did not apply to torts, 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY); 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC):Illegality 
overrides all proof and 
procedural 
matters/justice.   
o Procedural Justice 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ); 






therefore the suit was improperly 
instituted and dismissed.   











Under a contract of life insurance, 
payment of premium was made by 
cheque, which the evidence proved 
to be a usage. The cheque was 
dated before the deceased’s death 
but posted and received after the 
death. The court held and 
reasoned that: 
o It was the defendant’s sanctioned 
usage to receive payment by 
cheque; 
o There was no evidence that the 
defendant had made the post her 
agent for receiving premium so 
that upon post it was presumed 
received; 
o For a debtor to choose to pay by 
post does so at her own risk; 
o The policy was not existing at the 
time of death and therefore no 
liability. 
 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
formalities of payment of 
premium strictly 
honoured, and payment 
by post discounted; 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): No 
Filling gaps in Contract 
terms, i.e., Refusing to 
imply terms; 
 
o Procedural Justice 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC): 
Judicial Non-
Interventionism; 




APPENDIX 3: Flexible Adjudication In Uganda’s Commercial Hard Cases (Post Independence-1962-1986)  
No CASE 
TITLE 
CITATION COURT & 
JUDGE 









Applicant applied for relief from 
disability to enforce contracts by 
firms whose particulars were not 
registered (S.10 (1) (a), of the 
Business Names Registration 
Ordinance).  Court held that it was 
not just and equitable for the 
respondent to oppose application.  
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the Rules of 
Law, to find fairness and 
equity  
 
o Substantive Justice (SJ): 
Ubuntu concept of justice; 
o Judicial Absolutism (JA). 
 





HC A tenancy agreement had been 
drawn contrary to the statutory form 
and not registered. The court held 
that: 
o The agreement could still be 
enforceable as an agreement to 
lease and not a tenancy; 
o In the tenancy agreement, since 
sub-letting was not legally 
permissible, the third parties that 
the lessee had allowed to work on 
the premises for were mere 
licensees and not sub-tenants. 
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the Rules of 
Law  , by interpreting facts  
o Substantive Justice (SJ). 






[1963] 1 EA 
148 
 The defendant, being a statutory 
body created by the Coffee 
Ordinance of 1959, was the one 
entitled to buy coffee for export and 
set prices for it. The plaintiff sought 
to have court interfere with the 
pricing, on grounds that the contract 
o Statutory Regulation and 
Intervention in Contract 
Terms (SINTERV) 





Board for purchase of coffee was a sale of 
goods contract. The Court: 
o Rejected the plea, holding that it 
was a statutory contract in which 
the parties and court had no say 
regarding the terms, such as 
price; 
o Found that the contracts were not 
ones where freedom of contract 
reigned.   






[1966] 1 EA 
252 
 An insurance contract was made 
orally to cover cash in transit by an 
insurer that usually issued written 
policies for such contracts. The 
issue was whether the usual 
exceptions to the insurer’s liability 
embodied in the usually written 
contracts applied.  
The court recognised the standard 
terms usually contained in the 
insurer’s written policies as 
governing the oral contract.  
Court reasoned that: 
o The insured should have 
reasonably expected the standard 
terms as appropriate to the risk; 
o The attitude of the insured not 
insisting on other terms at the time 
of making the contract was also 
seen as justifying the implied 
standard terms.   
o Judicial Interventionism in 
Contract (JINTERV): 
Filling gaps in contracts 








o Contractual Justice 
(CONJUS), through Judicial 
Interventionism; 
o Judicial Absolutism (JA); 
o Inequality under the law 
(INEQUALITY); 








HC A contract for the sale of goods was 
entered when the goods had 
o Criminalising civil wrongs 
(CRIMINALISING). 
o Judicial Absolutism (JA); 
o Public Interest as a Rule of 
 580 
Kagezi 21 of 1974. perished, which would make it void 
under section 7 of the Sale of 
Goods Act, implying that the loss 
would fall where it was.  
The court instead applied section 
7(2) of the Distribution and Prices of 
Goods (Amendment) Decree (No. 
1of 1972), under which the seller’s 
action was criminalised, and held 
that the seller had to forfeit the 
goods and the price money to the 
buyer. 
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): Using 
executive decrees, and  
Stretching the meaning 
and Applicability of a rule; 
o Statutory Regulation and 




Recognition, the basis of 
obligation and enforceability 
of in Private Contracts 
(PUBLIC INTEREST): But 
State Policy as representing 
Public Interest; 











HC The court went beyond the 
offending employees to extend the 
imprisonment sanction imposed by 
a statute criminalizing otherwise a 
breach of sale of goods, to their 
employers.  
The court reasoned that the 
imprisonment was mandatory and 
had to so extend, unless there was 
evidence that the employers tried to 
prevent overcharging. 
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Stretching the meaning 
and Applicability of a rule;  
o Statutory Regulation and 
Intervention in Contract 
Terms (SINTERV); 
o Criminalising civil wrongs 
(CRIMINALISING). 
 
o Judicial Absolutism (JA); 
o Public Interest as a Rule of 
Recognition, the basis of 
obligation and enforceability 
of in Private Contracts 
(PUBLIC INTEREST): But 
State Policy as representing 
Public Interest; 
o Conception of Law as A 
Means to An End 
(LMEANS); 
o Conception of a Command 
Economy (COMM-ECON) 
o Public Interest as a Rule of 
Recognition, the basis of 
obligation and enforceability 
of in Private Contracts 
(PUBLIC INTEREST). 




HC The charge sheet in a case of 
fraudulently obtaining credit was 
defective for citing a non-existent 
section, as the law under which the 
o Undue regard to technical 
or procedural defects to 
do substantive justice 
(PROC-DISREGARD); 
o Statutory Regulation and 
Intervention in Contract 
o Substantive Justice (SJ); 
o Public Interest as a Rule of 
Recognition, the basis of 
obligation and enforceability 
of in Private Contracts 
(PUBLIC INTEREST); 
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charge had been preferred.  
The Court held that there was no 
miscarriage of justice and 
proceeded to hear the case.  
Terms (SINTERV); 
o  Criminalising civil wrongs 
(CRIMINALISING) 
o Conception of a Command 
Economy (COMM-ECON); 




Cr. Rev. No. 
70 of 1975. 
HC A wrong paragraph had been cited 
as a basis for a charge under 
economic crimes law for sale of 
goods.  
The judge held that a defective 
charge sheet was not bad in law, as 
there was no miscarriage of justice. 
o Undue regard to technical 
or procedural defects to 
do substantive justice 
(PROC-DISREGARD); 
o Statutory Regulation and 
Intervention in Contract 
Terms (SINTERV); 
o Criminalising civil wrongs 
(CRIMINALISING) 
o Substantive Justice (SJ); 
o Public Interest as a Rule of 
Recognition, the basis of 
obligation and enforceability 
of in Private Contracts 
(PUBLIC INTEREST); 











1965] 1 EA 
418. 
HC The defendant was a carrier that 
had acted for a disclosed third party 
as agent to deliver meat, which 
upon arrival was found unfit for 
human consumption.  
The issue was whether the carrier 
was liable for the unpaid price under 
section 48 of the Uganda Sale of 
goods Act. 
Without finding evidence to prove 
that the plaintiff had delivered the 
meat in a merchantable condition to 
the defendant, the court held that 
the defendant was liable although 
the Defendant was proved as an 
agent of a disclosed principal, that 
would legally not be liable for the 
price, pleas of unfairness made, and 
no evidence of fault was tendered 
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Stretching the meaning 
and Applicability of a rule;  
o Legal Classificatory 
Categories ignored (NO 
CATEGORIES): Treating 
Economic Negligence as 
Contractual and used to 
justify liability; 
 
o   Contract viewed as a 
network of or other 
relations  (RELATIOINS): 
Intention to Create a Long 
Term Relationship of 
Parties Recognised.  
 




o The conception of law as a 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); 
o Conception of Contract as 
Relational (RELATIONAL): 
Including contractual 
obligations being based on 
Reliance; 
o Systeatic Flexibility 
(SYSTEM-FLEXTY).  
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against the defendant. 
The Judge reasoned that: 
The Defendant was the owner of the 
goods, although the principle of the 
defendant had a duty of care to be 
prudent and inspect the meat before 
accepting it and ensure that it was 
merchantable; 
There was a presumed contract for 
sale of goods. Presumed, because, 
the defendant was in any case the 
carrier, who could not be liable for 
the price of goods sold, for the 
buyer was disclosed.  





[1963] 1 EA 
381 
HC Two statutes seemed to lead to 
contradictory positions. The 
Mortgage Act required only the 
mortgagor to sign the mortgage 
deed for it to be effective, whereas 
the Registration of Titles Ordinance 
required every registered instrument 
to have been signed by both parties 
it is affecting to be effective.  
The mortgagee had not signed the 
deed in issue, and the court held 
that a mortgage form even in view of 
the provision in the Registration of 
Titles Ordinance did not require the 
formality and precision needed in a 
court order.  
The judge reasoned that the issue 
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the Rules of 
Law; 
o Undue regard to technical 
or procedural defects to 
do substantive justice 
(PROC-DISREGARD). 
o Conception of Justice as 
Substantive Justice (SJ); 
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was a minor procedural matter and 






[1974] 1 EA 
161. 
HC Section 99 (b) of the Traffic and 
Road Safety Act of 1970 was 
interpreted flexibly in an insurance 
claim for the provision for third party 
motor insurance to cover 
passengers carried in motor 
vehicles for hire or reward.  
The issue was whether the 
defendant, a businessman who had 
accompanied his goods in a pickup 
was covered by the insurance 
policy. The court held that the 
defendant was covered by the policy 
although the pickup was not a 
passenger vehicle.  
The judge reasoned that having 
been a commercial transaction, the 
owner of goods should have been 
expected to accompany them.  
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): Invoking 
Business Reality and 
Commercial Sense; 
o Contract viewed as a 
network of or other 
relations (RELATIONS): 
Using Reliance to find 
contractual obligation and 
Cooperation and Trust 




o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY): 
Commercialism and Wealth 
Maximisation; 
o Substantive Justice (SJ): 
Ubuntu concept of justice; 
o Conception of law as 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP); 
o Conception of Contracts as 
Relational (RELATIONAL); 
o Social Support as a Rule of 
Validity and Recognition of 
Law (SOCIAL SUPPORT): 
Contractual Obligation as 
based on Communal 
Control. 






HC The court refused to apply the time 
limitation to actions for wrongful 
dismissal provided by the East 
African Railways Corporation Act.  
The judge’s reasoning was that, 
since the plaintiff, who had been the 
defendant’s yard foreman, was a 
junior officer; only the terms of 
contract would apply and not the 
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepped the Statutory 
Rule;  
o Recognising inequality 
amongst contracting 
parties: Using economic, 
social or political class as 
criteria to access justice 
(NO-EQUALITY): in this 
case, favoring low 
economic class. 
o Inequality before the law 
(INEQUALITY): The 
Conception of Justice as 
dependent on Class  
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statute.  
The implication here is that the court 
side-stepped the statute to protect 
the weaker party, and was 
motivated by the inequality of 
contracting parties to allocate rights 
and obligations.  
13. East African 













426 of 1969 
 A deed of settlement had been 
made in court and confirmed by the 
endorsement of court. The plaintiff 
challenged the settlement, pleading 
mistake.  
The judge stretched the slip rule of 
civil procedure that is used to 
correct inadvertent errors in court 
orders, to amend the contract 
between the parties, and ordered 
the defendant to pay more money 
than agreed.  
The judge’s reasoning was based 
on equity, that there was no true 
accord, and it would be inequitable 
to enforce the contract as made.     
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Stretching the meaning 
and Applicability of a rule; 
i.e. Enlarging the 
Premises and Applicability 
of Rules; 




Guarding Jurisdiction, i.e., 
Upholding the Sanctity of 
Court Orders, i.e.,: Court 
orders held as sacred and 
must be obeyed even if 
irregular, null or void; 
o Judicial Interventionism in 
Contract (JINTERV): 
Equity invoked to 
interfere with Contract. 




o Law as a Means to An End 
(LMEANS); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM): 
Supremacy of Positive Law; 
o Judicial Self Preservation 
(JSELF-PRESERV); 
o Contractual Justice 
(CONJUS), through Judicial 
Interventionism in Contract; 
o Conception of Justice as 
Substantive Justice (SJ).   







HC  An authorized driver was held by 
court to be an insured party on 
ground that the indemnity under the 
policy was given for his benefit.  
The judge clearly reasoned that: 
o Abductive Reasoning to 
resolve competing 
interests or in 
interpretation of statute or 
precedents 
(ABDUCTIVE): Intuition; 
o Law Understood and 
Applied Purposively 
o Conception of law as 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); 
o Judicial Absolutism (JA); 
o Perception of law as 
Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS): The 
Role of Judges: To Fill 
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o In such cases, it was better to be 
flexible than restrictive in the 
interpretation of who an insured 
was; 
o  The purpose of the rule in section 
104 (1) of the Traffic and Road 
Safety Act, of 1970 was providing 
for the insured to benefit from third 
party insurance policies, and 
therefore the driver as one of the 
persons who would benefit from 
the judgment was an insured.  
(PURPOSIVE); 
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Stretching the meaning 
and Applicability of a rule.  
 











HC The Magistrates court had awarded 
damages to the respondent for non-
delivery of goods plus lost profits, 
without any proof of the latter or 
guidance on how court had 
assessed them.  
The High court upheld the decision, 
reasoning that to be fair and 
reasonable, some profits must have 
been contemplated.  
But the judge reduced the award by 
1/3, quoting interests of fairness.    
o Judicial Interventionism in 
Contract (JINTERV) 
Considerations of 
fairness invoked to 
interfere with contract 
terms: Fairness as guide 
to remedies; 
o Contract viewed as a 
network of or other 
relations  (RELATIONS). 
o Contractual Justice 
(CONJUS), through Judicial 
Interventionism; 
o Conception Justice as 
Substantive Justice (SJ); 
o Social Support as a Rule of 
Validity and Recognition of 
Law (SOCIAL SUPPORT): 
Contractual Obligation as 
based on Communal 
Control. 
16. Grayson & 







HC The judge construed the words “we 
undertake to guarantee” to 
reasonably and fairly conceivably 
mean that there was a guarantee. 
o Judicial Interventionism in 
Contract (JINTERV) 
Considerations of 
fairness invoked to 
interfere with contract 
terms. 
o Conception of Commercial 
Justice as Substantive 
Justice (SJ); 
o Contractual Justice 




[1964] EA HC The issue whether a hire purchase 
contract had been terminated when 
o Judicial Interventionism in 
Contract (JINTERV) 
Considerations of 
o Conception of Commercial 






317 an agent was appointed to 
repossess the goods, was decided 
in the negative by the judge. 
The Judge based his decision on 
the grounds of reasonableness and 
unsoundness.   
fairness invoked to 
interfere with contract 
terms;  




o Conceptual Flexibility 
(CONCEPT-FLEXTY); 
o Contractual Justice 
(CONJUS), through Judicial 
Interventionism; 
o Social Support as a as 








(U) Ltd.  
[1985] HCB 
82 
 The plaintiff sued for breach of a 
contract of carriage, on the basis 
that the defendant had delivered 
fewer goods than contracted and 
handed to him.  
The judge held the defendant to be 
a common carrier basing on the 
circumstances of the case, as 
opposed to a private carrier that the 
contract between the parties 
indicated. Further, that whether or 
not the goods were insufficiently 
packaged, the defendant as 
common carrier was liable to 
compensate the plaintiff under the 
contract of carriage.   
The judge selectively and flexibly 
applied negligence law by reasoning 
that the defendant’s actions had 
caused the destruction of the 
plaintiff’s goods.  
o Legal Classificatory 
Categories ignored (NO 
CATEGORIES): Treating 
Economic Negligence as 
Contractual and used to 
justify liability;  
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Stretching the meaning 
and Applicability of a rule;  
o Contract viewed as a 
network of relations 
(RELATIONS). 
o Judicial Absolutism (JA); 




o Conception of law as 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); 
o Conception of Contract as 
Relational (RELATIONAL): 
Including contractual 
obligations being based on 
Reliance; 
o Systematic Flexibility 
(SYSTEM-FLEXTY);  
19. Patel v 
Gajjar 
[1964] EA 27 HC An infant brought a suit to recover 
wages from an illegal contract, his 
father having collected the wages 
o Contract viewed as a 
network of relations 
(RELATIONS); 
o Judicial Absolutism (JA); 
o Contractual Justice 
(CONJUS), through Judicial 
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from the defendant but 
misappropriated them.  
The court noted that the 
employment contract with the infant 
was illegal but held that accepting 
the infant to render services was a 
collateral contract from which the 
plaintiff could recover wages.  
The judges further reasoned that: 
o Each case ought to be seen from 
its peculiar circumstances; and 
o That in this particular case, the 
infant deserved to recover.  
o   Judicial Interventionism 
in Contract (JINTERV): 
Filling gaps in contracts 
with implied terms; i.e. 
Collateral Contracts under 
which rights could be 
defined better than the 
contracts in dispute; 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL). 
Interventionism; 
o Substantive Justice (SJ): 
Ubuntu concept of justice; 
o Conception of Contracts as 
Relational (RELATIONAL); 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP); 
Commercial Reality as the 
Rule of Recognition; 





Ltd v Patel 
[1969] EA 
239 
HC In a suit on agency, the possession 
of a certificate of title by the agent 
was held by the court as ostensible 
authority to receive a deposit 
payment.  
The judge noted that he had found 
no cases or rules relevant to the 
issue and decided the case on the 
basis of what he called ‘general 
principles’, informed by reasonable 
assumptions from the 
circumstances surrounding the 
contract. 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 





o Contractual Justice 
(CONJUS), through Judicial 
Interventionism; 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP): that in 
absence of rules, use 
general principles from 
surrounding circumstances;  
o Conceptual Flexibility 
(CONCEPT-FLEXTY); 
o Legal Pluralism (LP); 
o Tension Management 
Mechanism (MGT): Judging 
as ‘general principles, 
informed by reasonable 
assumptions from the 
circumstances surrounding 
the contract’; 















 A contract provided that the 
defendant would not take milk from 
any other party, but stored milk for 
the plaintiff’s competitor. 
Court flexibly interpreted the word 
“take”, not to include taking for 
storage purposes.  
o Purposive Interpretation of 
Contract Terms 
(PURPOSIVE); 
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Stretching the meaning 
and Applicability of a rule. 
o Contractual Justice 
(CONJUS), through Judicial 
Interventionism; 
o Conception of Law as A 
Means to An End 
(LMEANS). 







HC An action challenging the 
suspension of an employee, yet the 
contract did not expressly provide 
for suspension.  
Court held that in absence of a term 
in the contract permitting 
suspension, it would be unlawful, 
however due to proven practice, this 
particular suspension was lawful.  
o Contract Law understood 
as including Practices 
(PRACTICES). 
 
o Contractual Justice 
(CONJUS), through Judicial 
Interventionism; 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP): 
Commercial Reality as the 
Rule of Recognition; 







HC-Allen J. The Plaintiff filed a claim for specific 
performance sixteen years after the 
defendant had within six days of its 
making, rescinded a contract for 
buying shares in a company.  
Allen J held that the plaintiff couldn’t 
be availed specific performance.  He 
reasoned that: Specific performance 
is an equitable remedy at the 
discretion of court, but the party 
seeking it should act promptly 
especially if it concerns property like 
shares with a fluctuating value.   
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): 
Commercial Sense; 
o Judicial Interventionism in 
Contract (JINTERV): 
Filling gaps in contracts 
with implied terms; 
defined by Social-
Economic Relations.  
 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY): 
Commercialism and Wealth 
Maximisation; 
o Conception of Contracts as 
Relational (RELATIONAL). 
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47/70, P.53  
HC After the 1966 political crisis that led 
to the abolition of the Buganda 
Kingdom using a new forcefully 
imposed constitution in 1967, 
Section 2(1) and (2) of the Local 
Administration Act, 1969 were 
enacted, making void agreements 
signed with the former Buganda 
Government, unless ratified by the 
Minister. Courts were also bound to 
dismiss suits commenced to enforce 
such voided agreements.    
The Plaintiff claimed under an 
agreement with the former Buganda 
Government and obtained 
judgment, but the defendant treated 
it as void. Upon reference, the court 
held and reasoned that: 
o The provisions infringed the 
constitutional rights to property 
(choses in action), and equal 
protection before the law; 
o Article 1 of the Constitution 
making it the supreme law, meant 
that its provisions had to prevail 
over Parliamentary laws; 
o Uganda was different from Britain 
because it had a Constitution that 
was, supreme and not Parliament 
like Britain; 
o The authority of Burma Oil Co. Ltd 
v. Advocate [1965] AC 75, in 
which compensation for war 
losses ordered by court were later 
declared unrecoverable by 
o Conformity with the 
Constitution as a Rule of 
Recognition (CONS-
CONFORM); 




o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 
o Contract viewed as a 
network of relations and 
(RELATIONS): Contract 
used as an Instrument of 
Social Relations. 
o Equality Before the Law 
(EQUALITY); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM): 
Constitutionalism; 
o Judicial Self Preservation 
(JSELF-PRESERV): 
Resisting foreign legal 
authorities 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY): Protection 
of free market economy i.e. 
Sanctity of Private 
Property; 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Conception of Contract as 
Relational (RELATIONAL).  
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Parliament using retrospective 
legislation, was not relevant as 
Parliament was not superior to the 
Constitution in Uganda.    















HC Court found the defendant liable as 
a bailee, and the issue was whether 
the Plaintiff could recover lost 
profits. Court held that in breach of 
contract the aggrieved party is only 
entitled to recover actual loss that 
was foreseeable at the time of the 
contract as resulting from a breach.  
Court reasoned that: 
o What was foreseeable depends 
on the knowledge of the parties, 
and where no actual knowledge 
exists, the question is whether a 
reasonable man could foresee or 
conclude that in the ordinary 
course of business one would lose 
profits; 
o The defendant knew that the 
plaintiff’s business was making 
garments, so should have 
foreseen loss of profits.  
o Expectancy loss 
Considered 
(EXPECTANCY); 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): 
Intention gauged from 
actual knowledge at time 
of the contract and 
Standard of a Reasonable 
man;  




o Contract Law understood 
as including Practices 
(PRACTICES): Ordinary 
Course of Business 
determined rights, duties 
and remedies. 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY): 
Commercialism and Wealth 
Maximisation: i.e., ex-ante 
perspective; 
o Accuracy in Contracting 
and Adjudication 
(ACCURACY); 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP); 




o  Conception of Contractual 
Obligation as based on 
Promise (PROMISE); 
o Conception of Contract as 












147, 148  
HC-Sekandi 
Ag. J 
The Appellant bank unjustifiably 
dishonoured a cheque issued by the 
respondent, a lawyer. He brought a 
claim for special damages for 
breach of contract. Court held that 
the lawyer was only entitled to 
nominal damages, reasoning that: 
o Without proof of special damages, 
bank customers who are not 
o Assessing damages 
based on actual financial 
loss (ACTUAL LOSS); 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): 
Invoking Business Reality; 
o Recognising inequality 
amongst contracting 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY): 
Commercialism and Wealth 
Maximisation; 
o Conception of Law as 
Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS);  
o Conception of contractual 





traders are only entitled to nominal 
damages from wrongful dishonor 
of cheques; 
o A trader is a person in commercial 
business whose credit would be 
injured if he fails to pay for goods 
in trade, during his commercial 
dealings; 
 
o A practicing lawyer is not such 
trader and can only recover 
nominal damages.  
parties: Using economic, 
class as criteria to access 
justice (NO-EQUALITY), 
i.e., that non-trader only 
entitled to nominal 
damages.   
o Inequality before the law 
(INEQUALITY): The 
Conception of Justice as 
dependent on Class; 
o Opportunism 
(OPPORTUNISM); 
o  Accuracy in adjudication 
(ACCURACY); 




HC-Allen J, An appeal from a decision of a 
Magistrate’s court that interfered 
with the agreed interest rate of 48% 
per annum, and reduced it to 4%.   
Court held that: 
o Under section 26 of the Civil 
Procedure Act, courts had the 
discretion to determine what rate 
of interest was harsh and 
unconscionable, and reduce it, 
irrespective of the practice of the 
people lending money in the 
country; 
o The normal court rate was 6%, 
and there was no good reason for 
going below it, so the magistrate 
wrongly exercised his discretion; 
o In the instant case, 10% was fair, 
reasonable and proper.    
o Judicial Interventionism in 
Contract (JINTERV) 
Considerations of 
fairness invoked to 
interfere with contract 
terms;  




o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Stretching the meaning 
and Applicability of a rule;  
o Abductive Reasoning to 
resolve competing 
interests or in 
interpretation of statute or 
precedents 
(ABDUCTIVE): Intuition, 
i.e. his sense of fairness 
and reasonableness. 
o Judicial absolutism  (JA) 
i.e., Law applied per the 
Personal prejudices and 
sense of justice of judges; 
o Contractual Justice 
(CONJUS), through Judicial 
Interventionism;  




o Conception of Law as 
Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS); 
o Social Support as a as 




28.  Kintu v 
Kyotera 
[1976] HCB HC-Allen J. The Plaintiff, an African Ugandan 
sued for wrongful dismissal, having 
o Making New Law 
(LMAKING) i.e. that 
o Judicial Absolutism (JA). 





362 been appointed to a position and 
without notice an Indian also 
appointed to take up the same post.   
The defendant’s defences were that 
the seal on the appointment letter of 
the plaintiff was forged, proving that 
since 1958, she had used a different 
seal; and that the directors whose 
signed the letter were still in dispute 
at the time.  Court held that: 
o The fact that the directors who 
signed the latter were still in 
dispute and may have lacked 
capacity did not affect the validity 
of the agreement; 
o No special regulations applied to a 
seal, so any could work, even if it 
belonged to another company, as 
long as it was used;  
o A company secretary signing an 
agreement, witnessed by an 
advocate was enough to validate 
the agreement; 
o A contract by a commercial 
company can be oral or written 
and even section 34 of the 
Companies Act cannot change 
this settled law; 
o Damages are meant to restore a 
position as good as if no breach 
had taken place; 
o The plaintiff was an experienced 
and qualified manager, so could 
get another job in mitigation of his 
loss, so damages reduced.    
illegality and fraud could 
be validated; Contract 
Law understood as 
including Practices 
(PRACTICES);  
o Recognising inequality 
amongst contracting 
parties: Using economic, 




o Viewing at remedies as 
restoration 
(RESTORATION).  
o Perception of law as 
Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS): The 
Role of Judges: To Fill 
Gaps in the Law;  
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY): 
Commercialism and Wealth 
Maximisation; 
o Inequality before the law 
(INEQUALITRY); 
o  Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP) 
o The Restitution Measure of 
Damages (RESTITUTION); 
o Inequality before the law 
(INEQUALITY): The 
Conception of Justice as 
dependent on Class. 
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NB: Although damages were looked 
as restoring a party to the pre-
breach status, restitution was clearly 
seen as the end goal rather than 




















The defendant consumed the 
services of the plaintiff as a 
structural engineer, having been 
appointed by an architect appointed 
by the defendant. 
Court held that: 
o The architect had no implied 
authority to appoint the engineer;  
o There was no contract between 
the parties, not even a void one;  
o Therefore, quantum meruit would 
be unjust liability.  
Note 
“…there was no contract, not 
even a void one…” means that 
void contracts can be contracts 
recognized by courts. Such 
recognition could only be based on 
a source of normativity different 
from the legal order. Therefore, this 
formalistic judge recognized legal 
pluralism.   
o Contract Law understood 
as including Practices 
(PRACTICES): 
Normativity recognized as 
possible beyond legal 
validity. 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms as 
sacrosanct, i.e. Attempts 
to remedy illegal contract 
using equity rejected; 
 
o Freedom and Autonomy of 
Contract (FOC): Judicial 
non-interventionism; 
o Conception of Contract as 
Discrete (DISCRETE); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Legal Pluralism (LP); 
o Conceptual Flexibility 
(CONCEPT-FLEXTY); 










The plaintiff companies were 
indebted to the defendant bank, and 
a third party issued a promissory 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY): 








Case 160/70 note on their behalf in favour of the 
bank, to cover the debt.   
The bank foreclosed on the 
plaintiffs, who claimed that 
accepting the promissory notes 
suspended the defendant’s rights to 
foreclose. 
Court held that: 
o Whether the rights had been 
suspended depended on all 
circumstances of the case, since 
there was no specific agreement; 
o The remedy in a debt is not 
suspended where the plaintiff 
would loose a better remedy 
(Relied on Allen v. Royal Bank of 
Canada (1924-5) T.L.R 625).  
Note: 
o Evidence of Conspiratory 
Formalism precipitated by 
capitalist interests i.e. protecting 
banks and ensuring recovery of 
their debts. 
Invoking Business Reality 
and Commercial Sense. 
 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP). 










In a subrogation claim, where a car 
kept with a garage owner, the 
defendant had been stolen, court 
held that: 
o A bailee is not an insurer, and only 
liable where there was negligence; 
o It was enough for the bailor to 
show that the car was not 
returned, a prima facie case made 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 
o Legal Classificatory 
Categories ignored (NO 
CATEGORIES): Treating 
Economic Negligence as 
Contractual and used to 
justify liability;  
o Judicial ABSOLUTISM (JA); 
o Legal Pluralism (LP); 
o Freedom of Contract and 
Autonomy of contract 
(FOC); 
o Judicial Self-Preservation 
(JSELF-PRESERV): 
Determination from British 
Law; 














out for the bailee to show there 
was no negligence or misconduct; 
o Because of car thefts in Entebbe-
Uganda, it was unsafe to leave the 
car unlocked; 
o Convenience, which is the reason 
the defendant did not take 
adequate steps to secure the car 
was not compelling reason to 
escape liability;  
o Exemption of liability by bailee had 
to be by clear and unambiguous 
terms, brought to notice of bailor;  
o Subrogation was contractual and 
could not be defeated by a 
contract between the bailor and 
bailee;  
o There was no statutory law on 
bailment in Uganda, per the 
Judicature Act;  
o The Common Law being applied 
as far as the circumstances of 
Uganda permit means that to be 
applicable, English authorities had 
to be relevant, reasonable and 




Both Flexibility and Formalism were 
applied in the same decision, 
without absurdity. 
o Contract viewed as a 
network of or other 
relations (RELATIONS): 
Long Term Relationship of 
Parties Recognised;      
o Judicial Interventionism in 
Contract (JINTERV) 
Considerations of 
fairness invoked to 





obligations being based on 
Reliance; 
o Conception of Law as a 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); Legal Validity 
and Contractual Obligation 
judged by Practical Utility   
o Systematic Flexibility 
(SYSTEM-FLEXTY); 
Contractual Justice 








The appellant sought to challenge a 
restraint of trade clause that 
o Abductive Reasoning to 
resolve competing 
interests or in 
o Judicial absolutism (JA); 
o Public Interest as a Rule of 






July 1972  
[1973] E.A. 
358 
.J,  restricted him working in the capital 
city Kampala and the industrial 
capital Jinja, having been a 
manager of roofing and flooring 
company. 
Court found for the employers, 
reasoning that: 
o Whether restraint of trade is good 
or bad depends on whether it is 
injurious to public interest; and  
o Whether it goes beyond what is 
reasonably necessary; 
o  That the term was neither 
contrary to public policy nor 
unreasonable.  
interpretation of statute or 
precedents 
(ABDUCTIVE): Intuition; 
i.e. Enforceability of 
contracts subjected to a 
judge’s sense of 
reasonableness; 





o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): Public 
policy invoked. 
obligation and enforceability 
of in Private Contracts 
(PUBLIC INTEREST): But 
State Policy as representing 
Public Interest; Conception 
of Law as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS); 
o Public Opinion as Criteria 
for contractual Obligation 
and Enforceability (PUBLIC 
OPINION); 
o Social Support as a Rule of 
Validity and Recognition of 
Law (SOCIAL SUPPORT); 
o Conceptual Flexibility 
(CONCEPT-FLEXTY). 














HC The plaintiff’s car was stolen from 
the defendant’s garage while under 
repair. The plaintiff sued for breach 
of contract and negligence.  
Court held that in absence of 
negligence, there was no liability, 
reasoning that, unless a special 
contract to the contrary exists, a 
bailee was not an insurer.  
Note: 
The court further held that it was the 
defendant’s watchman’s duty to 
prevent thefts, and found the 
defendant vicarious liability. The 
judge stretched the rules on 
negligence, to defeat formalistic 
common rules law for what he 
o Legal Classificatory 
Categories ignored (NO 
CATEGORIES): Treating 
Economic Negligence as 
Contractual and used to 
justify liability;  
o Objectively applying 
general principles of 
contract (GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES), i.e. to 
insurance and bailment. 






o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL): The 
Conception of Law as 
Conceptually Ordered, i.e., 
based on Precise, 
Objective, Neural, 
Universally Applicable and 
Fundamental Principles;  
o Conception of Contract as 
Relational (RELATIONAL): 
Including contractual 
obligations being based on 
Reliance; 
o  Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM): Law as 
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perceived as fair and just. Objective and Neutral;  
o Conception of law as a 













HC This was an application to reinstate 
a claim for loss of expected profits 
the registrar of the High Court had 
eliminated from an exparte 
judgment for the applicant.  
Court dismissed the application, 
reasoning that loss of anticipated 
profits will however be allowed if the 
profits were in reasonable 
contemplation of the parties to the 
contract.  





o Contract Law understood 
as including Practices 
(PRACTICES): 
commercial practice as 
superior to positive law 
o Judicial Interventionism 
(JA); 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY): 
Commercialism and Wealth 
Maximisation; 
o Conceptual Flexibility 
(CONCEPT-FLEXTY);  
o  Conception of Contract as 
Relational (RELATIONAL); 








HC A regular surveyor for the appellant 
bank did extra work for her, than 
what had been contracted, without 
agreement on a scale of fees for the 
extra works. 
Court held that the contractor was 
entitled to be paid a quantum meruit 
for the extra works.  
o Judicial Interventionism in 
Contract (JINTERV) 
Equity invoked to 
interfere with Contract.  
o Substantive Justice (SJ) 
o Contractual Justice 
(CONJUS), through Judicial 
Interventionism. 









The plaintiff issued a cheque for 
UGX 10,301, but before banking, 
the amount was fraudulently 
changed to UGX 40,301. The 
plaintiff sued her for breach of 
banking contract, claiming UGX 
40,301.  
o Legal Classificatory 
Categories ignored (NO 
CATEGORIES): Treating 
Economic Negligence as 
Contractual and used to 
justify liability;  
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the Rules of 
Law , and choosing to 




o Conception of law as a 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); 




Court held that:  
o The plaintiff was only entitled to 
the UGX 10,301 originally on the 
cheque;  
o The customer being in a 
contractual relationship with the 
bank, had a duty when drawing a 
cheque to avoid forgeries; 
o  If the customer negligently draws 
a cheque, in accordance with 
Donoghue & Stevenson [1932] AC 
562, forgery will be treated as a 
natural consequence;  
o In this case, the defendant was 
apparent but the alteration not so 
apparent, therefore section 64 of 
the Bills of Exchange Act that 
protected banks was not 
applicable.    
N.B: This case contradicts the 
decision by Karokora J, in 
Consultant Surveyors & Planners v. 
Standard Bank (U) Limited (1984) 
HCB, that customers of banks have 
no duty to avoid forgeries while 
drawing cheques. 
follow general principles. obligations being based on 
Reliance; 
o Judicial Absolutism (JA); 










H.C Opu, J. Under a contract of employment, the 
employee was liable for dismissal if 
found ‘guilty’ of unsatisfactory 
conduct. The plaintiff was accused 
of selling travellers cheques 
contrary to the Exchange Control 
Regulations, and the police 
investigated but were not able to 
place charges on him, however the 
o Recognising inequality 
amongst contracting 
parties: Using economic, 
class as criteria to access 
justice (NO-EQUALITY), 
i.e. the perception of 
master and servant with 
one having to serve the 
other; 
o Inequality before the law 
(INEQULAITY); 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP); 
o Conception of Law as  A 
Means to An End 
(LMEANS). 
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defendant dismissed him. The court 
held and reasoned that: 
o The right to dismiss an employee 
accrued to the defendant by virtue 
of the employee having ‘entered 
into the position of servant' 
doing anything incompatible with 
the due and faithful discharge of 
his duty to the master; 
o The word guilty did not mean 
convicted in a court of law, and it 
was enough that his conduct had 
made him unreliable.  
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL). 










Under a written contract (indent) for 
sale of goods where the buyer 
offered to pay the seller directly but 
the latter insisted and it was agreed 
that the seller be paid through a 
confirming agent as a home agent, 
the buyer paid but the agent did not 
pay the seller. Upon instruction to 
cancel the promissory note used 
and pay the seller directly, the buyer 
refused, thus the suit. The court 
held and reasoned that: 
o Whether it was still the law or not 
that a home agent is presumed 
liable for the price was irrelevant, 
because the principal would still 
be liable; 
o According to the surrounding 
circumstances, the conclusion 
was that the defendant was 
reasonably led to believe that the 
plaintiff was not interested in the 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 




o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the Rules of 
Law, and choosing to 
follow general principles. 
o Judicial Absolutism (JA); 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP); 





defendant and looked to the agent 
for payment, thus the defendant 
was released from liability.   









C.J.   
Under a contract for sale of goods 
(lint), the buyer delaying sending the 
promissory note at the agreed time, 
and altered the date agreed on the 
ones sent. The defendant refused to 
deliver the goods. The court held 
and reasoned that: 
According to the circumstances, the 
plaintiff was insolvent and unable to 
honour the 45 day bill, therefore the 
defendant was entitled to withhold 
delivery and treat the contract as 
repudiated;  
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL). 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP); 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY). 
41.  Lugalambi 





HC-Allen, J.  The headmaster of a school 
contracted the plaintiff to effect 
some repairs at the school. The 
defendant to which the headmaster 
was secretary disclaimed authority 
of the headmaster. The issue was 
whether the required formalities 
were complied in before the contract 
being made.  
The court held that, the 
headmaster was an agent of the 
board, the Ministry of Education, 
and had ostensible and apparent 
authority to contract. 
o Contractual Obligations 




Functionality used guide 
the applicability and 
meaning of parties’ 
actions.  
o Conception of Law as a 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); Legal Validity 
and Contractual Obligation 
judged by Practical Utility ; 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY). 
41. Kafuma v. 
Masaka 
[1975] H.C.B. HC-Lubogo, A contract of employment was, 
silent on how much notice of 
o Judicial Interventionism in 
Contract (JINTERV): 
Filling gaps in contracts 
o Contractual Justice 







285 J.  termination the employee was 
entitled to. He was dismissed 
without notice. The court held that, it 
was implied that the employee was 
entitled to three months notice of 
termination.   
with implied terms, i.e. 
Honouring standard 
terms.  
o Judicial Absolutism (JA). 








An employee misconducted himself 
outside office hours and he was 
arrested and detained. The 
employer dismissed him without 
notice, citing damage to the good 
name of the employer.  The court 
held and reasoned that:  
o A dismissal was wrongful if done 
without justification or reasonable 
cause, and although the employer 
was embarrassed, this was not a 
fundamental breach of contract to 
warrant dismissal as it never 
affected his work, moreover his 
work was appreciated by the 
employer; 
o Sufficient notice is to be 
determined by the terms of the 
contract, legislation, or common 
law required that it be reasonable 
notice; 
o Natural justice should have been 
observed by giving the employee 
a hearing; and the notice should 
have been sufficient to allow the 
employee find alternative 
employment on the same terms; 
o The appropriate reparation for 
wrongful dismissal was damages 
o Judicial Interventionism in 
Contract (JINTERV): 
Filling gaps in contracts 
with implied terms, i.e. 
Honouring standard 
terms; 
o Contractual Obligations 




Functionality used guide 
the applicability and 






o Contract Law understood 
as including Practices 
(PRACTICES): 
commercial practice  
 
o Conception of Law as a 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); Legal Validity 
and Contractual Obligation 
judged by Practical Utility ; 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY); 
o Contractual Justice 
(CONJUS), through Judicial 
Interventionism; 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP); 






of a pecuniary nature and not 
reinstatement as the employer 
had an unfettered right to 
dispense with the services of his 
employee.  






Butagira, J.  Under a contract for audit services, 
a price was agreed, ‘subject to the 
books being in order’. The plaintiff 
found that the defendant’s books 
were not all in order and did more 
work than agreed, but the defendant 
refused to pay more. The court 
held that the proviso meant that 
any extra work would have to be 
paid for separately.  
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 
o Contractual Obligations 




Functionality used guide 
the applicability and 
meaning of parties’ 
actions. 
o Conception of Law as a 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); Legal Validity 
and Contractual Obligation 
judged by Practical Utility ; 
o Substantive Justice (SJ): 
Ubuntu concept of justice  
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY). 














A builder subcontracted the 
objector, to do work for the third 
respondent. At some stage of the 
works, the builder accepted and 
authorised that the third respondent 
pays the objector directly. The 
objector continued to complete the 
rest of the work. The builder later 
became bankrupt and revoked the 
authority. The bankrupt sued the 
third respondent for payment and 
sought to attach the monies owing, 
thus the objector proceedings by the 
sub-contractor/second.  
The court held and reasoned that: 
o With the authority to pay, the 
bankrupt released the third 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL); 
o Practicality and 
Functionality used guide 
the applicability and 
meaning of parties’ 
actions (PRACTICAL); 
 
o Contract viewed as a 
network of or other 
relations (RELATIONS): 
Intention to Create a Long 
Term Relationship of 
Parties Recognised.  
 
o Legal validity and 
Contractual Obligation to be 
judged by Practical Utility 
(PRACT-UTILITY); 
o Substantive Justice (SJ): 
Ubuntu concept of justice; 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY). 
o The conception of law as a 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); 
o Conception of contractual 
obligations based on 
Reliance   (RELIANCE); 







respondent from paying him in 
consideration of paying the 
objector directly; 
o It is not disputed that the bankrupt 
did not carry out all the work as 
some was done by the sub-
contractor/objector; 
o The authority to pay should 
receive wide construction and be 
seen as allowing future payments, 
not only those due on the date;  
o The subsequent purported 
revocation of authority was of no 
legal consequence.  
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APPENDIX 4: Formalistic Adjudication In Commercial Hard Cases (NRM Era -1986-2018) 
NO CASE TITLE CITATION COURT & 
JUDGE 
CASE SUMMARY INTERNAL VALUE (S)  EXTERNAL VALUE (S) 
1. Lubega v. 
Barclays Bank 
(U) Limited 





The bank had a debenture over the 
insolvent company that barred sale of its 
properties without the bank’s consent. 
The appellant bought the company’s 
property behind the bank’s back and the 
bank challenged the sale on grounds of 
fraud. Fraud was not pleaded but proved 
in evidence. The trial court held that 
not giving particulars of fraud in the 
plaint caused no prejudice and therefore 
immaterial. On appeal however, the 
Supreme court held that the omission 
was not a mere irregularity but made the 
suit bad in law.  
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
Restricting litigant’s case 
to Pleadings; 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC). 
o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Role of Courts as 
implementers not makers 










were applied in 
this decision).   





In a sale of goods claim that the goods 
were not fit for purpose, court held that 
the plaintiff was liable because the 
defendant delivered the motor vehicles 
in his names, although not verified or 
used. 
Pleas that the defendant knew the 
purposes for which the vehicles had 
been bought were irrelevant. 
Court reasoned that: 
o When a contract is in writing and its 
language clear and unambiguous, 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms as 
sacrosanct;  
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM): 
Disregard of the 
Contract’s purposes; 
o Abductive Reasoning in 
interpretation of statute or 
precedents 
(ABDUCTIVE): Intuition 
used resolve competing 
answers;  
o Exercising Unrestrained 
o Writing as the best 
evidence of parties’ 
intentions (PAROL 
EVIDENCE); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete (DISCRETE); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC): 
Judicial non-
interventionism; 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Judicial Absolutism (JA); 
o Inaccuracy in adjudication 
(INACCURACY). 
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court’s duty is to look at it and 
determine whether it applies to the 
facts; 
o No evidence can be adduced to vary 
the terms of a written contract; 
o In assessing damages, there is no 
exact science or mathematical 






of Unfettered Discretion 
i.e., award of general 
damages-exactness, 
science and mathematics 
as tools for assessing 
damages rejected.  






Ltd & Pan 
World 
Insurance Co. 
Ltd. (N.B. Both 
Formalism and 
Flexibility were 
applied in this 
decision).    
[1999] 1 EA 69 CA-Barko, JA The insurer in a marine insurance 
contract brought a subrogation suit 
against the tortfeasors, having fully 
indemnified the insured.   
Court held that: 
o Although the Insurance Certificate and 
evidence of payment by the insurer 
had been tendered, the contract of 
insurance had not been proved to 
have existed without the policy itself 
being tendered; 
o Subrogation springs from a valid and 
operative contract of insurance which 
was not proved without the policy.  
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the Rules of 
Law, i.e. Rules validating 
informal insurance 
contracts sidestepped; 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms as 
sacrosanct.  
o Writing as the best 
evidence of parties’ 
intentions (PAROL 
EVIDENCE); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete (DISCRETE); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
i.e. Proof of written terms 
the only way to prove 






Ltd & Pan 
World 
Insurance Co. 
Ltd.  v. Egypt 





The supreme court agreed with the court 
of appeal that without the insurance 
policy being tendered, there was no 
proof of a valid and operative contract of 
insurance to trigger subrogation.   
Justice Oder rejected King v. Victoria 
(1896) AC 250 PC, which at common 
law is authority for the proposition that it 




o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA):  
Disregard of Fairness of 
Terms and Equity 
rejected as source of 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of contract (FOC); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete (DISCRETE); 
o Procedural justice 
superior to Substantive 
Justice (PJ); 
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Air Corporation is not open for the third party to question 
the contractual propriety of the insurer 
having indemnified the insured, as long 
there was a contract of insurance and 
evidence of indemnity. 
Tsekooko JSC, added that it would be 
vital to prove a valid and operative 
policy, to know under what 
circumstances the usurer may not be 
liable to pay under the policy, and 
whether the third party had a defence 
under the policy.  
Arguments that: it would be unfair and 
unjust to allow the respondent who 
delivered spoilt fish to get away with it; 
and the practice in marine is to prove 
contracts of insurance by many means 
other than the policy, were rejected. 
remedy i.e. Common law 
rule upholding equitable 
subrogation as above 
technical defences and 
holding parties to their 
insurance contracts 
rejected/modified.   
o Writing as the best 













were applied in 
this decision).    




While the appellant was transporting the 
respondent’s goods, an accident 
occurred and they were damaged.  The 
respondent sued for negligence, which 
was not proved, but the principal judge 
found liability against the appellant as a 
common carrier.  
Court held that: 
o Owing to the nature of the business, a 
common carrier has an implied 
warranty to ensure safe delivery of the 
goods; 
o Since a common carrier was not 
pleaded, the respondent could not rely 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
Restricting litigant’s case 
to Pleadings; 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 




o Contractual Obligations 




Functionality used guide 
the applicability and 
o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY); 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP); 
o Conception of Law as a 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); Legal Validity 
and Contractual 
Obligation judged by 
Practical Utility ; 
o  Conception of Law as 
determinate 
(DETRMINATE): 
Negligence not to resolve 
Contract disputes; 
o The Restitution Measure 
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on the obligations of such carrier; 
o With regard to damages, restitution 
principles should be followed, where 
the market value and currency at the 
time and place of destruction should 
be used. 
meaning of parties’ 
actions, i.e., Invoking 
Business Practicality; 
o Recognising Law’s 
Classficatory Categories 
(LCATEGOTIN): 





o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL): 
The Conception of Law 
as Conceptually Ordered, 











(U) Ltd v. Opio 
(1992-93) HCB 
107 
CA Court held that in breach of contract 
cases: 
o The measure of damages is only what 
a party would have benefited from 
performance of the contract. 
o Exemplary damages cannot be 
awarded unless the breach gives rise 
to a tort. 
o Assessing damages 




o Accuracy in Contracting 
and Adjudication 
(ACCURACY); 
o Contract viewed as 
Discrete (DISCRETE). 
7.  Larco Concrete 





applied in this 
decision).    
[1987] HCB 39 CA The contract between parties 
incorporated in the United Kingdom 
provided that the High Court of England 
shall have non-exclusive jurisdiction.  
The Court of Appeal held that the High 
Court had jurisdiction, reasoning that: 
o The use of the word “non” was not a 
slip; 
o Since business was being carried on 
in Uganda for gain; 
o Even if the parties had conferred 
jurisdiction to a foreign court, the 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms as 
sacrosanct;  
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM); 
o Contractual Obligations 




Functionality used guide 
the applicability and 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Conception of Law as a 
means to an end 
(LMEANS); Legal Validity 
and Contractual 
Obligation judged by 
Practical Utility ; 





Uganda High Court would have the 
discretion to decide whether or not to 
entertain the dispute; 
o The High Court should jealously guard 
its jurisdiction and any instrument 
purporting to oust it should do so in 
very clear and certain terms; 
o Terms of a contract are not decisive 
on jurisdiction. The issue is whether 
the parties submitted to jurisdiction 
unequivocally.  
meaning of parties’ 
actions, i.e., Invoking 
Business Practicality; 
o Exercising Unrestrained 
Judicial Authority 
(UNRESTRAINEDAUTH
ORITY): Exercise of 
Unfettered Discretion i.e., 
to modify terms of 
contract on jurisdiction, 
and Jealously Guarding 
Jurisdiction of Court.  
o Judicial Self Preservation 
(JUD- SELF PRESERV); 













CA Court gave the reasoning behind strict 
adherence to pleadings, that the 
purpose of pleadings in litigation is to 
define and deliver with clarity and 
precision the real matters in controversy, 
upon which parties can prepare and 
present their cases, and upon which, 
court can adjudicate.   
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
Restricting litigant’s case 
to Pleadings. 
 
o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Role of Courts as 
implementers not makers 
of the law (ROC-
NONMAKERS) 
  
9.  Osman v. 
Mulangwa 





This was an action for breach of a sale 
of land contract, however the judge 
revealed the values and perception of 
courts in adjudication, when he 
observed that: 
“Courts will not make a contract for the 
parties but will give effect to their clear 
intentions”, and referred with approval to 
Jiwaji v. Jiwaji [1968] EA 547.  
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Disregard of Fairness of 
Terms. 
 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY). 
 




[2000] 1 EA 193 CA The law in Matayo Musoke v. Alibhai 
Garage [1960] EA 31, which relied on 
Newbury Car Auctioneers Ltd v. United 
Finance Ltd & Another, [1956] 3 ALLER 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC): i.e. A mere 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Role of Judge as 
Mechanical deduction, 
implementers not makers 
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were applied in 
this decision). 
905, that in sale of goods, a car logbook 
is not a document of title was changed. 
Court held that in Uganda, a buyer who 
has been given a logbook as well as 
possession can resale it and pass good 
title, because a logbook is presumed to 
be a document of title.    
Authority for the new proposition was 
cited as section 31 of the Traffic and 
Road Safety Act, 1998, and Fred 
Kamanda v. Ugandan Commercial Bank 
(CA 17/1995), which held that because 
the statute created the presumption, a 
logbook is evidence of ownership. That 
this was no longer good law. 
Court further held that in this case the 
presumption was rebutted because 
although the seller remained with the 
logbook and consideration had not been 
paid in full as was the case in Matayo 
Musoke’s case, under section 20 (1) of 
the Sale of Goods Act the time for 
payment or delivery being postponed is 
immaterial and property passes in the 
case of an unconditional sale of specific 
goods in a deliverable state. 
Further, that having given up 
possession, the unpaid seller’s lien 
under section 43 was lost, and that 
according to sections 39(1) and 40 (1), 
the unpaid seller’s lien did not prevent 
the passing of property.  
presumption created by 
statute taken as evidence 
of ownership; 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Disregard of Fairness of 
Terms: Contextual 
Fairness Ignored, i.e., 
Disregard of Fairness of 
Terms (The fact that the 
seller had not been paid 
ignored); 
o Applying Formalism with 
flexible ends in mind 
(OPPORTUNISTIC 
FORMALISM): 
o A rule in an earlier statute 
(Sale of Goods Act, 
received form England in 
1902) used to rebut a 
presumption created in a 
later statute, the Traffic 
and Road Safety Act, 
1998, to justify formalistic 
decision. 
of the law (ROC-
NONMAKERS);of rules; 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC);  
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete (DISCRETE); 
o Tension Management 
Mechanism (MGT): 
Restraint to Judicial 
Authority, i.e., by 
legislative language, 
intention and norms; 
o Conception of Law as 
Experience (LEXP): 
Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules, i.e. 
Old fashioned law not       
























Section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act 
provided that a sale of goods contract 
could be oral, in writing or by conduct. 
Further, that for a contract above UGX 
200 to be enforced, it should be in 
writing.  
 The judge however held that Since 
section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act 
required that all contracts above UGX 
200 had to be in writing, oral evidence 
would not be admissible to vary a written 
contract of sale of goods. 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC): i.e. given a 
narrow meaning to shut 
out informality, and 
Applying Conceptual 
Formalism in the Statute; 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms as 
sacrosanct; 
o Presumption of Equality 
of Contracting Parties 
(EQUALITY 
PRESUMPTION). 
o Writing as the best 
evidence of parties’ 
intentions (PAROL 
EVIDENCE); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete (DISCRETE); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Equality before the law 
(EQUALITY). 
  





were applied in 
this decision). 
[2004] 2 EA 146 CA-
Byamugisha 
JA. 
The appellant orally contracted to buy 
drugs from the respondent, and argued 
at the hearing that oral agreements were 
the trade custom in the industry, and 
allowed by section 4 (1) of the Sale of 
Goods Act. 
The court held and reasoned that: 
a) Since the plaint contravened Order 
7 Rule 1 (e) of the Civil Procedure 
Rules to disclose the full particulars 
of the type of contract, its terms, 
subject matter, etc., the suit had to 
be dismissed; 
b) For usage to be relied on:  
 
o The parties must have a business 
relationship; and 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
Restricting litigant’s case 
to Pleadings; 
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the Rules of 
Law, i.e. Section 55 of the 
sale of goods Act that 
subjected all rights and 
duties in the Act to usage 
and the course of 
dealings sidestepped and 
indirectly outlawed by 
judge; 
o Positive Law Superior to 
non-legal orders (NON-
LEGAL INFERIOR) 
o Subjecting Acceptability 
of Non-Legal Orders to, 
Business Community 
o Certainty of Law (COL) 
on litigation and 
adjudication; 
o Social Support as a Rule 
of Validity and 
Recognition of Law 
(SOCIAL SUPPORT): 
Business Community 
support for extra-legal 
norms; 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Conception of Law as 
determinate 
(DETRMINATE); 
o Tension Management 
Mechanism (MGT):  i.e. 
Hierarchical Normativity 
i.e., Validity of non-legal 
norms Subject to 
Conformity with Positive 
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o The usage must be known to all who 
normally do such business, so that it is 
presumed to have been incorporated 
into the contract unless expressly or 
by implication excluded; 
c) Newbold P in Harilal v. Standard 
Bank [1967] EA 512 and the 
authority of Bhogal v. International 
Computers (EA) Ltd [1972] EA 55 
cited with approval, that for course 
of dealings to become usage:  
 
o It must be well known by parties 
affected by it; must be certain i.e. that 
the position of each party affected by it 
is capable of ascertainment and 
doesn’t depend on the whims of the 
other party;  
o It must be reasonable i.e. the course 
of dealings is as reasonable men 
would adopt in the circumstances of 
the case;  
o It must not be contrary to legislation or 
a fundamental principle of law; 
o It may be proved by calling witnesses 
with clear, convincing and consistent 
evidence that the usage existed as a 
fact, is well known and practiced by 
those affected by it. 
 
a) Further, that to be a good contract, 
there must be concluded a bargain 
that settles everything necessary 
and leaves nothing to be settled by 
agreement. 
b) In this case, the agreement pleaded 
did not settle everything to create a 
binding relationship, for instance, did 
Knowledge; 




o Certainty of terms as a 




declared void and 
unenforceable; 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): No 
Filling gaps in Contract 






knowledge and subject to 
support of reasonable 
men-not whole public; 




not indicate by what means the 
drugs were to be delivered. 
13.  Uganda 
Telecom Ltd v. 
Tanzanite 
Corporation  
[2005] 2 EA 331 SC-Oder 
JSC. 
The appellant issued a proforma invoice 
indicating willingness to buy 30,000 
phone sets from the respondent, 
through local Purchase Orders, and 
wrote to the respondent’s bank 
confirming its commitment to do so. The 
respondent borrowed money using the 
said letter, manufactured the phones but 
the appellant only bought 3000 sets and 
reneged on the contract.    
Court held and reasoned that: 
o In the case of obligations, the sale of 
goods contract was governed by the 
same principles as other contracts, 
only it was a special type;  
o The terms were uncertain and 
therefore there was no contract but a 
mere invitation to treat, and the letter a 
mere support for a debt application; 
o Special damages even in sale of 
goods contracts must be specifically 
pleaded, which was not done; 
o The damages in sale of goods must 
be the difference of the price from the 
market price as per sections 49, 50 (3) 
and 52 of the Sale of Goods Act, 
because a party can resale the goods 
on the market.  
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY): 
Restricting litigant’s case 
to Pleadings ; 
o Presumption of Equality 
of Contracting Parties 
(EQUALITY 
PRESUMPTION) i.e. 
Presumption of literacy of 
contracting parties 
o Recognition of general 
principles applicable to all 
manner of contracts 
(GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES): i.e. 
ignoring specific rules 
(the formalities of sale of 
goods contracts under 
section 4 of the Act that 
allowed contracts entered 
informally and formally or 
a combination of the two); 
o Certainty of terms as a 
requirement for a valid 
contract (CERTAINTY 
REQUIREMENT); 
o Assessing damages 




o Role of Courts as 
implementers not makers 
of the law (ROC-
NONMAKERS) 
o Equality before the law 
(EQUALITY); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL): 
The Conception of Law 
as Conceptually Ordered, 





o Accuracy in adjudication 
(ACCURACY); 
o Certainty of Law (COL): 






[2005]2 EA 57 CA-Mukasa-
Kikonyogo 
DCJ. 
The respondent who was frequent flyer 
with the appellant lost his luggage and 
sues for its value of $ 3,476. 
o Giving Procedural Justice 
Sway (PROCED-SWAY):  
Strict adherence to 
statutory regulation of 
contract terms; 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM): 
formal legality as ultimate 
rule of recognition; 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
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and Flexibility 
were applied in 
this decision). 
Court held and reasoned that: 
o The contract between the parties was 
governed by the Warsaw Convention 
that limited liability; 
o Ignorance of the law (the convention) 
by the respondent was no defence; 
o Extrinsic evidence cannot be admitted 
to alter the contents of a written 
contract (the terms on the ticket)   
o Although not pleaded, accepting 
payment for excess luggage by the 
applicant was illegal; 
o Illegality once brought to the attention 
of court overrides all questions of 
pleadings including admissions. 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms as 
sacrosanct); 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC): Illegality 
overrides all proof and 
procedural 
matters/justice.   
of Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SACTITY): Standard 
terms superior to 
substantive justice; 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete (DISCRETE); 
o Statutory interventionism 
(SINTERV) i.e. 
International Treaties 
regulating contracts have 
force of law. 




were applied in 
this decision). 
[2005] 2 EA 237 SC A bank customer claimed to have 
banked 30 million on the account but 
found 10m on it. The parties made a 
contract where the bank indemnified the 
customer and credited the account with 
the balance. The customer however 
indemnified the bank in the event that 
that the police adduced conclusive proof 
that the money had never been banked.  
The police made what it termed a 
progress report that the money had not 
been banked.  
Court held that: 
o The lower courts wrongly focused on 
the meaning of the word ‘conclusive’ 
to find against the bank and ignored 
the substantive issue of whether the 
money had been banked; 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical 
application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms 
as sacrosanct; 
o    Undue regard to 
technical or procedural 




o Substantive Justice 
(SJ): Substantiality in 
disputes and Justice 
over legal technicalities; 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
(DISCRETE); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY). 
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o In ascertaining intention of the parties, 
the word used should guide court, in 
this case the words were conclusive 
proof not a conclusive report.  




[2006] 1 EA 386 SC-Tsekooko The appellant, a judgment creditor 
signed a guarantee in lieu of execution, 
on condition that it was realisable if the 
appeal was determined in the 
respondent’s favour. 
The notice of appeal was struck out on a 
technicality.  
Court held and reasoned that the 
guarantee was realisable as the 
respondent could not wait forever, the 
appellant having not taken steps to 
rectify their procedural error.  
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY):  
fairness of the case 
ignored for want of 
procedural propriety; 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical 





o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Disregard of Fairness of 
Terms. 
o Procedural Justice as 
Superior to Substantive 
Justice (PJ); 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY): 
Business Efficacy; 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM);  
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 




17.  Begumisa 
Financial 
Services Ltd v. 
General 
Mouldings Ltd 
& Another (N.B. 
Both Formalism 
and Flexibility 
were applied in 
this decision). 
[2007] 1 EA 28 CA-Engwau, 
JA. 
The appellant helped the respondent get 
loans for agreed consideration, but the 
consideration was not paid. The trial 
court found for him and awarded interest 
from the date of judgment. 
The court of appeal held that: 
o The discretion had not been awarded 
judiciously, and awarded interest 
from the date of filing the suit; and  
o  That interest should be adequate to 
compensate a party.  
o Interest awarded 
Purposively 
(PURPOSIVE): need to 
compensate; 
o Looking at remedies as 
restoration 
(RESTORATION); 
o  Internal Judicial 
Guidelines (JUDGING 
GUIDE): Caveat on 
discretion to be 
exercised judiciously. 
o Conception of Law as 
Means to an End. 
(LMEANS); 
o Tension Management 
Mechanism (MGT):  
Restraint to Judicial 
Authority;  
o Conception of Justice 
restitutional 
(RESTITUTION)  
18.  Kenya Airways 
Ltd v. Ronald 
[2006] HCB 106 CA The respondent who lost luggage while 
on a flight with the applicant pleaded 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
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Katumba  ignorance of the terms limiting liability 
under the Warsaw Convention.  
Court held that: 
o Whether a party has or has not read 
or signed a document containing 
terms, once he assents to it he is 
bound; 
o The fact that the respondent could 
not read and write would not 
exonerate him from the obligations 
under contract. 
Treating written terms 
as sacrosanct i.e. 
Standard terms upheld 
whether read, signed or 
not; 
o Presumption of Equality 
of Contracting Parties 
(EQUALITY 
PRESUMPTION) i.e. 
Presumption of literacy 
of contracting parties 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY): Standard 
terms superior to 
substantive justice; 
o Equality before the law 
(EQUALITY). 
19. Tajdin Hussein 
& 2 Others v. 
HwanSung 
Industries Ltd 
[2006] HCB 101 CA Goods were sold by sample and on 
delivery although they corresponded 
with the description, they were not fit for 
purpose.  
Court held that in a sale by sample, 
once the sample corresponds, fitness for 
purpose is not an issue.   
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 




o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical 





o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
(DISCRETE). 
20.  Honday Ellab v. 
Attorney 
General  
[2011] 1 HCB 38 SC Under a contract for hirer of a car for an 
unspecified period, the car got an 
accident and was severely damaged. 
The issue was whether the contract had 
been frustrated and hirer (respondent) 
discharged from returning it hired car.  
Court held and reasoned that: 
o An accident did not mean total 




case to Pleadings; 
o Recognition of general 
principles applicable to 
all manner of contracts 
(GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES): without 
regard to justice of the 
o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL): 
The Conception of Law 
as Conceptually Ordered, 





o Sanctity of Contract 
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destruction, therefore the contract 
was not frustrated but its 
performance made impossible; 
o Although frustration would have 
discharged the contract, since it was 
not pleaded, it could not be relied on. 
o The hirer still had a duty to return the 
car, since there was no evidence of 
total destruction.   
particular case.   (SANCTITY): non-
interventionism  
21.  Nile Bank Ltd & 
Another v. 









The defence was struck out and 
judgment entered for the plaintiff. The 
court reasoned that, the court held that 
illegality of a contract could not affect 
the plaintiff’s rights since it was not 
particularly pleaded by showing the 
sections of the Companies Act 
contravened.  




case to Pleadings; 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
(PACTA): Plea of 




o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC);   
o Procedural Justice as 
Superior to Substantive 
Justice (PJ); 
o Sanctity of contract 
(SANCTITY):  even over 
Legality;  
o Role of Courts as 
implementers not 
makers of the law 
(ROC-NONMAKERS) 
22.  Sengooba & 4 
Others (Minors) 




Evidence was led to prove that a father 
signed an agreement to purchase 
property for his children. The issue of 
capacity to contract arose.  
Court held that: 
o The law on capacity is meant for the 
benefit of the children, however the 
authorities relate to cases where 
minors signed the agreement.  
o That in this case since the minors are 
not the ones who signed but the 
father, who had no capacity to 
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY) i.e. 




o Procedural justice as 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ); 

















The court approved the proposition by 
Denning in Solle v. Butcher (1950) 1 KB 
671, that once parties with sound mind 
have to all outward appearance agreed 
and entered a contract with sufficient 
certainty to its terms, unless it is set 
aside, a party can not rely on his 
mistake to say that it was a nullity.    
o Certainty of terms as a 
requirement for a valid  
contract (CERTAINTY 
REQUIREMENT);  
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the Rules 
of Law, i.e. Rule on 
mistake sidestepped; 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
applied (PACTA): Pleas 
of illegality and mistake 
ignored. 
o Certainty of Law (COL): 
Certainty of Contracts; 
o  Sanctity of contract 
(SANCTITY):  even over 
Legality;  
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 















After judgment in the respondent’s 
favour against the Attorney General, the 
parties entered an agreement they 
called the Consent Variation Order 
(CVO). Under the CVO, the debt was 
discounted and made payable to 
different parties including the 
respondent’s lawyer, who later died. The 
respondent then sued the appellant as 
legal representative seeking for an 
account of the money received by the 
lawyer, citing a letter written prior to the 
CVO indicating that the money was 
transferred to the lawyer’s clients’ 
account. The appellant maintained that 
the late lawyer had no duty to account 
as the money was his income. 
The Supreme Court held and reasoned 
that: 
o The court erred in having relied on   
Celtel (Uganda) Ltd v. Kituuma Magala 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
applied (PACTA):  Plea 
of illegality ignored i.e. 
(a) Registration of an 
agreement in court 
taken as having cleaned 
it of illegality; (b) Court 
enforced agreement to 
pay court awards 
through third party 
accounts without 
genuine transactions or 
consideration i.e. 
condoned one of the 
instruments used to 
corrupt public officials; 
o  A Consent agreement 
treated as a judgment of 
court. 
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM): 
Disregard of the 






o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 






& Co. Advocates, CA 39/2003and hold 
that the CVO was an agreement for 
remuneration of counsel that offended 
section 51(1) of the Advocates Act as 
it was not notarised and filed with the 
Law Council, as the CVO became a 
court judgment on being registered in 
court.  
o The CVO having been post judgment 
was not a remuneration agreement 
contemplated by the section; 
o It the respondent felt the payment 
was based on an illegal agreement, 
she should have applied to court to 
set it aside; 
o Could not be concerned with the 
intention of the parties in allocating 
different payments, but assumed 
both parties had know why the third 
parties were being paid and chose to 
protect the payments by an order of 
court.   
o Words of the CVO have to be read 
and enforced as is, without further 
attachments; 
o  Celtel (Uganda) Ltd v. Kituuma 
Magala & Co. Advocates CA 
39/2003, was not applicable because 
in this case, the agreement was not 
set aside and its legality not in issue.  
Note: 
In practice, the transaction reflects a 
trend of lawyers in public offices being 
paid kick-backs through proxy entities 
and protecting their interests by clothing 





by virtue of registration in court. The 
judge as a former private lawyer and 
public lawyer speak of parties knowing 
why and protecting that why.    
25. Rwakatooke 
Muchope v. 
Caltex Oil (U) 
Ltd. (N.B. Both 
Formalism and 
Flexibility were 








The Plaintiff sought to declare ineffective 
and non-enforceable a dealership he 
signed on every page, and stop 
foreclosure under a mortgage that 
resulted from it. His grounds were that 
he had never seen or read the 
agreement, and it was never referred to 
during the long time the parties had 
dealings.  
The court held that without vitiating 
factors being proved, the contract was 
binding. The judge reasoned that: 
o A man of the plaintiff’s status as a 
businessman and a marketing 
manager of a company should have 
asked for a copy of the agreement 
before signing. 
o The mortgage deed was a separate 
agreement, such that problems with 
the underlying contract would not 
hinder the defendant from exercising 
rights under the mortgage.  
o Recorgnising inequality 
amongst contracting 
parties: Using economic, 
social or political class 
as criteria to access 
justice (NO-EQUALITY): 
Using economic class 
as criteria to access 
justice, i.e, used to 
measure culpability 
under contracts; 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA):  
Collateral Contracts 
ignored and Signature 
on a contract treated as 
conclusive evidence of 
consensus; 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Inequality before the law 
(INEQUALITY): The 
Conception of Justice as 
dependent on Class; 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
(DISCRETE); 
o Procedural justice as 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ). 
26. Triad Holdings 
Ltd v. Networks 
Exports PVT 







The 2nd and 3rd defendants had the duty 
to pre-inspect rice before it was 
exported to Uganda. They issued a 
Clean Report but on reaching Uganda, 
the rice was found unfit for human 
consumption.  
Court held that the plaintiff’s remedy 




case to Pleadings -
refusing to invoke 
negligence for lack of 
pleadings.  
o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Pure Conception of Law 
(POSITIVISM); 
o Procedural justice as 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
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against them lay in negligence, but it 
had not been pleaded. The suit was 
therefore dismissed on ground that the 
plaintiff did not disclose a contractual 
relationship with them, and had no 
cause of action by virtue of the principle 
of privity of contract.  
(CONCEPT-FORMAL). 
 
27.  Mirembe Wire 









Insurance was issued through a cover 
note, and the policy issued later having 
wider terms than on the cover note. 
Insured goods were damaged while in 
transit following the cover note being 
issued.  
Court held that: 
o It could not read into the cover note 
terms other than those expressly 
stated in it.  
o Although the policy later referred to 
the cover note, the two were different 
insurance contracts and the terms in 
the policy cannot be held as having 
been incorporated in the cover note.  
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM): 
restricted itself to the 
four corners of the 
contract & rejected 
implied or incorporated 
terms; 
o Pacta sunt servanda 
Applied (PANCTA). 
  
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
Judicial non-
interventionism; 
o Sanctity of Contracts 
(SANCTITY); 




28.  Aqua Plumbing 









A comprehensive insurance contract 
expired and an accident happened 
before its renewal. However, at the time, 
a third party insurance cover was 
running with a sticker issued by the 
insurer reading “Comp”, which the 
plaintiff took to mean “Comprehensive”.  
Court held refused to take “Comp” to 
mean “Comprehensive”, and reasoned 
that it would go against the cardinal 
principle that insurance covers future 
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM):  
refusing to infer 
meaning into an 
abbreviation.  
o Recognition of general 
principles applicable to 




o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL): 
The Conception of Law 
as Conceptually 





o Freedom and Autonomy 
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events not those in the past.  principle of fortuity of 
risk invoked to refuse 
imputation of a contract 
and liability of insurers.  
of Contract (FOC).  









This was a subrogation suit; in cash in 
transit insurance contract was proved 
not to have been signed by the insured.  
Court held that there was no law 
declaring such a contract invalid, 
therefore it was valid and enforceable.  
o Positive Law Superior to 
non-legal orders (NON-
LEGAL INFERIOR): 
Anything not invalidated 
expressly by law seen 
as valid; 
 
o Conception of Law as 
Determinate 
(DETERMINANCY); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Role of Courts as 
implementers not 
makers of the law 
(ROC-NONMAKERS).  
30.  Greenboat 
Entertainment 





were applied in 
this decision). 
[2007] 
UGCOMMC 20.  
HC-
Bamwine, J. 
The contract for the plaintiff to manage 
street parking in the city expired, but the 
Plaintiff allowed by the defendant to 
continue offering the services. Tenders 
were later invited and the contract 
awarded to a third party.  The plaintiff 
argued that the contract was renewed 
and the court held that: 
o There is a difference between a 
contract and an agreement, as an 
agreement only becomes a contract 
when an intention is formed to have a 
legally binding relationship.  
o Call it an administrative arrangement 
or agreement in this case, but there 
no contract between the parties. 
o Written contracts cannot be renewed 
orally and if so done, the contract 
becomes invalid for want of certainty 
of terms. 
o Courts should be cautious of implying 
additional terms in contracts, for that 
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY):  oral 
contracts rejected. 
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Government can enter 




o Applying Formalism with 
flexible ends in mind 
(OPPORTUNISTIC 
FORMALISM); 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): No 
Filling gaps in Contract 
terms, i.e.,  Refusal to 
imply terms in contract.  
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Freedom and autonomy 






as a middle stage 
between contract and 
mere invitations or pre-
contractual non-binding 
statements; 
o Conception of Law as 
Means to an End 
(LMEANS): Court 
stretching contractual 
doctrine to save the 
state from liability.  
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will be rewriting the contract for the 
parties.  
31. Kirasha v. 
United 
Assurance Co. 
Ltd. (N.B. Both 
Formalism and 
Flexibility were 






In a claim by an insured for indemnity, 
the defendant alleged that the plaintiff 
burnt his own vehicle and there was no 
accident, proving that similar claims had 
been made on a number of occasions 
from other insurers.  
Court held that: 
o Evidence of similar facts had not 
been pleaded and could not be relied 
on; 
o It was possible that the plaintiff as a 
transporter had many similar cases; 
o The defendant was negligent in not 
following a novel idea of sending 
ashes to Kenya or South Africa for 
further testing; 
o General damages are not pleaded 
but awarded by court on estimating 




Both Formalism and Flexibility used in 
the same decision. 




case to Pleadings i.e. in 
the face of possible 
unjust enrichment and 
fraud; 
o Recognising inequality 
amongst contracting 
parties: Using economic, 
social or political class 
as criteria to access 
justice (NO-EQUALITY); 
i.e. Presumption of 
truthfulness made based 
on a party’s occupation; 
& Expensive process of 
testing samples from 
other countries seen as 
novel and the normal; 




of Unfettered Discretion 
i.e., award of general 
damages.   
o Certainty of Law (COL): 
Certainty in litigation and 
adjudication; 
o Inequality before the law 
(INEQUALITY): Class 
oriented Conception of 
Justice; 
o Judicial Absolutism 
(JA); 
o Law as Predictions of 




preferences with regard 
to general damages.  
 
32.  Akkermans 
Industrial 
Engeineering 








In a case where there was a lapse in the 
contract but the plaintiff provided 
services that the defendant consumed, 
quantum meruit was claimed and 
awarded by court. 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): No 
Filling gaps in Contract 
terms i.e., Equity limited 
by need to be accurate 
in awarding remedies  
o Using indeterminate 
o Accuracy in adjudication 
(ACCURACY); 
o Judicial Absolutism 
(JA); 




were applied in 
this decision). 
Court however reasoned that: 
o Quantum meruit being an equitable 
remedy, it must cover only actual 
services rendered; 
o  It was unreasonable for the plaintiff 
to be paid days they did not work 
waiting for spare parts.   
doctrines (INDETERM- 
DOCTRINE): 
reasonableness used to 
limit equity; 




of Unfettered Discretion 
i.e., award of general 
damages.   
 











The Plaintiff sought to recover money 
lent to the defendant, who was 
introduced to him by a person they both 
knew, saying he could lend money. 
Court held that: 
o The plaintiff was engaged in money 
lending illegally without a licence; 
o Amending the plaint to remove the 
claim for interest did not purify the 
transaction, as there was nothing 
friendly about the loan but only an 
illegal loan.  
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical 
application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC): i.e. 
ignoring the unfairness 
of the principal amount 
lent not being returned; 
and Illegality overrides 
all proof and procedural 
matters/justice i.e that 
pleadings no cure to 
illegality;  
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Disregard of Fairness of 
Terms; 
o Contract Law 
understood as including 
Practices 
(PRACTICES): 
Friendliness would cure 
potential illegality of 
loan. 
o Conception of law as 
determinate 
(DETERMINACY); 
o Role of Courts as 
implementers not 
makers of the law 
(ROC-NONMAKERS); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM): 
Supremacy of Law, i.e., 




o Substantive Justice 
(SJ): Ubuntu concept 
of justice: 
o Friendliness as a Norm 
superior to the legal 
order/norms.  
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were applied in 
this decision). 
HCMA 479/2005 HC-Lameck 
Mukasa, J. 
The defendant raised the defence of 
time limitation as being 3 years for 
contract cases against local 
governments, and the plaint not 
disclosing why there was delay. The 
plaintiff sought to have that declared a 
mere technicality, curable by Article 126 
of the constitution.  
Court held that time bars are matters of 
substance not mere technicalities.  
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY):  i.e. 
Commands on technical 
and procedural justice 
treated as matters of 
substance; 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): 
Political and State 
Interests Protected over 
Contract.  
o Procedural Justice 








o  State Protectionism 
(STATE POLICY).  





HCCS 300/2006 HC- 
Kiryabwire, J. 
In a suit for the price of goods supplied 
by the plaintiff, the defendant argued 
that the debt was caused by the fraud of 
one of its employees, who was acting 
outside the scope of his duties.  
Court held that such employee fraud 
had to be pleaded and strictly proven 
otherwise the employer was liable.   




case to Pleadings: for 
allocation of rights and 
obligations.  
o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Role of Courts as 
implementers not 
makers of the law 
(ROC-NONMAKERS). 
36.  Greenland 
Bank ltd (In 
Liquidation) v. 
Express Sports 





A football existed before the defendant 
was incorporated, and borrowed from 
the plaintiff. Court held that the plaintiff 
has no cause of action against the 
defendant, reasoning that: 
o There was no ratification of the pre-
incorporation contracts; 
o Although the memorandum and 
Articles of association clearly 
recognised the existence of the club 
pre-incorporation, it was not a 
contract between the plaintiff and the 
o Recognition of general 
principles applicable to 
all manner of contracts 
(GENERAL 




o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Disregard of Fairness of 
Terms. 
  
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL): 
The Conception of Law 
as Conceptually 





o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
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defendant, therefore could not be 
relied on.  
(DISCRETE); 












This was a suit for refund of the price 
plus special and general damages for 
selling a machine that was not fit for 
purpose and breach of the condition of 
merchantable quality (section 15 (a) & 
(b) of the Sale of Goods Act.  Court 
found in favour of the plaintiff, and 
ordered refund of the price and general 
damages, but declined to award 
expenses incurred as a result of the 
breach such as rent and other services. 
Court reasoned that business sense 
required that the machine to have been 
returned to the seller at the earliest.  
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA); 




of Unfettered Discretion 
i.e., award of general 
damages; 
o Abductive Reasoning in 
interpretation of statute 
or precedents 
(ABDUCTIVE): Intuition 
used to resolve 
competing answers, i.e. 
his business sense 
invoked to deny party 
special damages he had 
proved as incurred.  
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY); 
o Judicial Absolutism (JA); 
o Conception of Law as 
Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS); 
o Freedom and autonomy 
of contract (FOC). 













The parties agreed to nothing and the 
judge expressed his inability to get the 
true facts of the case as a result.  
The judge indicated that it was a hard 
case, the evidence enigmatic and the 
relationship between the parties very 
informal. The court admitted to having 
applied mere logic to interpret the 
documents before him and arrive at 
conclusions.   
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical application 
of rules (LOGICAL-
MECHANIC).   
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM). 








There was an agreement for hire of a 
motor vehicle to transport goods. The 
agreement was drawn on the letterhead 
of the defendant, although the defendant 
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY): 
Technical rules of proof 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of contract (FOC); 
o Procedural justice as 





applied in this 
decision). 
denied the telephone numbers; fax 
number and other particulars on the 
letters. Also that in her organisation, 
there was no operations director, who 
allegedly signed the contract.  
Therefore one of the issues was 
whether the contract was concluded, 
and enforceable. The court held that 
there was a valid and enforceable 
contract between the parties, reasoning 
that: 
o Questions before court had to be 
answered by looking at both the 
documents between them and their 
conduct.  
o Although the defendant had pleaded 
the defences above, evidence was 
adduced to show the defendant’s 
management structure or disprove 
the particulars on the letterhead; 
o The plaintiff was an outside who 
should not have been expected to 
know the weakness in the contract 
pleaded by the defendant, such as 
the internal arrangement of the 
defendant.  
used to find a valid and 
enforceable contract; 
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM); 
o Contract viewed as a 
network of relations 
(RELATIONS): i.e. The 
outsider protected 
against corporations.    
justice (PJ); 
o Dehumanisation of law 
(DEHUMAN)-
Corporations seen as 
fully integrated entities 
not reducible to invoking 
human beings behind 
them; 
o Conception of Contract 
as Relational 
(RELATIONAL).    
40. DFCU Bank (U) 
Ltd v. Ndibazza 
& Others (N.B. 
Both Formalism 
and Flexibility 







The second defendant was a collateral 
manager appointed to secure and 
supervise goods taken as collateral by 
the plaintiff for money lent to the 1ST 
defendant. Under the contract, the 2ND 
defendant had a duty to act with skill 
and care. The plaintiff also claimed that 
the 2ND defendant was a bailee under 
which contract she had a duty to keep 
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY): 
Technical rules of proof 
used to find a valid and 
enforceable contract i.e. 
Court relied on 
requirements for proof to 
reject a negligence and 
bailment claim; 
o Judicial Self 
Preservation (JUD- 
SELF PRESERV), i.e. 
Autonomy of judges 
from common law and 
precedents; 
o Conception of law as 
Indeterminate 
(INDETERMINACY); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
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secure the goods. The plaintiff who had 
dual control with the 2ND defendant stole 
the goods and diverted them, thus the 
suit, the claim being that the 2ND 
defendant was negligent and liable for 
the debt. Court held that: 
o Negligence had not been proved as 
all parties agreed that the 1ST 
defendant stole the goods. That theft 
dispelled the claim that there was 
negligence.  
o The judge noted the common law 
duty of bailee, with or without 
contract being proved to keep secure 
custody of the goods and avoid 
thefts.  
o Without assigning reasons for 
departure the judge reiterated that 
since negligence had not been proved, 
the 2ND defendant could not be held 
liable.    
o The judge making law 
(LAW MAKING): 
Sidestepping the Rules of 
Law, i.e. Rule in 
precedents sidelined and 
instead a new rule set by 
requiring proof of 
negligence in a bailment 
claim; 
o Legal Classificatory 
Categories ignored (NO 
CATEGORIES): 
Negligence Invoked to 
Find Liability in Contract.  
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Role of Court as Law 
Makers and Reformers 
(LMAKERS). 
 
41. Jade Petroleum 








The Plaintiff sued for conversion of his 
goods and the defendant claimed to 
have bought them from the third party, 
who in turn filed a defence that he had 
also bought form another person but 
adduced no evidence.  Court held that: 
 
o Under section 22 of the Sale of 
Goods Act, a sale by a non-owner 
passes no better title than he has 
unless the exceptions to that nemo 
dat quod non habe rule exist. Section 
23 also deals with sale under 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical 
application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC): rule on 
passing of title applied 
without regard to the 
fairness of the case, i.e. 
the relevancy of the 
second seller ignored; 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Disregard of Fairness of 
Terms; 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Role of Courts as 
implementers not 
makers of the law 
(ROC-NONMAKERS);  
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
(DISCRETE); 





voidable title, and none of the two 
gave the defendant any rights in the 
goods.  
o The argument by the defendant, that 
the plaintiff ignored pursuing the third 
party was immaterial, as the law on 
passing of title was clear.     
42. Mogas (U) Ltd 









In the contract for supply of goods, the 
time for delivery was mentioned as 
“immediately”. The plaintiff had a duty to 
provide a Payment Guarantee, and the 
defendant pleaded frustration of the 
contract. 
The court held that the doctrine of 
frustration and its effect of loss staying 
where it falls has been solidified into a 
statutory rule by section 66(1) &(2) of 
The Contract act, 2010. However, the 
frustrating event pleaded was not the 
subject of the contract i.e. Iran as a 
source of Bitumen causing the blockage 
of funds was not a term of the contract 
but a matter of choice.  
 
The word ‘immediately’ meant that the 
goods had to be supplied within the time 
of the guarantee.    
o Pacta Sund Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Meaning of terms of 
contract restricted to the 
sense in other terms of 
the contract and 
frustrating event 
rejected because it 
wasn’t specifically part 
of the contract. 
 
o Freedom of contract and  
Autonomy of contract 
(FOC); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
(DISCRETE). 
43. Asante Aviation 
Ltd v. Star of 
Africa Air 







In a contract for sale of an aircraft where 
the buyer defaulted to pay the full price, 
duress was claimed as having made the 
plaintiff sign the contract.  
Rejecting the defence of duress, the 
judge held that it had not been proved, 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 





o Freedom of and 
Autonomy of Contract 
(FOC); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
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and relied with approval the proposition 
in Stockloser v. Johnson (1954)1 ALL 
ER 630, that; “People who freely 
negotiate and conclude a contract 
should be held to their bargain and 
judges should not intervene by 
substituting, according to their 
individual sense of fairness, terms 
which are contrary to those which the 
parties have agreed upon 
themselves.” 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY). 
44.  AbdulRahman 
Elamin v. Dhabi 
Group, Warid 










The appellant brought a suit to recover 
damages from breach of contract with 
the 1STrespondent, which was a United 
Arab Emirates holding group, owning a 
company that owned and controlled the 
2ND respondent. By the contract, the 
appellant was entitled to 3% 
shareholding in the 2ND respondent as 
commission.  
The court dismissed the appeal and held 
that the trial judge was right in striking 
out the plaint and dismissing the suit, 
for: 
o The 2nd and 3rd respondents 
although were to be affected by the 
share transfer if it had taken place, 
were not party to the agreement and 
therefore there was no cause of 
action. 
o Pleas by the appellant that the 
connection will be proved at the trial 
were rejected and court relied on the 
plaint as not disclosing enough to 
hold them liable; 




case to Pleadings: for 
allocation of rights and 
obligations i.e. Suit 
dismissed based on 
pleadings not disclosing 
enough; 
o New Law Made 
(MAKING LAW): a new 
rule laid out, that a 
company not 
incorporated or 
registered in Uganda 
could not be sued; 
o Recognition of general 
principles applicable to 
all manner of contracts 
(GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES): Applying 
the Privity of Contract 
Doctrine: ignoring the 
substantive justice 
doctrine. 
o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Procedural Justice as 
superior to substantive 
justice (PJ); 
o Role of Court as Law 
Makers and Reformers 
(LMAKERS); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL): 
The Conception of Law 
as Conceptually 









o The Plaint did not show that the 1ST 
respondent been registered in 
Uganda, and the law is that if a 
company is not incorporated in 
Uganda, then it does not exist in 
Uganda as a body corporate; 
o The 1ST respondent does not exist 
within the court’s jurisdiction and 
could not be sued.  
o The plaint couldn’t be cured by 
amendment or substitution of parties 
but a fresh suit could be filed.  
 











A court order to transfer money from the 
appellant’s account was issued 
containing the wrong account numbers. 
The appellant issued countermand 
instructions, which the respondent did 
not carry out, and instead complied with 
the court order.   
The issues were whether the 
respondent bank was in breach of her 
duty as a banker and should have 
disobeyed the erroneous court order.   
The judge held that: 
o The respondent had a duty and 
obligation to obey a court order. It was 
not open to him to disregard it whether 
or not it contained errors minor or 
major. 
o A party who knows a court order, 
whether null and void, regular or 
irregular cannot be permitted to 
disobey it was recently re-affirmed by 
this court. 





Upholding the Sanctity 
of Court Orders, i.e., 
Court orders held as 
sacred and must be 
obeyed even if irregular, 
null or void. 
 
o Judicial Self 
Preservation (JUD- 
SELF PRESERV); 
o Judicial Absolutism 
(JA); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM): 
Supremacy of Law. 
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The supreme court upheld the decision 
of the court of appeal that even if the 
court order was erroneous the 
respondent had a duty to obey it and 
was not in breach of her duties as a 
banker to the appellant.  





i.e., Upholding the 
Sanctity of Court 
Orders: Court orders 
held as sacred and must 
be obeyed even if 
irregular, null or void.  
o Judicial Self 
Preservation (JUD- 
SELF PRESERV); 
o Judicial Absolutism 
(JA); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM): 
Supremacy of Law. 
47.  Halai 
Construction 




applied in this 
decision). 
HCCS 785/2014 HC- 
Wangutusi, J.  
Termination of a sub-contract was in 
issue and neither party adduced 
evidence to prove that termination 
actually took place.  
Court held that: 
o It is trite that terms of a contract are 
best ascertained by reviewing the 
contract itself.  
o No terms are implied in a contract 
unless this is what was intended and 
necessary to give business efficacy to 
the contract. 
o Contextual Interpretation 
of Contracts and 
Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): 
Invoking Business 
Reality i.e. that implied 
terms had to have the 
effect of giving the 
contract business 
efficacy 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Implying terms in a 
contract conditioned to 
intention of the parties; 
 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC): 
Judicial non-
interventionism; 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Economic Efficiency 
(EFFICIENCY): i.e. 
Judicial Interventionism 
conditioned to satisfying 
intention of the parties 

















A building contract between the parties 
was terminated and a final certificate of 
payment issued by the defendant’s 
project manager, but the defendant 
sought to amend it citing errors by the 
manager. The plaintiff sued to recover 
the amount on the certificate. The 
defendant is public body and the laws 
on procurement regulated its contracts. 
The court held that the plaintiff should 
o Pacta Sunta Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): i.e. 
Contract terms strictly 
enforced to exclusion of 
case law; 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical 
application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Positivist Concept of 
Law (POSITIVISM): 
Logical deduction of 
law; 
o Conception of Law as 
determinate 
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this decision). be paid the amount on the first 
certificate, and the defendant acted in 
contravention of the Procurement Law 
that required such payments to be done 
within 30 days. The court reasoned that: 
o If a contract is clear, it has to be 
interpreted as it is. Expositions from 
case law, common law or equity 
cannot be applied. 
o If a statute is clear, case law cannot 
be invoked to contradict it, as section 
14 of the Judicature Act subjects 
case law to written law and then 
other sources like common law 
follow.  
o A contractual clause is enforceable 
irrespective of adequacy of amounts 
stipulated in it, therefore the plaintiffs 
could not claim for more than was 
agreed. 
o The defendant was bound by 
estoppel under section 114 of the 
Evidence Act to honour the certificate 
issued by its Project Manager. 
o The plaintiff was entitled to 
commercial interest on the debt, 
which courts awarded between 18%-
24%, therefore 18% was fair interest. 
MECHANIC); 




of Procedural Rules; 
o Judicial Interventionism in 
Contract (JINTERV) 
Equity invoked to 
interfere with Contract: 
Equitable and statutory 
estoppel used to allocate 
obligation to pay; 
(DETERMINACY); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Substantive Justice 
(SJ): Estoppel used.     
49. Thunderbolt 
Technical 
Services Ltd v 
Apedu Joseph 
& K.K Security 
(U) Ltd 




The contract provided for limitations of 
liability against a security company in 
the event of theft. The guarding 
company’s employee who was meant to 
guard the premises carried out the theft. 
The Judge acknowledged that the theft 
by the employee was a fundamental 
breach of the security contract, but 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA); 
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM); 
o Presumption of Equality 
of Contracting Parties 
(EQUALITY 
PRESUMPTION): i.e. 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Equality before the law 
(EQUALITY); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
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freedom of contract was invoked to 
award only up to the maximum limit of 
special damages fixed by the contract 
terms.  
The Judge further reasoned and 
noted with approval the English 
authorities of Suisse Atlanti que Societe 
D’armement Maritime SAV v Rotterdam 
Sche Kolen Centrale, (1966) 2 ALLER 
61 and Photo Production Ltd v Securicor 
Transport Ltd, (1980) 1 ALL ER 556 for 
the proposition that such freedom of 
contract would be interfered with by the 
court in cases where the parties were of 
unequal bargaining power or where one 
of the parties did not sign the contract 
and that the court had to look at the 
contract as a whole before making its 
decision. 
Parties being of equal 
bargaining power taken 
as a pre-condition for 
non-interference with 










The contract provided for limitations of 
liability against a security company in 
the event of theft. The guarding 
company’s employee who was meant to 
guard the premises carried out the theft. 
The Judge acknowledged that the theft 
by the employee was a fundamental 
breach of the security contract, but 
freedom of contract was invoked to 
award only up to the maximum limit of 
special damages fixed by the contract 
terms.  
The Judge further reasoned and 
noted with approval, Thunderbolt 
Technical Services Ltd v Apedu Joseph 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA); 
o Literalism in contract 
interpretation 
(LITERALISM) ; 
o Presumption of Equality 
of Contracting Parties 
(EQUALITY 
PRESUMPTION): i.e. 
Parties being of equal 
bargaining power taken 
as a pre-condition for 
non-interference with 
freedom of contract 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of Contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Equality before the law 
(EQUALITY); 




& K.K Security (U) Ltd, HCCS No. 340 
of 2009 and the English authorities of 
Suisse Atlanti que Societe D’armement 
Maritime SAV v Rotterdam Sche Kolen 
Centrale, (1966) 2 ALLER 61  and  
Photo Production Ltd v Securicor 
Transport Ltd, (1980) 1 ALL ER 556 for 
the proposition that such freedom of 
contract would be interfered with by the 
court in cases where the parties were of 
unequal bargaining power or where one 
of the parties did not sign the contract 
and that the court had to look at the 
contract as a whole before making its 
decision. 
51 Ngege (U) 
Limited v. SDV 
Transami (U) 
Limited 
HCCS 579/2003 Egonda 
Ntende, J.  
The plaintiff sued the defendant for 
breach of a carriage and bailment 
contract, and recovery of the value of 
fish, which upon reaching Egypt had 
been declared unfit for human 
consumption. The defendant, which had 
issued an invoice for the services, 
denied existence of a contractual 
relationship between the parties and in 
the alternative claimed protection of her 
standard terms.  After a 4 year delay in 
the courts, the court: 
o Entered judgment for the defendant 
on ground of failure by the plaintiff to 
prove her case, as evidence was 
insufficient; 
o Held that the 4-year delay was 
unacceptable and the case had to be 
dismissed.  
 
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY): 
evidential rules strictly 
applied to make a 
finding; 
 




o Procedural Justice as 








HCMA 279/2000 Arach 
Amoko, J. 
This was a claim for payment of carriage 
fees, arising from the plaintiff having 
severally incurred very high risk, by 
transporting military hardware to the 
defendant, in battlefields. The defendant 
was a rebel organisation that was 
fighting in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, but with an office in Uganda.  
The researcher being counsel for the 
defendant rebel group brought and 
argued an application challenging the 
jurisdiction of court, on ground of the 
contract having been concluded and 
performed outside Uganda; the contract 
having been unenforceable for being 
contrary to public policy, and the 
defendant rebel group not being a legal 
entity, capable of being sued. The 
plaintiff counter argued that it would be 
defeating the interests of fairness and 
justice if the plaintiff that incurred such 
risk, was denied a right to sue the 
defendant, which actually received and 
used the goods in issue.  The court 
found for the defendant and dismissed 
the suit, reasoning that: 
o The suit had to be filed where the 
defendant resided or the cause of 
action wholly or partly arose, none of 
which applied to the case, as the 
defendant, a rebel group could not be 
said to reside in Uganda; 
o The rebel group was not a legal entity 
capable of being sued, and the plaintiff 
had assumed the risk of dealing with 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical 
application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC): rule on 
passing of title applied 
without regard to the 
fairness of the case, i.e. 
the relevancy of the 
second seller ignored; 
o Giving Procedural 
Justice Sway 
(PROCED-SWAY): 
evidential rules strictly 
applied to make a 
finding. 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM): 
Supremacy of Law: 
Conception of Law as  
logical deductions; 
o Role of Courts as 
implementers not 
makers of the law 
(ROC-NONMAKERS);  
o   Procedural Justice as 
















The Plaintiff was employed by the 
defendant to serve in the defendant’s 
Ugandan subsidiary, but latter offered to 
be transferred to the Tanzanian 
subsidiary, with an offer to be returned 
to the   Ugandan subsidiary at expiry of 
the term agreed. The plaintiff refused to 
sign the offer, but later brought action for 
damages for unlawful termination, 
arguing that the defendant was bound to 
return him to the Ugandan subsidiary 
after Tanzania. The Court held and 
reasoned that: 
o Under Ss. 3(1), 3(2), & 10 of the 
Contract Act, No. 7 of 2010, offer and 
acceptance exists where 
communicated in a manner capable 
of having effect, and the non-signing 
of the offer meant that the plaintiff did 
not accept the offer, thus no contract 
existed beyond employment in 
Tanzania; 
o Where a contract is in writing, no 
extrinsic evidence can be called to 
add or deduct from its terms, per 
Ramanbai Patel v. M/s Madhvani 
International Limited [1992-93] HCB 
189.  
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical 
application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC); 
o Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Applied (PACTA): 
Treating written terms 
as sacrosanct. 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM); 
o Writing as the best 
evidence of parties’ 
intentions (PAROL 
EVIDENCE); 
o Freedom and Autonomy 
of Contract (FOC); 
o Sanctity of contract 
(SANCTITY); 
o Conceptual Formalism 
(CONCEPT-FORMAL); 
o Conception of Contract 
as Discrete 
(DISCRETE). 









Following the Appellant hiring a motor 
vehicle to the State House (President’s 
official Home), the vehicle was involved 
in an accident and for a while kept by 
the police and latter handed over to a 




case to Pleadings; 
o Procedural justice 
superior to Substantive 
Justice (PJ); 







third party who had sold it to the 
Appellant but whom he had not fully paid 
(unpaid seller). The Appellant sued for 
the value of the vehicle and lost income, 
and interest. The High Court awarded all 
the claims but the Court of Appeal 
reversed them on ground that the 
contract had been frustrated by the 
accident and the Appellant had not 
taken steps to mitigate his loss. The 
Judge held and reasoned that: 
o Frustration was not pleaded as a 
defence, ground of appeal or leave 
sought to add it as required by law 
and therefore couldn’t be available as 
a defence; 
o The burden of proof for frustration 
was on the respondent that alleged it, 
which wasn’t discharged; 
o The plea of mitigation was rejected 
as the judge saw nothing more the 
Appellant could have done. 
o Literal and Logical 
deductive interpretation, 
or mechanical 





o Certainty of Law (COL); 
o Positivist Conception of 
Law (POSITIVISM). 
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APPENDIX 5: Flexible Adjudication In Selected Hard Commercial Cases (NRM Era 1986-2018) 
NO. CASE TITLE CITATION COURT & 
JUDGE 




1.  Construction 
Engineers and 
Builders Limited v 
Attorney General  
SCCA 24/94, (2/9/95) SC-Manyindo, 
JSC. 
Amidst performance of a road 
construction contract, the 
1979 war broke out and the 
contractor could not continue 
construction normally. The 
officer entitled to suspend 
work was not available and a 
junior officer allowed the 
contractor to suspend works.  
After the war, a dispute arose 
as to whether the contractor 
was entitled to payment of 
completed works. The 
defendant claimed that the 
contractor had abandoned 
work. Court held in favour of 
the contractor, reasoning 
that: 
o The High Court had done 
its best and devised an 
anodyne formula that the 
letter by the junior officer 
was not a suspension but 
a permission to leave site; 
o It was very reasonable to 
save the contractor as no 
contractor could have 
carried on works amidst 
























o Conception of 
Law as a means 

















o Social Support as 












shortage and foreign staff 
had left the country; 
o The two parties had acted 
very sensibly in response 




2. Oyester International 
Limited v Air Guide 
Services Limited 
HCCS 424/1994, 
Judgment of 12/06/95 
HC-Ntabooba, 
PJ. 
A director made a contract in 
the names of the company 
but for his own benefit. The 
court held that the company 
had a right to be indemnified 
by such director. Court 
reasoned that: 
o The memorandum and 
articles of association of 
the company is a contract 
that regulates affairs 
within the company, 
including between the 
company and the 
directors; 
o Although under such a 
contract there is only a duty 
for the director to be 
indemnified and not vice 
versa, the equitable 
fiduciary duty to account for 
benefits received should by 
analogy be looked at as 
implying a duty for the 
directors to indemnify the 
company at law and equity; 
o It is only fair that the 
company be indemnified.  




Statutory Rule, to 




Applicability of a 
rule, i.e. equitable 
rule premises 








equity invoked to 
interfere with 























HC-Kello, J. Oral evidence was adduced 
to modify a written contract.  









5/12/95 Court used equitable 
estoppel to overrule the best 
evidence rule and held the 
contract as having been 
modified.  
Sidestepped the 
Statutory Rule, to 


















being as valuable 
as written terms; 
4. Oriental Insurance 
Brokers Limited v 
Transocean (U) 
Limited  
[1999] 2 EA 260 SC-Oder, 
JSC. 
The issue was whether an 
insurance broker had locus 
standi to sue the insured for 
the premium.  
Court held that because 
section 43(3) &(4) of the 
Insurance Act obliged the 
broker to remit premium 
collected to the insurer, by 
implication the broker had a 
right to sue for premiums and 
enforce payment.  
Court further held that the 
principles of the contract of 
agency applied between the 
broker and the insured and 
the broker and the insurer on 
the other hand.  
Note: 
By holding that the broker 





Applicability of a 
rule and 
Modifying a rule 
in a statute.  







was an agent of both the 
insurer and the insured, the 
Supreme Court legalised the 
broker acting in a dual 
capacity, which is otherwise 
illegal under the Ugandan 
Insurance Act. 
5. Shiv Construction Co. 
Limited v Endesha 
Enterprises Limited. 
[1999] 1 EA 329 SC-Tsekooko, 
JSC. 
A joint venture was entered 
to facilitate and result in 
formation of a company. The 
company was set up, but 
without the joint venture 
being mentioned in its 
documents. The plaintiff 
continued to perform 
obligations under the joint 
venture. The issues were 
whether the plaintiff had 
consideration, whether the 
company was liable under 
the joint venture and whether 
the plaintiff could sue.  
Court held that the joint 
venture had sufficient 
consideration because the 
promises under it had 
financial implications in the 
form of shares; 
The joint venture was still in 
force even after the company 
incorporation because the 
parties could not perform all 
obligations under it in the one 













seen as any 
financial value.  
o Conception of 
Law as a means 




















benefits, rights, profits, 
interest, forbearance, loss, or 
responsibility to be suffered.  
6. Bank of Uganda v 
Masaba 
[1999] 1 EA 2 SC The appellant offered its 
employees an option to retire 
early in exchange for writing 
off their housing loans. After 
retirement, the appellant 
reneged on its undertaking. 
The appellant argued that the 
plaint had not disclosed the 
specific particulars of 
negligent misrepresentation, 
there was no binding 
contract, and estoppel was 
wrongly used. The court 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 
to do substantive 
justice (PROC-
DISREGARD): No 























found for the respondent, 
reasoning was that: 
o The plaint read as a 
whole, the particulars 
given in the different 
paragraphs were sufficient 
disclosure. 
o Hadley Byne’s Co. Ltd v. 
Heller & Partners Ltd 
[1961] ALLER 465; 
Edwards v. Skyways 
Limited [1964] WLR 1078; 
& Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd 
v. Mardon [1976] 2 ALLER 
5, provided the correct 
legal positions. Lord 
Denning MR’s proposition 
in Esso Petroleum was 
especially correct, that if a 
man professes special 
knowledge or skill, and 
makes a representation by 
virtue thereof to another, 
whether as advise, 
opinion or information, 
with intention of inducing 
him to enter a contract, he 
is under duty to use 
reasonable care to see 
that the representation is 
correct, and the advice, 
opinion or information 
reliable. If he negligently 
does otherwise, and 
induces the other to enter 
into a contract, he is 














Filling gaps in 
contracts, i.e., 





ty found in 
contract; 
o The judge making 
law (LAW 
MAKING): 
Modifying a rule in 
a statute, i.e. 
Equity and local 
legal regime 
uniqueness cited 
for modifying rule 
that estoppel is 






and Plasticity of 
Consideration; 
o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS): 
The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 
Gaps in the Law;  









o   
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o Estoppel having been used 
as a sword and not a 
shield, and the fact that the 
agreement to write off 
housing loans having 
lacked consideration in the 
strict sense were 
immaterial. This was based 
on estoppel having become 
incorporated into Ugandan 
statutory law under section 
113 of the Evidence Act, 
and Denning J, holding in 
Central London Property 
Trust Limited v. High Trees 
Limited [1947] KB 130, 
relying on Hughes v. 
Metropolitan Railways 
[1877] 2 AC 439, that; if 
there is estoppel, even if 
there is no consideration in 
such strict sense, the 
promisor is liable. 
o It was not equitable that the 
appellant be allowed not to 
be bound by the 
undertaking the two parties 
agreed to, so estoppel 
rightly used as a sword. 
o Issues of remoteness of 
damages don’t arise, for 
as per Esso Petroleum’s 
case, the respondent was 
to be paid damages not 
for loss of bargain, for 
there was no bargain 
given, but for being 






contract that turned 
disastrous, whether it be 
treated as a breach of 
warranty or negligent 
misrepresentation. 
7. Kanyomozi v Motor 
Hart (U) Ltd 
[1999] 2 EA 114 SC-Mulenga 
JSC 
After failing to repair the 
appellant’s motor vehicle, the 
respondent offered to redo 
the job at its cost.  No time 
was agreed, but after three 
years, the job was not done.  
The issues were whether the 
suit was premature and 
whether the appellant waived 
his right to sue. Court held 
that: 
o Where there is no 
stipulation as to time, 
court will impute a term 
that the work would be 
done within a reasonable 
time;  
o 1987-90 was 
unreasonable in the 
circumstances; pleas of 
lack of spares were 
rejected.  
o The trial judge was wrong 
to hold that to make time 
of essence, the appellant 
had to give notice it, and 
that he regretted the 
decision but had no 
choice. Such notice was 
not mandatory. Without it 




Filling gaps in 










Formalism in the High Court 
was openly substituted by 
flexibility at the supreme 
court. 
8. Banax Ltd v Gold 
Trust Bank Ltd (N.B. 
Both Formalism and 
Flexibility were 
applied in this 
decision) 
[1997) HCB 37 SC Where a bank froze the 
appellant’s business 
unjustifiably, court held that it 
breached the banking 
contract. However, for 
damages, court held that: 
o Damages for breach of 
banking contract have to 
be proved, as opposed to 
a trade contract where an 
assumption will be made 
that one lost business; 
o Damages for loss of 
business require evidence 
of a pattern of trading; 
o Inconvenience only 







or political class 











on actual financial 
loss (ACTUAL 
LOSS). 
o Inequality before 
the law 
(INEQUALITY); 










of Justice as 
dependent on 
Class. 
9. Alphonse Odido v 
Lebel (EA) Ltd & 2 
Others  
[1987] HCB 58 HC-Oder J. On the principles to govern 
grant of temporary injections, 
court hailed the flexibility 
created by Lord Diplock in 
American Cynamid Co. Ltd v. 
Ethican Ltd [1975] AC 396, 
where the requirement for the 
applicant to prove a 




Rule, to find equity 







o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS): 
The Role of 
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primafacie case was replaced 
by a requirement to simply 
show that he or she had a 
case to be tried with at least 
50% chances of success, 
after which the issue should 
be the balance of 
convenience.  
Court reasoned that this 
flexibility approach is what is 
appropriate for Uganda, as 
opposed to the principles 
found in older cases. He 
recommended that the court 
of appeal (then the highest 
court) ought to adopt the U.K 
approach and set new rules 
on injunctions.  
sidestepped in 
preference for 
softer and flexible 
rules; 
o Flexibility 
recognised as a 
judging paradigm 
(FLEXIBILITY): 
The flexibility of 
the U.K courts 
adopted and 
applauded.  
Judges: To Fill 
Gaps in the Law; 
10. Huq v Islamic 
University In Uganda 
(N.B. Both Formalism 
and Flexibility were 
applied in this 
decision) 
[1995-98] 2 EA 117 SC-Wambuzi, 
CJ. 
The appellant was employed 
as Rector of the respondent 
university that was set up by 
statute of Parliament and 
Sovereign agreements 
between the government of 
Uganda and the Organisation 
of Islamic Countries.  Court 
found appellant’s contract of 
employment unenforceable 
on grounds that: 
o It had not been attested 
as required of contracts 
employing foreigner; 
o The advocate who drew it 
did not possess a valid 
o The judge making 
law (LAW 
MAKING): 
Modifying a rule in 
a statute; 






of the employer.     








o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 









o Conception of 
Law as a means 
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practicing certificate. 
o Court reasoned that the 
exemption to attestation 
given to employees of 
government undertakings 
by section 13 of the 
Employment Act, did not 
apply, because although 
the word ‘undertaking’ 
meant enterprise, or 
something undertaken, in 
this case the university 
was not a permanent 
undertaking and its 
employees not those of 
the state.   
Note: 
o Tsekooko JSC, dissented 
on the issue of the 
advocate’s lack of a 
licence being used to 
prejudice a party that goes 
to him innocently. 
Therefore, putting 
substantive justice above 
procedural justice; 
o Formalism used but 
flexibility applied 
opportunistically to justify 
denial of exemption in the 
law; 
o Tendency to shield 
government from 
obligations that would 
come from the respondent 
being its undertaking 
MECHANIC); 














application of rules 
(LOGICAL-
MECHANIC): Faced 
with a liberal and 
wide definition, court 
chose a narrow 
definition of 
undertaking. 





















11. Jane Bwiriza v. Osapil [2001-2005] HCB 52 SC The second buyer from 
whom the motor vehicle had 
been impounded by Kaddu, 
who lost to Osapil 
(Respondent) in Kaddu v. 
Osapil [2000] EA 193 (Case 
No. 20 above), now brought 
an action for the loss of 
earnings and profits during 
the period of disentitlement. 
Court held and reasoned 
that: 
o The appellant’s loss was 
too remote as the seller 
(first buyer) did not 
contemplate that the 
motor vehicle would be 
used for commercial 
purposes; 
o The general rule to 
passing of property in the 
goods under sections 19 
and 20 of the Sale of 
Goods Act is modified by 
the intention or conduct of 
the parties; and  
o  The retention of the 
logbook, the insurance 




































o Conception of 
Law as a means 
























licence show that property 
in the goods had not 
passed, as the intention 













used to justify 




o Conception of 
Law as A Means 
to An End 
(LMEANS).  
12. TransAfrica 
Assurance Co. Ltd v. 
Cimria (EA) Ltd  
[2002] 2 EA 64 CA-Okello, 
JA. 
Referred to Mbogo v. Shah 
[1968] EA 93, with approval 
that an appellate court will 
not interfere with the 
discretion of a court unless it 
was used in a way that 















superior to even 
rules on judicial 
authority (SJ); 




13. DFCU Bank v. Kasozi 
(N.B. Both Formalism 
and Flexibility were 
applied in this 
decision) 
[2003] 2 EA 414 CA-Okello, 
JA. 
An advocate (respondent) 
had drawn a sale agreement 
between him and the 
appellant, without indicating 
his name as drawer, as 
required by section 66 of the 
Advocates Act, 1970.  
The respondent, who also 
worked with the Central 
Bank, had had his purchase 




Statutory Rule, to 
find Substantive 
Justice; 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 









under Article 126 
(2)(e); 
o Conception of 
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of the property sold by the 
appellant in foreclosure 
declared illegal in Nagongera 
Millers &Farmers Ltd & 
Another v. Gold Trust Bank 
Ltd [HCCS 1329/1999],for 
offending public policy, since 
the central bank had drawn 
the repayment schedule.  
The buyer therefore brought 
this suit against the bank for 
damages. The Court of 
Appeal held that: 
o Although the contract 
offended section 66 of the 
Advocates Act, putting the 
name and address of the 
drawer was a matter of 
mere form and a 
technicality, not 
substance; 
o Substantive justice 
commanded by Article 
126 (2)(e) of the 
Constitution required that 
it be ignored.   
o Caltex Oil Uganda Ltd v. 
Serunkuma Bus Services 
Ltd [2000] LLR 4 (CA) in 
which hitherto declared 
such omissions fatal to the 
contract, rejected as not 
binding on the judge 
justice (PROC-
DISREGARD); 




o Illegal contract for 
breach of public 
policy and 
statutory rule used 
as basis of legal 
obligations; 
o Pacta Sunt 
Servanda 
(PACTA): Plea of 















law as A Means 
to An End 
(LMEANS); 





o Public Interest as 


















i.e. it was used in 
Nagongera’s 
case, and in this 
resultant suit, 
defeated by 
burden of proof, 
to justify a 
remedy; 
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14. Sugar Corporation 
Uganda Ltd v Lawsam 
Chemicals (U) Ltd 
(N.B. Both Formalism 
and Flexibility were 
applied in this 
decision) 
[2003] 2 EA 679 SC-Tsekooko, 
JSC. 
Section 16 (a) of the Sale of 
Goods Act required that there 
is an implied condition that 
the goods shall be fit for 
purpose where the buyer 
relied on the seller’s skill and 
judgment.   The appellant 
bought cleaning chemicals 
for its boilers from the 
respondent who had to send 
experts to use them in 
cleaning. The appellant did 
not want to lose time waiting 
and did the cleaning itself but 
the chemicals did not work, 
thus the suit for refund of the 
deposit on the price.  
Court held and reasoned 
that:  
o The appellant had the 
burden of proof to prove 
unfitness for purpose, and 
an independent expert 
was required; 
o The chemical was 
presumed fit for purpose 
as ordered and supplied 
as the appellant didn’t rely 
on the respondent’s 
judgment and skill, having 
done the cleaning herself.  
o The appellant took the risk 
like all managers in a 
crisis, at their peril.    




o Evidential Rules 
used to shut 
court’s eyes to 


















o Contract viewed 
as a network of or 
other relations 
(RELATIONS): 
















o Conception of 
Law as a means 








evidence used to 




15. Magezi & Another v. 
Ruparelia 
[2005] 2 EA 156 SC-Karokora, 
JSC. 
The appellant sold their 
contract to supply roadside 
parking meters to the 
Kampala city authority. A 
deposit of the price was paid 
and the balance payable 
“upon commencement of the 
business”, which became 
contentious.  
Court held that the intention 
had to be got from the words 
of the contract, and until the 
street meters were installed, 
business could not be said to 
have commenced.   
The reasoning was that, in 
resolving ambiguity, Lord 
Wilberforce was right in 
Reardon Smith Line Ltd v. 
Hansen Tangen [1976] WLR 
995, that: 
o Contracts are not made in 
a vacuum as there is 
always a setting in which 
they will be placed; 
o The nature of what is 
legitimate to have regard 




circumstances is an 
imprecise phrase which 


















the background of 
the transaction, 
and the conditions 
of the market 




















o Law as a Means 











o In commercial contracts, it 
is certainly right that 
courts should know the 
purpose of the contract, 
which presupposes 
knowledge of the genesis 
of the transaction, the 
background, the contract 
and the market in which 
the parties are operating; 
o Intention is what 
reasonable people would 
have had in place in the 
situation of the parties.    
16. Shenoi & Another v. 
Maximov 
[2005] 2 EA 280 SC-Oder, 
JSC. 
The respondent sent money 
for investment to the 
appellant on the appellant 
representing that they were 
entering a joint venture. No 
business took place and the 
respondent sued for money 
had and received with 
interest. Court held and 
reasoned that: 
o Argument that the money 
was a mere investment in 
business therefore not 
refundable were not 
tenable; 
o In cases like this, the law 
implied a duty that the 
recipient of money did so 
for the use of the other 
and liable to pay it back; 












Implied duty to 
pay back in view 
of business nature 
of contract and, 
Business 
conditions and 
reality used to 
guide use of 
judicial discretion 








o Conception of 







(SJ).   
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sent for investment, 
discretion wrongly used to 
award interest of 6% was 
too little, so increased to 
20%. 
o Corporate personality was 
ignored and the appellant 
(a director), held liable 
jointly with the company. 
17. Goustar Enterprises 
Ltd v. Oumo 
[2006] 1 EA 77  SC-Karokora, 
JSC. 
Defective tractors sold and 
defects discovered only 
during testing after delivery. 
The contention was that the 
buyer damaged tractors 
during use and there was no 
rejection in the legal sense, 
instead acceptance existed 
by virtue of the tractors being 
used (section 35 of the Sale 
of Goods Act). Court held 
and reasoned that: 
o Returning tractors for 
repair was not rejection in 
the legal sense. 
o Communication of the 
purpose of the tractors 
alone was enough 
evidence that the buyer 
relied on the seller’s skill 
and judgment, to create a 
condition under section 15 
(1)(a) of the Sale of Goods 
Act, otherwise there would 
be no reason to do so.  
o Seller was liable under 15 










extended to mean 
reliance on skill 
and judgment; 
o Contract viewed 
as a network of or 
other relations  
(RELATIONS): 























o Conception of 




Goods Act, and per the 
authority of Sugar 
Corporation of Uganda v. 
Lasam Chemical 
(Uganda) Ltd [2001] LLR 
160 SCU.  
18. Magezi v. Multichoice 
Uganda Ltd 
[2007] 1 EA 164 HC An employee claimed 
unlawful dismissal claiming 
that under common law he 
was entitled to reasonable 
notice of 3 years; yet give n 
only 30 days. Court held and 
reasoned that: 
o In Uganda, under section 
14(2) of the Judicature 
Act, the common law is 
subject to written law, 
which under section 25 of 
the Employment Act 
required a minimum of 15 
days. So 30 days 
adequate.  
o The purpose of the notice 
was to allow the employee 
to sort his or her affairs 
and seek alternative 
employment, so even 
under common law, 3 
















o Conception of 
Law as a means 







19. Gitway Investments 
Ltd v. Tajmal Ltd & 
Others 
[2006] 2 EA 76 HC On the role of courts in 
making or modifying law, 
court quoted with approval 
Lord Lloyd of Berwick, in 
Hunter and Others v. Canary 
Wharf Ltd, UKHL Decision of 
o The judge making 
law (LAW 
MAKING): 
Modifying a rule in 
a statute: Court 
assumed the role 
of modernising the 
o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 




“Like I imagine all Your 
Lordships, I would be in 
favour of modernising the law 
whenever this can be done. 
But it is one thing to 
modernise that law, by 
ridding it of unnecessary 
technicalities; it is another 
thing to bring about 
fundamental change in the 
nature and scope of a cause 
of action”   
law, by getting rid 
of technicalities; 
o Internal Judicial 
Guidelines 
(JUDGING 
GUIDE): Limits to 
law Making by 
Court restrained 
itself from making 
fundamental 







20. Eldam Enterprises Ltd 
v. SGS (U) Ltd & 2 
Others (N.B. Both 
Formalism and 
Flexibility were 
applied in this 
decision) 
[2007] HCB 37. HC A contract for sale of good 
that contravened a statute 
that required all imported 
good to be pre-inspected by 
the first defendant (SGS) was 
held as enforceable under 
the Sale of Goods Act. Court 
reasoned that the obligations 
and rights under the Sale of 
Goods Act were not affected 







of contract law 
taken as exclusive 







flexible ends in 
mind 
(OPPORTUNISTI

























21. SDV Transami (U) Ltd 
v. Nsibambi 
Enterprises Ltd (N.B. 
Both Formalism and 
Flexibility were 
applied in this 
decision) 
[2008] HCB 93 CA The appellant transported the 
respondent’s goods and lost 
all of them, but pleaded 
exemption from liability 
clauses in the contract. Court 
held that: 
o For exemption clauses to 
be enforceable, they must 
be clear, unambiguous 
and accepted by the 
parties; 
o  If the incident amounts to 
a fundamental breach or 
of negligence is involved, 
exemption clauses will not 
be enforceable. 
o Allowing exemption 
clauses would defeat the 
purpose of the contract 
and cause injustice as no 







The purpose of 
the contract used 












used to justify 
liability; 












Judge’s sense of 



























o Conception of 
Law as means to 
an end 
(LMEANS); 
o Certainty of Law 
(COL): Certainty 




22. Dr. Vincent 
Karuhanga t/a Friends 
Ployclinic v. National 
Insurance Corporation 
and Uganda Revenue 
Authority. 
[2008] HCB 151 HC-Bamwine, 
J. 
The insured (URA) had an 
employee scheme insured 
with the first defendant, under 
which the plaintiff treated 
them. The scheme was 
internally terminated by the 
URA and not communicated 
to the plaintiff, or the first 
defendant.  
Court held that the insurance 
contract continued to be 
effective and therefore the 
insurer liable but the insured 
was not liable to the third 
party/plaintiff.    
From my experience, having 
been counsel for the insurer, 
the judge conveniently and 
instrumentally edited the 
facts and legal principles 
applicable in this case.  
He ignored the fact that the 
insured at all material times 
knew that the plaintiff 
continued to treat her 
employees and their families. 
The only way the insurer 
would be liable was if there 
was a valid and subsisting 
contract between the third 
party and the insured in the 
first place.   
Otherwise there would be no 








law to find a 











finding a contract 
where there was 
none and failing to 




o Law as a means 
to an end 
(LMEANS); 






consideration on the plaintiff’s 
part to give the insurer. The 
judge chose to ignore these 
principles of law and chose to 
reflect the insurer as having 
continued to contract to treat 
employees of a stranger 
(since the URA was not 
concerned as per the judge’s 
words).  
23. Mbale Exporters & 
Importers v. IBERO 
(U) Ltd  
[2007] 1 HCB 95. CA The parties had a contract for 
the supply of coffee, and the 
plaintiff took two trucks of 
coffee to the buyer’s 
warehouses two days late, on 
a Sunday (non-working day). 
The plaintiff then asked 
buyer’s security guard that 
the coffee be kept in the yard 
until the next morning when 
the buyer would be open for 
work. The next day the coffee 
was reported as having been 
stolen from the trucks 
overnight. Court held and 
reasoned that: 
o To ascertain if time is of 
essence under the Sale of 
Goods Act, one has to 
look at not only the terms, 
but also the conduct of the 
parties, and all 
circumstances of the 
case.  





















used to justify 
liability; 
o In bailment, 
formalities of 
contract formation 






















being as valuable 
as written terms; 






coffee was delivered two 
days late and the buyer 
never repudiated the 
contract, time was not of 
essence.  
o A contract of bailment can 
take place without 
consideration, and in this 
case the security guard 
having accepted the 
coffee, whether he acted 
within the course of his 
employment or not, did it 
for his benefit or acted 
negligently, a contract of 
bailment was made 
between the buyer and 
the seller. 
o The buyer owed the seller 
and breached a duty of 
care under the contract of 
bailment, responsible for 
whatever would happen to 
the coffee until it was 
weighed and tested and 
acted on under the 
contract of sale of goods.  
consensus ad 
idem and authority 








24.  Nantumbwe Shamira 
v. Kampala City 





In a suit by a next friend on 
behalf of a minor who later 
became of age, the court 
held that: 
o All procedural 
technicalities such as the 
plaintiff that was a minor 
applying to become the 
direct plaintiff were 
o Undue regard to 
procedural defects 




seen as curable 













o Law as a means 
to an end 
 662 
curable by Article 126 (2) 
of the Constitution; 
o Article 12 of the 
Convention on the rights 
of the Child (1989) cited to 
hold that a contract with a 
minor was void, reasoning 
further that a commercial 
transaction on behalf of 
minor may be to his or her 











international law in 
a municipal 




25. Concorp International 
Ltd v. East & 
Southern African 
Trade & Development 
Bank 
[2010] 1 HCB 12 CA The appellant sued for 
breach of loan agreements, 
but the respondent, a bank 
established by Charter 
between different states 
pleaded immunity from “every 
form of legal process”, as 
stipulated in Article 43 (3) of 
the charter.  
The court held and reasoned 
that: 
o  The interpretation must 
depend on the intentions of 
the legislature; 
o ‘The object of the charter 
having been to regulate 
relations between them, as 
per the preamble, the 
immunity must be restricted 
























o Conception of 
Law as a means 







o Public Interest as 














respondent and member 
states.  
o To confer absolute immunity 
would be contrary to public 
policy, for even sovereign 
immunity is restricted to 
sovereign acts. 
o Immunity of international 
organisations like the 
respondent should be based 
on the functionality principle, 
which means that it should 
encompass all and only acts 
needed for the proper 
functioning of the 
organisation’s functions 
under the charter.  
 
26. Uganda Wildlife 






A principle had been laid 
down in Southern highlands 
Ltd v. David Queen (1960) 
EA 490, 492, that in 
employment cases, 
employees wrongfully 
dismissed are entitled to full 
compensation for financial, 
with exception that they 
should take steps to get 
alternative employment, and 
if they get it before the suit, 
their new income should be 
taken into account in 
assessing damages.  
In this case, the plaintiff had 
become a Member of 






































being remunerated as such. 
The court held that becoming 
a Member of Parliament was 
not such alternative 
employment as covered by 
the David Queen case.  Court 
reasoned that: 
o In Uganda, becoming a 
Member of Parliament is 
tricky business, such that 
one has to spend a lot in 
the process and there is 
no guarantee that he will 
recover it in his term; 
o The demands of the job 
are such that the MP has 
to spend the facilitation on 
expenses such as 
transport, entertainment, 
fundraisings and 
donations to his 
constituents.  
o It is a well-known fact that 
many MPs end up with 
huge debts and fail to 
improve themselves; 
o This is not the type of 
employment their 
Lordships had in mind in 
the David Queen case.  
27. East African 
Development Bank v. 
Ziwa Horticultural 
Exporters Ltd 
HCMA 1048/2000 HC-Okumu 
Wengi 
The agreement had an 
arbitration clause, and the 
plaintiff instead filed a suit.  
Section 6 of the Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act made it 





rules, i.e., Court 
o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 
Gaps in the Law; 
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mandatory for court to refer 
the matter to arbitration upon 
application of any party. The 
judge declined to refer the 
matter and reasoned that: 
o Empowering people to 
adjudicate their own 
disputes did not oust the 
core mandate and 
function of courts in the 
context of governance. 
o The Arbitration Act’s 
ousting of the jurisdiction 
of court has to be looked 
at alongside the 
constitution and the 
Judicature Act that give 
the High Court inherent 
powers; 
o Court may not desire to 
intervene but 
circumstances may arise 
when intervention is 
essential such as the 
need to stop hardship and 
delays of arbitration, and 
the list is endless. 
insisting on having 
jurisdiction in face 








Court seeing its 
function and 

















to Interfere with 











Absolutism (JA).  
28. DFCU Ltd & DFCU 
Leasing Co. Ltd v. 
Sam Mutongole (N.B. 
Both Formalism and 
Flexibility were 
applied in this 
CA 56/2007 CA-Nshimye, 
JA. 
The appellant’s defence had 
been struck out for indicating 
irrelevant particulars i.e. a car 
number different from the one 
in issue. The court of appeal 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 












decision) held and reasoned that: 
o Having given the wrong 
number plate was a 
professional error of 
counsel that shouldn’t be 
visited on his client. 
o Sticking out the entire 
defence would be a 
fundamental error that 
would deny the appellant 
substantive justice under 






Article 126 (2)(e) 
















29. Pan African Insurance 
Co. (U) Ltd v. 
International Air 





The plaintiff issued an 
insurance guarantee under 
which, payment was due if 
the defendant issued a notice 
of default that specified the 
particulars of the creditor 
airline, amounts due and 
other details. A notice of 
default was served without a 
demand, and later a demand 
sent for the whole guarantee 
amount without particulars. 
The plaintiff paid some little 
money out of pressure of 
legal action, and then sued 
for a refund and declarations 
that it was not liable. Court 
held and reasoned that: 
o Guarantees are to be 
constructed like any other 
contracts, in that the real 
intention as can be 








and context used 

















Absolutism (JA).  
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circumstances had to be 
sought as opposed to the 
technical rules of 
interpretation. 
o The plaintiff was bound by 
estoppel to honour the 
guarantee; 
o Although preconditions to 
any contract had to be 
taken into account, in this 
case the plaintiff was 
bound to pay.  
30. Muwema & Mugerwa 
Advocates v. Shell (U) 
Ltd (N.B. Both 
Formalism and 
Flexibility were 
applied in this 
decision) 
CA 18/2011 CA-Mpagi 
Bahigeine, 
DCJ. 
Following a representative 
action, the plaintiffs having 
succeeded and been 
awarded costs, counsel 
sought to recover fees 
agreed to their 
representatives under a 
remuneration agreement. He 
got a charging order to have 
his fees deducted by the 
defendant before paying the 
plaintiffs. 
Some of the plaintiffs then 
brought an action in the High 
Court claiming that they were 
not bound by the 
remuneration agreement, but 
before hearing, counsel (the 
respondent) obtained an 
order from the registrar of the 
Court of Appeal staying all 





















court order to fight 
for her jurisdiction; 
o The judge making 
law (LAW 
MAKING): 
Modifying a rule in 
a statute, to find 







o Conception of 
Law as a means 


















Justice Mulyagonja of the 
High Court: ignored the order 
of stay and heard the 
application; declared the 
remuneration agreement a 
nullity; banned the lawyer 
from practicing in the High 
Court pending disciplinary 
proceedings of fraud that she 
said the Law Council should 
commence; and set aside 
both the order of the charging 
registrar and that of a fellow 
judge that awarded in the 
main suit. 
The High Court judge 
reasoned that:     
o She was embarrassed 
and her jurisdiction 
attacked by the Court of 
Appeal order of stay, and 
had to fight for her 
jurisdiction; 
o Her skills as a judge have 
been tested to their 
utmost limits, and she had 
suffered anxiety, and 
stress while hearing the 
case, like never before; 
o She had persevered to 
plant the judgment on 
what appeared the most 
virgin terrain in Ugandan 
jurisprudence, to ease the 
work of her brothers and 
sisters. 
fairness and 
equity, i.e.,  Judge 
sought to provide 









Judges to avoid 
actions and 
attitudes that 












Sanctity of Court 
Orders, i.e., Court 
orders held as 
sacred and must 
be obeyed even if 
irregular, null or 
void; and Interim 





















o Social Support as 
a Rule of Validity 
and Recognition 
of Law (SOCIAL 
SUPPORT); 






of Legal System 
as 
Comprehensive, 
i.e. that Judicial 





On Appeal, Court held and 
reasoned that: 
o It was not a safe attitude 
for the trial judge to say 
that she would not be 
deterred by an order of 
the Registrar of the Court 
of Appeal, as this could be 
seen as bias; 
o Interim orders are issued 
if it appears just and 
convenient and to protect 
the court when over 
whelmed with cases; 
o Orders of court must be 
obeyed, whether null or 
valid, regular or irregular, 
otherwise consequent 
proceedings a nullity; 
o Registrars are a vital log 
of the legal machinery and 
there is nothing 
embarrassing for a judge 
to be served by their 
orders; 
o Ignoring court order with 
such impunity destroys 
their authority, yet judicial 
orders are the reason the 
judicial machinery exists.  
o The judge was wrong to 
prejudge the competence 
of a matter before a 
superior court and wrong 
on the procedure to 
discipline a lawyer for 
just and 
convenient; 







o Internal Judicial 
Guidelines 
(JUDGING 
GUIDE): Limits to 
law Making, i.e.  
New matter be 
handled with 
Civility and Order; 
o and that Judges 
should always 





Civility seen as a 






Justice vital part 





Code of Conduct 
as Judging 
Guideline; 




Orders of Court 








used and that 
Judges as 
impersonal i.e. 
not to be 
influenced by 
human attributes.   
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matters that were before 
another court; 
o Justice should not only be 
done but be seen to be 
done, in that the right-
minded people should not 
go away thinking, “the 
judge was biased”.  
o The proposition by Devlin J, 
in Licensing Justices Ex 
parte Barsley [1960] 2 AER 
703; and Lord Hewart in RV 
Sussex Justices Ex parte 
McCarthy (1924) 1 KB 256, 
are correct, therefore all 
circumstances should be 
looked at in the eyes of a 
reasonable man.  
o Verbal exchanges in court 
between the judge and 
counsel, plus the recounts 
of stress showed bias on 
the judge’s part. 
o New matters coming 
before courts are 
increasing, and require 
civility and the highest 
order of both the bench 
and the bar.  Advocates 
should not work hard to 
annoy the judges and 
judges should not 
succumb to temptation to 
react in kind. 
o The judge acted on 
extraneous considerations 
which ought not to 
influence her, making it 
 671 
apparent that she had 
ignored her duty to act 
fairly in the midst of taunts 
and unbearable stress.  
o The judge let the stress 
get the better of her and 
color her judgment.“…all 
of us should comply 
with basic standards of 
good manners and 
professional decorum. 
We should not forget the 
necessity of civility as 
an indispensable 
lubricant that keeps our 
adversarial system 
functioning”.   
31. Kituuma Magala & Co. 
Advocates v. Celtel 
(Uganda) Ltd CA 
39/2003 (N.B. Both 
Formalism and 
Flexibility were 





A lawyer was retained by the 
respondent to collect debts 
with an option to sue difficult 
debtors. Some suits were 
accordingly filed but before 
their conclusion, the 
contracted was terminated by 
the respondent.  
The lawyer brought action to 
recover his fees under the 
Advocates Remuneration 
rules that had standard 
schedules of assessing fees. 
The respondent claimed that 
the contract with counsel was 
illegal and unenforceable.  
The judge chose not to 







or political class 





















of Justice as 
dependent on 
Class; 
o Social Support as 






Public policy as 




recover costs with or without 
the agreement and held that 
he chose to be paid under an 
agreement, thus its legality 
the issue. He then held that 
the lawyers’ remuneration 
agreement was illegal 
because it had not been 
registered with the Law 
Council and notarised.  Court 
reasoned that:  
o Basing on Pandit v. 
Sekatawa [1964] EA 491, in 
which Udo Udoma CJ, gave 
the rationale of the 
requirement in section 51(1) 
if the Advocates Act, as 
public policy, in the sense 
that clients had to be 
protected from advocates, 
and bring the latter within the 
control of courts. Further, 
that the rule helped to ensure 
that lawyers did not appear 
for clients unless duly 
instructed. 
o Lawyers were a special 
group of professionals and 
so their agreements special 
and not governed by the 
general rule that unlawful 
parts of an agreement should 
always be severed and the 



























32. National Social 
Security Fund & 
SCCA 15/2009 SC-Odoki, CJ. The respondent and its sister 
company Alcon Kenya bided 







Sentoogo v. Alcon 
International Ltd, 
decision of 8/2/2013 
to construct a workers’ house 
on behalf of the appellant, the 
retirement benefits manager 
in the country.  Alcon Uganda 
was found unsuitable and the 
contract awarded to Alcon 
Kenya, however internally it 
was agreed and the contract 
was assigned to Alcon 
Uganda, which signed the 
contract and constructed the 
NSSF house. A dispute arose 
regarding the final amount 
payable and after arbitration, 
the application to set aside 
the award was rejected in the 
High Court, but the Court of 
Appeal set it aside, thus the 
appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Court held that: 
o The arbitration award was 
contrary to public policy, 
for the respondent had 
fraudulently signed and 
ran the contract; 
o It is not enough that there 
was deceit, but court must 
be satisfied that there was 




contributed to the award 
being given.  It this case 
substituting names was 
fraud, illegal and therefore 




























o Public Interest as 











Public Policy, and 
understanding 






effects of wrongs, 
and legality of 
actions in issue;   
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contrary to public policy, 
which under section 
34(2)(b)(ii) of the 
Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act is a 
ground to set aside an 
award. 
o  Although fraud has to be 
specifically pleaded and 
proved, it is enough that it 
was first observed by the 
court of appeal during the 
making of its decision, for 
the respondents all along 
knew about it, and that is 
why they concealed it. 
o Being contrary to Public 
policy means anything 
against the constitution, 
national interests, justice 
and morality. 






The applicant applied to 
adduce further evidence in 
the supreme court, to tender 
a report by the government 
ombudusman, that the 
consent judgment respond 
had relied on to be paid and 
still sought up to UGX 120 
billion was forged.  
The court held that although 
Rule 30 of the Judicature 
(Supreme Court) Rules gave 
not jurisdiction to court to 
allow further evidence, the 









Inherent powers of 
court in statutes 
and Article 126 
invoked; 










o Public Interest as 









Public Good as 
the end of law 
 675 
reasoning that: 
o The object of the rule 
barring further evidence 
was merely to bring an 
end to litigation; 
o  The restriction should 
always be read within the 
context of provisions that 
give the court inherent 
powers to achieve the ends 
of justice or prevent abuse 
of court process (Rule 2(2) 
of the Judicature (Supreme 
Court) Rules; and 98 of the 
civil Procedure Act); and 
Articles 126 (1) & (2) (e) of 
the Constitution, that 
obliges courts to do justice 
without due regard to 
technicalities, and in 
accordance with the values, 
norms and aspirations of 
the people, thus court had 
to exercise due care; 
o In cases that are hard like 
this one, the supreme had 
to always be guided by the 
above provisions, and take 
into account exceptional 
matters, like the colossal 
amount of public money 
involved and the length of 
time the issue had spent 
hanging around the 
ministries of justice, finance 
and the courts; 
o If colossal amounts of 







Public interest and 
Substantiality in 
Article 126 (2)(e) 
invoked to cure 
defects; 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 
















and Article 126. 
o  
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public money were to be 
paid against a forged 
consent judgment, that 
would be abuse of 
process negated by Article 
126 of the Constitution.  
o The respondent would not 
be prejudiced by the 
additional evidence 
sought to be tendered. 
34. British American 
Tobacco Ltd v. 
Sedrach Mwijakubi & 
4 Others 
[2013] HCB 35 CA A consent judgment was filed 
but not signed by the 
Registrar of the court. The 
court ignored it and replaced 
it with its own and 
contradictory judgment. 
The court upheld the decision 
of the lower court and 
observed that it was prudent 
to always give reasons for a 
judge’s decision but giving 
such reasons was simply a 
matter of style, and failure not 









Court taking the 
giving of reasons for 
a decision as 
discretionary and 
simply a matter of 
style.  







35. Nipunnoratiam Bhatia 
v. Crane Bank Ltd 
[2013] HCB 76 CA A sale of goods contract was 
entered when the goods were 
in the hand of a third party. 
The court held that since the 
intention of the parties was 
that the property in the goods 
would be transferred without 
any encumbrances, and 
although a buyer would be a 
bonafide purchaser without 
o The judge making 
law (LAW 
MAKING): 
Modifying a rule in 
a statute, to find 
equity and 
fairness, i.e. Court 
declared as illegal 
and unenforceable 
contracts where 













notice and thus protected, 
such an agreement was not 
enforceable, being contrary 
to the law.  That the court 




contrary to lighter 
remedies under 
the Sale of Goods 
Act.  
36. Uganda Revenue 
Authority v. Wanume 
(N.B. Both Formalism 
and Flexibility were 
applied in this 
decision) 
[2012] 1 HCB 43 CA The respondent was 
dismissed from duty yet the 
contract was a fixed one 
without provision for 
termination. The issue was; 
what damages are awardable 
by court in such cases. 
Court held that: 
o Damages are by nature 
compensatory in money 
terms for loss or injury 
suffered.  
o No damages are due for 
injury to feelings or 
reputation, because the law 
needs to be kept at pace with 
economic and social 
development of modern 
society. 
o Punitive Damages are only 
awarded when there is high 
handed, malicious and such 
conduct or improper 
interference of public officers 
with the rights of ordinary 
subjects or against unjust 
enrichment. They are meant 
to appease the victim and 
o Assessing 
damages based 




matters, save if 
wrong had public 
implications; 
o Contract viewed 
as a network of or 
other relations 
(RELATIONS): 
Contract used as 
an Instrument of 
Social Relations. 
o  














sense of loss to 
guide courts-
Modern life seen 
as not valuing 
sentiments, no 
value for Ubuntu; 
o Conception of 
Contract as 
Relational 








warn society against similar 
conduct as the same will be 
an affront to society and its 
sense of decency.   
37.  Cooper Mptors 
Corporation (U) Ltd v. 
Genesis Transporters 





The plaintiff was a supplier of 
buses that the defendants 
bought under an agreement 
between the defendants and 
a Kenyan Company (a non-
party to the suit). The court 
identified jurisdiction as the 
issue and asked parties to file 
skeleton submissions for a 
ruling. The court: 
o Allowed evidence from one 
of the parties and based on 
it; plus; 
o The judge’s own inferences 
and deductions to make 
findings on the merits of the 
claim as well, without a 
proper trial.  
o Upon the losing party 
seeking for leave to appeal, 
the judge allowed leave but 
sought to bind and pre-empt 
the Court of Appeal in saying 
that he allowed as long as 
the higher court will base on 
a proper understanding of 
the law of Consumer Credit 
Agreements.   
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 
to do substantive 
justice (PROC-
DISREGARD), i.e. 




and trying to bias 
the Court of 
Appeal (higher 

















38.  British American 
Tobacco (U) Ltd v. 





The defendants were 
dismissed by the plaintiff after 
discovering that they were 










Others financial loss to her. The 
judge agreed and held that 
the offences were grave 
enough to justify summary 
dismissal, reasoning that: 
o Whether the misconduct was 
sufficiently grave to amount 
to a repudiation of the 
employment contract 
depended on the 
circumstances of each case, 
the nature of employment 
and possibly the terms of the 
contract; 
o Previous case law is of 
limited precedent value, 
particularly as attitudes to 
certain forms of misconduct 
may change over time.   
Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): 
The gravity of 
misconduct of 
employees 
measured by the 
context, and the 
changing attitudes 
in society; 
o Contract viewed 
as a network of or 
other relations 
(RELATIONS): 
Contract used as 
an Instrument of 
Social Relations; 






market and social 




o Social Support as 
a Rule of Validity 












(RELATIONAL).   
39.  Eclipse Edil Soil JVC 
Co. Ltd v. Kampala 
City Council (N.B. 
Both Formalism and 
Flexibility were 






The plaintiff, a building 
contractor sued for non-
payment, and the defendant 
pleaded poor quality work 
and illegality, citing non-
registration with government 
of the plaintiff’s civil engineer 
used as required by Act 
regulating the industry.  The 
court held that: 
 
o The defendant should not 
have expected quality 
o Applying 
Formalism with 








Statutory Rule, to 


















o Conception of 
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work without investing, as 
her payments normally 
delayed; 
o  Substantive Justice 
demanded that the 
defendant be held liable, 
and the non-registration of 
the engineer was curable 
under Article 126(2)(e) of 
the Constitution.  
o Non-registration was not 
pleaded therefore could 






Article 126 (2)(e) 
invoked to cure 
defects;  
Law as A Means 





40.  Amrit  Goyal v. Hari 




HC-Ogoola, J.   A contract relating to shares 
being agreed to be 
transferred was signed in 
India and meant to be 
effected in Uganda. It 
required the consent of the 
prior Minister under the 
Exchange Control Act 0f 
1951. The court held that the 
requirement in the statute 
had been overtaken by the 
government policy of 
liberalism in foreign 
exchange trading, and the 
liberalism in the Company’s 
Act as amended in 1996, that 
allowed a free transfer of 
shares.  
The court further reasoned 
that the law had to be 
updated to match the 










liberalism cited to 
override a rule in a 
statute. 
o The judge making 
law (LAW 
MAKING): 
Modifying a rule in 









o Public Interest as 









State Policy as 
representing 
Public Interest; 




was a very long time ago.  );  







to the market and 
contemporary 
circumstances.   
41.  Alpha International 




Arach-Amoko Under a money-lending 
contract, interest was 240% 
per annum. Sections 12 and 
13 of the Money Lenders Act, 
1952 (Chapter 273, Laws of 
Uganda) authorised courts to 
reopen transactions in which 
they deemed interest to be 
excessive, and therefore 
harsh and unconscionable. 
Excessive was defined as 
interest above 24% of lower 
interest that the court would 
deem so. The court held and 
reasoned that: 
o The interest rate was 
excessive, harsh and 
unconscionable, and in 
absence of data on 
market rates of 
moneylenders, the court 
reduced to 24% that was 
near the average 























Statutory Rule, to 
find equity and 
fairness; 
o Practice, the 
market and social 
















legal norms to 
changing market 
conditions; 
o Conception of 
Law as a means 








o At the time the 1952 Act 
was enacted, legislators 
were not aware that 
business circumstances 
would change, as has 
since happened. For 
instance that competition, 
inflation and increase of 
business risk had 
emerged which meant that 
courts had to be guided 
not by the set 24% but the 










42. John Kawanga, 
Remmy Kasule both 
t/a Kasule and 
Kawanga Advocates 
v. Stanbic Bank 
Uganda Ltd. (N.B. 
Both Formalism and 
Flexibility were 






A cheque drawn by the 
plaintiff law firm was 
dishoured without reason by 
the defendant bank upon 
presentation. Court held that 
in such cases the bank 
customer is entitled to 
substantial damages, with or 
without proof of financial loss. 
By way of reasoning: 
o Precedents like Coker v. 
Standard Bank of Nigeria 
Ltd (1976) ALR Comm. 
174, which supported the 
proposition that the 
remedy is available to 
traders and not 
professionals like lawyers 
were found to contravene 
Article 21(1) of the 
Uganda Constitution that 
guaranteed the right 
against discrimination, 
o Conformity with 
the Constitution as 









before the law; 







treated as an 
ordinary 
commercial 
business akin to 
trading; 
o Contract viewed 
o Constitutionalism 
(CONSTLISM); 
























and equality before the 
law.   
o Lawyers were said to be 
engaged in commercial 
legal business, and 
therefore entitled to the 
same treatment as 
traders.   
as a network of or 
other relations  
(RELATIONS); 
o Contract viewed as 
a network of or 
other relations  
(RELATIONS): 
Using Reliance to 
find contractual 




without proof of 




43. Sara Kagoro t/z 
Twengoma & Quality 
Tailoring Groups, 
Nyamurambi Women 










The defendant wrongfully 
impounded the plaintiff’s 
machinery. The court held 
that there were no guidelines 
in law on how compensation 
should be arrived at in such 
cases.  
The court then decided to:  
o Invoke the rule in Article 
126(2)(c) of the 
Constitution, that enjoins 
courts to ensure that 
adequate compensation is 
awarded to aggrieved 
parties; 
o Send the file to the court 
registrar to appoint 
valuers agreeable the 









under Article 126 
(2) (c); 
o Conformity with 
the Constitution as 




o Making uncertain 
court orders  
(ORDER-
UNCERTAIN): 
final court award 

























as ground of 
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recommended by such 
valuers then becomes the 







44.  Tobacco and 
Commodity Traders 





HC-Ogoola, J.  During a scheduling 
conference, a petition for 
winding up a company was 
opposed on grounds that the 
documents submitted in its 
support did not conform to 
legal requirements. The 
power of attorney was not 
stamped, in Spanish without 
the English translation, and 
not properly signed as the 
names of signatories were 
missing; the Affidavit 
contained hearsay evidence; 
and there was no company 
resolution to wind it up.  
The Judge observed that: 




o The scheduling 
conference as a 
preliminary stage of the 
trial was meant to be 
flexible, without much 
formality; 
o In considering rules like 
the one against hearsay in 
Affidavits, courts had to 
“be alive to the 
o Flexibility 
recognised as a 
judging paradigm 
(FLEXIBILITY); 




Statutory Rule, to 
find equity and 
fairness; 















Article 126 (2)(e) 




















o Conception of 
Law as a means 

















intricacies of modern 
commercial 
intercourse”. In hearing 
commercial cases, it was 
unlikely that any one 
person in the company 
knew all the facts. For 
instance, the directors of 
the petitioner were spread 
over many countries. 
Therefore, the closest to 
personally knowing all the 
facts was competent to 
swear the Affidavit, which 
“the court must give due 
consideration even 
though they may 
amount to hearsay”.  
o Although unstamped are 
not admissible in evidence 
by virtue of section 38 of 
the Stamps Act, this could 
be effectively remedied by 
payment of the 
outstanding duty. 
o A company resolution to 
wind up the company 
need not exist, as long as 
authority to do so was 
given in whichever way. 
o The rest of the objections 
were mere technicalities 
and irregularities, which 
could be remedied in the 
interest of substantive 
justice, in accordance with 
Article 126(2)(e). 





Uganda and with 
19Th Century 


































based on limiting 
formalistic wins to 
procedural 
battles, without 
being used in 
substantive 
decisions.    
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defeat the litigant in 2013 
Uganda, when in England 
courts held against this 
116 Years ago, per 
Pearce, L.J in Pontin v. 
Wood [1962] 1 QB 594, 
who wrote that this was 
not possible even in 1887 
England.     
o His personal sentiments 
about the veritable battle 
between procedural 
technicalities and 
substantive justice, thus: 
“In as much as these 
technicalities are aimed 
at a quick technical 
knock-out in this battle 
royale, they are 
understandable. 
However, in as much as 
the technicalities are 
intended to muzzle the 
course of justice by 
ousting the substantive 
merits of the petition 
from being aired by the 
Petitioner and heard by 
the Court, they are 
simply intolerable.”  
45.  United Assurance Co. 
Ltd v. Attorney 
General 
[1995] VI KALR 109 SC-Wambuzi, 
C.J 
The issue was whether the 
appellant had properly 
contracted counsel to file the 
suit without a company 
resolution having been filed. 
The court held that what 
mattered was that authority to 




Statutory Rule, to 
find equity and 








o Conception of 
Law as Means to 
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file the suit had been given, 
and it was irrelevant how this 
had been done.  
replaced ‘the end 
justifies the 
means’ as guides 
the court decision; 






46.  Atom Outdoor Ltd v. 
Arrow Centre (U) Ltd 
(N.B. Both Formalism 
and Flexibility were 






This was a contract where 
the defendant rented land to 
the plaintiff to erect and 
maintain a billboard on which 
advertisement could be 
made. The court held that the 
plaintiff was to earn from the 
rent not the advertisement, 
therefore it was not her duty 
to meet the cost of printing 
the flexi face for the 
defendant’s billboard. The 
court reasoned that: 
o To read into the contract 
that the defendant had 
such a duty would flout 
business common sense.  
o Such was a liability that no 
businessman in his right 
senses would be willing to 
incur. 
o Commercial contracts 
ought to be interpreted as 
per the guidelines of LS 
Sealy & RJA Hooley, in 
‘Text And Materials in 
Commercial Law’, 













Sense being held 
















o  Internal Judicial 







o Social Support as 
a Rule of Validity 
and Recognition 



















words and the 
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391, thus: the commercial 
sense of the provision, 
derivable from the words 
used, the remainder of the 
document, the nature of 
the transaction, and the 
legal and factual metrix; 
and that the duty of the 
court is simply to give 
effect to the contract, and 
not dictate to the parties 
what the court thinks they 
ought to have agreed or 
what a person 
(reasonable or otherwise) 
might have agreed.   
Guidelines 
(JUDGING 
GUIDE): The duty 
and role of courts 
restricted to giving 
the contract effect 
not dictation of 
court’s views.   
legal and factual 
matrix; 









o Conception of Law 
as a means to an 
end (LMEANS); 





47.  Edward Makubuya t/a 
Edward Engineering 
Works v. Kampala 




HC-Ogoola, J.  The procedure in the Public 
Procurement law was not 
followed in contracting the 
plaintiff by the defendant, a 
local government. The court 
held that: 
o Not following the 
procurement law affects 
the government bodies 
but cannot be used 
against an innocent third 
party such as the plaintiff. 
o The doctrine of estoppel 
binds the defendant to the 
contract.  




Statutory Rule, to 



















i.e. Equity to 
mitigate rigours 
of formalism;  
o Judicial 
absolutism (JA); 
o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 
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Gaps in the Law. 
 
48.  Kitayimbwa Salongo 






In a sale of goods contract by 
sample, a dispute arose as to 
conformity of the bulk of the 
goods supplied with the 
sample, as provided in 
section 16 of the Sale of 
Goods Act. Further, whether 
section 48 of the Sale of 
Goods Act that allows a right 
to sue for the price was 
available to the seller. The 
Court held and reasoned 
that, the eye is the best test 
to check differences and 
resolve imperfections of 
language. That language 
cannot fully describe the 
particulars of the goods.  
o Contract viewed 
as a network of or 























49. Obed Tashobya v. 
DFCU Bank Ltd (N.B. 
Both Formalism and 
Flexibility were 






The plaintiff banked a foreign 
cheque on his account with 
the defendant, and after a 
few days the defendant 
credited the plaintiff’s account 
with the money and he was 
allowed to draw against it. 
The defendant later recalled 
the money on ground that the 
cheque had been 
dishonoured by the alleged 
paying bank. The plaintiff 
claimed breach of contract. 
Court held that the plaintiff 












Bank custom and 



















Equity to mitigate 
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the money, reasoning that: 
o Uganda’s context had to 
be taken into account, 
especially the Bicupuli 
(fake cheques) that were 
floating around the 
country. 
o  It had become a 
recognised bank custom 
that pending final 
clearance, banks would 
allow customers to draw 
against the expected 
credit on the account. But 
they would recall the 
money if the cheque got 
dishonoured.  
o The bank had no license 
to be imprudent, however 
being imprudent does not 
mean being negligent. 
o It was not equitable to 
allow unjust enrichment by 
















o Conception of 
Law as a means 







50.  Ecumenical Church 
Loan Fund (U) 
ECLOFF v. John 
Bwiza & Others t/a 
Kamabare Women’s 
Development (N.B. 
Both Formalism and 
Flexibility were 






The loan contract was given 
out before the borrower was 
incorporated, and court 
recognised the principle that 
pre-incorporation contracts 
are not binding. The court 
however further held that, “it 
would be preposterous for a 
man who does not deny 
taking another’s money to 
plead without shame that the 
other should whistle of his 




Statutory Rule, to 
find equity and 
fairness : A rule of 
law sidestepped 
on ground of non-
conformity with 
reason; 
o Expectancy loss 
Considered 
o Conception of 
Contractual 












money merely because of an 
alleged illegality, which the 
parties may not have had in 
contemplation at the time of 
the contract.”  
(EXPECTANCY). o Sanctity of 
Contract 
(SANCTITY): 
even superior to 
law.  
51.  Petrocity Enterprises 
(U) Ltd v. Security 





The defendant was 
challenging the authority of 
the signatory to bind it. The 
court held that because of the 
nature of the contract, that 
involved invoices, it was 
reasonable to assume that 
the accountant had authority 
to sign on behalf of the 












i.e., Nature of the 






o Conception of 
Law as a means 
to an end 
(LMEANS); Law 









Social Support as 







Common Sense.  






The contract provided for a 
default penalty of 180% per 
annum. The court held that 
this was excessive and in its 
place awarded interest at the 
rate of 25%, which was seen 
as the average commercial 







to interfere with 














A defence of limitation of time 
was raised but the plaintiff 
argued that it had not been 
pleaded, therefore could not 
be raised by the defendant. 
The court held that limitation 
was a matter of law and need 
not be pleaded to be raised.  
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 







54.  Were Fred v. Kaga 
Ltd (N.B. Both 
Formalism and 
Flexibility were 






The plaintiff bought a motor 
vehicle from one Muyingo, an 
employee of the defendant, in 
whose names the vehicle 
was registered. The plaintiff 
paid in full and took 
possession but could not 
transfer the vehicle into his 
names as the defendant 
claimed that Muyingo had no 
authority to sell and took all 
the money for his own 
benefit. The court held that 
Muyingo had ostensible 
authority to sale the vehicle, 
and further reasoned that: 
o A logbook is a document 
of title; 
o According to section 22 of 
the Sale of Goods Act, 
goods sold without the 
authority of the owner 
cannot have their title 
passed; 
o Section 58 of the Sale of 
Goods Act that gives 






The law of agency 
deemed 
incorporated into 
the Sale of Goods 
Act by section 58 
that reserved 
common law and 
the law merchant.  
o Disregard of 










law incorporates the law 
of agency, such that a 
sale by an agent of the 
owner is a sale by the 
owner, even if the agent 
pocketed all the money 
received.    
55.  Mbale United 
Transporters Ltd v. 
Town Clerk, Mbale 
Municipal Local 
Government Council 
& Others (N.B. Both 
Formalism and 
Flexibility were 






The plaintiff’s contract to 
manage a taxi park was 
terminated by the town clerk, 
without the matter being 
considered by the 
Procurement Committee as 
required by the Procurement 
Law.  The termination 
resulted in clashes amongst 
taxi drivers and operators, 
and lives were lost. The court 
held and reasoned that: 
o The value of legal 
procedures cannot be 
underestimated especially 
where they interact with 
private bodies.  
o The value of procurement 
procedures is to ensure 
transparency, public 
accountability, and best 
practices, and court has to 
take judicial notice of 
these principles.  
o The contract termination 
had not been done 
transparently and 
therefore although the 
right existed, it had been 
























to be of great 
value as their 
flouting had led to 
loss of lives, and 
The conception of 
justice seen as 
different where a 




o Conception of 
Law as a Means 
to An End 
(LMEANS): 
o Legal Pluralism 
(LP); 
o  Public Interest 









o  Conception of 
Law as a means 










o The decision was reached 
with lapse in corporate 
governance, and was 
procedurally irregular, 
there illegal interference 
with the contract.  
matter related to 
private bodies, vis 
a vis government 
ones;    
o Applying 
Formalism with 







illegality that went 
to the core of the 
dispute. 
 
56.  Setramaco 




Scholl & Others (N.B. 
Both Formalism and 
Flexibility were 






The legality of a contract with 
the defendant (a public 
School) was challenged for 
not having been entered 
following the Procurement 
Law. The court held that 
there is nowhere in the said 
law that the contracts are 
made invalid. Instead, the 
non-compliance had to be 








i.e. The judge 
applied the law 
strictly to defeat its 
effect of avoiding 
contracts not 
entered following 














o Inequality before 
the law 
(INEQUALITY): 
Weaker party  
protection from 
the commands of 
Public 
Commercial law.   
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or political class 
as criteria to 
access justice 
(NO-EQUALITY); 
57.  Eastern and Southern 
African Trade and 




[2007] UGCommC 30 HC-Bamwine, 
J. 
The contract gave jurisdiction 
to English courts. The court 
held that the Ugandan courts 
still had jurisdiction to hear 
the dispute, reasoning that: 
Convenience dictated that 
Ugandan courts would have 
jurisdiction, because the 
contract was made and 













contract.   
 
o Conception of 
Law as a means 








used to intervene 




Absolutism (JA).  
58.  Mariam Naigaga v. 





The plaintiff having bought 
property from a bailiff as 
agent of the defendant bank 
in a foreclosure, and could 
not enjoy her rights. Sued the 
bank. Court held and 
reasoned that: 
o The bailiff was an agent of 
the bank, in view of the 
ordinary rule of law and 
the ordinary usage of 
human kind; 
o The intention of the 
parties to any contract 
should always be 




Application of Rules 
(CONTEXTUAL): 
Commercial cases 
held as attracting 
higher interest to 
cope with the 
market value of 
money.  
























Contract law to 
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o Interest to be awarded by 
courts in commercial 
cases had to be higher to 
reflect the current 






and relevant to 
the modern 










Anglin, J.  
An issue arose as to what 
should guide court in 
awarding damages for 
breach of contract. The court 
held that: 
o In accordance with section 
61(4) of the Contract Act, 
circumstances and means 
that can help in remedying 
the inconvenience caused 
by the breach are relevant 
considerations; 
o The measure of general 
damages is the opinion of 







o Contract viewed 
as a network of or 
other relations  
(RELATIONS): 
Using Reliance to 
find contractual 
























o Conception of 
Law as a means 
















60. Arnold Brooklyn & 
Company v. Kampala 
City Council (N.B. 
Both Formalism and 
C P No. 
23/2013(4/4/2014). 
CA/C. C During the trial for breach of 
contract, a constitutional 
defence was raised, that the 
contract was invalid, having 
o Pacta Sunt 
Servanda 
(PACTA): Plea of 









applied in this 
decision) 
been executed with a 
government body without the 
approval of the Attorney 
General, contrary to Article 
119(5) of the Constitution. 
The court held that: 
o Such a contract was 
invalid, but this did not 
resolve the dispute 
between the parties. 
o The matter had to be sent 
back to the High court for 
resolution of the dispute 
on its merits, as it was 
anticipated that further 
questions could arise such 
as whether the said 
approval by the Attorney 
General could be given 
retrospectively.   
Unconstitutionality 
of the contract 
held not adequate 
to resolve.   
Indeterminacy;); 
o Legal Pluralism 
(LP): Validity of 
norms can be 
sought beyond 
the four corners 
of the 
constitution; 





61.  NEC Health World 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd 
v. Engineering 





A building contract was not 
fully performed but the 
contractor claimed the full 
contract price under the 
doctrine of substantial 
performance.  
Court held that: 
o Where a contract is 
substantially performed, 
minor faults will be ignored 
and he or she is paid the 
full price under the doctrine 
of substantial performance.  
o Such performance had to 




















be proved by the claimant 
thereof; otherwise the 
doctrine was not available.  
62.  Central Purchasing 
Corporation v. Hon. 






The defendant, a minister 
made a contract for purchase 
of iron sheets, but never 
physically dealt with the 
plaintiff, but only through an 
agent. The minister denied 
receiving delivery of the 
goods. Court held that: 
o A sale through an agent 
was presumed and the 
denial of delivery rejected 
because the minister had 
to transact through 
messengers, as he could 
not pick up the iron sheets 
himself.  
o Property in the goods 
passed with risk in 
accordance with section 
19 of the Sale of Goods 
Act, and the seller entitled 
to an action for the price 
under section 48 of the 
Sale of Goods Act; 
o If the goods were stolen 
the loss had to fall on the 
minister.  
o Being a commercial 
transaction, interest was 
due, but due to the unique 
circumstances of the 
case, it was only awarded 






Court’s rule of 
practice modified 
for a minister and 
Using economic, 
social or political 
class as criteria to 
access justice; 
o Contract viewed 















o Inequality before 
the law 
(INEQUALITY); 










).   
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not before.  
63.  Damas Mulagwe v. 
Lanex Forex Bureau 





Under a contract with the first 
defendant, the plaintiff 
deposited $ 160,000 to be 
generating interest, but 
neither the principal amount 
nor the interest were paid as 
agreed. The Financial 
Institutions Act that regulated 
Forex Bureaus barred them 
from receiving such deposits. 
The first defendant had 
common ownership with the 
other defendants, thus the 
suit.    
Court held that the contract 
was illegal as Forex Bureaus 
were not authorised to take 
deposits, however the money 
would be taken as money 
had and received of the 
account of the plaintiff, 
therefore had to be repaid by 








invoked to get a 
remedy for the 
plaintiff in the face 












o Legal Pluralism 
(LP). 
64.  Swaibu Katongole v. 
Spear Tourism and 





The plaintiff contracted with a 
company in Dubai for his 
goods to be transported to 
Uganda. The court however 
found a Ugandan company 
liable for non-delivery of the 
goods on grounds of lifting 
the veil of incorporation. 
Court reasoned that: 
o The companies 




Statutory Rule, to 
find equity and 
fairness: in 
interest of justice, 





o Conception of 
Law as a means 








constituted one economic 
unity and therefore it was 
fraudulent practice to seek 
protection from the veil; 
o In the interest of justice, a 
remedy had to be found 
for the plaintiff, therefore 























65.  NIS Protection (U) Ltd 





The plaintiff received a call 
from the security officer of the 
defendant ordering security 
services, and all terms were 
agreed. After the plaintiff had 
finished mobilising but before 
deployment, she was 
stopped by the defendant on 
ground that the officer had no 
authority to contract. Court 
held and reasoned that: 
o Whether the issue be 
approached from tort, 
agency law or contract, 
there was a valid contract 
concluded between the 
parties. 
o The rule that servants 





















o Conception of 
Law as A Means 



















if their actions are criminal 
or wanton did not only 
make sense but was just 
as well therefore would be 
followed. 
o Directors bind companies 
due the indoor 
management rule that 
exists by virtue of there 
being constructive notice. 
o So long as strangers act 
bonafide, they ought to be 
protected.  
fairness invoked 
to interfere with 
contract terms, i.e. 
Weaker/ 
disadvantaged 
party protected by 
court.  
Interventionism.. 
66.  Hope Mukankusi v. 
Uganda Revenue 
Authority (N.B. Both 
Formalism and 
Flexibility were 






The plaintiff bought goods 
from an auction conducted on 
behalf of the defendant, 
however the goods were 
handed over to the original 
owner after paying the tax 
due on the goods.  
The court held that under 
section 57(1) (c) of the Sale 
of Goods Act, a contract at 
an auction is complete at the 
fall of the hammer, and 
therefore in this case 
property had passed to the 
plaintiff. Regarding damages, 
the court held and reasoned 
that: 
o Damages for breach of 
contract should be for loss 
that was foreseeable, in 
line with the decision in 
Hadley v. Baxendale 













Article 126 (2)(e) 

























o  Inaccuracy in 
damages 
(INNACURACY); 









(1854) 9 Exch. 341 at 354.  
o Special damages cannot 
be awarded unless they 
are pleaded and 
specifically proved; 
o The court has to be 
guided by Article 126(2)(c) 
of the Constitution, that 
victims of wrong have to 
receive adequate 
compensation. The goal 
should be to restore a 
party to their original 
position before the 
breach; 
o The rule in Esso 
Petroleum Co. Ltd v. 
Mardon (1976) 2 ALLER, 
that assessing loss is 
looking into the future to 
see what would have 
happened, is necessarily 
problematic. It can only be 
a rough and ready 
estimate.  
o Commercial transactions 
should attract a higher 
rate of interest.    
interest rate in 
adjudication; 
o Contract viewed 
as a network of 
relations 
(RELATIONS); 





o Certainty of Law 
(COL).  
 
67.  Buildtrust 






The court awarded a lesser 
amount to what was proved 
as the loss, reasoning that 
during a failed attempted 
settlement, the parties had 









treated as the fair 
and just 















end of law and 
justice. 
 
68.  Bank of Africa 
Uganda Ltd v. Clive 





A bank customer who 
operated through several 
companies banked a forged 
foreign cheque that the 
plaintiff sent to the 
international banking system 
for clearance. After 21 days 
the customer’s account was 
credited with the funds, which 
the customer withdrew. The 
cheque then dishonoured 
and the customer claimed 
that he withdrew money 
lawfully and the bank was 
estopped from claiming 
otherwise. Upon presentation 
of the cheque at the 
beginning, the bank had been 
shown a lease of land 
involving the customer, and a 
company that appeared as 
drawer of the cheque to 
justify the source of funds.  
The land was however 
registered in the names of Sir 
Henry Morgan & Associates 
Ltd (the 3RD defendant), 
owned by the bank customer 













assumed to cover 










o  Applying 
Formalism with 











and Equity as 













o Conception of 
Law as a Means 
to An End 
(LMEANS): 
Justice as a 
paper judgment 
not the ultimate 
end of law; 
o  Substantive 
Justice (SJ): 
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At the trial, for failure to file a 
defence in time, default 
judgment was entered 
against the 3RD defendant. 
However Henry Morgan later 
appeared in court, and 
without going through the due 
process of applying to have 
the judgment set aside, the 
same judge that entered it 
allowed Morgan to participate 
in the proceedings and 
defend the case.  
Court held that the customer 
acted fraudulently and the 
money was repayable by him 
to the bank as money had 
and received.  
Further, that the veil of 
incorporation be lifted over 
two of the companies, one of 
which had been proved to 
own property bought from the 
proceeds of the fraud, as the 
denial of nexus to them by 
the fraudulent customer was 
not credible evidence. The 
court however went on to 
hold and reason that: 
o There existed a quasi-
contract between the 
parties, under which 
liability was based on 






o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 













o The assets owned by the 
companies over which the 
veil had been lifted should 
not be sold until the 
fraudulent customer pays 
the decretal amount; 
o The veil of incorporation 
over Sir Henry Morgan & 
Associates would not be 
lifted, since the fraudulent 
customer had testified that 
there was no nexus with 
the fraudulent customer; 
o The lawyer who held out 
himself as agent of the 
alleged drawer of the 
cheque was held not 
liable, although the 
possibility was there that 
he had never existed; 
o  The Bank was grossly 
negligent/reckless but it 
was immaterial in this 
case.  
N.B: The researcher was 
counsel for the plaintiff bank 
and will share his experience 
in the analysis, which include, 
that:  
o The companies over 
which the veil was lifted 
were not held liable or 
ordered to pay the money, 
but only have their assets 
frozen, which in essence 
was a hollow remedy.  
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o Substantial evidence that 
proved the 3RD Defendant 
as owned and controlled 
by the fraudulent 
customer was not 
commented on or even 
acknowledged in the 
judgment; 
o The court was made 
aware that there no known 
assets in the names of the 
customer, and the only 
way the plaintiff could 
recover was to have the 
companies that held 
assets made liable, but 
the judge chose to award 
the bank while denying 
her the only available way 
to actually realise the 
fruits of litigation; 
o ‘A notice of appeal was 
filed but for over five 
years, the court has 
refused to release the 
record, and the recorded 
proceedings were 
reported as lost. 
o The trial judge was since 
promoted and is now the 
principle judge.   






The plaintiff gave information 
to the defendant about a tax 
defaulter, having been 
agreed as permitted by 
section 7 of the Finance Act, 
















be paid a 10% commission of 
the tax recovered. The 
defendant refused to pay the 
commission and after several 
reminders, the plaintiff 
brought this suit for the 10%, 
interest and damages.  
One of the issues was the 
rate of interest payable. The 
plaintiff sought to rely on 
section 136 (1) and (2) of the 
Income Tax Act, which 
allowed the defendant to 
receive a 2% monthly interest 
on delayed tax payments, 
arguing that the plaintiff be 
paid interest at the same 
rate, in accordance with 
Article 21 of the Constitution 
that all persons shall be 
equal before and under the 
law. In the judgment: 
o The judge was silent 
about the principle of 
equality and instead relied 
on section 7 of the 
Finance Act, 1999 not 
granting interest to hold 
that it was a matter of 
court’s discretion. 
o  He then awarded 20% as 
the commercial lending 
rate.  
o General damages were 
awarded for 















o Contract viewed 




Reliance to find 
contractual 













o Conception of 
Law as a means 


















losses rejected as not 
having been strictly 
proven.    
70. Highland & Agriculture 
Export Ltd & Another 
v. Alpha Global 21ST 






The plaintiff sued the 
defendant for recovery of 
money owing from the supply 
of goods and services, and 
sought to maintain action on 
dishonoured cheques as 
alternative and independent 
causes of action. At the trial it 
was proved that much of the 
debt was a result of interest 
that had been agreed at 15% 
per month. The defendant 
had claimed that the cheques 
were issued as security 
without dates and amounts, 
and one of the plaintiffs was 
signatory on the cheques. 
The judge held that the 
cheques were not 
enforceable on their face, 
reasoning that: 
o Although the law is that a 
cheque dishonoured forms 
an independent cause of 
action and is enforceable 
on its face without further 
proof, it would be prudent 
and just and the court is 
mandated to investigate the 
underlying contract and 
ascertain whether the 
amounts on the cheques 






















as per section 26 
of the Civil 
Procedure Act; 




























Judges to be 
prudent; 
o  Substantive 
Justice (SJ).  
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o In Uganda, section 26 of 
the Civil Procedure Act 
makes contractual interest 
that the court deems 
harsh and unconscionable 
unenforceable by due 
process of law. In this 
case, the agreement on 
interest was therefore 
unenforceable.  
71.  Prof. Egbert De SMET 
v. Juliet Nakassaga 
(N.B. Both Formalism 
and Flexibility were 






The contract between the 
parties provided that it was 
only enforceable under the 
Court of Commerce in 
Antwarp. The court held that 
since Article 139(4) of the 
Constitution gave unlimited 
jurisdiction to the High court 
in all matters, a mere term of 
an enforceable contract could 
not oust this jurisdiction, per 
Huadar Guangdong Chinese Co 
Ltd Vs Damco Logistics Uganda 











Jurisdiction;   
o Conformity with 
the Constitution as 




Article 139(4) of 
the Constitution 
gave unlimited 
jurisdiction to the 











72.  Belex Tours & Travel 
v. Crane Bank Ltd & 
Another (N.B. Both 
Formalism and 
Flexibility were 





The appellant defaulted on a 
loan from the 1ST respondent 
bank, and her furnished hotel 
was sold under foreclosure to 
the second respondent. The 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 
to do substantive 
justice (PROC-
DISREGARD): 
o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 
Gaps in the Law: 
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applied in this 
decision) 
appellant sued for recovery of 
the balance of the sale price 
after deducting the amount 
due and the value of the 
movable property in the hotel.  
The court of appeal 
reappraised the evidence and 
made its own findings not 
raised or even pleaded by the 
parties. The position in 
Stephen Lubega v. Barclays 
Bank Ltd, CA 2/1992, that 
fraud has not only to be 
pleaded but also 
particularised in the plaint 
was rejected as old law that 
was rejected in NSSF vs. Alcon 
International, SCA 15/2009.  
The court therefore held that it 
was a classic case of 
‘Shylock’ as the alleged sale 
and transfer of both the 
movable and immovable 
property was fraudulent, 
illegal and void because:  
o The 2nd respondent had 
only paid a small portion 
of the price and the 1ST 
respondent bank financed 
the balance through a 
mortgage secured by the 
very property of the 
Appellant being sold in 
foreclosure; 
o The transfer into the 2ND 







findings of fraud 
and illegality not 
pleaded or 
argued; 








strictly applied to 
declare mortgage 




courts in Uganda 
have consensus 
not to allow one to 
benefit from acts 







i.e. that Benefiting 
from fraud or 
Courts as 
guardians of 




o Conception of 
Law as a means 
































allegedly took place 
before the sale 
agreement, implying that 
the mortgage had been 
released by the time of 
sale, and the transaction 
was deceitful/fraudulent. 
o There was no public 
auction as alleged but a 
private arrangement 
between the respondents. 
The court further reasoned 
that: 
o The mortgage deed from 
which the sale took place, 
and the transfer 
instruments were null and 
void because the signing 
did not comply with the 
formalities of being done 
in latin characters or 
indicating names of 
signatories against the 
signatures, as 
commanded in sections 
147 & 148 of The 
Registration of Titles Act; 
o  “As the cases of Zaabwe 
vs. Orient Bank SCA 
4/2006, NSSF vs. Alcon 
International (supra) and a 
host of other cases in this 
court and at the Supreme 
Court have demonstrated, 
courts of law in this 
illegality 
considered 
injurious to parties 
and society; 
o Contract viewed 
as a network of 
relations and 
(RELATIONS): 
Contract used as 
an Instrument of 
Social Relations; 




Courts to be firm 
guards of the 
gates of justice; 
o  Internal Judicial 
Guidelines 
(JUDGING 
GUIDE): guards of 










country will not permit 
parties to benefit from 
their illegal and fraudulent 
transactions to the 
detriment of others and 
society. Justice demands 
that in all such cases 
courts stand firmly on 
guard at the gates of 
justice.” 
73.  Zaabwe vs. Orient 




The first respondent had by 
foreclosure sold the 
Appellant’s property upon 
default to pay a loan given to 
a donee of a power of 
attorney by the Appellant. 
The mortgage deed and all 
loan documents had been 
signed by the donee and the 
loan given to and used by 
her.  
Court reappraised the 
evidence in the lower court 
and made findings of fraud 
not pleaded or argued before, 
holding that court had such 
powers.  The court rejected 
the rule in Stephen Lubega v. 
Barclays Bank Ltd, CA 
2/1992, that fraud has not 
only to be pleaded but also 
particularized in the plaint. 
The court further reasoned 
that an agent doesn’t have 
authority to use the powers 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 











o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 
Gaps in the Law 
to arrive at what 








given in a power of attorney 
to his/her own benefit. The 
bank knew that the money 
was to be used for the sole 
benefit of the donee, to the 
detriment of the Appellant, 
which made the transactions 
fraudulent, null and void, and 
so was the sale by 
foreclosure.    





The respondent duped the 
supplier of goods to the 
Appellant, that he had a 
buyer for goods whose full 
price the Appellant had failed 
to pay, and orally undertook 
that he stood guarantor of the 
balance payable if the 
supplier could discount the 
debt. The issues were 
whether the oral guarantee 
was valid and enforceable. 
The controversy partly arose 
from ambiguity in the 
Contract Act, No. 7/2010, for: 
Section 10 (6) provides that 
all contracts by way of 
guarantee or indemnity shall 
be in writing; section 10(5) 
provides that all contracts 
above 25 currency points 
shall be in writing while those 
below may be oral of by 
conduct; and section 68 
provides that guarantees and 




ambiguity in a 
statute by inferring 
additional words in 
sections 10(6) and 
68 of the Contract 
Act; 

















o Perception of law 
as Predictions 
(LPREDICTIONS
): The Role of 
Judges: To Fill 














indemnities may be made in 
writing or orally. 
The court held that: 
o The above sections should 
read together and although 
they appear to contradict, 
the Act had to be 
harmonised. Accordingly, 
that the word ‘shall’ in 
section 10(6) being 
mandatory should be 
treated as implying that 
guarantees and indemnity 
contracts above 25 
currency points shall be in 
writing. As such those 
below may be oral, so that 
the permissive and 
discretionary word ‘may’ 
used in section 68 is taken 
as permitting only 
guarantees and indemnities 
below 25 currency points.   
o The Respondent did not 
come to court with clean 
hands and in equity could 
not enforce the guarantee.  
The guarantee arose as a 
result of deceitful scheme. 
It was about lying the 
supplier that there was a 
buyer, who was fictitious, to 
make him reduce his 
price/debt. 
offending equity-
No clean hands 
no justice.  
 715 
75.  Portland International 
(PTY) Ltd v Sembule 
Steel Mills Ltd & 2 Ors  





The contract provided that 
the law of south Africa was 
applicable to it and the South 
African Courts had exclusive 
jurisdiction. Court held that: 
o Under Article 139(1) of the 
Constitution, and section 
14(1) of the Judicature 
Act, the High Court had 
unlimited jurisdiction. 
o  Following LARCO 
Concrete Products Ltd v. 
Transair Ltd [1987] HCB 
40 [1988-90] HCB 80, a 
term of the contract 
cannot oust the unlimited 
jurisdiction of the High 
Court, unless it is very 
clear and unequivocal, 
and such jurisdiction 
should be jealously 
guarded.  
o The court further 
reasoned that, “…the 
Defendants are residents 
of Uganda, carry on their 
business here, have 
witness and Advocates 
here.  It is therefore 
appropriate and cost 
effective to maintain the 








Inherent Jurisdiction.   
o Court Interfered 

















y and cost 
effectiveness used 
to override a term 







o Conceptioin of 
Law as a Means 
to An End 
(LMEANS): 
Contracts to be 
enforced in 









76. Uganda Telecom v. 





An appeal challenging the 
judge’s refusal to dismiss a 
suit for want of a cause of 
action, and allowing the 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 




justice (SJ).  
 716 
 matter to be heard on the 
merits was filed out of time. 
An application was made to 
dismiss the appeal.  
Court held that in the interest 
of justice, the appeal was 
allowed to proceed and be 
heard on the merits so that 
the matter could be returned 
to the lower court to be heard 
on its merits. The court called 




77.  National Housing & 
Construction 
Corporation v. Lion 





The defendant issued an 
advance payment guarantee 
for the accommodation of the 
plaintiff’s contractor. After the 
contractor breached the 
building contract, the plaintiff 
sued for the guarantee value.  
The defendant challenged 
the suit on ground that no 
payment was made by the 
plaintiff to the contractor after 
issuance of the guarantee 
and yet guarantees are 
meant to cover future risk not 
past payments. The court 
held and reasoned that: 
o The purpose of 
guarantees is like letters 
of credit, to work as a tool 
of commerce. Therefore, 
their efficacy has to be 
o Pacta Sunt 
Servanda 
(PACTA): Plea of 














meaning of parties’ 
actions: Business 
efficacy as a tool of 
commerce. 
o Conception of 
Law as a Means 













protected by enforcing 
them as separate 
contracts independent of 
the underlying contract.  
o Defences under the main 
contract are irrelevant, 
save in a few exceptions 
such as fraud, which was 
the case here for there 
was no payment after the 
guarantee yet it was 
concealed.  
78.  Sendege, Senyondo 
& Co. Advocates v. 






The plaintiff, a firm of lawyers 
rendered legal services to the 
defendant, including litigation 
representation. The 
defendant, a capital city 
authority refused to pay for 
the services, alleging that the 
contract was illegal in far as: 
it was not approved by the 
Attorney General as 
constitutionally required; the 
procurement did not follow 
the procedure in the Public 
Procurement law; The 
contract did not comply with 
the procedure required under 
section 51 of the advocates 
Act, to wit, being notarised 
and filed with the Law 
Council; The contract had 
expired when some of the 
work was done. Court held 
and reasoned that:    







to interfere with 
contract terms, 
and Interests of 
justice invoked to 











Contract.: used to 
find a remedy and 
avoid injustice 
from statute. 
o Legal Pluralism 











o Public Interest as 











the scale of advocates 
would be used in 
remuneration with a 
discount, as such the 
Supreme Court authority 
of Kituuma Magala 
declaring illegal not 
entered under section 51 
of the advocates Act was 
not applicable; 
o Even if the contract was 
void, as long as the 
defendant consumed the 
services in equity, the 
plaintiff is entitled to a 
quantum meruit; 
o As decided in Finishing 
Touches Ltd v. Attorney 
General, HCCS 144/2010, 
non-compliance with the 
Procurement Law should 
not be used against the 
plaintiff, but the 
government officers who 
did not comply; 
o Public interest and the 
ends of justice that the 
consumer who consumed 
the services and 
appreciated them should 
pay for them.   
79.  Uganda Railways 
Corporation v. 
Bushenyi Commercial 
Agencies & 2 Others  
[2012] CACA 31 
(14/12/12) 
CA The appellant as carrier, was 
a third party to the contract 
between the respondents, but 
the High Court found it liable 
for breach of contract without 
a duty to indemnify being 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 











The Court of Appeal held that 
the trial judge’s orders 
caused injustice and 
therefore had to be set aside.  
80.  Commodity Export 
International Ltd & 
Another v. MKM 









At the time the High Court 
heard the case, there was no 
law in Uganda on 
admissibility of computer-
generated evidence. The 
issue was whether computer 
records should be admitted 
as best evidence, as counsel 
for the appellant claimed that 
it was only admissible when 
there was a way to verify it, 
such as diskettes being 
tendered. The Court of 
Appeal held that: 
o Computer generated 
evidence was admissible, 
relying on common law 
position from England, 
Canada and the US; 
o The best evidence rule 
had long lost value, the 
only remainder being that 
if the original document is 
in the hands of someone, 
then he must produce it.  
 
The court further reasoned 
that it was justifiable to admit 
o The judge making 
law (LAW 
MAKING): Gap in 



























grounds for new 
o Conception of 
Law as a means 










of rules/Rule of 
Recognition of 
Norm Validity; 
o Conception of Law 
as Experience  
(LEXP):Practical 
Reality and 













computer evidence because: 
o To require more 
verification was to push 
the matter beyond 
sustainable boundaries; 
o The information had been 
recorded and stored by an 
accountant in the ordinary 
course of business; 
o Practical reality made it 
necessary to recognise 
electronic evidence as 
primary evidence.  
rule of evidence.   normativity.   




SC- The issue was whether the 
trial judge was right in 
allowing a suit for breach of 
contract to be maintained 
under Summary Procedure 
(Order 36 Rule of the Civil 
Procedure Rules), when it 
pleaded and particularised 
fraud.  
The Court of Appeal held that 
the trial judge would have 
been wrong if the claim was 
for fraud, however in this 
case fraud was not essential 
to the claim, which was for a 
liquidated sum. The court 
reasoned that: 
o Order 36 was enacted to 
facilitate expeditious 
disposal of contract and 
debt suits of a commercial 





Applicability of a 
rule, i.e. Rule 
applied 
generously and 





























Indeterminacy:   
dependent on 
market forces; 
o Conception of 
Law as A Means 






nature and avoid 
unreasonable prolonging 
of litigation through 
frivolous and vexatious 
defences; 
o The summary procedure 
also helps the economy 
by removing unnecessary 
obstructions in financial or 







82. Eden International 







The plaintiff challenged the 
compounding of interest of ½ 
levied by the defendant on a 
loan as harsh and 
unconscionable. The 
defendant claimed that it 
could not be sued because 
its creating statute gave it 
immunity. The court: 
o Relied on Concorp 
International Ltd vs. East 
and Southern 
Development Bank SC 
No.19 of 2010, in which 
such immunity was held to 
be restricted to suits 
involving member states 
and not private 
companies, to hold that if 
such immunity protected 
the defendant, it would be 
against public policy; and 
o Held that the ½% 
compound interest was 















used to determine 
if interest terms 













o Public Interest as 
a Rule of 
Recognition, the 
basis of obligation 
and enforceability 














protection of a 
market economy; 









reasoning that, interest 
was low and the 
compounding was meant 
to protect and 
compensate the 
defendant against the 
economic vagaries and 
consequences of delayed 
payment, namely loss of 
opportunity cost, 
depreciation of the 














o Conception of 
Law as a means 






Utility: Rule of 
Recognition of 
Norm validity.  
83. Steam Aviation FZC v. 
Attorney General 
(N.B. Both Formalism 
and Flexibility were 






The plaintiff sued the 
defendant for non-payment, 
being breach of a contract 
she made with the Uganda 
Ministry of Defence to carry 
equipment and logistics to 
war zones in neighbouring 
countries. Admissions of the 
contract by both parties were 
presented to court. Court 
dismissed the suit, 
reasoning that: 
o Under section 6 of the 
Sale of Goods Act, and its 
amendment in section 
10(5) of the Contract Act, 
2010 contracts above 











contracts for sale 
of goods literally 
interpreted and 
strictly enforced; 
o The judge making 
law (LAW 
MAKING): 
















o Conception of 
Law as A Means 
to An End 
(LMEANS); 
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200= and 25 Currency 
points respectively, had to 
be in writing to be 
enforced; 
o Although the parties had 
agreed to existence of the 
contract, evidence of 
existence of the contract 
should have been 
adduced by the plaintiff, 
even if it was sensitive for 
security reasons; 
o It is a great danger to the 
public for litigants to come 
to court with agreed 
positions for court to 
merely stamp; 
o Allowing the above would 
reduce the role of courts 
to become administrative 
organs and not courts of 
law, since not putting such 
contracts into writing can 
lead to serious 
consequences, such as 
lawyers failing to recover 
their fees; 
o The plaintiff did not 
adduce evidence of its 
registration in Uganda as 
a foreign company yet 
section 370 of the 
Companies Act required 
businesses to be 
registered before doing 
business or trading in 
Uganda; 
o No evidence was adduced 
a Supreme Court 
Precedent, i.e. 
United Assurance 
Co. Ltd v. Attorney 
General [1995] VI 
KALR 109, that 
even without a 
resolution a 
company can 
authorise an act 
contradicted; 
o Pacta Sunt 
Servanda 
(PACTA): Plea of 
illegality ignored to 
enforce Contract;  





Applicability of a 
rule i.e., that 
writing was 
mandatory; pilots 
are required to get 




enter a contract in 
Uganda; 












Judicial Role and 
Relevancy; 
o Public Interest as 



















that the company had 
passed a resolution 
authorising the contract; 
o The director of the plaintiff 
did not tender evidence of 
his directorship and work 
permit since he was at all 















Court’s role and 
relevancy in the 
legal system cited 




84.  SDV Transami (U) 
Limited v Agrimag 
Limited & Jubilee 







A contract of carriage 
between the parties provided 
that goods were carried at 
owner’s risk and no liability 
was to arise save in cases of 
gross negligence. The 
arbitrator’s decision was that 
no negligence had been 
proved but he had to invoke 
the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitor and infer gross 
negligence thus making the 
award.  
An application was then 
brought before the 

























Law as a Means 
to an End 
(LMEANS); 







o Conception of 
Contract as 
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aside the arbitral award 
under section 34 of the 
Ugandan Arbitration Act, 
which allows setting aside 
where the arbitrator deals 
with issues not contemplated 
by the parties; or not falling 
within his/her terms of 
reference; and where the 
award is contrary to the Act 
or public policy.  
The judge upheld the 
arbitrator’s award, reasoning 
that, in such cases, the “apt” 
question is whether the 
special and general damages 
awarded ‘conformed to the 
considerations of justice and 
fairness 
and public policy 
under Section 34 
of the Arbitration 
Act;  














Judge’s sense of 
justice and 

























85.  Hydro Engineering 
Services Co. Uganda 
Limited v. Thorne 
International Boiler 
Services Limited. 




The defendant contracted the 
plaintiff to carry out 
construction under a fixed 
price contract, but the 
defendant failed to complete 
the works and instead 
demanded more money as a 
condition for completion, 
leading the plaintiff to rescind 
the contract.  
While applying the doctrine of 
substantial performance 
































Mahadeva, [1972] 1 WLR 
1009, having noted that the 
plaintiff had breached the 
construction contract, the 
Judge held and reasoned 
that: 
o The plaintiff was entitled 
to the full contract price on 
grounds of fairness, since 
‘full performance was 








to interfere with 
contract terms;  
o Flexibility 





86. Traces SA v. Attorney 
General 
HCCS No 525 of 
2006 
HC-Kabiito, J. A foreign investor was invited 
by the government through a 
public bidding process and 
contracted to collect TV 
Licence fees. However, after 
investing in preparatory 
works and collecting for only 
nine days, the President 
abolished the fees at a 
political rally.  
The Judge found for the 
foreign investor (plaintiff), but 
declined to grant the 
remedies stipulated in the 
contract or declare specific 
performance. 
In reasoning, the judge cited 
the President’s 







to interfere with 
contract terms: 













agreement of the 
o Judicial 
Absolutism (JA); 







as condition for 
enforceability of 
Contracts; 
o Conception of 
Law as a Means 
to An End 
(LMEANS); 
o Legal Pluralism 
(LP): i.e. 
Responsiveness 
to Public policy 
as condition for 
enforceability of 
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changed government ‘policy’ 
that TV licences should not 
be paid by non-commercial 
viewers, despite statutory law 
that still says that they 
should.  
 
parties with what 
would best serve 
the political 
wishes of the 
president. 
Contracts; 
o Public Interest as 













87.  Equinox Global 
Trading Co Ltd Vs. 
Panalpina Uganda Ltd 
(N.B. Both Formalism 
and Flexibility were 
applied in this 
decision). 




A Bill of Lading was issued 
by and reflected the carrier 
as Paintainer Express Line 
and the place of delivery as 
Kampala-Uganda. The issue 
was whether there was a 
contract with the defendant to 
transport the goods from 
Mombasa to Kampala. The 
Judge held that the Bill of 
Lading summarises the terms 
of the contract of carriage 
and therefore, the carrier was 
Pantainer Express Line Ltd 
and not the defendant. 
Attempts to prove the terms, 
other than those written in the 





gaps in contracts 







o Inequality under 
the law 
(INEQUALITY); 






88. Jjagwe v. Standard 
Chartered Bank (U) 
Ltd.  
HCCS 375/2004  
HC-Bamwine. 
J.  
The bank was proved and 
held as having sold the 
plaintiff’s security upon 
default to repay a loan in a 
hurried manner. The court 
reasoned that: 
o At equity the fairness of 
each such transaction is a 
question of the particular 
circumstances.  
The flexibility created by 
equity is not too much, 
therefore lenders have a duty 
to ensure that they get good 
advice and use proper 












recognised as a 
judging paradigm 
FLEXIBILITY); 






practice of using 
agents to get a 
















89.  Matovu & Others V. 
Attorney General 
M.A 143/2008 (from 
HCCS 248/2003) Kibuuka 
Musoke J,  
The 475 plaintiffs were 
former employees of a 
government corporation. 
Their services had been 
terminated but their 
retirement benefits and 
gratuity not fully paid, thus 
the claim. Government had 
admitted liability through 
several letters but refused to 
pay the claim without court 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 






















making a finding. An 
application was made for 
judgment on admission, 
which the Attorney General 
opposed on ground that the 
admissions were internal 
classified government 
communication and not 
unequivocal. The judge held 
in favour of the plaintiffs, 
reasoning that: 
o For purposes of court 
receiving admissions, 
Government was equal to 
private parties, therefore 
admissions against it 
receivable; 
o The form of admissions 
and the manner in which 
they were made was 
immaterial, quoting with 
approval, R v. Simon 
(1834) 6 C & P 540; and 
Halsbury’s Laws of 
England, 3rd edn. Vol. 15, 
par. 536-539; 
o Where admissions were 
unequivocal, court loses 
discretion whether to enter 
judgment or not. It must 
enter judgment; 
o  The award of damages is 
in the sole discretion of 
the court; 
o The case had spent 9 
years in court while the 
plaintiff being denied their 
the 9 year delay in 
the case, and the 
aging and dying of 
many plaintiffs 
considered; 








award of general 
damages; 



















gratuity, therefore court 
had to award general 
damages. 
o NB. The researcher 
having been counsel for 
the plaintiffs adds that 
at the trial, the judge 
commented off record 
that, it was inhuman for 
the defendant to see 
people aging and other 
dying while still 
insisting on not paying 
them gratuity for having 
served the country for 
so long.  
90. R.L Jain v. Kamugisha 
(N.B. Both Formalism 
and Flexibility were 
applied in this 
decision) 
[2015] UGCOMMC 77 
(Dated 14/4/2015)  Madrama J,  The plaintiff sued challenging 
interest levied under the 
terms of a loan agreement as 
harsh and unconscionable, 
and that court should 
interfere under section 12 of 
the Money Lenders Act and 
26 of the Civil Procedure Act.   
It had been agreed that in the 
event of default of 
repayment, the outstanding 
amounts would attract 15% 
interest per month. Court 
held and reasoned that: 
o Under section 21 of the 
Money Lenders Act, 
transactions secured by 
mortgages are excluded 
















Discretion i.e., to 
determine what 
interest is harsh 
and 
unconscionable; 























o Procedural Justice 
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said law; 
o Although section 12 of the 
Money Lenders Act was 
not applicable, section 26 
of the Civil Procedure Act 
was invoked to reduce the 
interest rate, as it gave 
courts the discretion to 
interfere with interest they 
deemed harsh and 
unconscionable; 
o The notions of sanctity 
and freedom of contract 
expounded in Sharif 
Osman v. Haji Haruna 
Mulanga, SCA 38/1995 
commanded courts to give 
effect to the clear intentions 
of the parties gathered from 
the agreement and not 
make a contract for them, 
such as interfering interest. 
However, the case was 
distinguishable as it did 











litigant’s case to 
Pleadings. 
as Superior to 
Substantive 
Justice (PJ). 
91. Graphic Systems (U) 
Limited v. SDV 
Transami (U) Limited  





Wangutusi, J.  
The plaintiff brought a 
subrogation suit, having been 
paid by the insurer, for 
damages under a carriage 
contract, for loss arising from 
alleged short landing of 
goods transported. The 
defendant denied existence 
of a contract of carriage, 
alleging that she acted as a 




















i.e. writing a 
contract for the 
parties, where 
none can be 
proved; 
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coordination agent, the 
carriage contract having been 
between the plaintiff and a 
Dutch company. The Plaintiff 
tendered an invoice from the 
defendant dated after the 
goods had arrived, for 
services alleging that it was 
the contract. Further, the 
defendant, represented by 
the researcher adduced 
evidence proving that 
documents authored by the 
plaintiff’s carrier and clearing 
agents indicated no short 
landing of goods.   
During cross-examination, 
the insurer’s loss assessor, a 
part from admitting that he 
had lied about his 
qualifications, disowned the 
report he had given to the 
insurer as the basis of proof 
of lost goods and their value, 
confessing that he was 
embarrassed by it, for being 
full of contradictions, and that 
the insurer should never have 
relied on it to pay.    The 
judge held and reasoned 
that: 
o One would be tempted to 
think that by the time the 
goods arrived in the 
country no contract 
existed between the 
gaps in contracts 
with implied terms; 
o Undue regard to 
technical or 
procedural defects 
to do substantive 
justice (PROC-
DISREGARD): 












Judge’s sense of 
justice used to 
override terms 
enforceability.  






parties, however since the 
Dutch received 
instructions to transport 
the goods through the 
defendant, the 
presumption is that the 
invoice was the reduction 
into writing what had been 
agreed already; 
o Although the expert 
admitted shortfalls in his 
report, and never spoke to 
potential suppliers that 
issued him an invoice for 
value of lost goods, the 
invoice should be trusted. 
N.B, in this case, the 
judge suppressed 
evidence proving that all 
the goods were carried by 
the Dutch company, and if 
any loss occurred, it was 
in the hands of the 
plaintiff’ local agents, and 
he ignored admissions by 
the expert that his report 
was not believable.  
92.  Kavuma v. First 
Insurance Co. Limited 





Kainamura, J.  
The insured claimed 
indemnity for the value of his 
Mercedes Benz G 300 
completely destroyed in a 
fire. The defendant had 
repudiated liability on ground 
that the vehicle had been a 
G50, that was upgraded to a 
G300, by adding parts for the 

















superior to even 
rules on judicial 
authority (SJ); 
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brought to the attention of the 
insurer, and which would 
have affected the decision to 
enter the insurance contract 
including the premium. The 
court held and reasoned 
that: Changing the model of 
the vehicle and concealing 
the fact from the insurer was 
a breach of good faith, an 
implied term in every 
insurance contract, an act of 
fraud and a ground for the 
insurer to repudiate the 
claim/liability. The judge 
relied on Pan Atlantic 
Insurance C. Limited v. Pine 
Top Ins. Co. [1995] A.C. 501; 
HIH Casuality and general 
Insurance v.  Chase 
Manhattan Bank [2003] 
UKHL, and Carter v. Boehm 
(1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
 
93. Barclays Bank of 
Uganda v. Geofrey 
Mubiru 





The Respondent sued for 
unlawful dismissal having 
worked with the respondent 
since 1969, but dismissed 
without notice for failing to 
abide by the Appellant bank’s 
lending limits. The High Court 
held that his contract could 
not be terminated before he 
reached retirement age and 


























time left to his retirement and 
general damages.  In the 
Supreme Court, the judge 
held and reasoned that: 
o The banks manage and 
control money belonging 
to other people and 
institutions in their 
thousands and in a 
fiduciary relationship with 
customers; 
o The employee of a bank 
should exercise 
reasonable skill and 
competence since he was 
employed on the basis 
that he held out himself as 
being skilled to do that 
type of work; 
o In the judge’s opinion, in 
the banking business any 
careless act or omission if 
not quickly remedied is 
likely to cause great 
losses to the bank and its 
customers plus loss of 
reputation to the bank and 
therefore loss to its 
customers and investors 
upon which the existence 
and business of a bank 
depends; 
o  Notwithstanding a fixed 
term contract, a bank 
employee can be 
dismissed summarily 


















(JINTERV): that it 





notion) to interfere 
with contract terms;  
o Contract viewed as 
a network of or 
other relations  
(RELATIONS): 
Intention to Create 







interests or in 
Interventionism 
(CONJUS); 


























o Conception of 
Law as a Means 









o  The employee having 
exceeded his lending 
limits was a serious and 
negligent act which the 
trial judge should have 
considered; 
o Since a notice period for 
termination had been 
agreed under the terms of 
the contract, the proper 
remedy should have been 
damages for payment in 
lieu of reasonable notice 
and not lost income, which 
has no foundation in law; 
o Reasonable notice would 
depend on the nature of 







preference of the 
judge used, i.e., 




Law as a means 






Utility: Rule of 
Recognition of 
Norm validity. 
94.  Post Bank (U) Limited 
v. Abdu Ssozi 
[2017] SCCA 1 
(19/1/2017) Tumwesigye, 
JSC, 
In a summary suit to recover 
money, the bank pleaded 
fraud in the plaint. The issue 
was whether the plea of fraud 
disqualified the plaint from 
Order 36 Rule 2 permitting 
summary procedure for 
liquidated amounts where no 
clear defence exists and all 
claims arise from contract. 
Notwithstanding the law in 
precedents on summary suits 
that any plea that requires 
proof beyond the contract 
and; pleadings takes the 
case out of Order 36, the 










preference of the 
judge on the role 
















o Conception of 
Law as a Means 








o  Conception of 
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that: 
o The plaint fulfilled the 
requirements since the 
claim was based on 
breach of contract and not 
fraud, fraud not being 
essential in the case and 
merely incidental; 
o  The purpose of Order 36 
was to facilitate 
expeditious disposal of 
cases involving debts and 
commercial contracts, by 
preventing frivolous and 
vexatious defences to 
unreasonably delay 
litigation; 
o Order 36 was also 
intended to help the 
economy by removing 














Law as a means 


















APPENDIX 6: Presentation of Findings in Tables and Figures 
Table 2: Prevalence of Judging Approaches during Uganda’s Political Historical Epochs 
(Percentages) 
  Colonial 1962-1986 1986-2018 
Formalistic 44.29 32.93 20.27 
Flexibility 48.57 45.12 45.27 
Flexibility and 7.14 21.95 34.46 
 
 
Figure 13: Prevalence of Judging Approaches during Uganda’s Political Historical Epochs 
Table 3: Frequency of Reference to Judging Guidelines in the Various Periods (percentages) 
  Colonial 1962-1986 1986-2018 
MGT 2.86 6.10 8.78 







Figure 14: Frequency of Reference to Judging Guidelines in the Various Periods 
(percentages) 
 
Table 4: Prevalence of Internal Values behind Flexibility in the Various Periods 
  Colonial 1962-1986 1986-2018 
CONTEXTUAL 45.45 29.73 40.00 
JINTERV 33.33 27.03 27.69 
LAW MAKING 24.24 37.84 27.69 
PROC-DISREGARD 24.24 8.11 16.92 
PRACTICES 21.21 10.81 9.23 
PURPOSIVE 18.18 16.22 27.69 
INDETERM-DOCTRINE 15.15 21.62 16.92 
NO-EQUALITY 9.09 8.11 3.08 
UNRESTRAINED AUTHORITY 9.09 0.00 13.85 
ABDUCTIVE 6.06 8.11 12.31 
INDUCTIVE 6.06 0.00 0.00 
NO CATEGORIES 6.06 8.11 9.23 
RESTORATION 3.03 2.70 0.00 
CRIMINALISING 0.00 10.81 0.00 
FLEXIBILITY 0.00 0.00 6.15 
OPPORTUNISTIC FORMALISM 0.00 0.00 1.54 
RELATIONS 0.00 16.22 9.23 











Table 5: Prevalence of External Values Behind Flexibility in the Various Periods 
  Colonial 1962-1986 1986-2018 
CONJUS 51.52 32.43 33.85 
JA 48.48 37.84 33.85 
SJ 39.39 35.14 46.15 
EFFICIENCY 36.36 27.03 32.31 
LPREDICTIONS 27.27 10.81 27.69 
LMEANS 24.24 32.43 43.08 
CONCEPT-FLEXTY 24.24 29.73 32.31 
LEXP 24.24 29.73 20.00 
RELATIONAL 9.09 24.32 20.00 
SOCIAL SUPPORT 9.09 13.51 4.62 
INEQUALITY 9.09 13.51 3.08 
SYSTEM-FLEXTY 6.06 8.11 16.92 
LP 6.06 10.81 6.15 
JSELF-PRESERV 6.06 0.00 4.62 
OPPORTUNISM 3.03 0.00 1.54 
RESTITUTION 3.03 2.70 0.00 
PUBLIC INTEREST 0.00 13.51 10.77 
COMM-ECON 0.00 10.81 0.00 












Table 6: Prevalence of Internal Values behind Formalism in the Various Periods 
  Colonial 1962-1986 1986-2018 
LOGICAL-MECHANIC 48.28 29.17 28.57 
PACTA 34.48 54.17 50.00 
PROCED-SWAY 31.03 45.83 39.29 
LITERALISM 20.69 25.00 14.29 
MONEY-VALUE 13.79 0.00 0.00 
EXPECTANCY 3.45 0.00 0.00 
ACTURAL LOSS 0.00 4.17 7.14 
CERTAINTY 0.00 0.00 3.57 
EQUALITY PRESUMPTION 0.00 4.17 17.86 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 0.00 12.50 14.29 
LCATEGOTIN 0.00 4.17 0.00 
NON-LEGAL INFERIOR 0.00 0.00 7.14 
 
 






Table 7: Prevalence of External Values behind Formalism in the Various Periods 
  Colonial 1962-1986 1986-2018 
POSITIVISM 44.83 37.50 39.29 
FOC 37.93 54.17 46.43 
SANCTITY 34.48 41.67 42.86 
COL 31.03 12.50 28.57 
PJ 31.03 41.67 25.00 
CONCEPT-FORMAL 27.59 29.17 42.86 
DISCRETE 24.14 33.33 42.86 
ACCURACY 13.79 4.17 7.14 
ROC-NONMAKERS 10.34 16.67 28.57 
PROMISE 6.90 0.00 0.00 
PAROL EVIDENCE 3.45 12.50 10.71 
FORMALITY 3.45 0.00 0.00 
EQUALITY 0.00 4.17 17.86 
DETERMINACY 0.00 0.00 3.57 



















Table 8: Prevalence of Internal Values behind the Mixed Approach in the Various Periods 
  Colonial 1962-1986 1986-2018 
LOGICAL-MECHANIC 50.00 33.33 14.55 
RELATIONS 50.00 14.29 12.73 
CONTEXTUAL 37.50 38.10 16.36 
PROCED-SWAY 37.50 23.81 29.09 
LAW MAKING 25.00 9.52 25.45 
MONEY-VALUE 25.00 0.00 0.00 
PACTA 25.00 28.57 38.18 
FLEXIBILITY 12.50 0.00 0.00 
INDETERM-DOCTRINE 12.50 9.52 14.55 
LITERALISM 12.50 19.05 10.91 
PURPOSIVE 12.50 0.00 18.18 
ABDUCTIVE 0.00 4.76 7.27 
ACTUAL LOSS 0.00 14.29 3.64 
CONS-CONFORM 0.00 4.76 5.45 
CONTRACT-CERTAINTY 0.00 0.00 5.45 
EQUALITY PRESUMPTION 0.00 9.52 1.82 
EXPECTANCY 0.00 4.76 1.82 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 0.00 4.76 1.82 
JINTERV 0.00 9.52 10.91 
LCATEGOTIN 0.00 0.00 7.27 
NO CATEGORIES 0.00 19.05 5.45 
NO-EQUALITY 0.00 14.29 9.09 
NO-FAIRNESS 0.00 0.00 1.82 
NON-LEGAL INFERIOR 0.00 0.00 1.82 
OPPORTUNISTIC FORMALISM 0.00 4.76 18.18 
ORDER-UNCERTAIN 0.00 0.00 1.82 
PRACTICES 0.00 14.29 9.09 
PROC-DISREGARD 0.00 0.00 9.09 
RESTORATION 0.00 0.00 3.64 













Table 9: Prevalence of External Values behind the Mixed Approach in the Various Periods 
 Colonial 1962-1986 1986-2018 
RELATIONAL 50.00 23.81 10.91 
CONCEPT-FLEXTY 37.50 33.33 18.18 
EFFICIENCY 37.50 23.81 23.64 
POSITIVISM 37.50 47.62 21.82 
ACCURACY 25.00 19.05 3.64 
FOC 25.00 33.33 25.45 
LMEANS 25.00 33.33 30.91 
LPREDICTIONS 25.00 4.76 20.00 
PJ 25.00 19.05 14.55 
SANCTITY 25.00 9.52 32.73 
COL 12.50 9.52 12.73 
CONCEPT-FORMAL 12.50 19.05 20.00 
JA 12.50 14.29 23.64 
LEXP 12.50 19.05 12.73 
OPPORTUNISM 12.50 9.52 23.64 
ROC-NONMAKERS 12.50 4.76 3.64 
SJ 12.50 4.76 21.82 
SYSTEM-FLEXTY 12.50 9.52 10.91 
CLASSFICATION 0.00 4.76 0.00 
CONJUS 0.00 14.29 14.55 
DETERMINACY 0.00 0.00 7.27 
DISCRETE 0.00 19.05 18.18 
EQUALITY 0.00 9.52 1.82 
EXPEDIENCY 0.00 0.00 1.82 
INACCURACY 0.00 0.00 3.64 
INEQUALITY 0.00 28.57 10.91 
JSELF-PRESERV 0.00 14.29 10.91 
LP 0.00 14.29 3.64 
PAROL EVIDENCE 0.00 4.76 3.64 
PROMISE 0.00 9.52 5.45 
PUBLIC INTEREST 0.00 0.00 7.27 
PURPOSIVE 0.00 4.76 0.00 
RESTITUTION 0.00 0.00 5.45 
SINTERV 0.00 14.29 1.82 










Table 10: Distribution of cases among courts during colonial period (frequencies) 
  Flexibility Formalism Flexibility & Total 
HC 30 28 6 64 
EACA 3 1 1 5 
Privy Council Appeal 0 1 0 1 
 
Table 11: Distribution of cases among courts during colonial period (percentages) 
  Flexibility Formalism Flexibility & 
HC 46.88 42.19 10.94 
EACA 60.00 20.00 20.00 
Privy Council Appeal  0.00 100.00 0.00 
 
 






Table 12: Distribution of cases among courts during 1962-1986 (percentages) 
  Flexibility Formalism Flexibility & Formalism 
HC 46.15 28.21 25.64 
SC 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EACA 25.00 50.00 25.00 
CA 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 13: Distribution of cases among courts during 1962-1986 (frequencies) 
  Flexibility Formalism Flexibility & Formalism Total 
HC 36 22 20 78 
SC 0 0 0 0 
EACA 1 2 1 4 
CA 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Figure 22: Distribution of cases among courts during 1962-1986 
 
 
Table 14: Distribution of cases among courts during 1986-2018 (frequencies) 
  Flexibility Formalism Flexibility & Formalism Total 
HC 40 17 31 88 
SC 16 6 15 37 




Table 15: Distribution of cases among courts during 1986-2018 (percentages) 
  Flexibility Formalism Flexibility & Formalism 
HC 45.45 19.32 35.23 
SC 43.24 16.22 40.54 








Figure 24: Variation of categories for different categories (frequencies) 
 
Figure 25: Variation of categories for different categories (percentages) 
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Table 16: Flexibility indicative practices for 1986-2018 
FLEXIBILITY INDICATIVE PERCENTAGES FREQUENCY 
CONTEXTUAL 40.00 26 
PURPOSIVE 27.69 18 
LAW MAKING 27.69 18 
JINTERV 27.69 18 
INDETERM-DOCTRINE 16.92 11 
PROC-DISREGARD 16.92 11 
UNRESTRAINED AUTHORITY 13.85 9 
ABDUCTIVE 12.31 8 
NO CATEGORIES 9.23 6 
PRACTICES 9.23 6 
RELATIONS 9.23 6 
FLEXIBILITY 6.15 4 
NO-EQUALITY 3.08 2 
OPPORTUNISTIC FORMALISM 1.54 1 
 
 
Figure 26: Flexibility indicative practices for 1986-2018 
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Table 17: Flexibility motivating values for 1986-2018 
FLEXIBILITY MOTIVATING PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
SJ 46.15 30 
LMEANS 43.08 28 
CONJUS 33.85 22 
JA 33.85 22 
CONCEPT-FLEXTY 32.31 21 
EFFICIENCY 32.31 21 
LPREDICTIONS 27.69 18 
LEXP 20.00 13 
RELATIONAL 20.00 13 
SYSTEM-FLEXTY 16.92 11 
PUBLIC INTEREST 10.77 7 
LP 6.15 4 
JSELF-PRESERV 4.62 3 
SOCIAL SUPPORT 4.62 3 
INEQUALITY 3.08 2 





Figure 27: Flexibility motivating values for 1986-2018 
 
Table 18: Formalistic indicative practices for 1986-2018 
FORMALISTIC INDICATIVE PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
PACTA 50.00 14 
PROCED-SWAY 39.29 11 
LOGICAL-MECHANIC 28.57 8 
EQUALITY PRESUMPTION 17.86 5 
LITERALISM 14.29 4 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 14.29 4 
ACTURAL LOSS 7.14 2 
NON-LEGAL INFERIOR 7.14 2 
CERTAINTY REQUIREMENT 3.57 1 
 
 




Table 19: Formalistic motivating values for 1986-2018 
FORMALISTIC MOTIVATING VALUES PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
FOC 46.43 13 
DISCRETE 42.86 12 
SANCTITY 42.86 12 
CONCEPT-FORMAL 42.86 12 
POSITIVISM 39.29 11 
ROC-NONMAKERS 28.57 8 
COL 28.57 8 
PJ 25.00 7 
EQUALITY 17.86 5 
PAROL EVIDENCE 10.71 3 
ACCURACY 7.14 2 
DETERMINACY 3.57 1 
EXPEDIENCY 3.57 1 
 
 





Table 20: Flexibility indicative practices for 1962-1986 
FLEXIBILITY INDICATIVE PRACTICES PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
LAW MAKING 35.90 14.00 
CONTEXTUAL 28.21 11.00 
JINTERV 25.64 10.00 
INDETERM-DOCTRINE 20.51 8.00 
PURPOSIVE 15.38 6.00 
RELATIONS 15.38 6.00 
SINTERV 12.82 5.00 
CRIMINALISING 10.26 4.00 
PRACTICES 10.26 4.00 
ABDUCTIVE 7.69 3.00 
NO CATEGORIES 7.69 3.00 
NO-EQUALITY 7.69 3.00 
PROC-DISREGARD 7.69 3.00 
RESTORATION 2.56 1.00 
 
 
Figure 30: Flexibility indicative practices for 1962-1986 
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Table 21: Flexibility motivating values for 1962-1986 
 FLEXIBILITY MOTIVATING  PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY  
JA 35.90 14 
SJ 33.33 13 
CONJUS 30.77 12 
LMEANS 30.77 12 
CONCEPT-FLEXTY 28.21 11 
LEXP 28.21 11 
EFFICIENCY 25.64 10 
RELATIONAL 23.08 9 
INEQUALITY 12.82 5 
PUBLIC INTEREST 12.82 5 
SOCIAL SUPPORT 12.82 5 
COMM-ECON 10.26 4 
LP 10.26 4 
LPREDICTIONS 10.26 4 
SYSTEM-FLEXTY 7.69 3 
COORD-ECON 2.56 1 




Figure 31: Flexibility motivating values for 1962-1986 
Table 22: Formalistic indicative practices for 1962-1986 
FORMALISTIC INDICATIVE PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
PACTA 54.17 13 
PROCED-SWAY 45.83 11 
LOGICAL-MECHANIC 29.17 7 
LITERALISM 25.00 6 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 12.50 3 
EQUALITY PRESUMPTION 4.17 1 
ACTURAL LOSS 4.17 1 




Figure 32: Formalistic indicative practices for 1962-1986 
Table 23: Formalistic motivating values for 1962-1986 
FORMALISTIC MOTIVATING PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
FOC 54.17 13 
PJ 41.67 10 
SANCTITY 41.67 10 
POSITIVISM 37.50 9 
DISCRETE 33.33 8 
CONCEPT-FORMAL 29.17 7 
ROC-NONMAKERS 16.67 4 
COL 12.50 3 
PAROL EVIDENCE 12.50 3 
ACCURACY 4.17 1 









Table 24: Formalistic indicative practices for the colonial period 
FORMALISTIC INDICATIVE PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
LOGICAL-MECHANIC 48.28 14 
PACTA 34.48 10 
PROCED-SWAY 31.03 9 
LITERALISM 20.69 6 
MONEY-VALUE 13.79 4 




Figure 34: Formalistic indicative practices for the colonial period 
Table 25: Formalistic motivating values for the colonial period 
FORMALISTIC MOTIVATING VALUES PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
POSITIVISM 44.83 13 
FOC 37.93 11 
SANCTITY 34.48 10 
COL 31.03 9 
PJ 31.03 9 
CONCEPT-FORMAL 27.59 8 
DISCRETE 24.14 7 
ACCURACY 13.79 4 
ROC-NONMAKERS 10.34 3 
PROMISE 6.90 2 
FORMALITY 3.45 1 




Figure 35: Formalistic motivating values for the colonial period 
 
 
Table 26: Flexibility indicative practices for colonial period 
FLEXIBILITY INDICATIVE PRACTICES PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
CONTEXTUAL 45.45 15 
JINTERV 33.33 11 
LAW MAKING 24.24 8 
PROC-DISREGARD 24.24 8 
PRACTICES 21.21 7 
PURPOSIVE 18.18 6 
INDETERM-DOCTRINE 15.15 5 
UNRESTRAINED AUTHORITY 9.09 3 
NO-EQUALITY 9.09 3 
ABDUCTIVE 6.06 2 
INDUCTIVE 6.06 2 
NO CATEGORIES 6.06 2 




Figure 36: Flexibility indicative practices for colonial period 
Table 27: Flexibility motivating values for colonial period 
FLEXIBILITY MOTIVATING VALUES PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
CONJUS 51.52 17 
JA 48.48 16 
SJ 39.39 13 
EFFICIENCY 36.36 12 
LPREDICTIONS 27.27 9 
CONCEPT-FLEXTY 24.24 8 
LEXP 24.24 8 
LMEANS 24.24 8 
RELATIONAL 9.09 3 
SOCIAL SUPPORT 9.09 3 
INEQUALITY 9.09 3 
JSELF- PRESERV 6.06 2 
LP 6.06 2 
SYSTEM-FLEXTY 6.06 2 
OPPORTUNISM 3.03 1 




Figure 37: Flexibility motivating values for colonial period 
 
Table 28: Mixed formalism-flexibility flexibility motivating values for colonial period 
MOTIVATING VALUES PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
RELATIONAL 50 4 
POSITIVISM 37.5 3 
CONCEPT-FLEXTY 37.5 3 
EFFICIENCY 37.5 3 
FOC 25 2 
PJ 25 2 
SANCTITY 25 2 
ACCURACY 25 2 
LMEANS 25 2 
LPREDICTIONS 25 2 
CONCEPT-FORMAL 12.5 1 
ROC-NONMAKERS 12.5 1 
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COL 12.5 1 
JA 12.5 1 
LEXP 12.5 1 
OPPORTUNISM 12.5 1 
SJ 12.5 1 
SYSTEM-FLEXTY 12.5 1 
 
 




Table 29: Mixed formalism-flexibility indicative practices for colonial period 
INDICATIVE PRACTICES PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
RELATIONS 50 4 
LOGICAL-MECHANIC 50 4 
CONTEXTUAL 37.5 3 
PROCED-SWAY 37.5 3 
LAW MAKING 25 2 
MONEY-VALUE 25 2 
PACTA 25 2 
INDETERM-DOCTRINE 12.5 1 
PURPOSIVE 12.5 1 
FLEXIBILITY 12.5 1 




Figure 39: Mixed formalism-flexibility indicative practices for colonial period 
Table 30: Mixed formalism-flexibility indicative practices for 1986-2018 
INDICATIVE PRACTICES PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
PACTA 38.18 21 
PROCED-SWAY 29.09 16 
LAW MAKING 25.45 14 
UNRESTRAINED AUTHORITY 21.82 12 
OPPORTUNISTIC FORMALISM 18.18 10 
PURPOSIVE 18.18 10 
CONTEXTUAL 16.36 9 
LOGICAL-MECHANIC 14.55 8 
INDETERM-DOCTRINE 14.55 8 
RELATIONS 12.73 7 
LITERALISM 10.91 6 
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JINTERV 10.91 6 
NO-EQUALITY 9.09 5 
PRACTICES 9.09 5 
PROC-DISREGARD 9.09 5 
LCATEGOTIN 7.27 4 
ABDUCTIVE 7.27 4 
CONS-CONFORM 5.45 3 
CONTRACT-CERTAINTY 5.45 3 
NO CATEGORIES 3.64 3 
ACTUAL LOSS 5.45 2 
RESTORATION 3.64 2 
EQUALITY PRESUMPTION 5.45 1 
EXPECTANCY 1.82 1 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 1.82 1 
NO-FAIRNESS 1.82 1 
NON-LEGAL INFERIOR 1.82 1 











Table 31: Mixed formalism-flexibility motivating values for 1986-2018 
MOTIVATING VALUES PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
SANCTITY 32.73 18 
LMEANS 30.91 17 
FOC 25.45 14 
EFFICIENCY 23.64 13 
JA 23.64 13 
OPPORTUNISM 23.64 13 
POSITIVISM 21.82 12 
SJ 21.82 12 
CONCEPT-FORMAL 20.00 11 
LPREDICTIONS 20.00 11 
DISCRETE 18.18 10 
CONCEPT-FLEXTY 18.18 10 
PJ 14.55 8 
CONJUS 14.55 8 
COL 12.73 7 
LEXP 12.73 7 
INEQUALITY 10.91 6 
JSELF-PRESERV 10.91 6 
RELATIONAL 10.91 6 
SYSTEM-FLEXTY 10.91 6 
DETERMINACY 7.27 4 
PUBLIC INTEREST 7.27 4 
SOCIAL SUPPORT 7.27 4 
PROMISE 5.45 3 
RESTITUTION 5.45 3 
ACCURACY 3.64 2 
PAROL EVIDENCE 3.64 2 
ROC-NONMAKERS 3.64 2 
LP 3.64 2 
INACCURACY 3.64 2 
EQUALITY 1.82 1 
EXPEDIENCY 1.82 1 










Table 32: Mixed formalism-flexibility indicative practices for 1962-1986 
 
 
INDICATIVE PRACTICES PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
CONTEXTUAL 38.10 8 
LOGICAL-MECHANIC 33.33 7 
PACTA 28.57 6 
PROCED-SWAY 23.81 5 
NO CATEGORIES 19.05 4 
LITERALISM 19.05 4 
NO-EQUALITY 14.29 3 
PRACTICES 14.29 3 
RELATIONS 14.29 3 
ACTUAL LOSS 14.29 3 
INDETERM-DOCTRINE 9.52 2 
JINTERV 9.52 2 
LAW MAKING 9.52 2 
UNRESTRAINED AUTHORITY 9.52 2 
EQUALITY PRESUMPTION 9.52 2 
ABDUCTIVE 4.76 1 
OPPORTUNISTIC FORMALISM 4.76 1 
CONS-CONFORM 4.76 1 
EXPECTANCY 4.76 1 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 4.76 1 
EXPECTANCY 4.76 1 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 4.76 1 
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Table 33: Mixed formalism-flexibility motivating values for 1962-1986 
MOTIVATING VALUES PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY 
POSITIVISM 47.62 10 
CONCEPT-FLEXTY 33.33 7 
LMEANS 33.33 7 
FOC 33.33 7 
INEQUALITY 28.57 6 
EFFICIENCY 23.81 5 
RELATIONAL 23.81 5 
LEXP 19.05 4 
ACCURACY 19.05 4 
CONCEPT-FORMAL 19.05 4 
PJ 19.05 4 
DISCRETE 19.05 4 
CONJUS 14.29 3 
JA 14.29 3 
JSELF-PRESERV 14.29 3 
LP 14.29 3 
SINTERV 14.29 3 
OPPORTUNISM 9.52 2 
SYSTEM-FLEXTY 9.52 2 
COL 9.52 2 
EQUALITY 9.52 2 
PROMISE 9.52 2 
SANCTITY 9.52 2 
CLASSFICATION 4.76 1 
LPREDICTIONS 4.76 1 
PURPOSIVE 4.76 1 
SJ 4.76 1 
SOCIAL SUPPORT 4.76 1 









APPENDIX 7: Inferred Internal Formalism Engendering Higher Values  
Table 1: Judicial Perception Values  
HIGHER VALUE 
INFERRED 
JUDGING PERIOD LOWER VALUE (S) 
OBSERVED 
MANIFESTATIONS  SOURCE (CASE NUMBERS) 
1. Non-Interventionism and 
Judges as Legal 
Mechanics 
Colonial  1. Sanctity of Contract 
(PACTA) 
Written terms perceived 
sacrosanct  
25, 29, 31, 37, 46, 50, 51, 67 
2. Literalism 
(LITERALISM) 
Literal Meaning taken  4, 25, 29, 53, 67 
3. Judges as legal 
mechanics 
Rulism  8, 27, 38 
 Early Post-Colonial  1. Sanctity of Contract 
(PACTA) 
Written terms perceived 
sacrosanct  
3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 23, 33, 34, 35 
Refusal to intervene 
 
Rejection of equity (3, 23); 
Rejection of implied terms (7, 
9, 41); 
Rejection of vitiating factors 
(13, 34, 35); 
Rejection of context/business 




Literal Meaning taken  4, 5, 13, 34 
3. Judges as legal    
mechanics  
Rulism  2, 9, 10, 22, 14 









Written terms perceived 
sacrosanct  
2, 3, 7, 11, 14, 15, 18, 24, 25, 
27, 37, 53, 49, 50 
Refusal to intervene Rejection of equity (4, 32); 
Rejection of fairness (4, 9, 10, 
16, 19, 33, 36, 43); 
 Rejection of implied terms (3, 
12, 30, 41, 42, 47, 49, 50); 
Rejection of illegality (21, 23); 
Rejection of other vitiating 
factors (23, 21, 48)   
Literalism Literal Meaning taken  2, 7, 25, 27, 50 
Judges as legal 
mechanics 
Rulism  1, 8, 29, 35    
2.Perception of law as logic Colonial Positivism  
 
Logical deduction of law and 
treating law as discoverable   
1, 3, 8, 11, 40, 41, 48, 49 
Law as value free-disregard of 40, 48 
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extra-legal considerations  
Legalism and Formality  19 
2. Adherence to 
Conceptual Formalism  
Strict Enforcement of Statutory 
Regulations of contract  
40, 41, 49, 50, 51, 60 
Strict Enforcement of Process 
and Procedural Laws  
27, 47, 68 
Strictly Enforcing contract 
doctrine  
27, 69 
3. Equalitarianism None  
4. Certainty  Certainty in litigation  
 
18 
Certainty of Law  8, 19, 40, 41, 47, 52 
 
Certainty of Contract  53 
 Early Post-Colonial  1. Positivism  Logical deduction of law and 
treating law as discoverable 
  
9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 28, 31, 39, 40 
 
 781 
Law as value free (disregard of 
extra-legal considerations)   
9, 10, 36 
 
Legalism and Formality 1, 12, 28, 31, 36, 40 
  Adherence to Conceptual 
Formalism 
Strict Enforcement of Statutory 
Regulations of contract  
9, 14, 15, 27 
Strict Enforcement of Process 
and Procedural Laws  
27, 37 
 
Strictly Enforcing contract 
doctrine-rejection of other 
considerations  
14, 22, 24, 28, 37 
Treating law as conceptually 
ordered-a matter of principles  
15, 31 
Equalitarianism Presuming the equality of 
contracting parties  
23, 27 
Certainty Certainty of contract  1 
Certainty in litigation  2, 8, 30, 37 
 Late Post-Colonial  Positivism  
 
Logical deduction of law and 
treating law as discoverable  
10, 38, 41, 43, 53, 54 
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Law as value free-disregard of 
extra-legal considerations   
4, 13, 1626, 29, 46 
Legalism and Formality  1, 3, 14, 16, 26, 33, 53 
Law as conceptually ordered  26-categorisation, 33, 36-
general principles 
Adherence to Conceptual 
Formalism 
Strict Enforcement of Statutory 
Regulations of contract  
10, 11, 13, 41, 42, 44, 48 plus 
Table 5 of Appendix 1: Cases 
10, 20, 31, and 83 
Strictly Enforcing contract 
doctrine-rejection of other 
considerations  
10, 13, 40, 41 
 
Treating law as conceptually 
ordered-a matter of principles  
5, 28, 32, 36, 40, 41 
Equalitarianism 
 
Presuming the equality of 
contracting parties  
11, 13, 18-literacy presumed, 
49-equal bargaining power 
Certainty Certainty in Litigation  
 
1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 21, 26, 31, 35, 
44, And in Table 5 of 
Appendix 1: Case 66 
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Certainty of Contract  13, 23, And in Table 5 of 
Appendix 1: Case 21 





TABLE 2: RULE OF LAW VALUES  
HIGHER VALUE 
INFERRED 
JUDGING PERIOD LOWER VALUE (S) OBSERVED MANIFESTATIONS   SOURCE (CASE NUMBERS) 




Civil procedure technicalities 
determined cases  
11, 18, 19, 21, 47 
Contract due process and 
formalities superior to intention 
53 




Formality Conformity to formalities 
determined disputes 
53 
 Early Post-Colonial  Procedural Justice 
 
 
Civil procedure technicalities 
determined cases 
1, 2, 9, 10, 17, 28, 30, 31, 33, 
37, 39, 40 
Contract due process and 
formalities superior to intention  
8, 38, 41 
Superiority of positive law Law as value free 9, 10, 36 
Formality Conformity to formalities 
determined disputes 
8, 38, 41 






Civil procedure technicalities 
determined cases  
1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 20, 21, 26, 31, 
44, 54 
Contract due process and 
formalities superior to intention or 
fairness 
14, 16, 22, 30, 34, 48  
 
Technical rules of proof 
determined valid and enforceable 
contract 
39, 40, 51, 52 
Superiority of positive law  Law as value free 4, 13, 16, 26, 29, 33, 46, 48 
Formality Conformity to formalities 
determined disputes 
14, 16, 22, 30, 34, 48  
 785 
Judicial Objectivity Colonial  Law as logic  treating law as discoverable fact  1, 3, 8, 11, 40, 41, 48, 49 
Sanctity of Contract  Written terms perceived 
sacrosanct  
25, 29, 31, 37, 46, 50, 51, 67 
Literalism  Literal Meaning taken 4, 25, 29, 53, 67 
 Early Post-Colonial  Law as logic   treating law as discoverable fact 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 28, 31, 39, 40 
  Sanctity of Contract  Written terms perceived 
sacrosanct 
3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 23, 33, 34, 35 
  Literalism  Refusal to intervene 3, 23, 7, 9, 13, 34, 33, 35, 41 
 Late Post-Colonial  Law as logic  treating law as discoverable fact 10, 38, 41, 43, 53, 54 
  Sanctity of Contract  Written terms perceived 
sacrosanct   
2, 3, 7, 11, 14, 15, 18, 24, 25, 
27, 37, 53, 49, 50 
  Literalism  Refusal to intervene 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 16, 19, 21, 23, 
30, 32, 33, 36, 43, 41, 42, 47, 
48, 49, 50 
Judicial Rationality Colonial  Contract law as derivable from 
General Fundamental Principles  
Recognition of general principles 
applicable to all contracts 
27 
 Early Post-Colonial  Contract law as derivable from 
General Fundamental Principles  
Recognition of general principles 
applicable to all contracts 
14, 15, 31. 
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 Late Post-Colonial  Categorisation of Law  Adherence to categorization and 
classification of law  
26, 31, 39 
  Contract law as derivable from 
General Fundamental Principles  
Recognition of general principles 
applicable to all contracts 
3, (parol evidence rule), 5, 26 
(privity rule), 28, 32, 36, 40, 53 
(parol evidence rule).  
Predictability and 
Certainty 
Colonial  Certainty in litigation  18 
  Certainty of Law  8, 19, 40, 41, 47, 52 
  Certainty of Contract  53 
 Early Post-Colonial  Certainty of contract   1 
  Certainty in litigation  2, 8, 30, 37 
 Late Post-Colonial  Certainty in Litigation   
 
1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 21, 26, 31, 35, 
44, And in Table 5 of 
Appendix 1: Case 66 
  Certainty of Contract  13, 23, And in Table 5 of 
Appendix 1: Case 21 









LOWER VALUE (S) 
OBSERVED 
MANIFESTATIONS   SOURCE (CASE NUMBERS) 
Judicial 
Responsiveness  
Colonial  Adherence to the Legal 
Order  
Judges refusing to make or 
change law 
8, 27, 38 
Strict Enforcement of Process and 
Procedural Laws  
27, 47, 68 
   Strictly Enforcing contract doctrine  27, 69 
 Early Post-
Colonial 
Adherence to the Legal 
Order 
Judges refusing to make or 
change law 
2, 9, 10, 14, 22 
Strict Enforcement of formality, 
including Process and Procedural 
Laws  
1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 17, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 37, 
38, 39, 40, 41 
   Strictly Enforcing contract 
doctrine-rejection of other 
considerations  




Adherence to the Legal 
Order 
Judges refusing to make or 
change law 
1, 8, 29, 35 
Strict Enforcement of Statutory 
Regulations of contract  
10, 11, 13, 41, 42, 44, 48 plus Table 5 of 
Appendix 1: Cases 10, 20, 31, and 83 
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   Strict Enforcement of process and 
Procedural Laws  
1, 5, 13, 20, 22, 26, 36, 42, 44 
   Strictly Enforcing contract 
doctrine-rejection of other 
considerations  
10, 13, 40, 41 
 
 
SECTION B Inferred External Formalism Engendering Higher Values  
Table 4: Systematic Legal Values 
HIGHER VALUE INFERRED JUDGING 
PERIOD 
LOWER VALUE (S) 
OBSERVED 
MANIFESTATIONS   SOURCE (CASE NUMBERS) 
Perfectionism-value of 
legality 
Colonial to late 
post-colonial  
Comprehensiveness  Determinism and Certainty of 
law  
As above (Tables 1-3) 
  Completeness or Clarity of 
the Legal system 
Deductive Reasoning and 
positivism  
As above (Tables 1-3) 
  Conceptual Ordering of law  Recognition of General 
Principles of contract law plus 
general categorisation and 
classification of law 
As above (Tables 1-3) 
  Formality of the legal system  Strict Enforcement of process 
and Procedural Laws  
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  Acceptability  Responsiveness As above (Table 3) 
The Legal Power Value: 
Judicial Authority Restraint  
Colonial  The Parol Evidence Rule  Adherence to the Parol 
Evidence Rule  
31 
Legal Restraints Judicial power restrained by 
Rules 
27, 47, 68 
 Early Post-
Colonial  
The Parol Evidence Rule Adherence to the Parol 
Evidence Rule 
4, 5,9  
Legal Restraints Judicial power restrained by 
Rules 
1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 17, 27, 28, 30, 31, 
33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 
 Late Post-Colonial  The Parol Evidence Rule Adherence to the Parol 
Evidence Rule 
3, 30, 39, 43, 53 
  Legal Restraints Judicial power restrained by 
Rules 
1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 20, 21, 22, 26, 31, 
36, 42, 44, 45 
Conceptual Formalism  Colonial to Late 
Post-colonial  
Positive law commanding or 
oriented towards formalism   
Adherence to legal 
requirements for formalism  







Table 5: Doctrinal Values  
HIGHER VALUE INFERRED JUDGING PERIOD LOWER VALUE (S) 
OBSERVED 
MANIFESTATIONS   SOURCE (CASE NUMBERS) 
Market Conformism  Colonial  Non-Interventionism  
 
Adherence to freedom of 
contract 
4, 25, 29, 37, 47, 49, 50, 67 
Adherence to Sanctity of 
contract 
2.Certainty of Law and 
Contract 
As Above  As above  
  Superiority of positive law  As Above  
  Transaction Security Represented by sanctity of 
contract 
As Above  
  Generality of contract law Represented by the 
conceptual ordering of law  
As above.  
 Early Post-Colonial  Non-Interventionism  Adherence to freedom and 
Sanctity of contract 
5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
35, 41,  
 Late Post-Colonial  Non-Interventionism  Adherence to freedom and 
Sanctity of contract 
3, 9, 14, 19, 23, 24, 27, 28, 39, 
43, 47, 48, 49, 50 
2 Individualism Colonial to late post- Freedom and sanctity of Adherence to freedom and As Above  
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colonial  contract Sanctity of contract 
 
Table 6: Extra-Legal Values  
HIGHER VALUE 
INFERRED 
JUDGING PERIOD LOWER VALUE (S) 
OBSERVED 
MANIFESTATIONS   SOURCE (CASE NUMBERS) 
Discreteness of contracting  Colonial  Contract not a network of 
relations  
No Relations recognized beyond 
agreed terms 
4, 46, 53, 60 
  Rights and Obligations 
are defined at time of 
contracting  
Rejection of Vitiating factors  25, 49 
  No Relations to future 
transactions  
No relations recognized between 
parent and antecedent contracts 
29 
 Early post-colonial  Contract not a network of 
relations  
No Relations recognized beyond 
agreed terms 
Case 29 of Appendix 3 
 Late post-colonial  Contract not a network of 
relations  
No Relations recognized beyond 
agreed terms 
3, 6, 10, 41 
  Rights and Obligations 
are defined at time of 
contracting  
Rejection of Vitiating factors  23, 42, 54 
  No Relations to future No relations recognized between 11, 14, 15, 19, 25, 27, 36, 44, 
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transactions  parent and antecedent contracts 49, 50 
Accuracy  Colonial  Accuracy in contracting 
and adjudication 
Damages used to give relief  16, 27, 32, 46, 60, 69 
 Early post-colonial Accuracy in contracting 
and adjudication  
Actual loss used to measure 
damages 
26, 18, 28, and Case 26 of 
Appendix 3 
 Late post-colonial  Accuracy in contracting 
and adjudication  
Actual loss used to measure 
damages 




APPENDIX 8: Inferred Internal Flexibility Engendering Higher Values 





LOWER VALUE (S) 
OBSERVED 
MANIFESTATIONS  SOURCE (CASE 
NUMBERS)  
Adaptability, Retroactivity 
and Elasticity of Law  
Colonial   Pursuit of efficiency Normative recognition of trade usage 
and custom  
34, 64 
Normative recognition of ordinary 
course of business  
12, 59, 64 
Normative recognition of 
normative standards  





 Pursuit of efficiency Normative recognition of trade usage 
and custom  
22, 28, 29, 34, 42,  
Normative recognition of ordinary 
course of business  
4, 25 
Normative recognition of 
normative standards  
Adherence to commercial 
reasonableness 
4, 17, 20, 25, 28, 29, 32, 34, 
38, 42 




Intervention in public interest 32 
 Late Post-
Colonial  
Pursuit of efficiency Normative recognition of trade usage 
and custom  
10, 44, 49, 55, 58, 69, 88  
Normative recognition of ordinary 
course of business  
14, 38,  
Normative recognition of 
normative standards  
Adherence to commercial 
reasonableness 
1, 14, 15, 30, 38, 41, 44, 59, 
75, 93 
Intervention on harsh and 
unconscionable grounds 
70, 90 
Intervention in public interest 33, 84 
Invoking substantialism  28, 33, 39, 43, 44, 61, 66,  
Utilitarian Instrumentalism Colonial Conception of Law as a Means 
to an end 
Invoking law’s purposes 7, 10, 12, 20, 36, 58,  
Invoking contractual purposes   
Invoking functionality and practicality of 
decisions  
56, 63  
Conception of Law as 
Experience 
Invoking the circumstances of the 
contract, its performance or the dispute  
10, 12, 13, 16, 28, 32, 33, 34, 
35, 36, 39 
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Economic efficiency and 
wealth maximisation as ends 
of law 
Normative recognition of trade usage 
and custom  
34, 64 
Normative recognition of ordinary 
course of business  
12, 59, 64 





Conception of Law as a Means 
to an end 
Invoking law’s purposes 14 
Invoking contractual purposes  21 
Invoking functionality and practicality of 
decisions  
41, 42, 43  
  Conception of Law as 
Experience 
 
Invoking the circumstances of the 
contract, its performance or the dispute  
General circumstances (11, 
19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31); 
Contractual context (20, 32, 
37, 38, 39, 43, 47) 
Economic efficiency and 
wealth maximisation as ends 
of law 
 
Normative recognition of trade usage 
and custom  
22, 28, 29, 34, 42,  
Normative recognition of ordinary 
course of business  
4, 25 
Adherence to commercial 
reasonableness 





Conception of Law as a Means 
to an end 
 
 
Invoking law’s purposes 11, 13, 17, 45, 72, 75, 80, 81, 
93, 94 
Invoking contractual purposes  11, 15, 16, 21,  
Invoking functionality and practicality of 
decisions  
1, 5, 11, 14, 18, 25, 31, 41, 
46, 51, 59, 77, 82, 93 
Conception of Law as 
Experience 
Invoking the circumstances of the 
contract, its performance or the dispute 
General circumstances (15, 
27, 38, 40, 44, 55, 86, 89); 
Contractual context (16, 86) 
Economic efficiency and 
wealth maximisation  
As ends of law 
 
Normative recognition of trade usage 
and custom  
10, 44, 49, 55, 58, 69, 88  
Normative recognition of ordinary 
course of business  
14, 38,  
Adherence to commercial 
reasonableness 







TABLE 2: VALUES OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE  
HIGHER VALUE INFERRED JUDGING 
PERIOD 
LOWER VALUE (S) 
OBSERVED 
MANIFESTATIONS   SOURCE (CASE 
NUMBERS) 
Interventionism in Contract Colonial Contractual fairness Invocation of Fairness and ubuntu 
(as fairness) 
5, 42, 44, 56, 58, 62 
Invocation of equity 5, 39 
Courts as contract gap fillers  Filling gaps in contracts 6, 34, 55 
 Early Post-
Colonial  
Contractual fairness Invocation of Fairness and ubuntu 
(as fairness) 
16, 17, 27 
Invocation of equity 13, 35 
Courts as contract gap fillers  Filling gaps in contracts 23, 41, 42, 47 
 Late Post-
Colonial 
Contractual fairness Invocation of Fairness and ubuntu 
(as fairness) 
2, 27, 29, 47, 52, 57, 65, 
70, 72, 84, 85, 86, 90, 
92 
Invocation of equity 2, 3, 47, 48, 49, 63, 74, 
92, 93 
Courts as contract gap fillers Filling gaps in contracts 7, 27, 69, 87, 91 
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Judicial Law making Colonial  Judges as law gap fillers Rule gap filling  9, 12, 20, 36, 57 
Judges as law modifiers  Rule sidestepping  5, 23, 24, 45 
Stretching the meaning of rules None  
 Early Post-
Colonial  
Judges as law gap fillers Rule gap filling  None  
  Judges as law modifiers  Rule sidestepping  1, 2, 10, 12, 32, 38 




Judges as law gap fillers Rule gap filling  6, 10, 19, 30, 35, 40, 72, 
74, 80, 83,  
  Judges as law modifiers  Rule sidestepping  
 
2, 3, 9, 13, 22, 27, 33, 
39, 41, 44, 45, 47, 50, 
64, 72 
Stretching the meaning of rules 6, 19, 81, 83  
Law as Predictions Colonial  Judging by Hunch-abductive 
reasoning 
Judging by personal intuition or 
preferences 
2 
Reliance on Judges’ personal 
cognitive attributes 
None 





Colonial  reasoning preferences 





Judging by Hunch - abductive 
reasoning  
Judging by personal intuition or 
preferences  
21, 22, 26, 65, 93, 94  




21 (personal sense of 
justice); 
30 (personal emotions); 
44 (personal 
sentiments); 
65 (personal common 
sense); 
84 (Personal sense of 
fairness); 
91(Personal sense of 
justice). 
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Table 3: Judicial Responsiveness  
HIGHER VALUE INFERRED JUDGING PERIOD LOWER VALUE (S) 
OBSERVED 
MANIFESTATIONS   SOURCE (CASE 
NUMBERS) 
Judicial Responsiveness  Colonial  Contextual responsiveness 
  
Responsiveness to judging 
environment 
10, 12, 16, 28, 32, 33, 
34, 35, 36, 39 
Responsiveness to circumstances 
surrounding the contract 
13, 34 
Purposive responsiveness Responsiveness to law’s purposes 7, 10, 12, 20, 36, 58,  
Responsiveness to contractual 
purposes  
None 
 Early Post-Colonial Contextual responsiveness Responsiveness to judging 
environment 
11, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
30, 31 
Responsiveness to circumstances 
surrounding the contract 
20, 32, 37, 38 39, 43, 
47 
  Purposive responsiveness Responsiveness to law’s purposes 21 
Responsiveness to contractual 
purposes  
41, 42, 43  
 Late Post-Colonial Contextual responsiveness Responsiveness to judging 
environment 




Responsiveness to circumstances 
surrounding the contract 
16, 86 
Purposive responsiveness Responsiveness to law’s purposes 11, 13, 17, 45, 72, 75, 
80, 81, 93, 94 
Responsiveness to contractual 
purposes  
11, 15, 16, 21,  
 
SECTION B Inferred External Formalism Engendering Higher Values  
Table 4: Systematic Legal Values 
HIGHER VALUE INFERRED JUDGING 
PERIOD 
LOWER VALUE (S) OBSERVED MANIFESTATIONS   SOURCE (CASE 
NUMBERS) 





Substantive justice and 
substantialism overrides procedural 
justice 
Substantive justice cures legal 
defects  
15, 22, 45, 55, 62, 65 
Invocation of equity  
Invocation of fairness 42, 44 
Taking into account the totality of 
circumstances 
32, 34, 36, 44, 45 and 





Substantive justice and 




Substantive justice cures legal 
defects  
10,  
Invocation of equity 13, 35,  
Invocation of fairness 15, 16,  
Taking into account the totality of 
circumstances 
2, 17,  
Late Post 
Colonial  
Substantive justice and 












Substantive justice cures legal 
defects  
6, 12, 13,24, 28, 32, 
33, 39, 44, 53, 61, 67, 
72, 76, 7.8, 79 
Invocation of equity 2, 47, 48, 49, 65, 63, 
68, 70, 78,  









Taking into account the totality of 
circumstances 
1 (ubuntu), 2 
(ubuntu), 15, 16, 17, 
21, 26(ubuntu), 29, 
44, 45, 48, 58, 64, 68, 
72, 88, 89  
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Recognition of non-legal norms  Normativity of business practices As above 
Taking into Uganda’s experiences  As above 
Taking into account contractual 
contexts 
As above 
Taking into account public interest  As above 
Conceptual Flexibility Colonial to Late 
Post-colonial  
Conceptual flexibility as a rule of 
recognition  
Adherence to purposive judging, 
commercial reasonableness and 
substantialism   
As in Tables 1-4 
above.   
 
Table 5: Doctrinal Values  
HIGHER VALUE INFERRED JUDGING PERIOD LOWER VALUE (S) 
OBSERVED 
MANIFESTATIONS   SOURCE (CASE 
NUMBERS) 
Consumer Welfarism  
 
Colonial  Fairness in exchange Invocation of contractual fairness 5, 42, 44, 56, 58, 62 
Reliance Normative recognition of reliance  26, 32, 51 
  Equity Invocation of equity 5, 39 
  Good faith Invocation of good faith None  
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 Early Post-Colonial  Fairness in exchange Invocation of contractual fairness 16, 17, 27 
Reliance Normative recognition of reliance  9, 11, 18, 31, 33, 36, 44 
Equity Invocation of equity 13, 35 















Colonial to late post-
colonial  
 
Fairness in exchange 
 
Invocation of contractual fairness 2, 27, 29, 47, 52, 57, 65, 
70, 72, 84, 85, 86, 90, 92 
Reliance Normative recognition of reliance  6, 11, 14, 17, 21, 23, 42, 
59, 69, 84, 93 
Equity Invocation of equity 2, 3, 47, 48, 49, 63, 74, 
92, 93 
Good faith Invocation of good faith 92 
Commercialism  Economic efficiency Custom and trade usage, 
ordinary course of dealings and 
commercial reasonableness  
As above under efficiency 
and wealth maximization  
Wealth maximization  Ordinary course of dealings and 
commercial reasonableness 
As above under efficiency 
and wealth maximization 
  
 805 
Table 6: Extra-Legal Values  
HIGHER VALUE INFERRED JUDGING PERIOD LOWER VALUE (S) 
OBSERVED 
MANIFESTATIONS   SOURCE (CASE 
NUMBERS) 
Relational Contracting  Colonial  Contract a network of 
long-term relations  
Relations recognized beyond agreed 
terms 
None  
  Trust and Cooperation   Reliance recognised 25, 49 
  Contract source of 
social relations   
Normative recognition of social 
relations from contract 
29 
 Early post-colonial  Contract a network of 
long-term relations  
Relations recognized beyond agreed 
terms 
9, 17,27, 44   
Trust and Cooperation   Reliance recognised 11, 16, 18, 19,  
Contract source of 
social relations   
Normative recognition of social 
relations from contract 
9, 24 
 Late post-colonial  Contract a network of 
long-term relations  
Relations recognized beyond agreed 
terms 
93 
  Trust and Cooperation   Reliance recognised 14, 17, 48, 59, 69 
  Contract source of 
social relations   
Normative recognition of social 
relations from contract 
36, 38, 68, 72 
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Social Support Colonial  Public Policy or Interest  Social or state policy 9, 36 
Normativity of 
community standards 
Common sense, reasonableness, 
unconscionability, and sensibleness  
As indicated above  
 Early post-colonial Public Policy or Interest  Social or state policy None  
Normativity of 
community standards 
Common sense, reasonableness, 
unconscionability, and sensibleness  
As indicated above  
 Late post-colonial  Public Policy or Interest  Social or state policy 5, 6, 7, 8, 32  
Normativity of 
community standards 
Common sense, reasonableness, 
unconscionability, and sensibleness  
As indicated above  
Judicial Absoluteness  Colonial to late post-
colonial  
Judging by hunch 
 
 
Reliance on personal preferences or 
prejudices-such as citing no law and 
reliance on convenience or common 
sense  
As indicated above 
normative recognition of 
experiences 
Being motivated by of business, 
political or social realities  
As indicated above 
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APPENDIX 9: Content Code Book/Table 
No. CONTENT CATEGORY CODE 
A. NAME OF COURT   
1. Supreme Court SC 
2. Court Of Appeal CA 
3. High Court HC 
4. East African Court of Appeal EACA 
5. Constitutional Court CC 
B. LAW REPORT  
1.  Uganda Law Report ULR 
2.  East African Law Reports EALR 
3.  East African Court of Appeal Law Reports EACA 
4.  High Court Bulletin HCB 
5.  Kampala Law Reports KLR 
6. Ulii Commercial Law Reports UGCOMMC 
7. Uganda Protectorate Law Reports UPLR 
8. Law Development Centre Monthly Bulletins LDC 
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C. UNREPORTED CASE CITATIONS  
1. Supreme Court Civil Appeal SCCA 
2. Supreme Court Miscellaneous Applications  SCMA 
3. Court of Appeal Civil Appeal CACA 
4.  High Court Civil Appeals HCCA 
5. High Court Civil Suit HCCS 
6. High Court Miscellaneous Application HCMA 
7. High Court Company Cause HCCC 
8. Constitutional Court Petition CP 
9. Criminal Revision Number CR.REV.NO. 
D. CALIBER OF JUDGES  
1. Chief Justice CJ 
2. Deputy Chief Justice DCJ 
3. Principle Judge PJ 
4. Supreme Court Justice  SCJ 
5. Court of Appeal Justice JA 
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6. High Court Judge J 
7. Acting Judge Ag. J 
E. FORMALISM INDICATIVE PRACTICES  
1. Literalism in contract interpretation:  Represents: 
o Judging that assigns the ordinary or literal meaning to words 
used in the contract, and its terms; 
o    Judging that ignored or refused to take into account 
the context under which the contract was entered, had 
to be performed, or enforced;  
o It covers the ignoring of the law’s or contract purposes, 
as well as; 
o  Refusal to take into account institutions that constitute 
the judging environment or otherwise the reality that 
would call for flexibility. 
LITERALISM 
2. Considering money as the measure of value  VALUE-MONEY 
3. Giving Procedural Justice Sway: Stands for judges paying 
strict adherence to and blind application of: 
o Procedural rules, such as regulate the manner of filing 
actions, pleadings, and process of litigation. It for instance 
involves instances where judges denied the aggrieved party 
access to justice on grounds of defective or inadequate 
pleadings; 
o It also covers strict enforcement and adherence to rules on 
form during contracting and litigation. 
 
PROCED-SWAY 
4. Pacta Sunt Servanda Applied: Stands for the practice of 
deciding in favour of the strict and blind enforcement of 
contracts as made by the parties. This includes the refusal to 
fill gaps in terms of contracts or otherwise implying terms; 
treating written terms as sacrosanct; and refusal to interfere in 
contracts in the face of pleas of illegality, equity, unfairness, 
PACTA 
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unconscionability, or vitiating factors.    
5. Positive Law Superior to non-legal orders: Refers to:  
o Incidents where judges, while asserting the applicability 
of positive law, rejected the relevancy and normative 
value of practice, business knowledge, custom, usage, 
ordinary course of dealing and other non-legal orders; 
and  
o Includes the presumption of legality, where anything 
not expressly declared by law to be illegal is deemed 
legal.    
NON-LEGAL INFERIOR 




7. Presumption of Equality of Contracting Parties  
 
EQUALITY PRESUMPTION 
8. No Filling gaps in Contract terms: This covers all judging 
that refuses to interfere with the parties’ freedom of contract, 
by rejecting pleas challenging the contractual terms on 
grounds like fairness, unconscionability, unreasonableness, 
equity, worthlessness, and the like.  
NO- CORRECTING 
9. Recognition of general principles applicable to all manner 
of contracts:  
o Covers the application of general contractual 
principles, such as the privet of contract doctrine, to 
solve a range different contractual disputes; 
o It includes using the same general principles to resolve 
contracts falling in different categories, such as sale of 
goods, bailment, banking and the like.   
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
10. Certainty of terms as a requirement for a valid contract: 
Refers to the practice of judges declaring contracts as void or 
CERTAINTY 
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otherwise unenforceable for being uncertain in their terms.  
 
REQUIREMENT 
11. Literal and Logical deductive interpretation, or 
mechanical application of rules, stands for: 
o Judicial approach that views the law as positive law, 
logically deducible from the words of a statute or precedent, 
with consistence, and free of consideration for its 
underlying values; 
o The practice of judges applying rules of law in statutes or 
precedent as if a mechanic fixing a part in a pre-designed 
and built machine, with mathematical precision and 
inflexibility; 
o This includes practices that ignore any contextual, purposive 
or other extra-legal considerations in the application of law 
to given facts; and 
o It also covers the tendencies to look at law as always 
providing a single correct answer to any given dispute 
 
LOGICAL-MECHANIC 
12 Conformity with the Constitution as a Rule of Recognition: 
Judging that recognises the constitution as the higher norm to which 
all other norms must conform to.   
CONS-CONFORM 
13.  Legal Classification Categorisation Recognised: This 
stand for: 
o The judicial recognition of classification and 
categorisation of law into contract, tort and the like, in 
the sense that negligence was for instance rejected as 
a source of rights and obligations in contract; 
o It also covers the distinction between different types of 
contracts, thereby giving more force to specific rules 
relating to such contracts than fundamental general 
principles applicable to all manner of contracts.  
LCATEGOTIN 
14. Parties’ consent and expectations at the time of the contract 
used to determine validity of norms. This includes: 
EXPECTANCY   
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o The judges treating the heart of contract as consent of the 
parties, thereby the search for rights and obligations being a 
search for what the parties consented to; 
o  Even when judges opt to intervene, their choices are 
governed by what the parties consented or are taken as 
having consented to; and 
o Remedies are based on what the parties expected or agreed 
to be bound to, and nothing more. 
F FORMALISM MOTIVATING VALUES  
1. Positivist Conception of Law: Covers:  
o Judicial perception that the law is value free, neutral and 
objective by nature. Therefore, it should not be construed 
contextually or purposively; and  
o The perception that for every legal dispute or question, 
including hard case, the law provides an answer that is 
discoverable by logical deduction. Judges will therefore 
simply reason out the answers to legal issues from positive 
law, without external aids; 
o  Kelsey’s Pure Theory of law as true and using it to guide 
adjudication, especially the recognition of normativity. 
POSITIVISM 
2. Freedom and Autonomy of Contract: It covers judicial worship of 
the freedom of contract idol by refusing to accommodate anything 
that would amount to court or legislative intervention in the terms of 
the contract.  It includes the practice and culture of judges 
choosing not to interfere in contracts to do fairness and 
justice. 
FOC 
4. Certainty of Law: Covers: 
o Judicial tendency to pursue certainty in the legal system 
including the institutions of litigation and adjudication, This 
is exhibited in practices like intolerance to uncertain 
pleadings, non-contextual judging, and paying due regard to 
certainty of issues and law in litigation and adjudication; 
o  It also includes the concept/ideal of certainty of contracts, 
being that subscribers to it view contract as a source of 
private law.   
COL 
5. Constitutionalism: Refers to the culture of compliance to and CONSTILISM 
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basing all legal decisions on the validity as defined by the 
constitution. The constitution is looked at as the emitter of ultimate 
norms to guide judicial decisions.  
6. o Procedural Justice as superior to substantive justice: This 
covers the paying of emphasis to matters of form, technical rules, 
matters of procedure and evidential rules, over and sometimes in 
substitution for the substantive fairness and justice of the case.   
 
PJ 
7. Role of Courts as implementers not makers of the law: 
This covers all tendencies by judges to make law by 
modifying existing rules, enlarging their scope/premises, or 
outright promulgation of new rules.   
ROC-NONMAKERS 
8. Writing as the best evidence of parties’ intentions:   
 
PAROL EVIDENCE 
9. Sanctity of Contract: Represents the adaption and 
observance of the pact sent servant notion, the essence of 
which is that contracts have to be enforced, with the parties’ 
intentions reflected by the ordinary meaning of the terms 
being given full effect.  
 
SANCTITY 
10. Conception of Law as determinate:  
o Covers the recognition and promotion of certainty in 
law’s corpus and applicability.  
o It is the view that the law is complete and judges can 
always get the right answer to disputes within the legal 
order, without reference to social policy or other extra-
legal considerations.    
DETRMINATE 
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11. Contract viewed as Discrete: Represents the conception 
that contracts are entered and completed discretely and 
create no future or relational obligations not expressly agreed 




12. Tension Management Mechanism: Represents internal 
mechanisms of managing the tension between formalism and 
flexibility, including restraining judges in what appears 
absolutism emitted by unfettered and unguided discretions 
often allowed by the law. The restraints act as a management 
tool in the tension between formalism and flexibility. 
MGT 
13. Equality before the law: It represents judicial treatment of 
parties to a contract as having been equal both at the time of 
contracting and during the trial, including adjudication.  
 
EQUALITY 
14. o The Conception of Law as Conceptually Ordered: 
Represents the treatment of contract law as being 
made up of neutral objective and consistent 
fundamental general principles and concepts, that 
apply to all manner of contracts; 
o It also covers the treatment of different classifications 
and categories of law as vital and rigid, such that torts 
like negligence cannot be used to find obligation in 
contract.   
 
CONCEPT-ORDERED 
15.  Conception of Contractual Obligation as Promise: This 
includes the conception that contractual obligation is based on 
a self-imposed promise, creating a voluntary obligation to be 
bound. It includes the view that damages should be based on 
what the parties expected and nothing more, and excludes 
considerations outside the real intentions verifiable by the four 
PROMISE 
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corners of the contract.   
16. Conceptual Formalism: This represents formalism as an 
inherent character of rules applicable to commercial contracts 
in Uganda. It includes: 
o The strict regulation of contracts; 
o Requirements for formalities or form; and  
o The conceptual shutting out of contextual and other 
non-legal considerations when enforcing contracts. 
CONCEPT FORMAL 
17. Others: These cover the one-off or otherwise values that 
have been observed. They include:    
o Courts need to end disputes/litigation 
expeditiously (EXPEDIENCY); 
o Dehumanisation of law (DEHUMAN); 
o Accuracy in contracting and adjudication: It refers to the 
value of accuracy that came with the introduction of money, 
finding its way into adjudication’s culture of insisting on 
measurable claims and awards of relief (ACCURACY).    
OTHERS 
G.  FLEXIBILITY INDICATIVE PRACTICES  
1. Inductive Reasoning in interpretation of statute or precedents: 
These are instances when a judge started with a conclusion or 
explanation, and sought to apply law as a justification. The finding 
does not flow from a logical application or literal interpretation of 
the rule of law.  
INDUCTIVE 
2. Abductive Reasoning in interpretation of statute or precedents: 
Judges applied personal intuition, preferences, or other forms of 
abductive reasoning like their sense of justice   or reasonableness.  
ABDUCTIVE 
3. o Sidestepping the Rules of Law: This represents instances where 
the judge circumvented a rule in a statute or precedent, either by 
misinterpreting facts so as to put the dispute beyond the rule, or 
cases of simply doing so in the name of finding fairness, equity or 
SSTR 
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justice.   
4. Judicial Interventionism in Contract: Represents judicial 
interference to write into or otherwise modify terms of contracts and 
substitute the parties’ intentions with what judges deem fair, just or 
equitable in the circumstances. It includes cases where ubuntu was 
invoked to interfere with contract. 
IINTERV 
5. Recorgnising inequality amongst contracting parties: Covers 
cases where the economic, political or social class or position of a 
party to the contract was part of the motivation for a judicial 
decision.  
NO-EQUALITY 
6. Practicality and Functionality used guide the applicability and 
meaning of parties’ actions: Stands for judging that focuses on 
how realistic, practical, useful or effective a decision would be, and 
then flexibly use the law to justify it. The practice starts with the end 
of practical utility in mind, and works backwards to make the law 
serve such ends.     
 
PRACTICAL 
7. Law understood and Applied Purposively or Contractual 
Obligations and rights determined Purposively: Stands for 
judging that is purposeful, the purposes pursued being extra-legal 
considerations such as political ends, the facilitation or promotion of 
state policies, social goals and economic/commercial ends. It is the 
process of using law instrumentally as means to other ends.       
PURPOSIVE 
8. Contextual interpretation or enforcement of a contract, or law:  
o Covers searching for the intention of the parties to the 
contract from outside its four corners, by looking at the 
social, economic or political context within which the 
contract was made; 
CONTEXTUAL. 
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o  It also covers interpretation or application of the law by 
reference to and having the goal of satisfying such 
contextual considerations of the time, as opposed to the 
ordinary meaning and applicability of the words used by the 
lawmakers; and 
o Interpretation or application of rules based on Necessities of 
the time; and 
o Interpretation or application of rules based on Political 
Interests. 
9. The judge making law: Representing the Filling of gaps in Laws 
with new rules; creation of new rules; and amending Laws, 
LAW MAKING 
10. o Flexibility recognised as a judging paradigm: Expressing 
approval for flexibility as a notion in law and judging. 
FLEXIBILITY 
11. Undue regard to procedural defects to do substantive justice: 
Covers judges disregard of procedural or other technical defects that 
would otherwise impede access to substantive justice of a case, such 
as: 
o Defective pleading; 
o Following the wrong procedure during contracting or 
litigation; 
o Using wrong forms or otherwise non-compliance with 
stated formalities in contracting or litigation and the like.  
PROC-DISREGARD 
13. Filling gaps in contracts in Contracts: This covers all incidences 
of judges treating written terms as rebuttable and only primafacie; 
implying terms to fill gaps or correct what they deem as unworthy, 
unreasonable, unconscionable or unfair terms.  
CFILLING 
14.  Using indeterminate doctrines: This covers the use of doctrines 
like reasonableness, ‘substantiality’, ‘contemplation of parties’, the 
standard of a reasonable man, unconscionable, unworthiness, and 
bad faith to allocate rights and duties amongst parties to the contract.  
INDETERM- DOCTRINE  
15. Stretching the meaning and Applicability of a rule: Represents 
instances where owing to the ordinary or literal meaning a particular 
rule would not extend to cover and apply in the way a judge has 
STRETCH-MEANING 
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used it.  
16. Criminalising civil wrongs: All decisions that recognised and 
enforced laws that contained criminal sanctions for what would 
otherwise be civil wrongs.   
CRIMINALISING 
17. Legal Classificatory Categories ignored: Stands for judges 
ignoring the categorisation of law into different subjects. This 
includes invoking negligence to justify liability in Contract. 
NO CATEGORIES 
18. Contract viewed as a network of or other relations: 
Includes judges ignoring the doctrine of privet of contract; and the 
discrete nature of contracting, and instead giving effect to intentions 
for the contractual benefits to last beyond its immediate 
performance.   It includes practices that look at contract as creating a 
network of relations, long term relation, and where cooperation and 
trust are expected by contracting parties.   
RELATIONS     
19.  Applying Formalism with flexible ends in mind: 
Represents judging that applied formalism instrumentally to 
justify an answer already reached by a judge, or other 




20. Jealously Guarding Jurisdiction of Court: Covers practices where 
judges insist on having jurisdiction to hear disputes in the face of 
disabling laws or facts.  
 
JEALOS-GUARD: 
21. Using Reliance to find contractual obligation: Stands for judges 
finding contractual obligations on the basis of parties having relied 
on the promises made by the other, as opposed to the promise being 
RELIANCE-USED 
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the end point at which obligation arises.  
22. Contract Law understood as including Practices:  
This covers judging that allocates rights and obligations from 
commercial practices, ordinary usage, custom, trade usage, and 
other types of social or commercial practices. These practices are 
looked at the source of social policy that moves the law from being 
dead letters to living law.   
 
PRACTICES 
23. Public policy invoked to determine Contractual Obligations and 
Enforceability: Covers judging by reference to public policy as a 
source of normativity. It includes references to public interest.   
PUBLIC POLICY 
 
24. Internal Judicial Guidelines: Represents attempts by judges to lay 
out guides for judging in hard cases.  
JUDGING GUIDE 
25.  Public interest invoked to determine Contractual Obligations 
and Enforceability: Covers judging based on giving value to public 
interest.    
PUBLIC INTEREST 
   
26. Viewing remedies as restoration RESTORATION 
27. Exercise of Unfettered Discretion  ABSOLUTE- DISCRETION 
H. FLEXIBILITY MOTIVATING VALUES  
1.  Judicial Absolutism: Covers all forms of non-recognition of JA 
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restraint to judicial authority, such as the exercise of unfettered 
discretion, refusal to recognise contractual ouster of jurisdiction, 
judges looking at themselves as the emitters of and authority over 
law rather than its subjects, and the like.   
2. Law as Predictions of What Judges Will Do: This includes 
occurrences of radical realist perceptions, especially the use of 
judges’ intuitions, preferences, and or prejudices to choose between 
competing answers, and thereby looking at rules of law and dead 
letters, only becoming alive depending on what judges do about 
them.   
LPREDICTIONS 
3. o Conception of Law as Experience:  The perception of law as 
including the dictates of the time’s Necessities, Political, social or 
economic/commercial reality, commercial sense and reality, 
business reality or other considerations rooted in Uganda’s history 
and contextual reality, being the environment within which the 
contract was entered, performed or is adjudicated upon.  
LEXP 
4. o Social Support as a Rule of Validity and Recognition of Law: 
Includes the recognition of public opinion, and other forms of 
public or social acceptance, being viewed as a rule of recognition 
and applicability of law.   
SOCIAL SUPPORT 
5. o Legal Pluralism: Represents the recognition of extra-legal orders 
that are sources of normativity.  
LP 
6. o Contractual Justice through Judicial Interventionism: this 
cover all forms of judges interfering with freedom of contract, to: 
o Write into, by filling gaps, adding or amending terms; 
o Correct what they deem improper terms; or 
o Otherwise to find fairness, justice or rewrite what they fell 
should have been the appropriate contract.     
CONJUS 
7. o Opportunism: Covers judging that is formalistic but purposive, 
motivated by the instrumental use of law as a means to and end, or 
flexible but motivated by formalistic goals. Either approach is in 
OPPORTUNISM 
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that sense used opportunistically.  
8. o Economic Efficacy as the Criteria for Enforceability/Validity of 
Contracts: Covers judicial reasoning that used the guiding norm, 
worthlessness of the contract, and measure of fairness of the terms. 
Economic Efficiency then stands for what makes business, 
commercial or general economic sense rather a conceptual analysis 
and application of positive law. It is represented by references to 
practices such as trade usage, and direct reference to economic, 
commercial or business reality.  
EFFICIENCY 
9. o Inequality before The Law: The recognition of social and 
economic inequality and classification as a reality that forms part of 
the institutions from which contracts, the legal order and 
commercial adjudicatory approach arise.  
INEQUALITY 
10. o Informal Contracting as a source of enforceable bargains INFORMALITY 
11.  Law as a Means to An End: Indicates traces of applying law as 
instruments to fulfil underlying goals that are not the enforcement of 
bargains as stated in contracts, or the application of contract doctrine 
to facts of a case with neutral and purely legal mind.  
LMEANS 
13. The Restitution Measure of Damages: RESTITUTION 
14. o Role of Courts as Law Makers and Reformers: Covers the trend 
of judges seeing their role as that of law reformers, gap fillers or 
otherwise emitters of law.  
LMAKERS 
 
15. o Perception of Law as Indeterminate: Covers judges’ perceptions 
of contract doctrine as capable of adaptability to regulate changing 
circumstances, through the use of tools like conceptual flexibility in 
rules, and the adoption of negligence remedies to resolve contract 
disputes.  It is the perception that the law is incapable of certainty, 
especially when applied in hard cases that often have a bearing on 
INDETERMINANCY 
 822
complex and dynamic social, economic and political contexts.  
16. o Judicial Self Preservation: Covers the culture of judges deciding 
against most efforts to oust their jurisdiction or giving effect to 
restraints to their authority.   
JSELF-PRESERV 
17. o Legal validity and Contractual Obligation to be judged by 
Practical Utility: It covers cases where judges were motivated by: 
o How practical it was to allocate certain rights or obligations 
in a dispute; or 
o Which line of interpretation or application of legal rules 
produced the most practical outcome; 
o Mere Convenience of the court or the parties.   
PRACT-UTILITY  
18. Substantive Justice as superior to procedural justice: This 
represents the substantive justice principle embedded in Article 126 
of the Uganda Constitution, to the effect that during adjudication, 
substantive justice shall always be done without due regard to 
technicalities. Technicalities here cover procedural rules, matters of 
form and other non-substantive rules, including positive law as 
opposed to what the substance of a dispute would call for.   
SJ 
19. Ubuntu Concept of Fairness and Justice: This covers all cases 
where the notions of fairness or justice were perceived by judges in 
line with African culture, which looks at the plight of the human 
being as the primary goal of legal norms. 
 
UBUNTU 
20. Contractual Justice: This covers judicial interventionism in 
contract. Judges interfered with the terms by filling gaps, adding; 
substituting or setting aside terms to find what created fairness or 
justice, especially in favour of the weaker party.  
CONJUS 
21. Conformity with Public Interest: as a rule of recognition of legal PUBLIC INTEREST 
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norms and enforceability of contracts.  
22.  Conformity with Government Policy: as a rule of recognition of 
legal norms and enforceability of contracts. It covers all cases where 
judges recognised normativity in government policy that was not 
law, in the sense that it was not commanded by known sources of 
law, i.e. legislation, local precedent, custom, trade usage or common 
law.   
GOVT-POLICY 
23.  The Command Economy: Represents the judges’ recognition and 
being motivated by the state regulation of production, distribution, 
sale, and terms of contracts of sale of goods and services, including 
price.   
COMM-ECON. 
24.  Conception of Contract as Relational: Covers the viewing of 
contracts as extending beyond the transaction to cover long-term 
relations, third party relations, and social relations.    
RELATIONAL 
25.  Public Opinion as Criteria for contractual Obligation and 
Enforceability:  
o This covers instances of judges basing contractual obligation 
on communal standards such as reasonableness, the 
reasonable man, unconscionability, unsoundness; and  
o A direct use of public opinion by whatever name called, such 
as public interest.  
PUBLIC OPINION 
26. o Commercialism and Wealth Maximisation: Represents the quest 
for allocating contractual rights and obligations with a view to 
promoting commerce and creation or multiplying of wealth.  
COMM-WEALTH.  
27.  o Conceptual Flexibility: Represents tendencies to: 
o Ignore the categorisation of law into subjects like contract, 
tort and the like; 
o The refusal to see contract law as being made up of 
fundamental abstract but few principles and concepts from 
which the detailed rules emerge and can derive their ability 




o  It therefore includes the refusal to consider contract law 
principles as universal, neutral and objective that can apply 
in whatever context and set of facts.   
28. State Policy as criteria for Contractual Obligation and Rule of 
Recognition of Law: Covers the perception that public policy and 




29.  Conception of contractual obligations based on Reliance: Relates 
to the conception that the enforcement of promises should be viewed 
as compensating a plaintiff because he relied on the promise of the 
defendant, and covers the use of torts like negligence to find liability 
in contract.     
o  
RELIANCE 
 o   
30. o Protection of free market economy: Refers to the belief in and 
practices of protecting and promoting the free market economy as 
the ideal. 
o MARKET ECONOMY 
 
31. o Systematic Flexibility: Covers the practice and conception of 
condoning and giving weight to uncertainty in litigation and 
adjudication, such as accommodating uncertainty in pleadings, and 
selectively adhering to procedural rules.  It also extends to 
flexibility in the machinery of the legal system such as 
jurisdictional flexibility.   
SYSTEM-FLEXTY 
 o MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS  
1. o Tension Management Mechanism: Refers to the mechanisms 
judges have used to try and manage the tension between formalism 
and flexibility.   
MGT 
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